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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a study of Louisiana's political, social, 
and economic development during World War II. Louisiana in 1939 was 
a rural, agricultural, poorly-educated, racially segregated, one-party, 
southern state. By 1945, however, many aspects of life in Louisiana 
had changed.
Louisiana’s political development during the war years was marked 
by the temporary displacement of the Longite faction of the Democratic 
party by the reform faction of the party. Even though reformers Sam 
Jones and James H. Davis captured control of the executive branch of 
the state government, Longites remained strong in the legislature and 
in minor state offices. The Longite holdovers retained enough politi­
cal clout to prevent full implementation of the reform program and 
preserved their faction’s political base.
Both teachers and students left their schools in order to partici­
pate in the war effort. In addition, schools took on the task of edu­
cating their students and the general public for the new wartime 
demands.
The state's economy was marked by increased industrialization 
during the early 1940s. Demand for implements of war stimulated in­
dustrial production throughout the country, and Louisiana was no ex­
ception. Despite large war plants constructed in the state, however, 
Louisiana remained predominately rural. Increased income caused by 
the demand for agricultural products raised the living standard of 
Louisiana farmers from the low levels of the 1930s.
vi
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Louisianians living on the homefront had to adjust to many 
changes. Consumer goods virtually disappeared "for the duration"; 
family members and friends disappeared in the vast American war ef­
fort ; holidays lost many traditional trappings; and two groups whose 
social and economic equality had long been suppressed made claims for 
their share of recognition. Blacks and women used the scarcity of 
traditional laborers to move into jobs formerly dominated by white 
males. Even though their gains proved to be temporary, their emergence 
from the economic shadows established the foundation upon which later 
economic and social improvements were made. Louisiana was transformed 
between 1939 and 1945. The old state, however, was still visible 
underneath the layers of change.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
Louisiana politics in 1939 was still dominated by the heirs of 
Huey P. Long, whose organization had retained control of the state's 
political system following Long's assassination in 1935 and which con­
tinued to overshadow the weak anti-Long opposition- In 1939, Governor 
Richard W. Leche could survey a state he controlled. The upcoming 
gubernatorial campaign to elect Leche's successor promised to be 
relatively uneventful. Leche's own 1936 landslide victory over the 
anti—Longite faction of the Democratic party seemed to indicate that 
the Longites would have little trouble in the foreseeable future main­
taining their control of the state. No candidate powerful enough had 
emerged from the political opposition during Leche's term to challenge 
the Longites, and even if such a candidate had emerged, the Longites 
remained firmly entrenched and widely popular.
Unpredicted developments during 1939, however, affected all as­
pects of life in this rural, agricultural, poorly-educated, racially 
segregated, unsophisticated, Southern, one-party state. The "Louisiana 
Scandals," exposed to public attention in June toppled the Long 
machine, while the beginning of the European conflagration in Septem­
ber eventually brought new people with new ideas, millions of federal 
dollars, and accelerated urbanization and industrialization to 
Louisiana.
Louisiana in 1939, therefore, stood on the threshold of unprece­
dented political, social, and economic change. The criminal behavior 
of individual Longites seriously undermined the organization, while 
American support of massive national defense efforts and military
viii
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involvement in the war itself greatly altered the state's economy and 
society from the outside. Louisianians on the homefront elected to 
live under two anti-Longite administrations between 1940 and 1945, 
learned much about European and Asian geography, took jobs in industry 
made higher wages than ever before, moved from one location to another 
and worried about family members or friends in the United States armed 
forces. Changes wrought by events set in motion during 1939 left 
Louisiana in 1945 far different from what it had been before.
The Longite organization's defeat in the 1939-40 election initi­
ated major changes in political policies and performance during the 
war years. The venality of several Longites and their temporary 
banishment from the center of power produced an effective bifactional 
political system in which both Longite and anti-Longite Democratic 
candidates became viable contenders for public office.
This study, therefore, begins with a summary of Huey Long's suc­
cessful appeal to the ordinary Louisianian's desire for a share in the 
state's politics and economic opportunities, controlled for decades 
by New Orleans machine politicians and rural parish aristocrats.
Long's sudden and unexpected death left his organization leaderless.
By 1936, a coalition of top Longites had seized control of their fac­
tion. But without Long to supervise them, his heirs committed ex­
cesses which so weakened Longism’s hold on Louisiana's government that 
the anti-Longite opposition was given its first meaningful opportunity 
in twelve years for a return to power.
When "reform” anti-Longite Governor Sam H. Jones took the oath of 
office in the spring of 1940, France was about to be overrun by
ix
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Hitler's Wehrmacht. Events both at home and abroad were thus con­
verging upon Louisiana, to produce unforeseen problems, responses, 
and results.
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CHAPTER I
LOUISIANA IN 1939: THE LEGACY OF
HUEY LONG AND HIS ASSOCIATES
The new year, 1939, dawned fair and mild in Louisiana. In New 
Orleans the temperature on Sunday, January 1, 1939, reached into the 
60s during the afternoon before falling to a low in the mid-40s. Mon­
day, January 2, again was mild; gentle easterly winds blew across the 
city where the temperature at halftime of the Sugar Bowl football game 
was 65 degrees and reached a high of 73 degrees later in the afternoon 
Louisianians struggled back to work Tuesday morning, many exhausted by 
the three-day holiday week-end.
Overall, the New Year's holiday in 1939 seemed deceptively normal 
It was the last year of a trying decade which had witnessed the near 
collapse of the American economic system. Presidents Herbert Hoover 
and Franklin Roosevelt, each in his own way, had struggled to cure the 
system's ills after its 1929 debacle which ended the giddy 1920s. Be­
fore the fateful year of 1939 ended, however, the world and Louisiana 
were transformed, and never again would the old patterns, attitudes, 
or relationships precisely fit the circumstances of the new order. 
Germany plunged the world into the horror of global war for the second 
time in the twentieth century with Chancellor Adolph Hitler's dawn in­
vasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The great European democracies 
Britain and France, belatedly realized the uselessness of their ac­
commodating policy toward Hitler’s expansionist demands and declared 
war on Germany. Many Americans hoped that the new conflict would be 
contained on the European continent and that the United States would 
remain uninvolved. These hopes proved unfounded. President Roosevelt
1
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in 1939 began revisions of the Neutrality Acts passed during the 1930s 
to prevent American involvement in armed conflict. In direct conflict 
with President Woodrow Wilson's pleas to the American people for 
neutrality at the beginning of World War I, Roosevelt said that "I 
cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought..." Through­
out 1940 and 1941, the President followed the dual course of helping 
the Allies (Britain and France) as much as possible and girding the 
United States to defend itself in case the country was attacked. Des­
pite Roosevelt's aid to the Allies in the European war, direct United 
States involvement in the conflict did not begin until December, 1941, 
when negotiations with the Japanese over conflicting interests in the 
Pacific failed to achieve results, and the Japanese launched their sur­
prise attack on United States military and naval installations in 
Hawaii.
Full United States participation in the war led to permanent 
changes in Louisiana: its depression-ravaged economy improved because
of the influx of federal money into army camps, payrolls, and numerous 
war industries; while Louisiana's people adjusted themselves to life 
in a modern age of grave threats to national security. The most sig­
nificant change in Louisiana politics during the war years, however, 
came about not because of the war but because of the venality of the 
state’s elected officials who had grown fat and careless in office.
In 1939, that carelessness led to the temporary downfall of the estab­
lished order in state politics, the "Longite" faction of the Democratic 
party headed by Huey P. Long from 1928 until his death in 1935, and 
thereafter by his heirs. From the 1939 "Scandals" arose a new politi­
cal order —  effective bifactionalism, in which both Longite and anti-
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Longite Democrats became mutually competitive in statewide elections.
Louisiana’s ruling political organization from 1928 until 1939 
was the creation of one man, Huey P. Long, who wrenched control from 
the previous aristocratic ruling class and shaped it to meet his own 
goals. His virtual dictatorship of the state re-shaped both the form 
and substance of Louisiana politics, and the events of 1939, along with 
their subsequent repercussions, cannot be understood without assessing 
Long's background and political career.
Huey Long based his organization directly on the votes of Louisi­
ana's ordinary people, who had become discontented with the control, 
corruption, and neglect of their interests and needs by the previous 
ruling faction dominated by the Regular Democratic Organization of New 
Orleans. The RDO, "Old Regulars," or "Ring," as the association was 
variously called, together with upstate cotton planters, constituted 
a tight oligarchy which had kept Louisiana under the control of busi­
ness, industrial and planter elements from the 1880s until 1928. T. 
Harry Williams best described this "government by gentlemen" as "con­
servative in make-up and outlook, devoted to the past and satisfied 
with the present, dedicated to the preservation of privilege, and 
staidly corrupt." Before 1928, successful gubernatorial candidates 
generally obtained victory by winning the support of the Old Regular/ 
upcountry alliance. Huey Long, however, spoke directly to the people 
of Louisiana, often over the opposition of the "Ring's" local political 
boss and in so doing attracted large blocs of votes for himself, his 
candidates, and his programs. Williams also credits Long with posses­
sing a political charisma which enabled him to attract popular support 
on the basis of his personal appeal. That quality, added to his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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forceful speaking style honed by his experience as a successful 
traveling salesman, created Long’s solid base of support on which he 
rose from an obscure Winn parish boyhood to the Railroad Commission, 
the governor’s office, and ultimately to the United States Senate.̂
Huey Long’s family background provided him with a keen appreci­
ation of the ordinary citizen’s needs- Long was bom August 30, 1893, 
in a log house on the farm of his father Huey P. Long, Sr., near the 
small, north-central Louisiana town of Winnfield, seat of Winn parish.
Arthur Schlesinger described Louisiana to be "as natural a breeding
2place for radicalism as its swamps were for fevers.” During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Winn parish inhabitants, "row 
crop" cotton farmers (not planters), subsistence farmers, or small- 
scale stockmen, eagerly embraced radical political reforms designed to 
alleviate the hard lot of the ordinary people. During the 1890s the 
parish became strongly Populist, providing the Populist candidate for 
governor in 1892. Following a visit by Socialist presidential candi­
date Eugene V. Debs in 1908 Winn voters elected Socialists to their
school board and policy jury, and in 1912 gave Debs more votes than
3they gave Republican presidential candidate William Howard Taft.
*T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern Politics (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1966), pp. 67, 69; T. Harry 
Williams, Huey Long (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 4.
2Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 42.
3Williams, Huey Long, pp. 13, 17, 23; Schlesinger, The Politics of 
Upheaval, p. 43; Reinhard H. Luthin, American Demagogues Twentieth 
Century (Boston, The Beacon Press, 1954), p. 239; Alan Brinkley, Voices 
of Protest Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New 
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), pp. 10-12.
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This heritage of radical protest, added to the individual person­
ality of Huey P. Long, ultimately produced a revolution in Louisiana 
politics. Huey’s brother Earl commented that as a boy Huey was "ner­
vous" and curious —  always wanting to know how things operated. Earl 
also observed that even though a reputation for physical cowardice 
dogged Huey, he had no fear of standing up politically for something 
he believed right. By 1918 Huey had concluded that the old oligarchy 
had worked too long with larger national corporations to exploit 
Louisiana’s resources and cheat her citizens. This conclusion con­
vinced him to run for the Third (North Louisiana) District seat on the 
Louisiana Railroad Commission. The Louisiana Railroad Commission (soon 
to be renamed the Public Service Commission) then regulated pipelines 
and utilities as well as railroad rates and practices. Long realized 
that while the commission appeared to be an almost moribund board 
manned by political hacks, it offered a platform from which an ambitious 
young politician could launch a successful career. Besides, the
Louisiana Constitution stipulated no minimum age for Railroad Commis-
4sion members and Long was only twenty-four years old.
Huey Long, with Earl's assistance, campaigned vigorously for the 
Railroad Commission seat against the overconfident incumbent, Burk A. 
Bridges, who ran a low-key, colorless campaign. As a result of their 
combined efforts’, Huey was nominated in the second Democratic primary
—4Williams, Huey Long, pp. 119-121; Schlesinger, The Politics of Up­
heaval , p. 51; Luthin, American Demagogues, p. 239; Earl Long, "Last 
of the Red-Hot Poppas," (phonograph recording, News Service Records, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1961). Huey Long first captured public atten­
tion when he opposed an increase of streetcar fares in Shreveport. 
Russell B. Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, January 
9, 1984.
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by a slim 635-vote margin. Democratic nomination then was tantamount 
to election because the impotent state Republican party rarely entered 
candidates in general elections. In this first of his campaigns, Huey 
Long discovered the usefulness of his ability to change his mood or 
his subject to bring forth maximum response from his listeners. He 
began to emerge as the newly-released voice of the Louisiana "redneck," 
pent up too long under oligarch rules.^
Huey Long did not forget his constituents after his election.
Many of his critics expected him to be merely another southern dema­
gogue who had promised much, would deliver little, and eventually 
stumble into cursing blacks and Yankees in order to hoodwink the voters 
into electing him to office again. While on the Railroad/Public Service 
Commission, Long championed the interests of the ordinary people, suc­
cessfully forced the public utilities and railroads on the defensive 
and actually brought some rates down. As Long told Forrest Davis, 
fulfillment of his campaign promises created an important distinction 
between him and other Louisiana politicians: "I would describe a dema­
gogue as a politician who don't (sic) keep his promises. On that basis, 
I'm the first man to have power in Loozyanna (sic), who ain't (sic) a
Williams, Huey Long, pp. 122-125; Schlesinger, The Politics of Up­
heaval , p. 51; Brinkley, Voices of Protest, pp. 15-16; Richard B. 
McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster Louisiana's Earl K. Long (Baton Rouge, 
Claitor's Book Store, 1967), p. 32; G. Dupre Litton, The Wizard of Winn- 
field (New York, Carlton Press, Inc., 1982), p. 12; Cabell Phillips,
From the Crash to the Blitz 1929-1939 (New York, The Macmillan Company, 
1969), p. 302; Parker Long, Sr. and Harley Bozeman interviewed by Joe 
Tullier, July 21, 1966, Louisiana State University at Alexandria Oral 
History Collection; Harley Bozeman interviewed by T. Harry Williams, 
January 7, 1959, transcript copy, T. Harry Williams Papers, Department 
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Williams Collection); 
Russell B. Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, Januarv 
16, 1984.
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demagogue."^ Moreover, he could not afford to forget the voters- He 
had plans for a higher office,' and he needed their continuing support.
Long reached for the top in his first try for the governorship in 
1924, conducting a vigorous campaign against Old Regular candidate 
Henry L. Fuqua and Lieutenant-Governor Hewitt Bouanchaud, but finished 
third in the first Democratic primary. Even though he lost, Long had 
become well known statewide, and began the groundwork for the next 
gubernatorial election immediately after his 1924 defeat.^
In the 1928 campaign Long again faced two opponents: incumbent
governor Oramel H. Simpson who had become governor upon Fuqua's death 
in 1926, and Congressman Riley J. Wilson. The main issues of the cam­
paign were Huey Long and his proposals to improve the conditions of 
the common people of Louisiana: toll-free bridges, state-owned "free"
school textbooks, more road construction, improved state social ser­
vices, and opposition to Old Regular and corporate rule. Conversely, 
Wilson, a self-made man and ardent spokesman for conservative beliefs, 
called for restricted, economical government, and low taxes. Simpson 
recognized the need for an increasingly activist state government, but 
his statements indicate that his reform streak ran shallow: he favored
free textbooks only if the money needed to buy them could be raised
Ŵilliams, Huey Long, pp. 4-5; Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 
p. 45; Forrest Davis, Huey Long: A Candid Biography (New York, Dodge
Publishing Company, 1935), p. 38; Monroe Lee Billington, The Political 
South in the Twentieth Century (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons,
1975), p. 43; Daniel M. Robison, "From Tillman to Long: Some Leaders
of the Rural South," Journal of Southern History, August, 1937, p. 303.
Ŵilliams, Huey Long, pp. 191-213. Long formally announced his 1928 
candidacy on October 16, 1926, more than two years before the election. 
New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 17, 1926.
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without increasing taxes. Faced with the rising tide of Longism,
Wilson and Simpson finally attempted to persuade Louisiana voters that
Long represented an attempt by communism to take over the state.
Neither Wilson nor Simpson found the political strength to overcome
Long’s appeal. Long finished first in the first Democratic primary
with 126,842 votes to Wilson's 81,747 and Simpson's 80,326. Because
Wilson and the Old Regulars chose not to continue the struggle into
8the second primary, Long won by default -
Long's administration continued Louisiana's lengthy tradition of
powerful governors who aggregated power through actual practice as
9well as through constitutional provision. — Once in office, he fully 
developed the powers inherent in the Louisiana govemship's control of 
budget formulation, selection of legislative officers, patronage, and 
the letting of state contracts. Despite efforts by the old political 
establishment to absorb and thus neutralize him immediately after his 
election, Long turned his attention to organizing the legislature so 
that his adherents held the positions of power. The pliant president 
of the senate and speaker of the house yielded the historic duty of 
their offices to appoint committee members and allowed the governor 
to dictate assignments. He obtained control of patronage with which
—
Williams, Huey Long, pp. 244-281; Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Hayride 
The American Rehearsal for Dictatorship (New York, William Morrow & 
Company, 1941; reprint ed., Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican Publishing Com­
pany, 1971), pp. 13-35.
9Ed Renwick, "The Governor," in Louisiana Politics Festival in a 
Labyrinth, ed. by James A. Bolner (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Univer­
sity Press, 1982), pp. 75, 77; Edwin W. Edwards, "The Role of the Gov­
ernor in Louisiana Politics: An Historical Analysis," Louisiana His­
tory, Spring, 1974, p. 115.
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to reward loyal followers when he appointed his friends as chairmen of 
the Highway Commission, the Board of Health, and the Conservation Com­
mission. In the legislature, Long often became his own floor leader, 
rallying his troops and issuing orders on key bills. To the consterna­
tion of the conservative opposition, he passed a bond issue for hard- 
surfaced roads which the state badly needed, but which horrified the 
conservatives whose political upbringing led them to recoil from public
indebtedness. He financed the new "free" schoolbooks program with in-
^  10 creased severance taxes.
With these measures, Huey Long began moving Louisiana into the 
twentieth century. His obsession with time, however, along with the 
strength of his opposition, caused him to move more ruthlessly and 
swiftly than previous governors. Long hoped to establish his programs 
while his opponents were still in disarray.'*'*' The opposition's residu­
al strength became fully, evident in a special session of the legisla­
ture which met in March, 1929, to consider a tax that Long proposed to 
place on the refining of oil in Louisiana. Long's opponents instead 
gathered enough support in the House of Representatives to impeach him
Williams, Huey Long, pp. 230-311; Brinkley, Voices of Protest, pp. 
22-24; Hodding Carter, "Huey Long: American Dictator," in The Aspirin
Age 1919-1941, ed. by Isabel Leighton (New York, Simon and Schuster, 
1949), pp. 349-350.
**Williams, Huey Long, p. 298; Russell Long, "Remarks," War and Poli­
tics Symposium, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 
April 27, 1979, typescript copy author’s collection; Russell Long in­
terviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast January 9, 1984; R. Norman Bauer in­
terviewed by T. Harry Williams, May 4-5, 1962, Williams Collection. 
Bauer, a reformer and ally of Sam Jones, maintained that Long moved 
quickly "not because he loved Louisiana or wanted to help people, but 
because he wanted to put Huey Long up."
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on a wide array of charges. He managed to thwart this threat with a
whirlwind campaign of circulars, speeches, and promises, but became
confident of success only when fifteen senators (one more than enough
to block the two-thirds vote necessary to convict him) signed a "round
robin" pledge that they would not vote to convict the governor because
12they believed that the charges against him were invalid. Even though
Long had defeated his opponents and remained in office, the impeachment
scare increased his determination to gain complete control of Louisiana.
He spent the remainder of his life acquiring enough power to prevent
13further challenges to his position and his program.
While still consolidating his position in Louisiana, Long ran for
the United States Senate, to which he was elected in 1930, and in
14which he assumed his seat in 1932. The Senate did not easily accept 
the new junior member from Louisiana, and Long did not especially care 
for the Senate. Except for progressives George W. Norris and Burton 
K. Wheeler, Long thought that the Senators constituted a collection of
12Williams, Huey Long, pp. 347-419; Carter, "Huey Long," pp. 350-351; 
Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 70-76; Russell Long interviewed by Gus 
Weill, broadcast January 9, 1984.
13Williams, Huey Long, pp. 409-410; Carter, "Huey Long," p. 351.
14The two year delay resulted from Long’s refusal to resign the gover­
norship and leave Louisiana in the hands of lieutenant-governor Paul 
Cyr who had become his political enemy. Long claimed the Senate seat 
only after Cyr had himself sworn in as governor to replace Long. Cyr 
maintained that Long could not be both governor and senator, and that 
Long’s Senate term began with the new session of Congress, even though 
Long had not claimed his seat. This move allowed Huey to have Cyr re­
moved from office, thereby allowing state senate president Alvin 0. 
King, a Longite, to become governor until the 1932 election when Huey 
engineered the election of the pliant Oscar K. Allen, one of his boy­
hood friends from Winn parish.
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stuffed shirts. The Senate, in turn, at first looked upon Long only 
as another southern demagogue and considered his frequent absences and 
his repudiation of his committee assignments as an attempt to avoid the 
hard work of the Senate. Even when he appeared on the Senate floor 
more frequently during late 1934 and 1935, many of Long’s colleagues 
regarded his vituperative personal attacks and prolonged filibusters 
as grandstand plays designed to further advertise his ideas on a na­
tional stage.^ Huey and the Senate never came to terms because they 
found that neither could dominate the other as they wished.
Following the United States Senate race in 1930, Long consolidated 
his hold on Louisiana. The Old Regulars began defecting to him when 
New Orleans business and political leaders recognized his strength in 
the city and realized that they would have to cooperate with Long in 
order to maintain state funding for the city's needs. In 1934, after 
he had moved to the Senate and managed the election of acquiescent 
Oscar K. Allen as governor of Louisiana, Long dominated a series of 
special sessions of the legislature which in undue haste considered 
and passed laws giving the governor unprecedented power and stripping 
the opposition of virtually all its few remaining sources of support.^
By 1935, Huey Long stood unquestionably at the helm of Louisiana
^Williams, Huey’Long, pp. 559-560; Schlesinger, The Politics of Up­
heaval , p. 53; Brinkley, Voices of Protest, pp. 74-77; Sindler, Huey 
Long's Louisiana, p. 83; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman 
Volume One Year of Decisions (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Com­
pany, Inc., 1953), pp. 145-146; Merle Miller, Plain Speaking, An Oral 
Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York, Berkley Publishing Corporation, 
1974), p. 161.
^Williams, Huey Long, pp. 481, 738-740; Billington, The Political 
South in the 20th Century, pp. 73-74.
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and also had become a national political figure through his Share Our 
Wealth movement. His greatest failure was his inability to come to 
terms with President Franklin Roosevelt. He had supported Roosevelt's 
quest for the presidency in 1932, but broke with him when Long became 
convinced that Roosevelt’s New Deal did not go far enough in its ef­
forts to ease the people's suffering. Long subsequently launched his 
Share Our Wealth movement in 1934 and continued battling Roosevelt, 
both on the national stage and for control of federal patronage in 
Louisiana until his death.^ Speculation about a possible Long run 
for the presidency in 1936 ended abruptly when he was shot in Baton 
Rouge on September 8, 1935, while managing yet another special session 
of the legislature in the new skyscraper capitol he had built to sym­
bolize Louisiana's dedication to, and confidence in, the future. Long 
died two days later. His assassin was a young Baton Rouge physician, 
Carl A. Weiss, who evidently committed the murder because Long was at­
tempting to gerrymander out of office Weiss's father-in-law, state
18judge Benjamin Pavy.
Williams, Huey Long, pp. 481, 378-740; Brinkley, Voices of Protest, 
pp. 68-69; Earl Long, "Last of the Red Hot Poppas”; Robert E. Snyder, 
"Huey Long and the Presidential Election of 1936," Louisiana History, 
Spring 1975, pp. 117-144; Michael KirtzV'Earl Long’s Political Rela­
tions With the City of New Orleans," Louisiana History, Summer, 1969, 
p. 242; Brinkley, "Huey Long, The Share Our Wealth Movement, and the 
Limits of Depression Dissidence," Louisiana History, Spring, 1981, pp. 
131-132; Glen Jeansonne, "Challenge to the New Deal: Huey P. Long and
the Redistribution of National Wealth," Louisiana History, Fall, 1980, 
p. 332. Jeansonne maintains that the Share Our Wealth Society "fore­
shadowed a national campaign designed to extend to the nation the dom­
inance he [Long] exercised in Louisiana." For a brief sketch of Long’s 
failure to unite with other prominent Roosevelt critics to present a 
serious challenge to the president, see also Sheldon Marcus, Father 
Coughlin The Tumultuous Life of the Priest of the Little Flower (Bos­
ton, Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 84-85.
18Williams, Huey Long, pp. 859-876; Luthin, American Demagogues, p.
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Long’s body lay in state in his capitol, and his funeral attracted
a crowd estimated at 125,000. He had not forgotten the people of the
hills and hollows while in office and they did not forget him. "Huey's
Preacher," Gerald L. K. Smith, provided a forceful eulogy. Governor
Allen, State Senate President-pro-tempore James A. Noe, State Speaker
of the House Allen J. Ellender, State Supreme Court Justice John B.
Fouraet, Long followers Robert Maestri, Seymour Weiss, and Abraham
Shushan slowly carried Long's body down the capitol steps and to a
nearby grave in the capitol gardens. Long's belpved LSU band led by
"his" bandmaster, Castro Carazo, played his theme song "Every Man A
19King" transposed into a minor key.
Long left behind a powerful but leaderless political organization, 
and an almost mystical memory on which the organization could perpetu­
ate itself. A sizeable bloc of his hill country people virtually 
canonized him and formed the foundation of continued Long machine rule. 
As late as the mid-1970s, long after bifactionalism had ended in 
Louisiana, campaign portraits of Huey Long still hung in places of 
honor in the homes of elderly Louisianians.
A contemporary news magazine surveyed Long’s political heirs
270; Hermann B. Deutsch, The Huey Long Murder Case (Garden City, New 
York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 29-135; David H. Zinnman,
The Day Huey Long Was Short, September 8, 1935 (New York, Ivan Obolen­
sky, Inc., 1963), pp. 113-118, 183-192.
19Glen Jeansonne, "Partisan Parson: An Oral History Account of the
Louisiana Years of Gerald L. K. Smith," Louisiana History, Spring, 1982, 
p. 153; Anne Price, To Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Louisiana 
State Capitol 1932-1982 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, State Times and Morning 
Advocate, 1982), p. 22; Dawson Corley, "Huey’s Capitol Idea," Louisiana 
Life, January/February 1982, p. 74; Castro Carazo interviewed by T.
Harry Williams, March 26, 1961, Williams Collection.
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shortly after his death and divided them into two groups: "insiders"
working behind the scenes to keep the machine running smoothly, and
20"outsiders" —  the vote-getting political front of the machine.
These two groups included "insiders" Seymour Weiss, who had handled 
the Long organization money and tax payments, and Robert Maestri, Con­
servation Commissioner. "Outsiders" included Public Service Commis­
sioner Wade 0. Martin, Sr., Senator James A. Noe, and Representative 
Allen Ellender, but no one man in either group had an undisputed claim 
to Long's mantle. Instead, the Long machine pledged the day after 
Long died to follow Governor Allen's lead when he called a caucus later 
to agree upon the slate of candidates for the next year's campaign. 
However, the machine soon began to fall apart. Too many men with 
strong egos and ambitions had campaigned in Huey's shadow too long.
Some observers considered Gerald Smith's eulogy to be a political 
speech in which Smith attempted to establish himself as Long's politi­
cal heir. Approximately ten days after Long's death, however, Smith
21persuaded Noe to rim for the governorship.
Even though it suffered from a lack of focal leadership, the Long 
organization in late 1935 still retained numerous political assets, 
among them the governorship and its attendent array of powers, as well 
as the memory of Huey Long with which to appeal for the votes of the 
people now enjoying the increased state services Long had provided.
on"Mourners, Heirs, Foes," Time, September 23, 1935, pp. 14-16.
21Zinman, The Day Huey Long Was Shot, pp. 189-190; Kane, Louisiana 
Hayride, p. 153; "Schism Among Long’s Political Heirs,” The Literary 
Digest, September 28, 1935.
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Just as significant for Louisiana's political future, the organization 
controlled an environment ripe with opportunities for abuse of power 
and public trust. Long had almost completely obliterated the checks 
and balances of the democratic process with his concentration of powers 
in the office of the governor, his domination of the legislature, and 
his discrediting of the state's newspapers. Hamilton Basso observed 
Long's heirs and accurately predicted what would soon unfold: "From
now on the boys who own the cow get the cream, every ounce of it, and 
the skimmed milk as well." Huey Long also had recognized the oppor­
tunities for graft created by his machine's tight control of the 
state, and doubted his associates' ability to withstand the temptation. 
As he accurately remarked, "If those fellows ever try to use the powers
I’ve given them without me to hold them down, they’ll all land in the 
22penitentiary."
This organization settled on a ticket for the 1936 campaign
headed by New Orleans Appeals Court Judge Richard Webster Leche for
governor, and Earl Kemp Long for lieutenant-governor. The Leche-Long
slate handily defeated that of opposition candidate Cleveland Dear of
Alexandria by drawing sixty-seven per cent of the vote in an election
Perry Howard has described as "the peak of the Long surge that had
23scattered the Bourbon Democrats into disarray."
22Carter, "Huey Long American Dictator," p. 357; Sindler, Huey Long’s 
Louisiana, p. 128; Hamilton Basso, "The Death and Legacy of Huey 
Long," The New Republic, January 1, 1936, p. 218.
23Carter, "Huey Long American Dictator," pp. 357-358; Kane, Louisiana 
Hayride, pp. 159-162; Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisi­
ana (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Louisiana State University Press, rev. ed. 
1971), p. 263; John T. Hood, Jr., "History of Courts of Appeal in Lou­
isiana,” Louisiana Law Review, April, 1961, p. 552. One student of
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The new administration established itself as the true heir of
Huey Long by visibly continuing programs of public works and public
assistance. Longites in high position also began to steal money from
the state at every opportunity, the top leaders clothing themselves
in the trappings of an aristocracy. They dressed expensively and
built lavish homes. They flashed rolls of $1,000 bills as an essen-
24tial accouterment of a well-groomed gentleman. For three years the 
members of the Leche administration surveyed a state they controlled. 
They made peace with Franklin Roosevelt —  something Huey had never 
done —  and thus added more federal patronage to available state jobs. 
In 1939, however, a disgruntled former member of this ruling circle, 
James A. Noe, began final action that toppled the state administration 
and sent shock waves all the way to Washington.
Noe broke with the organization because it failed to nominate 
him for governor in 1936. In 1937 he began collecting affidavits 
certifying thefts in state government, but found himself unable to 
interest the United States Justice Department because he lacked sub­
stantial proof of his allegations. Noe turned to the federal justice 
system because he had no faith in state courts and prosecutors sub­
servient to the Long organization. Noe also distrusted the state's 
major newspapers, "lyingnewspapers," as Huey had dubbed them, because
the Scandals period accurately observed that "Huey liked money but 
loved power; ’Governor Dick' [Leche], on the other hand, liked power 
but loved money." Davy Brooks, "A Turn of Events: Earl Long and The
Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1940 and 1948," The Southern His­
torian, Spring, 1984, p. 38.
24Alva Johnston, "Louisiana Revolution,” Saturday Evening Post, May 11,
1940.
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many Louisianians would dismiss any corruption story as merely another
biased charge of the anti-Long newspapers' ongoing campaign against
the organization. Noe decided, therefore, that he needed photographic
or other valid proof of his affidavits in order to prove their validity.
Subsequently, he added photographers to his staff of researchers. At
first, their pictures proved useless because no photographs actually
showed a theft of property that could be unquestionably identified as
25property of the state.
On June 7, 1939, however, Noe's luck changed. The telephone in 
his Monroe home rang before.daylight.that morning, and Hicks Batts of 
the Louisiana State University construction department informed him 
that a truck loaded with window frames was leaving a workshop at LSU 
bound for the construction site of a house in Metairie owned by James 
McLachlan, a colonel on Governor Leche's staff. Noe quickly relayed 
this information to the city editor of the New Orleans States, his 
friend F. Edward Hebert. Hebert assigned reporter Meigs 0. Frost and 
photographer Wilfred D'Aquin to meet Noe's WNOE radio station manager 
Ray Hufft who could guide them to the Metairie construction site where 
they were to take clear photographs of the truck unloading its cargo
25Kane, Louisiana Hayride, p. 267; George E. Simmons, "Crusading News­
papers in Louisiana," Journalism Quarterly, December, 1939, pp. 325- 
326; Elmer L. Irey and William J. Slocum, The Tax Dodgers The Inside 
Story of the T-Man's War With America's Political and Underworld Hood­
lums (New York, The Fireside Press, Ltd., 1949), pp. 98-99, 101; F. 
Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of the Titans” The Life and 
Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisi­
ana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana.
1976), pp. 118-120; Betty Marie Field, "The Politics of the New Deal 
in Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1973), p. 397.
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on private property. They found the truck on the highway and followed 
it to the McLachlan house. There they drove around a street comer 
and parked their car. Frost remained in the car to keep the motor 
running in case they needed to escape quickly, while D'Aquin and Hufft 
crawled through a vacant lot and took the photographs from the cover 
of high weeds. D’Aquin had to crawl partially from the cover provided 
by the weeds in order to use his bulky Graf lex camera properly. A 
horse pastured in a vacant lot watched them intently, causing Hufft 
to fear they would be detected. The workers continued unloading the 
materials. The truck bore no identifying marks, and the rear license 
plate was smeared with mud, but photographs of the front of the truck 
revealed the license number which States researchers traced to LSU 
through records in the secretary of state's office. The States staff 
meticulously checked every angle of the story. They traced the license 
numbers of several automobiles parked at the construction site and 
found that their owners worked for George Caldwell, LSU superintendent 
of construction. Additional contacts with the men’s relatives re­
vealed that they were in New Orleans "on a job." Jefferson Parish 
assessment records revealed that the construction site belonged to
Mrs. James McLachlan. Finally, neighbors in the Metairie suburb con-
26firmed that the McLachlans were indeed building the house.
Hebert and McMillan, ’’Last of the Titans, pp. 123-124; Kane, Louisi­
ana Hayride, pp. 267-268; Irey and Slocum, The Tax Dodgers, pp. 101- 
102; Field, "The Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," pp. 397-398; 
Simmons, "Crusading Newspapers in Louisiana,” p. 326; John Wilds, 
Afternoon Story: A Century of the New Orleans States—Item (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, Louisiana State University Press, 1976), pp. 239-240; Alva 
Johnston, "The Camera Trapped Them," Saturday Evening Post, June 15, 
1940, p. 22; New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 26, 1939.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
Hebert delayed the story for two days while his staff re-checked 
the facts, and then published a page-one article which carefully de­
tailed the episode and caused a sensation throughout the state. Leche 
attempted to explain away the apparent wrongdoing. He declared that 
the sale of LSU products to individuals was not unusual, citing the 
public sale of LSU dairy products as an example. Other state officials 
clearly contradicted each other as they desperately attempted to cover 
themselves. Leche maintained that the McLachlans purchased the window 
frame materials at a commercial lumber yard, that university workers 
constructed the window frames while otherwise unemployed, and that the 
McLachlans used their private funds to pay them for their work.
George Caldwell, when asked whether he could verify the governor’s 
statements, replied that "My (record) books were open once, but they’re 
closed now." LSU President Dr. James Monroe Smith later stated in a 
news conference that the McLachlan work done in the LSU carpentry shop 
was not in accordance with LSU policy, a contradiction of Leche's
statement made six days earlier. Smith also commented that Caldwell
27must have been "befuddled" about the record books.
In addition to Noe’s private investigation which led to the 
States revelation, United States Treasury Department officials also 
had kept a watchful eye on Longite state officials since the 1937 
settlement of income tax claims against them. In 1938, Rufus W. 
Fontenot, collector of Internal Revenue at New Orleans, convinced
^Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," pp. 126,127; Kane, 
Louisiana Hayride, pp. 269-270; Johnston, "The Camera Trapped Them," 
p. 22; New Orleans States, June 13-15, 1939.
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Elmer Irey of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Washington to resume 
an active investigation of Louisiana*s politicos. By mid-1939 special 
agent James M. Cooner found that Dr. Smith had spent sums of money far 
in excess of his salary. Subsequent investigations revealed that 
Smith had obtained sizeable sums of public money for his personal use: 
he had sold $130,000 worth of stock in 1938; he purchased 2,000,000 
bushels of wheat and pledged as collateral $500,000 in mostly unauthor­
ized and unsold (occasionally completely forged) LSU bonds. Smith’s
28salary at this time totaled $10,000 per year.
Irregularities at LSU proved to be only the tip of a system of 
statewide corruption unequaled in Louisiana history. Even Louisi­
anians, long used to venality in their state officials, had had enough. 
J. J. Foumet, president of the Louisiana Police Jury Association, ob­
served even before the States revelation that "... due to the weak­
ness of human flesh and the great pleasures and the many luxuries that 
money does buy, men in public life, in too many instances, are unable 
to resist successfully always the evil influences of a money-mad age, 
and are selling our people down the river.” Following the first reve­
lations, the Board of Directors of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce 
called on President Roosevelt, Congress, and the Attorney General of 
the United States to conduct a thoroughinvestigation for the purpose 
of "bringing to light . . . every misdeed affecting the good State of 
Louisiana." Other Louisianians expressed their disgust in diverse
OQIrey and Slocum, The Tax Dodgers, pp. 99-100; Hebert and McMillan, 
"Last of the Titans,” p. 126; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 275-279; 
Field, "The Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," pp. 398-399.
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ways. A correspondent using the pseudonym "John Gauthier" wrote to 
Hammond attorney James H. Morrison, "They have stole (sic) even the 
stink from the pole cat." The Scandals also inspired at least one 
Louisiana poet to compose the following doggerel verses on the subject:
Sing a song of monkey money
Pocket full of swag
Four and twenty blackguards
Caught in a bag
And when the bag was opened
They all began to moan
’Headed for Atlanta (the nearest federal prison) 
But not there a l o n e . ’2 9
The federal government quickly responded to the developing situ­
ation in Louisiana with a full investigation headed by 0. John Rogge, 
chief of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, who commanded a 
force of seventeen treasury agents. Together with postal inspectors 
and other federal investigators, Rogge came to Louisiana with the in­
tention of prosecuting errant state officials on charges of income 
tax evasion. When he began his investigation, however, he found that 
most machine leaders had been painstakingly honest in reporting their 
incomes, from whatever sources, just to prevent the kind of indict­
ments Rogge envisioned. As Rufus Fontenot informed Elmer Irey: "All
we did (in the 1937 tax evasion cases) was to teach 'em (sic) to cut
29Kane, Louisiana Hayride, p. 264; Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the 
Titans," p. 124; J. J. Fournet, "A Message From President Fournet," 
Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1939, p. 3; Minutes of the Meeting 
of the Board of Directors of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce, July 
13, 1939, (microfilm copy, Microform Room, Troy H. Middleton Library, 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana); "John Gauthier" 
to James H. Morrison, August 6, 1939, poem, n.d., 1939, James H. Mor­
rison Papers, Center for Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana 
University, Hammond, Louisiana.
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30Uncle Sam in on their graft."
State officials had been less careful with state money. The new 
business manager at LSU, Troy H. Middleton, found in late June, 1939, 
that "We didn’t know whom we owed, if we owed anyone." University 
officials had placed all income into one fund from which they made 
all expenditures without bids, purchase orders, or full knowledge of 
the status of the budget. Rogge discovered, however, that some state 
officials had made mistakes which would enable him to prosecute them 
for violation of federal mail fraud laws. He prosecuted James Monroe 
Smith, Seymour Weiss, and three others on this charge because the 
check for $75,000 they had received in a fraudulent deal (the Bien­
ville Hotel case in which the University paid twice for the building's 
furniture) was mailed from a bank in New Orleans to a bank in Baton 
Rouge after being cashed. The court held that the use of the mails
in this way was a direct result of the cashing of the check by one of
31the defendants, and all were convicted.
The details of the Bienville Hotel case revealed the intricate
maneuverings by which private individuals profited from public office 
and political connections. The case stemmed from the sale of the Bien­
ville Hotel, "lock, stock, and barrel, ready for immediate occupancy,"
O Q Jerry Purvis Sanson, "The Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1940" 
(M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1975), p. 29; Irey and Slo­
cum, The Tax Dodgers, p. 99; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 335-337; 
Field, "The Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," p. 400; Times- 
Picayune, June 26, 28, 1939.
31Alva Johnston, "They Sent a Letter," Saturday Evening Post, June 22, 
1940, p. 29; Frank James Price, Troy H. Middleton A Biography (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp. 128-133.
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to LSU for use as a dormitory for student nurses studying at the LSU 
Medical Center in New Orleans. The state subsequently purchased the 
hotel's furnishings a second time. Prosecutors charged that on or 
about October 20, 1936, Smith drew a check for $75,000 on LSU funds 
deposited in City National Bank in Baton Rouge, ostensibly to pay for 
the furniture of the Bienville Hotel, which the state had already 
bought. He made the check payable to the National Equipment Company 
and gave it to Monte E. Hart, former co-owner of the Bienville, at an 
undetermined location in East Baton Rouge Parish. Hart brought the 
check with him to New Orleans and cashed it at the City Branch of the 
Whitney National Bank where he received $25,000 in cash and deposited 
$50,000 to the credit of the National Equipment Company. He then gave 
the $25,000 cash to J. Emory Adams (Mrs. Smith's nephew) in New Orleans. 
Adams divided the money with Smith in an unspecified location, Smith 
receiving $14,000 while Adams kept the rest. Meanwhile, Hart drew a 
$25,000 check on the National Equipment Company funds made payable to 
Louis C. LeStage, a Standard Oil Company lobbyist, who subsequently 
gave $16,000 to Seymour Weiss, former Bienville co-owner along with 
Hart, at the Roosevelt Hotel in New Orleans. After the investigators 
had exposed these questionable dealings, Smith and the others were 
charged with a bill of information in Orleans Parish where Hart cashed 
the check. The defendants protested that jurisdiction was improper, 
that the alleged crime had occurred in East Baton Rouge Parish where 
Smith had given Hart the check, and that the trial should be moved 
there (where the defendants had a more friendly district judge). The 
trial judge overruled their motion, but the Louisiana Supreme Court 
agreed that LSU lost the funds when City National Bank paid the check
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in Baton Rouge, and that Smith was responsible for the funds in Baton 
Rouge where they had been entrusted to him. The trial was ordered
32moved to Baton Rouge. Nevertheless, all defendants were convicted.
The investigations and subsequent indictments continued through­
out the summer and fall of 1939. The splashiest of the Scandals trials 
occurred in June, 1940, when Governor Richard Leche himself went to 
court. Leche was charged with participating in several illegal deals, 
including irregularities in the construction of Leche Hall, an admini­
stration building at Louisiana Technological Institute at Ruston.
His trial, however, focused on a kick-back scheme with an Alexandria 
automobile dealer named George Younger. Younger had sold 138 trucks 
in 1937 for a profit of $57,931.06. In 1938 he sold only 95 trucks, 
some to the state, for a profit of $53,349.50. In addition, he re­
ceived a $5,000 "refund" on state sales tax payments. (Rogge commen­
ted that Louisiana must have "tax-paying in reverse."). Younger testi­
fied that he paid James Thomas, a lobbyist and friend of the late Huey 
Long, a $53,000 "commission" on the sales. Thomas then stated that 
he gave $31,000 of the money to Leche and distributed the rest among 
legislators. Leche in his testimony fatally damaged his own defense.
He denied receiving the $31,000 from th'e Younger truck deal, but ad­
mitted under Rogge’s relentless questioning that he had received 
$67,000 in an oil deal with Seymour Weiss, and that his $75,000 St. 
Tammany parish home had cost him personally only $10,000. Leche also
32Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 336-337; State of Louisiana v. James 
Monroe Smith, Et. Als., No. 35,603 Supreme Court of Louisiana, John B. 
Fournet Papers, Troy H. Middleton Library, Department of Archives and 
Manuscripts, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
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admitted that he had received an $11,000 yacht bought with Conservation
Department funds and presented to him as a gift from "friends," and
that the sale of Huey Long’s old newspaper, The Progress, had made him
$215,000 profit.33
Despite his protestations of innocence, Leche was convicted and
sentenced to ten years imprisonment. He entered the Atlanta Federal
34Penitentiary on December 31, 1941. Following a disbarment trial at 
which Leche again denied any involvement in the Younger deal, and at 
which Mrs. Leche testified that at the time of the alleged deal in 
1938 she and her husband were out of state, the Louisiana State Bar 
Association struck Leche's name from the roll of practicing attorneys. 
The Bar in its petition stated that Leche had been convicted of a 
felony in a United States District Court, was serving his sentence, 
and that his name should therefore be removed from the roll. The 
petition, however, did not cite any of the specific facts upon which 
the conclusion could be drawn that Leche was guilty of misconduct.
The Bar Association instead relied on the general contention that a 
convicted felon should not be a practicing attorney. The Louisiana 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Bar Association, but Justice John 
B. Fournet, a Long stalwart, produced a dissenting opinion which 
stated that the Bar Association should present evidence of each act 
which had resulted in Leche's imprisonment so that Leche could
33Irey and Slocum, The Tax Dodgers, p. Ill; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, 
p. 333; Times-Picayune, June 12, 1940.
34Times-Picayune, June 12, 1940; Shreveport Journal, November 14, 1941; 
Town Talk, December 30, 1941, March 17, 1943.
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35adequately prepare his defense.
Leche remained in prison until June 27, 1945, when he was re­
leased from the federal penitentiary in Texarkana, Texas, following 
three and one-half years' incarceration. At the time of his release, 
the United States Attorney in New Orleans, Herbert W. Christenberry, 
announced that the government had dropped two of its remaining charges 
against him (one involved a questionable LSU landscaping deal in which 
an original bid of $45,855.68 mysteriously escalated to $122,000; the 
other involved "Ruth," the 40-foot yacht he received from "friends"). 
But the justice department did not drop charges that Leche had con­
spired to violate the Connally "Hot Oil" Act. Leche, Seymour Weiss, 
and Freeman W. Burford had allegedly produced through the Pelican Oil 
and Gas Company 488,000 barrels of illegal oil above the allowable 
production from thirteen wells in the Rodessa field in northwest 
Louisiana. Leche's share evidently amounted to 10 cents per barrel 
of oil and a share of the pipeline profits, a total of $67,000. Leche,
however, was never tried on these charges and eventually received a
36full pardon in 1953 from President Harry S. Truman.
35Louisiana State Bar Association v. Richard W. Leche, Supreme Court 
of Louisiana No. 36,352, Fournet Papers.
36Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, June 29, 1945; States, May 23, June 
28-29, 1945; Town Talk, June 28, 1945; Times-Picayune, January 24,
1953; Field, "Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," p. 403. Tru­
man's pardon of Leche led some observers to recall Truman's own politi­
cal beginnings associated with the corrupt Pendergast machine in 
Kansas City, Missouri.
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Leche maintained throughout his ordeal that he was a martyr suf­
fering at the hands of the conservatives who were never able to defeat 
Huey Long. He tried repeatedly to portray the investigators and news­
papers uncovering the Scandals as villains attacking him because he 
was a friend of Huey and the poor people. The newspapers, he said, 
"ignore completely the true facts of which they were aware, and pub­
lish instead a story containing cheap and untrue insinuations ..." 
Just before he entered federal prison, he quite accurately remarked:
It was no easy task to succeed an unusual 
individual like Huey Long. Nor, was it 
easier to placate, to the great advantage 
of the state, the enemies he accumulated.
It was by no mean achievement to bring 
peace to a state torn by eight years of 
bitter political strife and to restore 
amity to our relations with the national 
government.37
Leche received support from his friends in organized labor. A 
pro-Leche booklet circulated in 1941 asked, "Why is Labor’s Best 
Friend Being Crucified in Louisiana?" and answered, "The Demagogues 
Want Him Incarcerated. Ten Years Imprisonment on a Technicality. 
Political Vengeance Was Satisfied." Many more Louisianians, however, 
agreed with a poem in the Louisiana Bumble Bee which caustically com­
mented
37Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 126; Town Talk, 
December 30, 1941.
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Tokens here and shakedowns there
Has (sic) made Brother Dick a m i l l i o n a i r e . ^
The major newspapers also felt no hesitation at probing further 
into the state's sordid affairs. As each day brought forth a new 
scandal, journalists kept the state's attention riveted on the docu­
ment. Their attitude is best summarized in a Times-Picayune edi­
torial:
By misuse of his sweeping powers, Governor Leche 
made himself largely responsible for the scanda­
lous record compiled during and under his admin­
istration. He set an evil example which wrought 
great mischief and might have had disastrous 
consequences but for the timely exposures and 
punishments of those who aided in its setting.
... in the case of the governor who profited 
financially from the scandalous practices that 
flourished under his administration and then 
strove so desperately to avoid sharing the con­
sequences with other convicted offenders, com­
ment upon the vindication of justice seems a
public d u t y . 29
Dr. James Monroe Smith became Louisiana's other most celebrated 
felon besides Leche. Smith's imprisonment included both state and 
federal incarcerations. He entered the Louisiana State Penitentiary 
at Angola on November 18, 1939, attired in a regulation denim suit
38Michael J. Cousins, ed., Organized Labor's Tribute to the Record 
of Governor Richard W. Leche The Record Speaks for Itself (New Or­
leans, n.p., November, 1941), Fournet Papers; The Louisiana Bumble 
Bee, n.d., clipping in Richard W. Leche Papers, Department of Archives 
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge.
39Simmons, "Crusading Newspapers in Louisiana," pp. 325-333; Times- 
Picayune, December 30, 1941.
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with three-inch-wide black and white stripes - The former status of 
the new prisoner failed to impress Warden L. A. Jones, who announced 
that Smith would cut sugar cane for harvest and that he "will be 
given the same treatment as any other prisoner, no better and no 
worse." On November 14, 1944, the pardon board recommended a commu­
tation of Smith's sentence, and Angola warden D. D. Bayer announced 
that he would recommend a "double good time" early release. These 
actions reduced Smith's original eight to twenty-four year sentence to 
twelve years and made him eligible for parole in thirty days. Governor 
Jimmie Davis announced on April 3, 1945, that he had released Smith on 
recommendation of the state pardon board and commuted his sentence to 
time already served. Nevertheless, Smith still faced a detainer from 
the federal government to serve a 30-month sentence on conviction for 
income tax evasion. He left Angola on April 5, 1945, and went im­
mediately to federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia. He received a parole 
from the United States Parole Board in Washington, D.C., on January 
10, 1946, and left Atlanta on February 5. Following his release,
Smith returned to Angola as director of rehabilitation and worked 
there until his death in June, 1949. Smith applied his long training 
in education to reforming the prison's work policies, attempting to 
institute a careful screening program to direct prisoners into jobs
which would prepare them for legitimate occupations upon release.
40Lack of state support limited the success of his work, however.
40Mark T. Carleton, Politics and Punishment The History of the Louisi­
ana State Penal System (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Louisiana State Univer­
sity Press, 1971), pp. 135, 148-149; New Orleans Item, November 20, 
1939, April 4, November 5, 1945, January 17, February 21, 1946; Morning 
Advocate, November 15, 1944, April 4, 6, 1945, January 18, 1946. While 
at the federal prison in Atlanta, Smith taught correspondence courses
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In his statement issued just before entering prison, Richard 
Leche had remarked that "I am happy that .... the vast improvements 
attained during my administration will long outlast the ten years I 
am about to serve for an offense which I never committed." Investiga­
tion of the record, however, reveals that Leche’s administration 
achieved only a mixed success in "vast improvements." It did continue 
traditional Longite construction and state service programs. Typi­
cally, while members of the administration enriched themselves at state 
expense, they neglected to provide adequate facilities or services for 
many of the most unfortunate of Louisiana's citizens —  inmates of the 
state mental hospitals and prisons. A thorough investigation of Cen­
tral Louisiana State Hospital at Pineville and the East Louisiana 
State Hospital at Jackson, both treatment centers for mental patients, 
conducted by State Supervisor of Public Funds Jerome Hayes in 1941, 
revealed that at Central between December 1938, and November, 1940 
some "employees" carried on the payroll performed no work; that pur­
chases totaling $117,706.10 were made without public bids; and that 
over $10,000 was due the state from non-indigent patients. During 
that same period, athletic contests for the patients were dropped, 
the poultry farm abandoned, and patients housed in old firetraps 
equipped with improperly-maintained fire extinguishers. Trash blocked 
fire escapes, and helpless and elderly patients were assigned to 
third-floor rooms. Hayes' investigation found patient care as inade­
quate as the physical facilities at both hospitals. As one recent 
study stated: "Wade Long's administration at Jackson was, simply
in English to inmates of other federal prisons.
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stated, an abomination." Agricultural land became weedlots, the or­
chards lay abandoned, fields were rented out and equipment sold. 
Recreation for patients was discontinued. The tennis courts became 
unplayable. Even the simple recreation provided by reading rooms and 
organized walks was dropped. Moving pictures were no longer shown 
after Long argued with the Jackson citizen who owned the projector 
and promptly reclaimed it. As at Central, fire fighting equipment
41was not in good repair and no practice fire drills were conducted.
Unfortunately, the reformers did not immediately correct condi­
tions in the state's mental hospitals. In September 1940, four months 
after Sam Jones became governor, expenditures for food at East Louisi­
ana State Hospital fell to 10.6<? per day per patient. Cooking equip­
ment included only six steam-jacketed boilers, so that only boiled 
food could be prepared. Beef stew and greens sometimes were served 
for thirty days at a time. By August 1941, however, Jones' admini­
stration had raised the number of acres in cultivation at Jackson 
from 40 to 1200 and had let contracts for over $100,000 in new equip­
ment and physical improvements. The focus, however, continued to be 
on profit. The state made $622.23 in May 1941; $1,942.49 in June; 
and $2,366.95 in July.42
Just as Louisiana's mental patients were mistreated, so were its 
convicts. Huey Long set the tone for his machine’s penal administra­
tion when he hired Robert L. "Tighty" Himes as general manager of the
4 R̂ichard Lawrence Gordon, "The Development of Louisiana's Public Men­
tal Health Institutions, 1735-1940," Volume II (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Louisiana State University, 1978), pp. 438-441.
/ oMorning Advocate, September 18, 1940; Town Talk, August 26, 1941.
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Louisiana State Penitentiary in 1931. He praised Himes for "the close 
manner in which he has guarded every fund and every property of 
(Louisiana State) University . . '. that is the kind of man we need at 
the penitentiary." Long endeavored to maintain the prison as cheaply 
as possible at whatever cost in prisoner labor or treatment. His suc­
cessors continued his policy. By 1940 their goals for the prison in­
cluded keeping the prisoners securely behind bars and making the 
prison "as light a burden on the tax-payers as possible." They gave 
no mention to reform or rehabilitation. Concentration on discipline
and control led to beatings administered by guards to prisoners during
43Longite control as a result of which about forty died.
Even though the Long machine often presented itself as the friend 
of the common people of Louisiana, obviously certain groups were ex­
cluded from this friendship, quite probably for practical political 
reasons. The mental patients and prisoners did not vote, and rela­
tively few of the general voting population ever witnessed conditions 
which existed in the mental hospitals or the prison. Money spent on 
highways and public buildings was much more visible and thus worth 
more politically.
During the summer and fall of 1939 these shortcomings were over­
shadowed by the Scandals which were the top news story and topic of 
conversation in Louisiana. The Scandals had broken just as Louisiana 
began the 1939-1940 gubernatorial campaign. Louisiana politics is 
_
Carleton, Politics and Punishment, pp. 126-134; States, June 25,
1941.
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seldom dull, but the revelation of the Scandals added to the normal 
factional stridency. In addition, the vibrant campaign style of such 
1940 candidates as Earl Long and James H. Morrison, produced a rowdy 
campaign even by Louisiana standards.
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CHAPTER II
THE 1939-1940 LOUISIANA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
The Louisiana gubernatorial campaign of 1939-1940 was a major 
point of departure in the state's political history. Before Sam 
Jones' victory over incumbent Governor Earl Long in February, 1940, 
anti-Long Democrats had been merely an impotent minority protesting 
political and fiscal abuses within state government. While Huey 
Long’s election to the governorship in 1928 spawned a sharply polarized 
political system in which recognizable "pro-Long" and "anti-Long" fac­
tions within the Democratic party vied for control, it was Jones' elec­
tion that proved that the Long political machine was not invincible; 
that reformers within the state Democratic party could at last carry 
the anti-Long banner in Louisiana and win a state-wide election. The 
1940 contest ushered in two decades of competitive bifactionalism. 
During the next five hard-fought state campaigns, both factions were 
viable contenders for capturing control of the state government, al­
though the only one to elect two successive governors during the next 
twenty years was the anti-Long reform group, which elected James H. 
Davis to follow Jones in 1944. The Longs recaptured the state govern­
ment in 1948, lost to the reformers in 1952, but returned to power in 
1956. The 1939-1940 campaign and election, therefore, initiated an 
evolution of modern Louisiana one-party Democratic politics into a 
close approximation of the traditional American two-party system.
The major issue of the 1939-1940 campaign was unquestionably the 
Louisiana Scandals which unfolded just as the campaign began. Other 
issues arose before the first Democratic primary in January 1940 —
34
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the beginning of World War II abroad, military records of the candi­
dates during World War I, continued apparent corruption in Earl Long's 
short administration, and eventually the race issue —  but the pri­
mary issue remained the Long machine's systematic looting of state re­
sources while Richard Leche had been governor.
The gubernatorial candidate most damaged by the corruption issue 
was Huey’s younger brother, Earl Long. Machine leaders had selected 
Earl to run for lieutenant-governor in the 1936 election because of 
his name and his close kinship to the martyred Huey. In 1939 they 
chose him as their gubernatorial candidate largely by default.
Earl Long was born August 26, 1895, in a log house other than the 
one in which Huey had been born. (Huey Long, Sr.'s family lived in 
three log houses before he built his two-story frame home in Winnfield.) 
Earl recalled in later years that they were closer than any other two 
members of the family. While in school, Huey proved to be the better 
student. He had a fondness for learning that Earl lacked, even though 
the younger Long was capable of learning much about a subject if it 
interested him. Earl was also more inclined toward physical violence 
than was Huey. ̂
Earl became involved in Huey’s political career from the begin­
ning. In the 1918 contest for a seat on the Railroad Commission and
*Earl Long, "Last of the Red-Hot Poppas," (phonograph recording)
(Baton Rouge, News Records, Inc., 1961); Richard B. McCaughan, Socks 
on a Rooster Louisiana's Earl K. Long (Baton Rouge, Claitor's Book 
Store, 1967), pp. 8, 14-15, 19-20; G. Dupre Litton, The Wizard of Winn­
field (New York, Carlton Press, Inc., 1982), p. 12; Morgan D. Peoples, 
"Earl Kemp Long: The Man From Pea Patch Farm," Louisiana History, Fall 
1976, p. 385; Parker Long, Sr., and Harley Bozeman interviewed by Joe 
Tullier, July 21, 1966, Oral History Collection, Louisiana State Uni­
versity at Alexandria.
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in the 1924 gubernatorial race, Earl performed yeoman work tacking up 
signs, distributing posters and leaflets, and learning the fundamental 
rules and tactics of politics. Following study at Loyola University, 
Earl was admitted to the Louisiana bar, even though he had not ac­
quired a law degree. In 1928, following Huey's gubernatorial election, 
Earl became attorney for the state inheritance tax collector in New 
Orleans, a political "plum" because even though Earl received over 
$14,000 yearly salary, the duties of the job were so light that he 
spent most of his time in Baton Rouge performing political odd jobs 
for Huey.̂
Despite the closeness of their boyhood years and their early 
years together, the two brothers found themselves publicly at odds 
in 1932. In 1931 Earl decided the time had come for him to run for 
public office, and he asked Huey to support his gubernatorial candi­
dacy. Huey refused, and also refused to support Earl in a campaign 
for the lieutenant-governor’s post. Huey maintained later that he was 
being criticized enough for trying to create a personal dictatorship 
in Louisiana, and therefore he could not support his brother for a 
state office. Also, Huey was already committed to Oscar K. Allen's 
candidacy for the governorship, and he was too shrewd a politician 
to place two men from the same parish at the head of his ticket. 
Nevertheless, Earl ran a futile independent campaign for lieutenant-
~~2McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, p. 14; Litton, The Wizard of Winn- 
field, p. 15; Margaret Dixon, "Governor Earl K. Long," Baton Rouge 
Morning Advocate Magazine Section, May 9, 1948, p. 7; T. Harry 
Williams, Huey Long (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 315-316.
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ogovernor against Huey’s candidate, state senator John B. Foumet.
The bitter feelings caused by the 1931—1932 campaign surfaced 
during United States Senate investigations into alleged improprieties 
in the 1932 election of John H. Overton of Alexandria, Huey's candi­
date for Edwin S. Broussard's Senate seat. The Senate eventually de­
cided to seat Overton, but the hearings provided a public forum in 
which Huey and Earl each attempted to blacken the reputation of the 
other. Earl testified that Huey had stolen votes during a 1930 elec­
tion and that he gave and took bribes. Huey often shouted during 
Earl’s testimony, "That’s a d(amned) lie!", to which Earl replied 
sharply, "I stood with you as long as I could, but you run (sic) 
wild!" After his break with Huey, Earl was no longer attorney for 
the inheritance tax collector, but in 1932 became Louisiana counsel 
for a Hew Deal agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. By 1934 
the brothers had reconciled, and both helped elect Foumet to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court. Earl also returned to a state job as counsel 
to the State Tax Commission. They continued on amicable terms until 
Huey's death in 1935. When he heard that his brother had been shot,
Earl rushed from Winnfield to Baton Rouge where he visited Huey on 
4his deathbed.
3McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, pp. 39-40; Litton, The Wizard of Winn­
field, pp. 13-14; Huey P. Long, Every Man a King The Autobiography of 
Huey P. Long (New Orleans, National Book Company, Inc., 1933), pp. 
260-262; Russell B. Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, 
January 9, 1984.
4McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, pp. 39-40, 42-54, 57, 270-282; Litton, 
The Wizard of Winnfield, pp. 13-14; Stan Opotowsky, The Longs of Lou­
isiana (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1960), p. 139; Russell B. 
Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, January 9, 1984.
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Following his return to favor, Earl could not be ignored by the 
Long machine leaders who met to choose a ticket for the 1936 election. 
Some of them were uneasy with his forceful personality and refused him 
the gubernatorial nomination, choosing instead the more polished and 
urbane Richard Leche, but offered Earl the second spot on the ticket.^
Earl Long served a relatively uneventful term as lieutenant- 
governor from his inauguration in May 1936 until June 1939. He re­
mained in the background while the dapper Leche and his associates ran 
the state and filled their bank accounts. The question of Earl's in­
volvement in any of the Scandals remains unresolved. If he was not 
involved in the corruption, why did he not report it or move more 
forcefully against it in 1939? Allan Sindler answers this question 
by maintaining that Earl hoped to be elected governor in 1940 and 
feared that Leche might not endorse him. Earl knew that he could not 
win the governorship without the support of either Leche o.r the state 
machine headed by Robert Maestri. Because he did not wish to lose 
either of these potential sources of support, Earl kept quiet about 
whatever he knew of corruption. The fact that Earl himself was a top 
member of the administration should not be overlooked. It would have 
been difficult and politically unwise for him to expose his associates.
Earl Long was not convicted for any offense arising from the 
Scandals, but he was indicted along with four other officials for 
allegedly ordering that ten people employed by the New Orleans dock
M̂cCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, pp. 57-58; Litton, The Wizard of 
Winnfield, p. 15; Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Hayride The American 
Rehearsal for Dictatorship 1928—1940 (New York, William Morrow & Com­
pany, 1941; reprint ed., Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican Publishing Company, 
1971), p. 154.
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board just before the second Democratic primary in 1940 be paid whether 
or not they appeared for work. The indictment was later quashed be­
cause it was improperly worded, and the case was not revived. Never­
theless, Long had to defend himself for the rest of his political life 
from charges that he had profited at state expense during his lieuten­
ant -governorship. During the 1939-1940 campaign, for example, Andrew 
P. Tugwell charged that Long had "supplied LSU, the Normal College, 
the Pineville Asylum, and possibly other institutions with a large 
part of their pork and beef requirements." James Domengeaux charged 
during the 1948 gubernatorial campaign that Earl Long had absconded 
with $500,000 during the Scandals period but had escaped prosecution 
because the federal government was too involved in more important 
cases in Louisiana and because the war also brought an end to the in­
vestigations. The effect on the voters caused by the aura of corrup­
tion surrounding Earl Long is graphically illustrated by a letter Mrs. 
Mary Flogel wrote to James H. Morrison in 1939: "Its (sic) a lots
(sic) of voters around here (Tunica) certainly dont (sic) want Earl 
long (sic) for Governor becaus (sic) he was with the crowed (sic) when 
they were doing the Stealing (sic) & wouldnt (sic) open his mouth
guntile (sic) they were caught ..." Despite his apparent innocence,
Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana State Politics 1920-1952 
(Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 145; New Orleans Times- 
Picayune, July 30, 1939, July 24, 26, August 8, 1940; Times-Picayune 
New Orleans States, July 28, 1940; Morning Advocate, October 3, Decem­
ber 12, 1940; "New Light on Earl's Record," Radio Address by Congress­
man James Domengeaux, typescript copy, William Walter Jones Collection 
of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collections Division, How- 
ard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana 
(hereinafter cited as Jones Collection); Mrs. Mary Flogel to James H. 
Morrison, December 10, 1939, James H. Morrison Collection, Center for 
Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, Louisiana 
(hereinafter cited as Morrison Collection).
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Earl Long bore a large measure of the public blame for the Scandals.
Just after the McLachlan window frame story broke and the investi­
gation into Dr. James Monroe Smith's personal finances surfaced, 
rumors that Governor Richard Leche planned to resign from office be­
gan to surface on June 22, 1939, around both Baton Rouge and Washing­
ton, D.C. Leche maintained that his health no longer permitted him to 
remain in office.̂  Many people in Louisiana, however, suspected that 
Leche hoped to fade quietly into the background without further in­
volvement in the Scandals.
After he decided to resign, Leche set state administration law­
yers to work researching the correct procedure for resigning the 
Louisiana governorship. Only one Louisiana governor had resigned be­
fore 1939 —  Thomas Boling Robertson, elected in 1820, resigned in 
1822 —  but records of how he technically completed the action had 
been lost. Following discussion of several harebrained schemes,
Leche decided that he would merely resign by issuing a proclamation
Leche apparently did have health problems with chronic arthritis.
In letters he received early in 1939, months before any hint of the 
Scandals, his correspondents either mentioned his poor health or sent 
hopes that he was feeling better. Also, Leche told an interviewer in 
February, 1939, that he suffered "a million shooting pains" in his 
legs and had recently been bedridden because of them. Governor Albert 
B. (Happy) Chandler to Leche, January 18, 1939; W. W. Cunningham to 
Leche, January 29, 1939; Earle Christenberry to Leche, February 14, 
1939; D. M. Ellison to Charles M. Colvin, February 23, 1939; E. A. 
Conway, Sr. to Leche, March 9, 1939; New York Journal and American, 
February 25, 1939, Richard W. Leche Papers, Department of Archives and 
Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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gthat he was no longer governor. (He was upstaged in his resignation, 
however, by the surprise resignation of LSU president Dr. James Monroe 
Smith who had no such technicalities of resignation to worry about.) 
Nevertheless, Leche signed his formal resignation and issued his dec­
laration that he was no longer governor on June 26, 1939. Leche’s 
resignation led to Earl Long’s inauguration to the first of his three 
terms as governor. Leche undoubtedly breathed a sigh of relief as he 
commented "It's all yours now, Earl." The new governor in his first 
official statement characteristically captured the mood of the Louisi­
ana public and announced that his new administration would take as its 
motto a text from the book of Proverbs: "Better a little with righ­
teousness than great riches without right." "That’s a significant
9statement," an anonymous observer remarked.
Even though Earl Long quickly settled into the governor's office, 
he did not immediately receive the full endorsement of all the Longite 
allies. Through much of September, 1939, some of the New Orleans 
Old Regulars expressed displeasure at the prospect of automatically 
endorsing him. One faction thought the New Orleans component of the 
Long machine was becoming increasingly subordinate to the state organ­
ization and suggested that the city and state groups should settle on
g
One rejected scheme called for Leche to leave the state and have 
then-acting-governor Earl Long appoint him a justice of the peace so 
that when he took the oath for that office he would vacate the gover­
nor’s chair. Another scheme, still bizarre, but not quite so circui­
tous as the first, called for the attorney general to appoint Leche 
as his assistant so that again Leche would vacate the governor's office 
when he accepted another state job.
9McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, p. 65; Times-Picayune, June 23, 25, 
27-28, 1939.
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a compromise candidate- An even more extreme group favored the Old 
Regulars splitting with the Long machine entirely and supporting an 
independent candidate. Concurrently, "some of the North Louisiana 
hoys" announced that a permanent alliance with the Old Regulars might 
not have been in the best interest of the state machine. Long’s 
position was affirmed, however, on September 21, when a caucus of 
state administration leaders endorsed him as their candidate for 
governor. Old Regular leaders present at the meeting interpreted a 
separate endorsement of New Orleans city attorney Francis Bums for 
attorney general as a compromise in their favor.^
Although his chances appeared to be improving, Governor Long 
recognized that the linchpin in any agreement between the Old Regulars 
and the Louisiana Democratic Association would be New Orleans mayor 
and LDA president Robert Maestri. (One New Orleans magazine remarked 
that Maestri was "the man [Long] probably admires most in the state.") 
Long announced on September 4, probably with more hope than concrete 
assurance, that none of his opponents could bring "power enough on 
earth" to keep Maestri from supporting him. The night after the state 
association caucus had endorsed him, Long traveled to New Orleans to 
confer with Old Regular leaders.During late night meetings with 
Maestri and other leaders from St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson 
parishes, Long discussed a possible special session of the legislature 
to repeal one of Huey’s state laws depriving sheriffs of control over 
hiring and firing their deputies, a law which the local political
^New Orleans Item, September 3, 5, 17, 20, 22, 1939.
**Ibid., September 5, 23, 1939; The Punch, July 1939, p. 7.
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leaders disliked. The Old Regulars, though, extracted even further
concessions in exchange for their support. The deal eventually struck
between the two sides obliged the Old Regulars to support Long in the
1939-1940 governor’s race in exchange for Long’s promise of a special
legislative session to repeal a number of state laws offensive to
local interests which had been enacted during Huey’s, Allen’s, and
Leche’s administrations —  and Long’s promise to support Old Regular
12candidates in the 1942 New Orleans city campaign.
Despite their seeming agreement, Earl Long worked feverishly un­
til almost mid-October keeping Old Regular support. On October 10 he 
held an all-night conference with Old Regular ward leaders at Maestri’s 
Roosevelt Hotel suite. He met with each ward leader individually be­
cause he feared that an open caucus would permit those opposed to his 
candidacy to convince those still wavering to withdraw their support.
A majority of the Old Regular leaders reportedly assured him that they 
could carry their wards for him, but a small group scattered throughout 
the city told him that they considered him a negative candidate. 
Nevertheless, they agreed to support Long because of a previous agree­
ment with Leche, Maestri, and Allen Ellender to support state associ­
ation candidates in 1939-1940 in exchange for state support for the 
Old Regulars in the 1942 campaign. As a result of this series of 
meetings, and in order to smooth over any remaining problems, the 
two sides created a steering committee composed of Dr. Joseph A. O’Hara 
of the state board of health, Edmund Burke, first ward representative
TF~Item, September 24, October 11, 1939.
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from the LDA, Old Regular vice-chairman James Reilly, Commissioner of
Public Property Joseph J. Skelly, and James Comisky, the third ward
Old Regular Leader. Long met with Skelly and Comisky the next day at
his Jung Hotel suite in an attempt to keep them from endorsing one of
three anti-administration candidates reportedly seeking their help.
When asked whether the Old Regulars would support him, Long replied,
"I don't know." The next day, however, the Old Regulars and the Old
Regular women's organization endorsed Long, the women's organization
pointedly noting in its resolution that "through all of the storms
of scandal that have rocked the state (he) remains untouched and his
13honesty unquestioned. . ."
Harmony had apparently been restored between the LDA and the Old 
Regulars by late October. A joint Old Regular-LDA rally on October 26 
packed New Orleans Municipal Auditorium with thousands of spectators 
as Long opened the New Orleans phase of his campaign. James L. Reilly, 
then acting chairman of the Old Regular caucus, joined him on stage.
But problems between Long's followers and Old Regulars persisted 
throughout the campaign. The next threatened break occurred early in 
November when Robert J. Silva, leader of the Eighth Ward Democratic 
Club, announced that he had resigned his job as an inspector for the 
state board of health as a gesture of support for twenty of his fol­
lowers who had been dismissed from their jobs with the New Orleans 
Dock Board. Silva recalled commitments from Huey that every precinct 
captain would have a job, and sharply commented: "We thought his
—
New Orleans States, October 11-14, 1939; Item, October 13-14, 1939.
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successors would stand by us, but it looks as though we have been 
double-crossed." Silva’s protests lasted four days until his fol­
lowers were returned to their jobs. An anonymous Old Regular leader 
commented sadly of the episode: "It’s just another example of what
we are going to have to put up with as a result of our support of
Earl Long . . .  his men are causing breaks in our already thin ranks,
. 14and we can t afford to have these things get out."
This feeling of resignation, of having to "put up with" Earl Long 
and his followers persisted in Old Regular ranks throughout the cam­
paign. The New Orleans States commiserated with the dissident Old 
Regulars who felt ill at ease with Earl Long. An October 12 editorial 
compared (with some overstatement) the Old Regulars with the state ad­
ministration :
The Old Regulars have been guilty of many sins.
Their record is far from white. But in all their 
years of political activities, you never saw 
their leaders rising from rags to riches. You 
never saw them engage in wholesale thefts. You 
never saw them stealing from the poor, the maimed 
and the crippled. You never saw them growing fat 
over hospital contracts . . . the Old Regulars 
didn’t steal from'this class of people.
An anonymous Old Regular leader, observing the campaign near the end,
sadly commented:
I wonder what Martin Behrman and some of the real 
Old Regulars would say about conditions today.
Here we are forced to endorse Earl Long without 
even holding a caucus. We don’t want Earl Long, 
the people don’t want Earl Long, nobody but Bob
^Item, October 26, November 4, 6, 1939; States, November 8, 1939.
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Maestri wants Earl Long.*̂
Despite their differences, leaders of both the LDA and the Old 
Regulars had no choice other than to endorse Earl Long for governor. 
As William P. Dillion, LDA fourteenth Ward Leader, told a New Orleans 
rally:
We’ve got to win this election. If we don't 
—  well it’s your meal ticket. We don’t want 
any unemployment in the 14th ward. If the 
other gang gets in, you'll be out. So think 
it over and talk to your neighbors.^
The marriage between Earl Long supporters and the Old Regulars may not 
have been convenient, but it was one of necessity. Long without Old 
Regular support stood little chance of election; the Old Regulars with­
out Long faced the possibility of four years in the political wilder­
ness without allies. Political realism dominated consideration of 
events on both sides and forced their cooperation.*̂  Despite his 
problems with the threatened Old Regular defection and his embarrass-
*̂ States, October 12, 1939, January 25, 1940.
*̂ Ibid., November 10, 1939.
*̂ By December 1939 the terms "Louisiana Democratic Association" and 
"Old Regulars" had become virtually interchangeable. In addition to 
securing peace with Roosevelt, Leche had also restored amicable re­
lations between the state government and the Old Regulars. The price 
of peace (and restoration of some city income denied it by Huey Long) 
was that the Old Regulars became the Long organization in New Orleans. 
Hermann B. Deutsch, "New Orleans Politics — The Greatest Free Show on 
Earth," in The Past as Prelude New Orleans 1718-1968, ed. by Hodding 
Carter, William Ransom Hogan, John W. Lawrence, and Betty Werlein 
Carter (New Orleans, Tulane University, 1968),-p. 328; Joseph B. 
Parker, The Morrison Era Reform Politics in New Orleans (Gretna, 
Louisiana, Pelican Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 58-59.
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ment by the unfolding. Scandals, Earl Long remained the candidate to
beat in the 1939-1940 campaign.
The eventual victor who overcame the Long machine was Lake Charles 
attorney Sam Houston Jones. Jones was bom to Robert and Susan Jones 
on July 15, 1897, in a two-room log house on his grandfather Moses 
Frazar's farm near the small town of Merryville, in rural Beauregard 
parish in southwest Louisiana. The physical surroundings of Jones’ 
boyhood in Beauregard parish were not too different from those of
Huey and Earl Long in Winn parish at about the,same time. One recent
study of Louisiana’s political culture categorizes Beauregard as the 
most southwesterly of ’’North Louisiana” parishes. As Jones said:
Beauregard’s economy was based largely on timber, 
then secondarily on livestock, such as cattle 
and sheep; with small piney woods farms growing 
upland cotton, and other such crops as com,
Irish and sweet potatoes, and vegetables of vari­
ous kinds, but largely subsistence type farms.
This description could just as easily have applied to Winn parish in 
the 1890s.
Sam Jones’ earliest political training came from his father who 
abandoned farming and sold insurance, managed a store, taught school, 
and finally became a minor public official. When Jones was three his
18Denny Daugherty, ’’From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion" (senior 
thesis, Louisiana State University, 1970), pp. 16-17; Sam Jones to 
Denny Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department 
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy Hv Middleton Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection); 
David M. Landry and Joseph B. Parker,-"The Louisiana Political Culture," 
in Louisiana Politics Festival inla Labyrinth, ed. by James Bolner 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982),.p..3; Bob Angers, 
Jr., "Sam Houston Jones Reform Governor,"'Acadiana Profile, October/ 
November 1971, p. 6.
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father moved the family to the small town of DeRidder in north central
Beauregard parish where he served on the town’s Board of Councilmen
and as mayor from 1908 until 1912.. During World War I the elder Jones
served on the local draft board and board of health, and capped his
political career with twelve years as Beauregard parish clerk of court
(1916-1928). His antipathy to Old Regular control of Louisiana and
his political independence influenced his son's political viewpoint.
When Huey Long arose to challenge the Old Regulars, the elder Jones
could not resist his appeal and supported him. After Long began
building his own powerful control of Louisiana, however, Robert Jones
19looked upon his initial support of Huey as a great mistake.
Sam Jones later recalled that he was "practically born in a court­
house." He began his public career during World War I as clerk of the 
draft board of Beauregard paxish.. Army service from 1917 until 1919 
interrupted his career, but in 1920 he became his father's deputy 
clerk of court, and in 1921 was the youngest delegate to the Louisiana 
constitutional convention, where he served on the Suffrage and Elec­
tions and the Conservation committees. On April 3, 1922 Jones became 
a lawyer after passing the state bar examination without finishing 
college —  he attended Louisiana State University from 1915 to 1917 —  
and less than one year later received an appointment from Governor 
John M. Parker to fill an unexpired term as city judge of DeRidder.
In 1924 a new district attorney for the five parishes of southwest 
Louisiana offered him an appointment as assistant district attorney,
19Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion," pp. 16-20; Jones 
to Daughery, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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and Jones accepted, even though the new job required him to leave his
native Beauregard parish and move to Lake Charles in neighboring 
20Calcasieu parish.
Jones left political life after the 1928 election, believing 
that active opposition to the powerful Long machine was useless un­
less some unforeseen problem greatly weakened its hold on Louisiana
t  •. . 21politics.
The unfolding Louisiana Scandals in 1939 propelled Jones back 
into the political arena. When the Scandals broke, Jones was a suc­
cessful Lake Charles lawyer, bound by commitments to his wife and his 
partners to stay out of politics, even though he still occasionally 
toyed with political involvement. (He had supported Democratic presi­
dential candidate A1 Smith in 1928 and was to head Franklin Roosevelt’s 
re-election effort in Louisiana’s seventh Congressional District in 
1936 to counter the' efforts of the incumbent Congressman who was
20Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion, pp. 16-20.; Jones 
to Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Daugherty collection; Roster, Members 
and Officers Constitutional Convention State of Louisiana of 1921 
Also Standing Committees and Rules Governing the Convention (Baton 
Rouge, Ramires-Jones Printing Co., 1921), pp. 5, 10, 15, Jared Y. 
Sanders and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts,
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge; 
"Louisiana’s Governor-Elect,” Louisiana Police Jury Review, April,
1940, p. 14; Sam Houston Jones Interviewed by James M. Godfrey, Feb­
ruary, 1977, typescript copy, LSU Oral History Collection, Department 
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge; Maj. Gen. E. S. Adams to Allen J. Ellender, 
February 3, 1940, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, 
Allen J. Ellender Memorial Library, Nicholls State University, Thibo- 
daux, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Ellender Collection); Angers,
"Sam Houston Jones,” p. 6.
21Jones to Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection; Jones inter­
viewed by Godfrey, February, 1977, LSU Oral History Collection.
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boosting Huey Long, but Long’s death: in late 1935 made Jones' effort 
22unnecessary.)
In early August, 1939, a committee of prominent Louisianians 
headed by Prescott Foster, son of former Governor Murphy J. Foster, 
visited Jones ("they came to me in desperation," Jones later remem­
bered) to persuade him to run for governor. Many anti-Longites thought 
that at last the time had come for a reformer to turn the Long machine 
out of office, and they thought that Sam Jones was the man most likely 
to complete the task. Jones’ lack of political experience was no mark 
against him in their opinion. As Jones recalled later, by 1939 the 
anti-Longs had been out of office in Louisiana since 1928 and the fac­
tion had no candidate with both major elective experience and a chance 
to win the governorship. Fortunately, Jones had joined the American 
Legion following his release from the army, and as he rose through 
various offices until he became state commander in 1930, he made a 
network of personal contacts and acquaintances all across the state, 
thus laying the foundation for an effective campaign. In addition,
his American Legion service allowed Jones to polish his stage presence
23as he spoke in all 64 Louisiana parishes.
Jones initially rejected the entreaties that he enter the gover­
nor’s race but gave his permission when Foster asked whether they could
22Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion," pp. 23-24.
23Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion, pp. 21-22; Sam 
Houston Jones interviewed by Dennis Daugherty, May 6, 1970, tape re­
cording, Daugherty Collection; Angers, ’-'Sam Houston-Jones," p. 6; •
Roland Boatner Howell, Sr.,-Louisiana Sugar Plantations, Mardi Gras and 
Huey P. Long: Reminiscences'of Roland Boatner Howell; Sr. (Baton Rouge,
Claitor’s Publishing Division,-1969), p. 168.
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talk to Jones' law partners. Bis partners and his wife, Louise Gambrel 
Jones (to whom the reformers also talked), added their encouragement 
to the suggestion that he make the race. Jones was visibly warming to 
the idea, and consulted with his old friend, Vance Plauche, who told 
him, "There are times when we have to risk everything for the right. 
This is one of them." Even though he received much encouragement to 
run for governor throughout August, Jones waited until at least one 
of the Longites had been sentenced to prison before he made a final 
commitment. The completion of the Bienville Hotel case in September, 
1939, fulfilled this requirement, and Jones tossed his hat into the 
ring the day following the successful prosecution. He did not declare 
for the governorship lightly and made advance preparations to move 
to Houston, Texas, to continue his law practice there if he lost the 
election.^
In the final analysis, the reform streak in Jones' personality 
had much to do with his final decision. Moreover, he was the father 
of two small children, Carolyn and the infant Robert Jones, and step­
father of William and James Boyer. In a letter to James B. Aswell,
Jr., Jones revealed the influence his fatherhood had on his decision:
»
I do not want my children to grow up believing 
it is all right for the rich and powerful to . 
steal from the poor. Neither do I want them 
to be taught, by the force of public example, 
that the road to success lies through schemes
24.Daugherty., "From Log Cabin to Governor's Mansion," pp. 25-27; Kane, 
Louisiana Hayride, p. 347; Jerry Purvis Sanson, "The Louiisiana Guber­
natorial Election of 1940” (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University-, 
1975), pp.-22-23.
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for making easy money and disregard for the
Ten Commandments.25
Or, as he said more succinctly during one of his campaign addresses,
"We are fighting for honesty and decency against dishonesty and degra- 
26dation." After he overcame his initial reluctance, Jones waged a 
vigorous and ultimately successful campaign centered around his pledge 
to restore much-needed "Common Honesty" (his campaign slogan) to 
Louisiana government, for, as he cogently reminded the voters, "We
27are seeing the result of the lack of it in Louisiana affairs today."
Besides Sam Jones and Earl Long, three other candidates competed 
for the governorship in the first Democratic primary. Most prominent 
among them was former governor James Albert Noe. Noe, a native of 
West Point, Kentucky, was bom December 21, 1893, and began his politi­
cal career as a follower of Huey Long. He was elected to the state 
senate in 1932 from his adopted home of Ouachita Parish in northeast 
Louisiana, and was serving as president-pro—tempore of the senate when 
Governor Oscar K. Allen died in office. Lieutenant-governor John 
Foumet had already been elected to the state Supreme Court, and Noe 
became governor of Louisiana. Noe’s short term as governor lasted 
approximately four months (January 28 to May 12, 1936) before Richard
25Sam Jones to James B. Aswell, Jr., November 15, 1939, James B. As- 
well, Jr. and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, 
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana- State University, Baton Rouge 
(hereinafter cited as Aswell. Collection); "The Jones Family,"
Acadiana Profile, October/November, 1971, p. 12.
26Sam Jones campaign address (n.d., 1940), Jones Collection.
27Item, September 21, 1939.
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Leche was inaugurated as a result of the 1936 election, but the feel 
of the office suited him. Noe was convinced that he had been cheated 
out of the 1936 gubernatorial nomination, and he was determined to 
show the state a model administration beginning in 1940, when he 
planned to assume'the governorship. While briefly in office, Noe 
opened the governor’s mansion to Huey’s country people and further 
gained their favor by naming Huey’s widow to complete Long’s unexpired 
United States Senate term. When Noe’s short term was over, he re­
luctantly left office and became a staunch critic of the new admini­
stration, collecting the affidavits which eventually led to its down-
* n  28 fall.
After 1936, Noe devoted himself to his personal businesses —  
oil and gas leases, real estate, and radio station WNOE in New Orleans 
—  and to his personal vendetta against "Dick" Leche. By 1939, the 
wealthy Noe was again serving in the state senate and launched his 
gubernatorial campaign from that post. Noe’s political career both 
inside and outside the Long camp undoubtedly contributed to his poor 
showing in the first Democratic primary. He had broken with the 
machine and could expect no help from it, but neither was he accepted 
by the anti—Long voters because of his previous close ties to the 
machine. Noe was thus neither fish nor fowl. The Louisiana Associ­
ation for Clean Government's statement that "The people of Louisiana
23Robert Sobel and John Raimo, eds .j'Biographical Directory of the 
Governors of the United States 1789-1978 Volume II Iowa-Missouri 
(Westport, Connecticut,- Heckler Books, 1978), p. 585; Sanson, "The 
Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1940,” pp..25-26; Sindler, Huey 
Long’s:Louisiana, p. 142; Kane, Louisiana Hayrlde, pp. 155, 191—192; 
Times-Picayune, March 19, 1940.
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want to destroy the machine- Jimmy Noe wants to take it over and run 
it for himself," accurately characterized the reform element’s assess­
ment of him. Noe centered his campaign appeals on the old Huey Long 
voter who was disgusted with the corruption of the post-Huey Long 
machine. Longites attacked Noe for supposed irregularities in the 
amassing of his wealth. Earl Long, for example, declared on numerous 
occasions during the campaign that Noe since the 1920s had been on
29the "Crooks to Look Out For" list of the United States Post Office. 
Despite his paradoxical political stance, anti-Long but not fully a 
reformer, Noe ran a strong third in the first primary and had a de­
cisive voice in the selection of the new governor in the second primary.
The fourth candidate in the first primary race with thirty-two- 
year-old James Hobson Morrison, a graduate of Tulane University and 
lawyer from Hammond. Morrison's legal career had included work for 
various groups of strawberry farmers in the Florida parishes, and he 
hoped to capitalize on his "friend of the small farmer" image in the 
campaign. Morrison later recalled that he really did not have much 
chance to win the governorship in 1940, but the campaign allowed him 
to express his contempt for the corruption rampant in public office:
"No matter how strong a political machine gets, some people will stand 
up and they will inspire others to follow for election reform . . .
(the election) gave me a chance to show what I had —  the courage of
30of my convictions.”
29    'Kane, Louisiana Hayride, p. 431; Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p.
269.
3 0.......  .......... .....................Congressional Directory 78th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, United
States Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 43; James H. Morrison 
interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, May 13, 1982.
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Morrison’s campaign may easily be classified as the flashiest 
conducted by any candidate in the contest, outstripping even the usu­
ally flamboyant Earl Long- The centerpiece of Morrison’s appeal was 
his fiery stage presence: on some occasions he called Earl Long a
"slimy little stooge" and shared the stage with a monkey named "Earl 
Long" until the beast went mad, but his most colorful innovation was 
"Jimmy Morrison’s Convict Parade," a group of his farmer friends who 
volunteered to dress as convicts and appear on floats portraying state 
officials dressed in convict garb in the act of looting the state. 
Morrison recalled years later his appreciation for his friends who 
volunteered their time and trucks, and he remembered that costuming 
his characters proved to be something of a problem —  his farmers 
could not afford to buy white pants or to paint black stripes on their
"Sunday white shirt," so they used only the cheapest clothing to con-
31struct costumes of traditional prison attire.
Despite his shoestring budget which forced him to use the money 
collected at each rally to move the "convict parade" to the next stop, 
Morrison’s sideshow proved to be.a popular adjunct to his campaign.
Its appearance on Canal Street drew a crowd estimated to be larger 
than even the Rex Mardi Gras parade. A correspondent from Winnfield 
wrote Morrison, "When you visit this section, we certainly expect your 
parade". Another correspondent wrote that his family enjoyed the 
parade "even better than (the) ’Gang Busters’ (radio) program." With 
the convict parade, Morrison in one stroke solved a classic problem 
in politics: that of a minor candidate attracting potential supporters
31Morrison interviewed by Sanson, May 13, 1982.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
to notice him. His answer included the surface fun-and-games of the 
parade —  as he said "If you didn’t make a flamboyant campaign, you 
might as well stay home" —  but after the entertainment attracted a 
crowd, Morrison strove to persuade his listeners to support h-im rather 
than the other candidates. Moreover, the "convict parade" was un­
doubtedly a graphic reinforcement of the Scandal stories appearing 
each day. The parade’s effect on a poorly educated Louisiana elector­
ate should not be diminished, but despite his entertaining campaign,
Morrison finished a distant fourth in the first primary and refused
32to endorse either Earl Long or Sam Jones in the second primary.
The fifth and very minor candidate in the first primary was Vin­
cent Moseley, an Opelousas lawyer. Moseley’s campaign can be accur­
ately described as fiercely independent ("not supported by any coterie 
or any close corporation of capitalistic capons") and passionately anti- 
Long. Moseley often appeared to be running as much against Huey as 
against Earl Long:
I for one can never defend Huey Long. I do not 
believe that either you or I can ever condone 
his methods or elect a candidate who does, a 
candidate who announced 'Huey Long was betrayed’ 
when he well knew that his was the master mind, 
and he the master evil.33
32B. W. Bailey to James H. Morrison, November 2, 1939, Frank B. Beadle 
to Morrison, January 5, 1940, Morrison Collection; Kane, Louisiana 
Hayride, pp. 438-439; Times-Picayune, September 30, 1939; Jerry Purvis 
Sanson, "James H. Morrison and the 1939 Gubernatorial Campaign," paper 
presented to the Edward Livingston Historical Association, May, 1982, 
typescript copy, Morrison Collection.-
33Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 142.
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The administration, considered Moseley.a minor nuisance. He was pic­
tured in 'Progress cartoons as. a.barely, visible pipsqueak of a man.
The other'candidates generally ignored him unless he made a direct 
personal attack bn one of them that they felt compelled to refute. 
Otherwise, outside the urban press,' Moseley’s campaign received scant 
attention.
Other politicians throughout the state announced their intentions 
to run for the governorship, but dropped out' of the race before the 
first primary. Among them were mayor Sam Caldwell of Shreveport,
State Treasurer Andrew P. ’’Pat" Tugwell, and former public service 
commissioner and perennially irrepressible ’’Cajun” politician Dudley 
LeBlanc. The 1939-1940 campaign for the Louisiana governorship there­
fore, focused upon the personalities, records, and promises of Long, 
Jones, and Noe.^
When Richard Leche suddenly thrust the governorship on Earl Long 
in June, 1939, Sam Jones had not yet announced hxs candidacy. Noe was 
in the field already, but the new governor’s most vocal critic during 
the early weeks of the campaign was Andrew P. Tugwell. Tugwell at­
tacked Long first about the ”de-duct" money taken involuntarily by 
the state machine from state employeespaychecks. He began his in­
vestigation with a letter to John M. Push, assistant to the general 
manager of the New Orleans dock board, asking whether it was true that
34New Orleans Item-Tribune, September 10, 1939; Vincent Moseley to W. 
Scott Heywood, August 11, 1941, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Rec­
ords, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Jennings- 
Heywood Collection); Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 428-429.
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New Orleans mayor Robert S. Maestri had custody of the funds derived
from the payroll deductions: "It is my understanding that you are
merely one of the state collectors and that the Honorable Mayor
Maestri is recognized custodian of all the funds collected," wrote
Tugwell. Fush replied that Maestri had "nothing whatsoever" to do
with the deduction funds. The next day Tugwell quoted from a speech
former governor Leche made on May 24, 1938, in which Leche disclaimed
handling any money from the deductions: "Dr. O’Hara (Joseph A. O’Hara,
president of the state board of health) is president of it (the
Louisiana Democratic Association, political front for the deduction
money), Mayor Maestri and Mr. Fush are treasurers of it." Tugwell
commented that in view of Leche’s speech, "Mayor Maestri’s denial re-
35garding the shakedown fund is far from satisfactory.”
Even though he remained unable to. connect Maestri with the deduct 
fund, Tugwell's persistent investigation brought LDA finances under 
increased public scrutiny. On July 10, 1939, Dr. O’Hara and Fush re­
vealed that they were indeed the custodians of the deduct fund collec­
ted by the LDA. Fush, though, declared that he was "too busy" to show 
Tugwell any of the organization’s records, but they would be open for 
his inspection if Dr. O'Hara approved. O’Hara refused to permit any­
one to see the LDA records and emerged as a staunch defender of the 
deduct system, commenting that the funds "are just like the dues of 
almost any other organization of its kind," without explaining which 
other states, parties, or factions had an "organization of its kind."
35Times-Picayune, July 6-7, 1939.
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He also admitted that the LDA funds were indeed the deduct dollars 
from state paychecks, thus establishing the connection between the 
two sets of funds. When asked if Governor Long had made any move to 
change the financing of the LDA, O'Hara replied, "No, not that I've 
heard of. "3^
O'Hara was correct. Upon taking office, Earl Long began tidying 
up the sloppy payroll procedures of the Leche administration by halting 
the practice of carrying employees on the payroll of one department 
even though they worked in another department. He did not, however, 
move against the deducts, even though Noe made public the sworn affi­
davit of James S. Allain (former clerk in the Louisiana State Auto­
mobile License Bureau office in New Orleans) which revealed that 
Hubert Haydell, chief clerk in his office, had cashed his $100 payroll 
check each month and returned $95 to him without mentioning where the 
other $5 had gone. Furthermore, Frank S. Perilloux, eighth ward 
leader for the LDA in New Orleans and chief inspector for the dock 
board, stated that contributions equal to five per cent of their 
salary were expected of state employees, and added that he collected 
an additional one percent for the ward organization because the local 
units received none of the "five per cent" money. Even though Governor
Long intimated that the deduct would be discontinued, the LDA continued
37to take money from state employees.
While they continued to collect the deducts, administration
36Ibid., July 11, 1939.
37Ibid., June 29, July 14, 21, 24, 1939.
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officials realized that the public mood demanded that their methods 
of collecting the "deducts" had to be streamlined. State employees 
reported in early August, 1939, that "sources which experience has 
taught them to respect" assured them that no more deductions would 
be taken from their salaries in the immediate future. One employee, 
however, added "we have been told to save our money because, when 
things quiet down, they will expect us to pay in a lump sum the equiv­
alent of deductions not taken out of our pay." Governor Long announced 
on August 9 that no further deductions would be taken from state em­
ployees after July 31, but responded angrily to reports that employees
had been ordered to save their money. "Anybody who says I told them
38that is a damned liar," he declared.
The system LDA leaders devised to replace the straight deduct 
was a "voluntary contribution" plan. Workers at the Charity Hospital 
in New Orleans were the first to report the new system. They would 
be "permitted to contribute" to Long's campaign, but hospital officials 
had assured them that no one would lose their jobs if they refused to 
do so. Several workers reported a further refinement of the old sys­
tem: the "voluntary contributions" would be accepted from them after
they cashed their paychecks, not before, and in a building set aside 
from the main hospital. Even though Governor Long steadfastly main­
tained that contributions "will never be collected on a fixed percent 
while I am governor" and that if any state workers was unable or un­
willing to contribute, or had suffered a recent family illness "he or
90Bill Attel to "Gentlemen," August 7, 1939, Morrison Collection; 
Times-Picayune, August 8-9, 1939.
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she won't be allowed to contribute," Charity Hospital workers in New 
Orleans found special brown envelopes marked for their "voluntary con­
tribution" included in their mid-November pay envelopes. State police 
and highway department workers in Baton Rouge also received strong 
hints to make the "voluntary contributions." Employees of the State 
Employment Service Perdido Street office in New Orleans received in 
December a form letter addressed to Governor Long with which they were 
to send their contribution "in recognition of your integrity and out­
standing record of accomplishments and to aid you in some small mea­
sure in your great fight to secure for Louisiana four more years of
39the good government that you inaugurated when you became governor."
Reform elements in Louisiana were particularly incensed by the 
state employee assessments to help pay for Long's campaign. Tugwell, 
Jones, Noe, and Morrison repeatedly referred to the practice when re­
citing their litany of abuses practiced by the Long regime. Their 
attitude is best typified in two editorials which appeared in the New 
Orleans States. The first portrayed a Long machine composed of poli­
ticians who treated the poor with callous disregard "unless the poor 
how down and worship them and give up in many instances part of their 
pay by means of the nefarious deduct system." More directly, the 
States reminded its readers that given the past record of the admini­
stration, every state employee who received one of the "voluntary
39Times-Picayune, November 15-16, 1939; States, November 10, 15, 17, 
December 18, 1939; Item, November 15, 28, 1939; Stella O'Connor, "The 
Charity Hospital at New Orleans: An Administrative and Financial
History, 1736-1941," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, January, 1948, 
p. 90.
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contribution" envelopes and failed to respond "would soon be regarded 
as inefficient, defiant or not possessing the requisite qualities to 
hold a job."^
Tugwell created a permanent campaign issue with his investiga­
tions into the deduct system.and next focused his attention on the 
suspicious activities of the Louisiana Conservation Department. He 
first questioned the arrangement by which the Longwood Oil and Gas 
Company received a permit to produce an extraordinarily high amount 
of gas from two wells in the Cotton Valley oil and gas field in Web­
ster parish. The permit was ostensibly for the purpose of conducting 
an experiment on recycling distillate gas in the field, but Tugwell 
charged that the extra gas was not recycled once it was pumped from 
the ground. He compared the Longwood permit to one issued to the 
Ohio Oil Company for a similar experiment in the same field. The Ohio 
permit was limited to a period of thirty days while the Longwood per­
mit was issued for an unlimited period.^
Tugwell also discovered other irregularities in the Conservation 
Department. The department had received $350,000 from the previous 
legislature to fund construction of a geology building on the campus 
of Louisiana State University, but LSU records showed only $275,000 
received. Governor Long held a hasty conference with university 
officials and Conservation Commission William 0. Rankin, and shortly
40States, November 9, 17, 1939.
^Brady Michael Banta, "The Regulation and Conservation of Petroleum 
Resources in Louisiana, 1901-1940" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana 
State University, 1981), pp. 458-459; Times-Picayune, July 12-13,
1939.
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afterwards LSU received the rest of its money. Tugwell next charged 
that many Louisiana companies dealing in oil well supplies and equip­
ment were compelled to obtain merchandise through the Maxwell Supply 
Company, which kept ten per cent of the total amount of the order 
even though it provided no service other than writing the bill for 
each order. Other firms transported, stored, and delivered the 
equipment. Tugwell identified C. A. Morvant of Thibodaux as the 
registered agent of the Maxwell Company in Louisiana. Morvant also 
happened to be chief attorney for the Department of Conservation.
Morvant admitted that he was the company's agent but maintained that
42no one was compelled to order through the Maxwell firm.
Governor Long initially declined to make any personnel changes 
in the Conservation Department, but he eventually removed Commissioner 
Rankin as the political attacks mounted and appointed state senator 
Ernest S. Clements as commissioner. Clements knew little about the 
oil business in Louisiana and freely admitted so but pledged to ob­
tain the best advice possible from experts in the field. Some Louisi­
ana oil men looked hopefully to his pledge to run the department with-
43out political favors.
Earl Long and other members of the Long ticket were not the only
^Times-Picayune, July 14, 19, 25, 28, 30, 1939.
43Ibid., July 25, 1939; W. Scott Heywood to Mr. and Mrs. Gene Heywood, 
August 2, 1939, Jennings-Heywood Collection; Banta, "The Regulation 
and Conservation of Petroleum Resources in Louisiana," p. 459; Rankin 
was eventually jailed for using Conservation Department funds to pur­
chase the yacht for Governor Leche, then was sentenced to an additional 
5 years for his participation in the Longwood deal.
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candidates involved in the campaign who were forced to defend them­
selves against corruption charges in the conservation area. Erstwhile 
reformer James A. Noe also ran into criticism for his oil and gas 
dealings. On August 23, 1939, the Ouachita Parish grand jury returned 
indictments against W. D. Dark and 1. J. Melton, respectively manager 
and field agent of the Louisiana Conservation Department in northeast 
Louisiana, charging them with bribery in connection with the flow of 
gas wells in the area. Dark and Melton admitted their guilt but main­
tained that the principal beneficiaries of the deal were the people 
who had bribed them. The indictments stated that the men received 
$2,250 from the J. and H. Gas Company to permit it to acidize twelve 
well and thus increase their production. James A. Noe was listed as 
president and general manager of J. and H. and incorporation papers 
for the company listed Noe and Harold Wood as joint stockholders.
Noe quickly explained that, ’’Since the beginning of the Dick Leche- 
Earl Long administration, the independent oil and gas operators in 
this area have had to pay tribute to the indicted representatives of 
this vicious political machine,” and he added that the grand jury 
had examined all the evidence and had not indicted him. Governor 
Long, however, lost no opportunity to turn the glare of investigation 
away from the machine and onto Noe. He charged that "Noe used to run 
the conservation department" in Monroe, and that if Noe had nothing 
to hide, he should have reported the shakedowns instead of unlawfully 
paying them. L. J. Melton added that acidization of Noe's wells was 
a direct violation of a 1936 agreement among oil men in the region 
that they would refrain from using acid in their wells because 
continued use of acid caused an intrusion of salt water into the field,
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thus ruining it for further production. Melton also stated that Noe 
had not yet explained why he paid the two agents $666.66 in 1937 not 
to report him for producing excess gas from two of his wells by not 
having it properly metered. The money Noe called a "shakedown" 
to pay conservation department employees in order to operate his 
business, the Long machine maintained, was in fact a "bribe" paid by 
him to needy department officials who in turn allowed him to operate 
his wells illegally. The Progress, the administration newspaper, 
thereafter often pictured Noe in cartoons as the mother of two child­
ren, plump, well-dressed "Shakedown" for whom Noe provided the best 
care, and skinny, bedraggled "Bribe" whom Noe sought to disown.^
Administration officials correctly considered Noe and Sam Jones 
to be their most formidable opponents in the campaign and concentrated
44Times-Picayune, August 24-25, 1939; Item, September 17, 1939; Prog­
ress, various issues, August 1939-January 1940; Banta, "The Regulation 
and Conservation of Petroleum Resources in Louisiana," pp. 455-458. 
Noe's side of the argument is lent some credence by the fact that Dark 
and Melton were also indicted for accepting $1,000 from George D. Pipes 
ostensibly in exchange for protecting Pipes and Barlow Inabet from 
prosecution for violation of Louisiana conservation laws. They were 
never tried on this charge, however. See Supreme Court of Louisiana 
No. 35,665, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manu­
scripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton 
Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection); the Leche administra­
tion conservation department certainly was not above shady deals. W. 
Scott Heywood reported in 1939 that William Burton had appealed to 
Leche about the field agents in the Jennings field and Leche subse­
quently ordered Rankin to allow Burton to produce "around 5,000 bar­
rels" of oil per day per well, more than the other wells in the field. 
Heywood also maintained that Earl Long and Clements stopped that extra 
allowable. See Heywood to Mr. and Mrs. Gene Heywood, August 2, 1939, 
Heywood to Frank A. Smith, January 14, 1940, Jennings-Heywood Collec­
tion. The Item commented with much accuracy about the semantics of 
the episode that the logic in the "Bribery-Shakedown" incident "is 
more lengthy than convincing." See Item, September 12, 1939.
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most of their attacks on them. The anti-Noe campaign focused on con­
vincing the public that he had not earned his considerable wealth 
honestly and that he had somehow betrayed Huey Long when he broke with 
the machine following the 1936 nomination. Earl Long, for example, in 
one speech told his audience, "This Jimmie Noe has made plenty of 
money out of oil and gas when he was governor, taking it away from 
the school children of this state. .
The anti-Jones phase of their campaign sought to portray Jones 
as something of a "Bourbon" —  a conservative corporation lawyer who 
would turn back the clock by taking away all the state facilities and 
services that Huey Long and his heirs provided for the people. The 
Progress exclaimed that "Stuck-up Sam Jones, the High Sassiety (sic) 
Kid, of Lake Charles is to receive $100,000 for himself to run for 
governor of Louisiana as the candidate of the corporate interests." 
Long charged that Jones represented fifty corporations in his legal 
practice, a number which the Progress reduced to forty-three. The
governor warned Jones that "The people are not ready to turn this
46government over to the corporate interests."
Later during the heated campaign, Earl Long coined the famous 
phrase "High Hat Sam Jones, the High Society Kid, the High-Kicking, 
High and Mighty Snide Sam, the guy that (sic) pumps perfume under his 
arms" that haunted Jones throughout his political life. United States 
Senator Allen J. Ellender, speaking in behalf of Earl Long, told his
45Times-Picayune, September 5, 1939.
46Ibid., September 21, 1939; Progress, September 15, October 7, 1939.
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audience that "the opposition" wanted to turn the state back over to 
the "big hoys who haven't forgotten that the present regime made them 
turn over $8,000,000 in severance taxes, $3,500,000 in year in corpor­
ation franchise taxes, and $5,500,000 per year in income tax." Pre­
sumably the "big boys" were now out for revenge.̂
Jones, of course, did not allow these charges to appear unchal­
lenged. He repeatedly stressed his humble beginnings in rural Beaure­
gard Parish in his stump speeches and reminded voters that even though 
his law firm did handle corporation clients, he accepted only "honest" 
cases, corporate or otherwise, and moreover, he had been a member of 
the same law firm as former governor Alvin 0. King, whom Huey Long 
had made governor in his fight with Paul Cyr. If Huey had approved a 
governor whose legal firm handled corporate clients, why could not he 
(Jones) represent corporations? In addition, Jones reminded his lis­
teners that he had recently won a large judgement for some southwestern
48Louisiana rice farmers who had sued a milling corporation.
In Gueydan, Jones warned his audience that the administration 
would try to tell them he was against free school books, homestead ex­
emptions, the free right to vote, and old-age pensions, but he cited 
an article printed in the DeRidder Enterprise in 1920, in which Jones 
himself had advocated these measures. Speaking to a carpenter's 
union, Jones advocated Labor's right to organize, strike, and picket.
47Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 434-435; Item, November 17, 1939.
^Times-Picayune, October 1, 3, 5, 26, 1939. For a list of King's 
considerable corporate connections, see Sobel and Raimo, Biographical 
Directory of the Governors of the United States Volume II, pp. 583- 
584.
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His most pungent rebuttal to the "High Hat" charge, though, remained
his "My pappy was for Huey" phrase, repeated endlessly on the campaign
trail. But Jones failed to mention his father’s eventual disillusion-
49ment with Huey Long.
The charges and countercharges of both sides were briefly pushed 
from the front pages of state newspapers during early September, 1939. 
The European situation had steadily worsened since Adolph Hitler's 
rise to power as German chancellor in 1933. War finally erupted when 
Hitler ordered his armored columns to invade Poland during the early 
hours of September 1. England and France subsequently launched a fu­
tile effort to save Poland, and World War II spread across the European 
continent. The mood across the Atlantic, both in the United States 
and in Louisiana, was at first one of reluctance to envision any pos­
sibility of American involvement in the spreading war."̂
The outbreak of World War II immediately made the candidates’
World War I army records primary campaign topics as they sought to 
prove their patriotism. The only major candidate without a war record 
was Earl Long. Noe hastened to attack Long as a "slacker":
49Times-Picayune, October 15-16, 1939.
Jerry Purvis Sanson, "North Louisiana Press Opinion and the Begin­
ning of World War II," North Louisiana Historical Association Journal, 
Fall, 1980, pp. 33-36; Jerry Purvis Sanson, "Louisiana Public Opinion 
and the Beginning of World War II," paper presented to the Louisiana 
Historical Association convention, March 26, 1983; James MacGregor 
Burns, Roosevelt the Soldier of Freedom 1940-1945 (New York, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), pp..37, 41, 43; Robert Dallek, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945 (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1979), pp. 201, 228.
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I want to ask him where he was 21 years ago 
today (Armistice Day) . There never has been 
a greater slacker and draft dodger, i . Earl 
K. Long was in Texas dodging the draft. When 
the armistice was signed, a warrant was out for 
Earl Long’s arrest as a draft dodger.5*
Noe also sought to parallel the Long machine in Louisiana with Nazi 
Germany, characterizing the incumbent administration as "a political 
machine as evil and debauched as Adolph Hitler, Europe’s madman."
James H. Morrison joined the fray when he charged that the Louisiana 
administration even provided aid to Hitler by producing oil in excess 
of the allowable under the Connolly "Hot Oil" Act and selling the "hot" 
oil to Nazi Germany to be refined into airplane fuel. Pressing the 
same idea still further, Sam Jones declared that the Long machine had 
attempted to "Hitlerize" the school children of the state by having 
State Superintendent of Education T. H. Harris suggest to school prin­
ciples that if they could only afford one newspaper for their school,
52that paper should be the Progress.
Earl Long felt pressed to defend himself and his administration 
against any charge of disloyalty. He explained that he was living in 
Brownsville, Texas, during World War I, selling baking powder for $100 
per month plus expenses. With that money, he had helped to support 
one sister in Colorado suffering from tuberculosis and another widowed 
sister who was studying at the State Normal College at Natchitoches in 
order to support her children as a teacher. Long had sent the
 ̂̂Times-Picayune, November 12, 1939.
52Times-Picayune, September 10, November 4, December 19, 1939; States, 
December 19, 1939.
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Colorado sister $60 per month, the widowed sister $40 per month, and 
lived on the expense account. After investigation, his local draft 
board placed him in Class II. Class II of the 1917 Selective Ser­
vice Act.provided only temporary exemptions until the local board * s 
supply of Class I registrants was exhausted. Earl could be placed in 
this classification only by a strained interpretation of its first pro­
vision, which provided exemptions for registrants with both wife and 
children, or who were the father of motherless children, where the 
family was not solely dependent upon the registrant’s labor for sup­
port because "reasonably certain sources of support " (Huey?) were 
available. Actually, Earl’s situation could have more easily placed 
him in Class III, under Section A, providing exemption for a regis­
trant who was the main support of children not his own issue, or Sec­
tion C, a registrant with a helpless brother or sister, regardless of
53age, mainly dependent on his labor for support. Huey eventually 
offered to support their sisters, and Earl had reported promptly for 
induction. The draft board, however, told him that an armistice was
on the verge of being signed and that if he had a job, he need not
i. 54enlist.
Long’s explanation did nothing to defuse the opposition attacks. 
Noe remarked that he did not understand "how Earl Long . . .  can stand 
between the American flags and ask the people of Louisiana to elect
53The Classification Process, Special Monograph No. 5, Volume I Selec­
tive Service System (Washington, United States Government Printing Of­
fice, 1950), pp. 22-23.
54Times-Picayune, November 13, 1939.
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him governor," and that Long moved to Texas during the war not to pur­
sue his career but to escape the Winn Parish draft board. The States 
taunted the governor with a series of editorial cartoons deriding his 
supposed draft dodging, and then culminated its attack with a forceful 
editorial:
Sam Jones wore the uniform of his country during 
the World War. So did Jimmy Noe ...
But Earl Long wasn't there. He managed to keep 
himself out of khaki. He managed to keep a few 
jumps ahead of the draft board’s ’greetings’ 
peddling shoe polish along the way. When the 
draft board finally ran him down, he was at 
Brownsville, Texas, just across the border from 
Mexico. Earl Long did not fight for anything 
in 1917-18, except for a few dollars in commis­
sions.^
Long attempted to deflect criticism of his lack of army service 
by belittling Sam Jones' army experience. Noe had served overseas in 
the American Expeditionary Force, so he escaped this salvo, but Jones 
spent his World War I army days at Camp Beauregard north of Alexandria, 
Louisiana. Jones was initially a clerk of the Beauregard draft board 
because of his schooling at LSU and his familiarity with government 
forms, but he took the job only with the understanding that he would 
join the army reserves and be subject to call at any time. He was soon 
called into the army and applied for admission to the Army Artillery 
Officers Training School, but the armistice became effective before 
Jones received his appointment. Though Jones was never closer to 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany during the war than Alexandria, Louisiana,
^Item, October 9, 1939; New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribtme, November 12, 
1939; States, February 9, 13, 17, 1940.
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still he had served in uniform for seventeen months (September 29, 1917 
to February 28, 1919) during the conflict, eventually reaching the 
rank of sergeant, and he often reminded his audiences of his service 
to his country during the gubernatorial campaign.^
The Long forces made much of Jones' paltry war record, claiming 
that his war duties consisted of tending livestock at Camp Beauregard. 
The Progress later dubbed him "Mule Nurse Sam.Undaunted, Jones 
throughout the 1939-40 campaign clung to the image of a fighting pro­
tector of American liberty provided by his stateside service.
James A. Noe campaigned hardest for the support of World War I 
veterans vote. He attempted to convey the message that his overseas 
service gave him a special rapport with them. His campaign included 
veterans’ organizations throughout the state, including the "Jackson 
Brigade" charged with keeping the New Orleans vote count honest. Fol­
lowing his defeat in the first Democratic primary, he directed their 
efforts toward protecting fellow veteran Sam Jones' interests in the 
city.
Despite the sudden timeliness of the candidates' World War I army 
records —  or in Long's case, the absence of one —  the dominant issue 
of the campaign remained the corruption of the incumbent administra­
tion. Long attempted to dissociate himself from the Scandals, re­
minding voters that federal investigators had not indicted him. His
^Sam Jones to Denny Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection;
Maj. Gen. E. S- Adams to Allen J. Ellender, February 3, 1940, Ellender 
Collection; Angers, "Sam Houston Jones Reform Governor,” pp. 6, 12; 
States, January 15, 1945.
^Progress, February 16, 1940.
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opponents, however, charged that Long had either been a part of the 
systematic looting (despite his denials), or that if he had not actu­
ally known what was occurring, he was too stupid to be governor.
Jones stressed the "common honesty" theme of his campaign, 
charging that even "If Earl Long was deaf, dumb, and blind ... he 
should have known that something was rotten in Louisiana," and stating 
that, "Everybody in the state —  even the big majority of the job­
holders," now wanted to clean up Louisiana, and the organized re­
formers had only to see that the public sentiment was accurately 
counted at the polls. In a particularly vitriolic radio speech 
broadcast over WDSU, Jones said that, "The ancient Huns of the Old 
World were not so barbarous in their treatment of their enemies as
these people have been in the treatment of those who elected and 
58trusted them."
Former Senator Joseph Ransdell, whom Huey had retired from poli­
tics, endorsed Jones because "the state needs someone to lead it out 
of immorality, degradation, and dishonor into which it has fallen."
The state’s major newspapers endorsed Jones, and angry citizens 
joined groups with such names as the Fearless Democrats, the Citizens' 
Voluntary Committee of Louisiana, the Louisiana Association For Clean 
Government, and the People's League (chaired by young New Orleans at­
torney T. Hale Boggs), all designed to elect a reform governor of 
Louisiana. The Catholic church establishment joined in the general 
revulsion at the rampant corruption, but carefully avoided any appear­
ance of factional alliance. In February, 1940, Archbishop Francis
C Q Item, September 21, October 5, 16, 20, 1939.
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Rummel called on citizens to correct and atone
for all the public scandal, ugly crimes, 
flagrant injustices, slanders . . . dis­
turbing agitators which have during the 
past eight months poisoned our atmosphere, 
shocked the sensibilities and wounded the 
pride of honorable citizens, humiliating 
our state before the nation, and threatening 
to undermine its credit.59
The New Orleans Catholic newspaper added its hopes that "the shock of 
the recent revelations of scandals instill(s)- a firm resolution in the 
people to cherish the franchise of freedom before it is too late" and 
defended Rummel*s foray into politics: "Those of the priesthood should
counsel and encourage the people to the performance of their duty, to 
an honest use of their American birthright, the Ballot (sic) . .
•v
A minor adaptation of the general appeal of reformism developed 
in New Orleans, where Sam Jones and his supporters likened their cru­
sade to that of the White Leaguers who had worked to end what many 
New Orleanians considered the dictatorship of Reconstruction. Jones 
spoke at the Liberty Monument at the foot of Canal Street, and the 
States editorially asked the people to "Vote as They (the White 
Leaguers) Would Vote" —  for liberation and against tyranny. James 
Morrison charged that each of Earl Long’s rallies cost the state 
$4,000 and maintained that a vote for Earl Long would be cast only
59Times-Picayune, November 24, 1939; Shreveport Times, January 7, 1940; 
Item, November 29, 1939, January 3, February 19, 1940; Howell, Louisi­
ana Sugar Plantations, Mardi Gras, and Huey Long, p. 169.
^New Orleans The Catholic Herald, February 15, 1940.
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"by one who has no respect for America or Louisiana-
Earl Long and his allies countered this barrage of criticism with 
the political means at their disposal, legal, illegal, and question­
able. The governor was an effective stump speaker, amply able to con­
duct his own defense, but even he called upon the eloquent Gerald 
L. K. Smith to join him on the stage to deliver a fervent appeal to 
the voters not to let Huey down by repudiating the machine: "If you
want to know who to be against, find out who the devil is for." Earl
also called upon Huey’s widow, Rose, to join in a few rallies and
simply ask the audience to vote for him. Illegally, state trucks and 
employees continued distributing the Progress. Questionably, Dr. E.
L. Sanderson, Superintendent of the Shreveport Charity Hospital sent 
a form letter to the parents of student nurses studying at the facil­
ity, asking them to support Long: "If you have no special reason for
supporting someone else for governor, we shall consider it a great 
help to this institution if you will help us to elect him.” State
workers also glued Earl Long posters to the Orleans civil court
building on Royal Street while city officials refused permission to 
Jones and Morrison workers to place their political posters on public
Pbuildings already bearing Long posters. Civil Sheriff Louis Knopf re­
fused to allow Noe workers to photocopy Orleans parish poll lists so
62they could carefully check their accuracy.
^ Item, October 18, November 29, 1939.
62 . . .Times-Picayune, January 4, February 8, 1940; Progress, February 16,
1940; Item, November 16, December 20, 1939; States, November 6, Decem­
ber 4-5, 21, 1939; Earl Long circular, January 14, 1940, Ellender Col­
lection .
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The effect of the Scandals and the continued anti-Long effort to 
focus the campaign on them was revealed in December, 1939, when a new 
campaign device burst upon the Louisiana political scene. On December 
17, Dr. George Gallup began releasing the results of a public opinion 
poll his American Institute of Public Opinion had conducted in Louisi­
ana earlier in the month. A sample of 2,500 Louisianians revealed 
that Long and Jones were running even in public support with thirty- 
four percent of the straw vote, Noe was in second place with twenty 
per cent, Morrison third with ten per cent, and Moseley fourth with 
two per cent. These findings indicated that voter support of the Long 
machine had severely eroded since Leche’s rout of Cleveland Dear in 
1936. Even more ominous for the Longites were predictions that a
Jones-Long second primary would result in Jones receiving fifty-eight
63per cent of the vote and Long forty-two per cent.
The pollsters also asked other questions which revealed the lack 
of confidence in state government felt by Louisianians in 1939. When 
asked, "Do you think elections in Louisiana in recent years have been 
honestly conducted?" Louisiana voters responded: Honest - twenty-
five per cent, Dishonest - sixty percent, No opinion - fifteen per cent. 
Asked "Do you think that if the present state administration is re­
turned to office next year it will ’clean house’ in the state govern­
ment?", those polled responded: Yes - thirty percent, No - fifty-one
percent, No opinion - nineteen per cent. Asked "Do you think that
George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, The Pulse of Democracy (New York, 
Simon and Shuster, 1940), pp. 156-158; Sunday Item-Tribune, December 
17, 1939; Times-Picayune, December 24, 1939.
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state courts are honest?" they responded: Yes - thirty-six per cent,
No - forty per cent, No opinion - twenty-four per cent. Despite the
opinion revealed in these questions, a fourth question substantiated
the enduring legend of the man who had set the stage for the political
situation which many Louisianians had come to deplore. Asked "Taking
everything into consideration, do you think that Huey P. Long was a
bad or good influence in Louisiana? Louisianians responded: Good -
fifty-five per cent, Bad - twenty-two percent, Both - fourteen per
64cent, No opinion - nine per cent.
Even beyond these numbers, however, the Gallup pollsters made a 
chilling empirical assessment of Louisiana's political culture: "The
Institute has never found, in any state, on any question, such wide­
spread reluctance to speak and such guardedness in replies." The 
pollsters found fear of expressing an opinion more common in the 
poorer sections of the state, and more common in men than in women, 
though some women interviewed alone commented that "My husband has 
told me not to talk to anybody about state politics." Overall, one 
person in five indicated their reluctance to talk for fear of politi­
cal or personal reprisals. Their fears were not unjustified. When 
told that some respondents thought Huey Long had been a bad influence 
on the state, one man replied:
64Gallup and Rae, The Pulse of Democracy, pp. 156-158; Kane, Louisiana 
Hayride, p. 440; Item, December 20, 22, 1939; Sindler, Huey Long's 
Louisiana, pp. 115-116 includes a revealing further breakdown of the 
statewide figures on the last question showing that Longism had made 
heavy inroads into the middle class which should normally abhor a per­
version of democracy. Sindler attributes this anomaly to the voters’ 
disgust with Louisiana's political system before Huey Long.
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I wish you’d show me the ones that says (sic) 
he was a bad influence! I’ll report 'em (sic) 
tomorrow and they’ll sure lose their jobs fast.
You are probably a Long man, and you'll prob­
ably report them before I can, but I sure wish 
you’d let me do it.̂ 5
Reaction to the results of the.poll were understandably mixed.
Long thought the poll "ridiculous." The Progress charged that the 
Gallup organization came to Louisiana solely to rig the election, and 
in an attempt to discredit the results made the racial slur that the 
Gallup team included "a Harlem nigger (sic) in a double-breasted suit." 
Noe and Moseley had no comment; Morrison instructed his listeners to 
"pay no attention to this poll." Jones’ forces, however, used the re­
sults to their advantage. In a circular repeating the results, Jones
rhetorically told Long that "it may not be that you are beaten —  but
66you are at least found out."
The political threat to the machine revealed in the Gallup poll 
results led to the revival of a practice rarely used by Longites: 
raising the race issue when forced into a political corner. The Long 
machine threaded racist attacks throughout the campaign. When Dudley 
LeBlanc withdrew as a candidate on October 23, 1939, all sides hoped 
to inherit his sizeable Cajun support. LeBlanc endorsed Jones on 
October 25 and thus inspired a racist attack on the Jones camp. The
Sunday Item-Tribune, December 17, 1939.
^Sam Jones Circular, December 20, 1939, Aswell Collection; F. Edward 
Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of the Titans" The Life and Times of 
Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center 
for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1976), 
p. 145.
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Progress printed a picture of two black children holding Jones signs 
and literature. In an attempt to blunt the impetus given Jones’ 
campaign by LeBlanc’s endorsement, the newspaper noted that black 
support had come to Jones along with LeBlanc.̂  Obviously, the Long 
machine wished to persuade its white supporters where sympathy for 
blacks lay, and that a vote for Longism was a vote against presumed 
"nigger lovers" —  Jones and his followers.
As the campaign neared the first Democratic primary, United 
States Senator Allen J. Ellender made several speeches in an attempt 
to help Earl Long win the election. Speaking at the governor’s final 
New Orleans rally, Ellender charged that federal prosecutor 0. John 
Rogge came to Louisiana charged by the Justice Department with estab­
lishing the right of properly qualified blacks to vote in the election 
; and dared Rogge to perform his duty. Ellender soon expanded on the 
same charge. The day after his initial comments, he declared from the 
stump that, "If you people don’t watch out, in 10 or 15 years the fed­
eral government will be in charge of all your elections and the 
darkies will be voting." He held out hope, though, taking comfort in 
the fact that there were "too many good white citizens in Louisiana 
who remember the carpetbag days, when Negroes voted and held office,
^Progress, December 22, 1939; Item, October 26, 1939; Floyd Martin 
Clay, Coozan Dudley LeBlanc From Huey Long to Hadacol (Gretna, Louisi­
ana, Pelican Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 132-133; Trent Angers, "The 
Three Faces of Dudley LeBlanc," Acadiana Profile, Second Quarter, 1977, 
pp. 47-48, 58. Louisiana political folk wisdom held that LeBlanc 
strongly controlled 5,000 to 6,000 "Cajun" votes, a sizeable number in 
a close election. C. A. Shaw to David C. Pipes, October 2, 1940, Pipes 
to R. H. Chadwick, September 26, 1940, David C. Pipes Papers, Division 
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge.
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to permit any federal interference in state affairs." Earl Long did 
not join in this blast. During Ellender*s attack, he satisfied him­
self with calling the opposition candidates "filth chunkers and brow- 
beaters" and declaring that "I have been carrying on like Huey P. Long, 
Oscar Allen, Jesus Christ, and God Almighty would have me do." (His 
campaign stationery bore the motto: "Carrying On the Work of Huey and
O.K.").68
Despite the Long machine's efforts, Earl Long was not successful 
in this campaign. The Governor garnered more votes than any other 
candidate in the first Democratic primary, 226,385 to Jones’ 154,936; 
Noe's 116,564; Morrison's 48,243; or Moseley's 7,595, but he carried 
only nine parishes and failed to win the nomination outright as he 
had often boasted he would do. As the campaign wound into the second 
primary, the Progress descended into a blatantly racist appeal for 
votes. In its last edition published before the second primary, the 
newspaper reprinted facsimiles of the February 10, 1940, issues of the 
Louisiana Weekly, which it called "the largest Negro newspaper in the 
South," and the Sepia Socialite, so-called "No. 2 Negro newspaper in 
New Orleans." The sole purpose of these reprints was to appeal to 
the racism of white voters. A passage quoted from the Louisiana 
Weekly showed the Long machine as a staunch defender of white suprem­
acy:
Feeble attempts were made during the day (the
gg .....................................
Times-Picayune, January 14-15, 1940; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 
446-447; Earl K. Long to W. Scott Heywood, December 11, 1939, Jennings- 
Heywood Collection.
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first primary) at various polls throughout 
the city (New Orleans), by courageous Negroes, 
to call the bluff of the faomastic Mr. Ellender 
. . .  but to no avail. The Long machine 
crashed their hopes. The Negro was told that 
'this is a white man's primary.' Commissioners 
for both Mr. Jones and Mr. Noe argued that the 
Negro was entitled to vote, but the Old Regu­
lars thought differently, and their thoughts 
were conclusive.
Slyly attacking the opposition's war record, the Progress further 
quoted that:
Another advantage that the Negro who fought in 
World War No. 1 has is the comradeship of Mr.
Jones and Senator Noe. The sterling qualities 
possessed by these gentlemen will permeate down 
throughout the past system giving impetus to 
. . .  the birth of enfranchisement.
The Progress's editorial comment about the black newspapers’ endorse­
ment of Jones went even further in racist rhetoric:
Sam sure is making gains with the coons. He 
charms them with some kind of sex appeal. Look 
what this nigger (sic) newspaper say about Sam. 
This Negro 'society newspaper' attacks Governor 
Long for not letting the Negroes vote in the 
Democratic primaries and praises Sam Jones for 
the battle he is making in behalf of the coons. 
'We are against Earl Long because he takes the 
stand that the Democratic primary is a white 
man's election’ says this Sam Jones Negro news­
paper. The Sepia Socialite says that 'Sam Jones 
is the white hope of the black man.'69
Even though Jones and Noe ignored the attacks, many reform elements
69Progress, February 16, 1940; Alexander Heard and Donald S. Strong, 
Southern Primaries and Elections 1920-1949 (University, Alabama, 
University of Alabama Press, 1950), p. 70.
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in Louisiana condemned the Long machine for this ugly phase of the 
campaign. The Item editorialized that "we can't recall in 35 years 
any political faction that has departed so far from decency to raise 
the race-issue (sic) among Democrats, or even so-called Democrats, in 
this state," while the States commented that "The Maestri-Long-Leche 
machine has stooped to foul means of any sorts (sic) in the effort to 
win this election, but the most venal and contemptible plot it has 
yet engineered was its clumsy attempt to promote race animosity and 
class strife."^
The statement of James E. Wilkins, president of the New Orleans 
branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, raised a pertinent question about the entire episode: why
did the Long machine choose this time to raise the race issue?
The local branch of the NAACP resents the injec­
tion of the Negro into the Democratic primary 
campaign after every known scheme has been used 
to prevent this minority group of American citi­
zens from voting . . .  In our present voiceless 
state whoever emerges victorious on February 20,
1940 (the second Democratic primary) is of little 
concern to us.
Louisiana voting rolls in 1939 reflected approximately four decades 
of systematic disfranchisement. After all, it was not until 1944 
that the first blacks since disfranchisement in the early 1900s regis­
tered to vote in Rapides parish, and Assistant Registrar of Voters in 
Tangipahoa parish, Merle S. Weigel, wrote to her soldier-husband in
^Item, February 14, 1940; States, February 27, 1940.
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1944 that no blacks had registered yet in that parish.No "black 
threat" existed in Louisiana in 1939 comparable to that which existed 
during the 1890s and before by which unscrupulous Democratic poli­
ticians safely kept white voters in line. The votes necessary to 
create this "threat" simply did not exist in the black communities.
In 1940, only 886 black voters were registered in the entire state.
72They constituted .1 per cent of.the total registration. Neverthe­
less, and in desperation, the Long machine had used the threat of a 
fictitious black vote to capitalize on the ingrained fears and preju­
dices of the white community.
A full account of the Louisiana Weekly and Sepia Socialite 
articles reveals a trail of greed and misplaced zeal. The Louisiana 
Weekly editor, C. C. Dejoie, Jr., stated in an affidavit executed be­
fore notary public T. Hale Boggs that the articles he published were 
brought in to his office by James B. LaFourche, who paid for their 
insertion. He identified LaFourche as a black man who performed odd 
jobs for the police department and also for "a lawyer known to support 
the administration." LaFourche subsequently issued his own affidavit 
in which he stated that he wrote and inserted articles in the two 
newspapers in an effort to make money. He had heard that the Long
^Item, February 16, 1940; Alexandria Daily Town Talk (hereinafter 
cited as Town Talk), August 8, 1944; Merle S. Weigel to H. S. Weigel, 
August 11, 1944, H. S. Weigel and Family Papers, Division of Archives 
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge.
72Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 422; Riley E. Baker, 
"Negro Voter Registration in Louisiana, 1879-1964," Louisiana Studies, 
Winter, 1965, pp. 335, 338. It was not until 1964 that every parish 
in Louisiana had some blacks registered to vote.
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machine had sought to buy 450,000 copies of a black newspaper carrying 
an article asking 0. John Rogge to help blacks get the vote and sug­
gesting that Jones and Noe were willing to aid such a move. Keeping 
an eye on the main chance, LaFourche arranged with one of the papers 
to receive two cents royalty on the sale of each copy above the normal 
circulation. The Long machine subsequently purchased extra copies of 
the newspaper issues carrying LaFourche's articles, but when he heard 
them misrepresented in a radio address, he went to Jones headquarters 
and agreed not to write any more of them, commenting ". . .my only
idea was to agitate for civil rights of Negroes with an increased cir-
73culation of the papers out of which I would realize a profit." Even 
though crass commercial greed lay behind the publication of the 
articles, the Long machine bears sole responsibility for injecting the 
race issue into the campaign.
The major event of the second Democratic primary occurred when 
Noe endorsed Jones "1000 per cent" and actively campaigned for his 
election. Even though Jones' hopes for election brightened consider­
ably as he finished.second in the first primary, he welcomed Noe's 
support. The Progress detected a political deal in the Jones-Noe 
arrangement. Articles in the newspaper charged that Noe received 
$150,000 for his endorsement, and cartoons appearing in the paper 
showed Noe clutching a money bag labeled "$150,000" and dressed in a 
"Mark Hanna" suit covered with dollar signs. In fact, Jones and Noe 
had reached an agreement, but not exclusively for money. Instead,
^Item, February 14, 16, 1940.
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their "deal" included the stipulation that the Jones organization 
would pay Noe's campaign expenses and ironically, that fifty per cent 
of the state patronage jobs would be reserved for Noe's supporters 
after the election, even though Jones had promised to create an effec­
tive Civil Service. Morrison refused to endorse either Long or Jones 
and announced that he was "going fishing" on election day, though 
Jones claimed that thousands of Morrison supporters were flocking to
7his campaign. Moseley also did not participate in the second primary.
The second primary combination of Jones and Noe proved too power­
ful for Earl Long to overcome. Even the threat of massed troops could 
not sway voters for Long. On the eve of the second Democratic primary, 
Governor Long ordered the Louisiana National Guard to be ready to move 
in case of disorders at the polls. In nineteen cities throughout the 
state, 3,500 men were on call during election day. To counter this 
threat and also any attempted vote-stealing in the election, Noe en­
listed more volunteers in his "Jackson Brigade."7'’
Earl Long lost the Democratic nomination for governor when the 
voters in the second primary gave him 261,790 votes (48.2 per cent) 
compared to Jones' 282,470 (51.8 per cent), but Long was not yet ready 
to retire to his Winnfield farm. The Governor attempted to continue
74Progress, January 19, 1940; Times-Picayune, January 20, 25, 1940; 
Deutsch, "New Orleans Politics," p. 329; Howell, Louisiana Sugar 
Plantations, Mardi Gras and Huey P. Long, pp. 170-171; Kane, Louisiana 
Hayride, pp. 443-444; Mrs. Louise Jones to Jerry Purvis Sanson, August 
4, 1982, author's collection; Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Ti­
tans,", p. 149.
7^Times-Picayune, February 13, 20, 1940; Item, February 9, 1940;
States, February 9, 1940.
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in a lesser state office after the death of incumbent Secretary of 
State E. A. Conway on February 18, 1940. Conway had won renomination 
over reform candidate James Gremillion, but died just before the 
second primary. Long appointed E. A. Conway, Jr. to fill the remainder 
of his father's term. Meanwhile, several possible candidates emerged 
for the four year term to be filled in the general election. The 
leading contenders for the post were Long and Conway, Jr.^
The Long-dominated Democratic State Central Committee elected in 
1936 selected Long as the new Democratic nominee, but reform members 
of the "new" Democratic State Central Committee elected in 1940 ob­
jected to the selection and maintained that their committee should 
select the nominee. Sam Jones reached a settlement with Wade 0.
Martin, Sr., chairman of the "old" (1936) committee, in which Martin 
agreed to call his committee into session again to replace Long with 
a nominee more compatible with the governor-elect. The 1936 committee 
on March 2, 1940, rescinded its earlier nomination and nominated Gre­
million, and the 1940 committee meeting the same day reaffirmed that 
77actxon.
Earl Long immediately appealed to East Baton Rouge District Court 
Judge James D. Womack for a court order blocking Gremillion's certi­
fication as the legal candidate in the general election, but Jones'
^Times-Picayune, February 23, 1940; Item, February 19, 1940; Heard 
and Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections, p. 71.
^Times-Picayune, February 23, 25, 28, March 3, 1940; Baton Rouge 
Morning Advocate, March 1, 1940.
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forces blocked this maneuver by filing a petition for application of 
writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court asking that Womack be relieved 
of all jurisdiction in the struggle. The high court agreed that dis­
trict courts did not have jurisdiction in such cases and later dis­
missed Long's suit, stating that he had no legal basis for contesting
78Gremillion's nomination. The Supreme Court ruling was the end of 
Long's dream of retaining office in 1940.
The campaign of 1939-1940 was at last over. Jones still faced 
token opposition in the general election from Republican William 
Tuttle of New Orleans but did not bother to campaign against him. The 
miniscule Louisiana Republican party was split into two warring fac­
tions, and the Democratic nomination was then tantamount to election. 
The general election results were: Jones 225,841 and Tuttle 1,367.
The April general election merely lent a final stamp of authority to 
the vigorous reform movement now ready to do battle with the Long 
machine at every turn. That running battle lasted twenty-four years 
until a brief reappearance of the race issue following civil rights 
developments in the 1950s, and the unique homogenizing campaign of
John McKeithen for the governorship in 1964 obliterated the last
*
JQTimes-Picayune, March 3, 1940; Ibid., March 8, 1940; Ibid., March 9, 
13, 1940. One casualty of Long's fight was Angola Warden Louie A. 
Jones. Long discharged him because Jones gave his proxy to the oppo­
sition side in the nominating struggle in the "old" committee. Jones 
was subsequently appointed Angola farm superintendent by Angola gen­
eral manager Theophile S. Landry who had also given his proxy to the 
opponents, but was protected from Long's wrath because his job re­
quired Senate confirmation. See Times-Picayune, March 14, 1940, 
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, March 17, 1940.
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79vestiges of the classic bifactionalism in Louisiana.
Reform-minded commentators throughout the state and nation hailed 
Jones’ victory as a triumph also for the democratic principles of 
government. Jones, however, saw his election not as a final triumph, 
but only as a beginning. He commented in an interview after the 
second Democratic primary that, "We have got to restore decent, demo­
cratic government and enact legislation that will prevent the recur­
rence of debauchery, corruption and dictatorship that has character­
ized Louisiana in recent years," and he reminded the people of Louisi­
ana in his inaugural address that, "Once again yours is the dictator­
ship, the dictatorship of the whole people over the men who serve
80them, the only kind of dictatorship that a Democracy can abide."
Even though he acknowledged his debt to Noe and to the reformers 
who had helped him from the beginning of the campaign, Jones also
79Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics 
Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York, Basic 
Books, Inc., 1976), pp. 166-167; Perry H. Howard, "Louisiana Resis­
tance and Change," in The Changing Politics of the South, ed. by Wil­
liam C. Havard (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 
pp. 561-566; Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, pp. 386-389; 
States, January 31, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, March 24, 
1940; Official Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of 
Louisiana at the Tenth Regular Session of the Legislature (Baton Rouge, 
Thomas J. Moran’s Sons, 1940), pp. 10-11. Tuttle received no votes in 
sixteen parishes and one vote in five parishes. His highest parish 
total was 698 in Orleans, compared to Jones* 82,622 in Orleans.
80Sam Jones inaugural address, Aswell Collection; Tom Dutton, "Sam 
Houston Jones: Louisiana’s Liberator,” The Christian Science Monitor
Magazine, April 27, 1940; James C. Crown, "Louisiana’s David," New 
York Times Magazine, March 3, 1940; Alva Johnston, "Louisiana Revolu­
tion," The Saturday Evening Post, May 11, 1940; "The Whole People," 
Acadiana Profile, October/November 1971, p. 6; Times-Picayune, Febru­
ary 22, 1940; Shreveport Times, February 12, 1940; Jones to Denny 
Daughery, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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acknowledged the importance of the help he had received from Louisi­
ana’s women voters: "It can safely be said that a good many thousands
of wives of state and city officials voted against their own husbands 
who drew their pay from the political payrolls." With the secret bal­
lot, of course, his estimate is unverifiable, but it does echo the 
sentiments of organized reform women’s groups and of Mrs. James A.
Noe who took to the stump to urge women to vote for her husband in
81the first primary and then Jones, in the second primary.
While the reformers exulted in their victory, the Longites con­
soled each other and tried to put together what had gone wrong. T.
H. Harris, defeated candidate for re-election as State Superintendent 
of Education on the Long ticket, stated simply that the Long slate 
lost because the votes of the candidates who had been eliminated in 
the first primary went to their opponents in the second primary. 
Jennings oil man w. Scott Heywood, who had campaigned for Long in the 
first primary, concluded that Long lost because he was "double-crossed 
by the school teachers, the bus drivers, and the truck owners;" and 
because Jones had promised a $3 fee for automobile licenses, a fifty 
per cent reduction in the fee for truck licenses, and twelve months 
pay for school teachers, even though Long had maintained that the 
state could not afford such favors. Long himself provided the most 
fitting epitaph for his 1939-1940 troubles when he wrote eight years 
later: "They charged me with being politically and personally dis­
honest, and there was no way on earth, at that time, for me to prove
-----------------Jones to Daugherty, July 22, 1970; Jones interviewed by Daugherty, 
May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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82that their contemptible accusations were untrue."
As Long's ally, United States Senator Allen Ellender surveyed the
political situation in the early spring of 1940, he took comfort in
the fact that "We put up a good fight, but the odds were against us."
Ellender looked forward to a friendlier political climate in the
future: "Right now sentiment is swinging the Jones way, but I predict
83that the people will soon wake up and realize their mistake." The 
Long machine and its allies lay in wait for Sam Jones. Its articulate 
spokesmen still sat in the national and state Houses of Representatives 
and Senate, and in parish courthouses and city halls throughout the 
state. Jones began his administration in a state filled with expec­
tation. The reformers expected a vigorous assault on the abuses of 
the previous administrations, the Longites expected Jones to turn back 
the clock to a pre-Huey Long time, obliterate state services and thus 
lose his thin margin of support.
Sam Jones' victory in the 1939-1940 gubernatorial campaign, while 
important because it established effective bifactionalism in Louisi­
ana, was incomplete. He had no sweeping mandate from the voters. In­
deed, even with the help given his campaign by the revelation of the 
Scandals, he received only fifty-two per cent of the second primary
82W. Scott Heywood to Gene B. Heywood, February 27, 1940, Jennings- 
Heywood Collection; Earl K. Long to John B. Fournet, Fournet Collec­
tion; T. H. Harris, The Memoirs of T. H. Harris State Superintendent 
of Public Education in Louisiana 1908—1940 (Baton Rouge, Bureau of 
Educational Materials and Research, College of Education, Louisiana 
State University, 1963), p. 191.
83Allen J. Ellender to Donald A. Draughon, March 5, 1940, Ellender 
Collection.
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ft/vote compared to Earl Long’s forty-eight per cent.
Brief analysis of the 1940 second Democratic primary..results, the 
election which most clearly revealed the Long/anti—Long cleavage in 
that year, reveals that Longism remained strong in its traditional 
home base in the north Louisiana hills. Earl Long carried fourteen 
of the twenty—seven north Louisiana parishes. Moreover, eleven of 
those parishes gave him at least 53.3 per cent of their vote. South­
west Louisiana, Sam Jones’ home territory, also voted heavily Longite. 
Allen parish gave Long 57.4 per cent of its vote, compared to 42.6 
per cent for Jones; Cameron parish went 55.7 per cent for Long and
44.3 per cent for Jones. In addition, Jones' native Beauregard parish 
split almost evenly (50.9 per cent Long, 49.1 per cent Jones). Only 
in his adopted Calcasieu parish (55.9 percent to 44.1 per cent) and 
neighboring Jefferson Davis (60.3 per cent to 39.7 per cent) did Jones 
do well in his native area.
The reformers found much more support in south Louisiana. Jones 
swept the twenty-four south Louisiana parishes with the exception of 
four. Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines parishes voted for Long as 
a result of alliances between the Longites and Old Regulars in Orleans 
and Leander Perez in St. Bernard and Plaquemines. Long carried the 
fourth "Longite" south Louisiana parish, St. James, by only five votes. 
In addition, south Louisiana contained six of the sixteen parishes 
statewide giving Long the lowest percentage of their vote.
84 .Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 264.
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The Florida parishes remained a center of anti-Longism in this 
election- with Long carrying only Washington parish. The two bastions 
of reform sentiment in this region were East Feliciana, which voted 
for Jones 61.1 per cent to 38.9 per cent, and East Baton Rouge, 65.9 
per cent for Jones, 34.1 per cent for Long.
A survey of the 1940 Longite vote also reveals that the faction 
continued to obtain stronger support in the rural areas of the state 
than in the urban area. Louisiana then contained six parishes which 
either were urban or contained one of the state’s largest cities.
Earl Long carried only one of these: boss-controlled Orleans, by
55.3 per cent to Jones' 44.7 per cent. Jones carried the other five: 
East Baton Rouge and Calcasieu by the totals noted above; Rapides by 
57.6 per cent to 42.4 per cent; Ouachita by 62.5 per cent to 37.5 per 
cent; and Caddo by. 66.9 per cent to 33.1 per cent. Moreover, Jones 
also carried the nascent "bedroom suburbs" of Jefferson parish (56.8 
per cent to 43.2 per cent) and St. Tammany (53.0 per cent to 47.0 per 
cent).
Despite the large number of parishes he carried, however, Jones 
still won only a narrow victory, carrying eight of his forty-one 
parishes by a five per cent or less margin of victory. Moreover, he 
failed to carry all the members of his ticket into state office: re­
formers won in the races for Attorney General, Superintendent of Pub­
lic Education, and Secretary of State, while independent reformer A.
P. Tugwell retained the State Treasurer’s office, and Longite hold­
overs remained as Registrar of State Lands and Commissioner of Agri­
culture.
More importantly, Jones’ supporters did not win a majority of
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seats in the legislature. One estimate divided the House of Represen­
tatives into sixty-one or sixty-two "independent" members to thirty-
eight or thirty-nine Longites, and divided the Senate into twenty-
85four Jones supporters compared to fifteen for Long. This estimate
appears to have been generous. Other observers found much less
Jones support in the legislature, as few as seven Senators and four-
86teen Representatives prominently aligned with him. Jones later
claimed at most thirty-five supporters in the House and fifteen in 
87the Senate.
Jones, therefore, was not able to act independently and tear the 
Long machine "leaf from twig" as he had promised during the campaign. 
Because of his partial victory, he was forced to compromise on some 
of his measures in order to establish any of his reform program. His 
compromises disillusioned some of his followers who expected a pris­
tine reform unsullied by any hint of "politics as usual," but Jones 
cannot be realistically faulted for agreeing to compromise. His bed­
rock supporters, ardent but politically inexperienced, were not numer­
ous enough to pass his legislation by themselves. Jones counted his
political ability as the prime reason he was able to hold together and
88enlarge his legislative following enough to pass his program. His 
Morning Advocate, February 22, 1940.
QfLStates, May 13, 1940.
87Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1940, Daugherty Collection.
88Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 177-178; W. V. Holloway, "The 
Crash of the Long Machine and Its Aftermath," Journal of Politics, 
August, 1941, pp. 348-362.
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appraisal should be considered accurate. He had no reliable legisla­
tive majority for his proposals, and the residual strength of the 
Longite organization, discredited but not destroyed, became apparent 
during the 1940 and 1942 legislative sessions and in a series of law 
suits challenging Jones' program when passed. His election indicated 
a temporary popularity of reformism in Louisiana, but in its narrow­
ness it bore the seeds of an uneasy tenure in office.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III
SAM JONES AND THE BEGINNING OF REFORM (1940-1941)
Following his victory in the February second Democratic primary, 
Sam Jones left for Tucson, Arizona, and a vacation at the home of his 
wife’s parents.* During his lame duck period between the February 
primary and Jones’ inauguration in May, however, Earl Long sought to 
maintain Longite influence in state government. In one move, Wade J. 
Gamier of Amite resigned from the Louisiana Milk Commission in April 
rather than continue serving until August when his term would expire 
(thus giving Jones an appointment). Long then appointed State Repre­
sentative R. C. Hathorn to replace Garnier for the four remaining 
months and appointed Garnier to fill a new six-year term. He also ap­
pointed L. H. Bowden to fill a vacant term expiring in 1942. Henry 
Vernon, the other commissioner, had served only two years of his
original eight-year appointment and thus had six years remaining on 
2the board.
Long also attempted to help five New Orleans men convicted of 
attacking Jones supporters at the polls during the recent primaries. 
The five men were all political henchmen of Longite leader Philip 
"Nina’’ Patorno, who lived next door to the polling place of Orleans 
Parish’s Ward 5, Precinct 1 on Dumaine Street. Judge Frank T. 
Echezabal sentenced each of the five to a six-month term in prison.
*New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 29, March 4, 29, 1940.
2Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 19, 1940 (hereinafter cited as 
Town Talk).
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Long granted each man a reprieve so he could ask for clemency before a
special meeting of the State Board of Pardons- Long’s maneuver proved
3ineffective when the pardon board denied all five requests.
Even though Long still sat in the governor’s chair and occasion­
ally used his official power to the machine's advantage, the state’s 
attention focused on the incoming Jones administration. Jones an­
nounced that his inauguration would be held in Louisiana State Univer­
sity's horseshoe-shaped football stadium. His planning committee 
hoped to seat 60,000 people in the stands and crowd the rest of the 
expected 125,000 people in the end zones and on the field. They also 
planned a huge barbeque of at least 800 cattle and 250,000 hams to 
be washed down with 300 barrels of lemonade. In an attempt to dis­
credit the "High Hat" label put on him during the campaign by Earl 
Long, Jones announced that the inauguration would be run "in the most 
democratic way possible” and promised, "We'll find room for as many 
as appear.” ’ Jones also sought to dispel the corporation lawyer image 
Long had attached to him by making his first speech as governor-elect 
to the Louisiana State Federation of Labor convention in Shreveport.
In this speech Jones promised to appoint a "real labor man" as labor 
commissioner; recommended that labor leaders continue their work to 
improve the economic condition of their members ("I have no respect 
for any organization that does not"); but also warned that labor’s
“3Times-Picayune, April 26, May 4, 1940. Patomo eluded justice by 
committing suicide May 8, 1940, the day of his delayed sentencing. 
Times-Picayune, May 9, 1940.
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4legitimate work could best be continued outside politics.
Inauguration day, May 14, 1940,- was a busy time for Jones. The 
festivities began at 9:00 in the morning with a parade from his 
Heidelberg Hotel headquarters in downtown Baton Rouge to the LSU cam­
pus, followed by a song festival in the LSU stadium at 11:30 (which 
included old favorites such as "Hail, Hail, The Gang’s All Here,"
"Home on the Range," and "God Bless America," as well as a new compo­
sition entitled "How Do You Do Sam Jones?"). The swearing-in ceremony 
began at 12:00 noon as Louisiana Chief Justice Charles P. O’Neill ad­
ministered the oath of office. In his inaugural address, Jones paid 
homage to the investigators who uncovered the Louisiana Scandals 
(". . . I take my high hat off to the unflagging courage of our press 
. . .”); cautioned his followers not to expect a free disbursement of 
public jobs ("do not make my administration," he said, "... an ob­
scene scramble for places at the public trough"); promised that the 
state police would no longer be used as political instruments of the 
state administration (they "will cease, to be a political gestapo, 
modeled on Hitler's best efforts"); promised to destroy completely 
all vestiges of the Long machine and repair its damage to political 
democracy in Louisiana; and compared the hopelessness of the European 
situation with the hopeful developments in Louisiana ("With the lights 
out in Europe, with democracy dead and dying . . .  it is as inspiring 
a task as we could set ourselves —  the restoration of thriving, un­
shakable democracy here in one great state of this Union."). The new
—4 .....New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, March 31, 1940; Town
Talk, April 4, 1940.
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governor's audience interrupted his speech with cheers and applause,
and as he concluded with "God Bless Louisiana," they gave h-i-m a
standing ovation."*
Afternoon inaugural festivities included the barbeque at 1:00
and block dances before the LSU Memorial Tower, on the old and new
capitol grounds, and in Victory Park, at which visitors could buy
souvenir top hats and perfume bottles. The final official events of
the day were informal dances held at the LSU Gymnasium and Field House
and at the American Legion Community Club. The new governor and Mrs.
Jones retired to the executive mansion on North Boulevard to host a
buffet supper for close friends and relatives in the mansion's east 
6room.
Sam Jones became Louisiana's chief executive at a threatening time 
in European affairs. On the day of his inauguration, the German armies 
broke through the French lines at Sedan, while the Netherlands sur­
rendered to the Germans later the same evening. In Washington, Presi­
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt worked with his aides on a message to 
Congress requesting extraordinary defense funds which reliable sources 
estimated could reach $500,000,000- Antwerp, Belgium, fell to the
X
B̂aton Rouge Morning Advocate, May 14-15, 1940; New Orleans States,
May 14, 1940; Sam Jones Inaugural Address, May 14, 1940, James B. 
Aswell, Jr. and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, 
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge 
(hereinafter cited as Aswell Collection).
^Morning Advocate, May 15, 1940. Outgoing-governor Earl Long declined 
to attend Jones’ inauguration. His first public appearance after leav­
ing office occurred May 16 when he appeared at a Bossier City cattle 
auction dressed in khaki pants, red checkered shirt, and white panama 
hat. He was there, he said, to sell some cattle from his Winnfield 
farm.
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German onslaught on May 17 and on May 20 residents of the English 
coast at Dover first reported hearing the sounds of airplanes coming 
toward the English Channel. The Allied debacle at Dunkirk occurred 
on May 30. Italy entered the war against France and England on June 
9, and Paris fell on June 13.^
The events of the unfolding war in Europe caused some concern in 
Louisiana, but most attention continued to focus on events in Baton 
Rouge. Sam Jones began his first day in office by driving himself to 
the capitol in his personal car. His first visitor was Vance Plauche,
ghead of the State Civil Service Commission. Other prominent poli­
ticians followed, including James A. Noe, who came to the governor’s 
office for the first time since leaving it at the end of his short 
term in 1936. Jones spent the rest of the day politicking: he shook 
hands with ordinary citizens who wanted to congratulate him, held his 
first gubernatorial press conference, appointed F. Edward Hebert as 
his personal representative in Washington, D.C., and Steve Alford as 
the new superintendent of state police. He signed Executive Order No. 
1 which forbade state department heads from collecting "deducts" from 
employees’ salaries and ordered any employee approached for a deduct 
to report the incident promptly. This order was important in fact,
^Times-Picayune, May 14-15, 20, 30, 1940; States, May 14, 1940; 
Morning Advocate, May 14-15, 1940; Town Talk, May 14, 17, 20, 30,
June 9, 13, 1940.
gThis Civil Service Commission was a sham created by Huey Long in the 
Second Extraordinary Session of the Legislature in 1934, which, in 
reality, provided no Civil Service protection, but instead helped the 
Longite machine seize control of local personnel. L..Vaughn Howard, 
"Civil Service Development in Louisiana," Tulane Studies in Political 
Science (New Orleans, Tulane University, 1956), p. 46.
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for it specifically forbade a particularly glaring political abuse 
perpetuated by the Longite machine, but it was also important as a 
symbolic act —  the reformer sweeping aside the vestiges of corrup­
tion. Finally, Governor Jones began laying the foundation for a 
successful legislative session by hosting an afternoon reception at
the mansion for legislators and then worked past midnight with his
gfollowers outlining administration bills.
Jones' attempt to establish a solid relationship with the in­
coming legislature was well advised. Because he had achieved election 
with only fifty-two per cent of the vote, Jones had no overwhelming 
mandate with which to persuade legislators, while a sizeable bloc of 
the legislature was elected on the Long slate.
Despite his lack of overwhelming support, Jones was successful 
in securing the important legislative leadership posts for his
9Morning Advocate, May 14, 1940; Times-Picayune, May 16, 1940; F. 
Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of the Titans” The Life and 
Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisi­
ana, Center for Louisiana Studies, The University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, 1976), p. 153; Roman Heleniak, Soldiers of the Law; Louisi­
ana State Police (Topeka, Kansas, Josten's Publications, 1980), pp. 50- 
51. Jones thought that the Louisiana Congressional delegation would 
not adequately represent his interest because it was anti—Jones. More­
over, the Louisiana governor's office already maintained a representa­
tive in Washington, Earle Christenberry, Huey Long's former secretary, 
whom Hebert briefly replaced in the $10,000 per year job before he ran 
foT Congress. Alford, meanwhile, immediately began purging the state 
police of Longite supporters. On May 15 he fired 17 troopers including 
Joe Messina, Huey Long's former bodyguard.
^Morning Advocate, February 22, 1940; States, May 13, 1940; Sam Jones 
interviewed by Dennis Daugherty, May 6, 1970, tape recording, Dennis 
M. Daugherty Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy 
H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisi­
ana (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection).
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followers or his allies. Norman S. Bauer of St. Mary parish, elected 
on the Jones ticket and the governor's choice for Speaker of the 
House, was chosen for the position following a briefly confused situ­
ation which led to several candidates announcing for the post after 
Jones announced that he would take no direct part in organizing the 
legislature because he was hesitant to appear to be following in 
Huey’s dictatorial footsteps. Frank T. Ellis of Covington, also elec­
ted on the Jones ticket, became President-Pro-Tempore of the Senate. 
Similarly, Jones carried the day in selection of committee chairmen:
Joe T. Cawthorn, a Noe associate, became chairman of the Senate Fi­
nance Committee; pro-Jones Senators James Bailey, W. D. Cotton, and 
Grove Stafford became Senate Judiciary Committee chairmen; and Lionel 
Ott, a Jones man from New Orleans, secured the chairmanship of the 
Affairs of New Orleans Committee. In the House, important chairman­
ships also went to Jones men: Rules (A. C. Petitjean), Ways and Means
(H. H. Huckabay), Judiciary (Arthur C. Watson and Lester Bordelon;
Old Regular Frank Stitch received the third Judiciary chairmanship).̂  
The new governor in his first address to the legislature called 
on members to help him carry out his pledges to reform Louisiana.
Jones won two early tests of strength on his anti-corruption pledges,
*^Times-Picayune, February 29, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, 
April 7, 1940; Morning Advocate, April 30, 1940; Town Talk, April 8,
30, 1940; Denny Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor's Mansion The 
Story of Sam Houston Jones” (senior thesis, Louisiana.State University, 
1970), pp. 48-49. Jones later maintained that the governor had the 
right to help select the president-pro-tempore and the speaker of the 
house, but that any further action on his part would result in execu­
tive domination of the legislature. Jones interviewed by Daugherty,
May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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though one victory came through default. On May 21, 1940, Representa­
tive DeLesseps S. Morrison of New Orleans introduced a resolution de­
claring vacant the seat of Representative Chester Wooten of Plaque­
mines Parish because Wooten had served as Plaquemines registrar of 
voters until September 22, 1939, and the constitution clearly stated 
that no parish registrar could be elected or appointed to any office 
until twelve months after vacating the registrar’s office. "It is 
purely a constitutional question," Morrison said, "The question is 
merely abstract and not personal. I am speaking for the principle 
alone." Wooten, however, represented the baliwick of the pro-Long 
political boss Leander H. Perez. The Wooten expulsion resolution 
deadlocked the Committee on Elections with a 3-3 vote, but Wooten 
resigned rather than face possible expulsion. Jones thus indirectly 
gained his objective. He was more clearly successful in ousting State 
Bank Examiner Jasper S- Brock, who also kept the payroll records of 
the infamous Louisiana Debt Moratorium Commission which the Longites 
had used to reward friendly legislators. The final vote to oust 
Brock passed 79-17 in the house and 31-6 in the senate. The New Or­
leans delegation provided fourteen of the house votes and five of the
12Senate votes against ouster.
Jones’ success in these early victories and in his subsequent 
passage of bills implementing a large part of his campaign platform 
has been credited to several factors. Allan Sindler traces much of
To :Times-Picayune, May 21-23, 28-29, 1940. Jones’ new bank examiner 
found that legislators had collected $296,987 in debt moratorium com­
mission salaries during the past four years.
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Jones' success to a working arrangement reached by Jones and Robert 
Maestri shortly after the second Democratic primary. Maestri recog­
nized that New Orleans needed continued state fiscal assistance, and 
that in large part his domination of New Orleans resulted from state 
legislation which could be undone in Baton Rouge. In return for favors 
from the state government, the Old Regular delegation agreed to sup­
port many of Jones' key reform bills. Ever the political realists, 
the Old Regulars recognized the direction of the political wind and 
accomodated themselves to it, pledging to support the governor "in 
every constructive move he made for the benefit and welfare of our be­
loved state and its people." As noted above, however, the Old Regu-
13lars remained unreliable allies at best.
Jones later maintained that he had been successful in the 1940 
legislative session because the general public's anti-Long, anti­
corruption sentiment was so strong that few legislators chose to vote 
against it. More perceptively, he also maintained that some of the
Longites voted with him in hopes of placating him and obtaining some
14of the patronage jobs for their followers.
In reality, all three of these considerations influenced decision­
making in the 1940 legislative session. Robert Maestri and Sam Jones
T3Allan Sindler,- Huey Long's Louisiana State Politics, 1920-1952 
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 162-163; New Orleans 
Item, May 10, 1940.
14Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection;
Sam H. Jones interviewed by James M. Godfrey, February, 1977,.type­
script copy, LSU Oral History Collection, Department of Archives and 
Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Times-Picayune', August 8, 1940.
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were shrewd, politicians who realized that both would benefit from a 
political compromise, and designed a temporary truce that both could 
accept. Old Regular representatives met with Jones representatives 
in Baton Rouge just before the 1940 regular session opened. Norman 
Bauer assured the Old Regulars that "nobody will be punished for the 
way he voted in the election" and that they would receive a fair 
share of committee memberships. Following this meeting, twenty-one of 
the twenty-eight member New Orleans legislative delegation met in­
formally at the Choctaw Club headquarters and voted to support the 
Jones program "as far as may be possible." Jones, however, always 
maintained that there was a limit to how far he could compromise:
"The important thing," he said later, "is getting your program 
through without sacrificing your principles.Moreover, the impor­
tance of the anti-corruption sentiment resulting from the Louisiana 
Scandals cannot be underestimated. No other single reason adequately 
explains the presence of such anti-Jones stalwarts as Representative 
William J. Dodd on the Jones side of several of the reform measures.
American legislative bodies seldom hold tidy, smooth-running ses­
sions. Their function is not only to enact bills into law, but also 
to hear alternatives, consider complaints, and forge compromises of 
issues they choose to consider. The 1940 Louisiana legislative ses­
sion was no exception to this rule. Sam Jones had pledged himself to 
a thoroughgoing reformation of Louisiana and was eager to embark on 
his task. He had to deal, however, with a legislature in which many
Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection; 
New Orleans Item, May 8, 10, 1940.
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of his slim cadre of supporters were, like Jones himself, political 
neophytes equally eager to do a good job of reforming the state, but 
who were also inexperienced in the procedure and unfamiliar with the 
political log-rolling necessary to accomplish their objectives. In 
addition, Jones was bound by his idealism and his campaign statements 
to leave the legislature unbossed. The result of this situation was 
the introduction of 1,430 bills, only 481 of which became law,^ be­
cause of the inexperience and excessive optimism of administration 
leaders in both branches of government.
Nevertheless, Jones managed at the outset of his administration 
to piece together a partial fulfillment of his platform. The heart 
of Jones’ effort consisted of his pledges to dismantle the centrali­
zation of power and resulting opportunities for corruption in the 
state government left from the previous administration, and to re­
organize the state government into a more business-like, manageable 
system. His record of accomplishment in these areas is mixed. Some 
of his reforms were successful, while others proved temporary and 
ineffective.
Much of Sam Jones' lasting success lay in his fight to repeal 
numerous laws, some dating back to Huey Long's administration, which 
allowed the state government to dominate parish and local units.
These centralization measures hampered the effective operation of 
local governments, and both the Louisiana Police Jury Association and
^Tom Dutton, "Sam Houston Jones: Louisiana's Liberator," Christian
Science Monitor, April 27, 1940; James Bugea, Carlos Lazarus, and 
William T. Pegues, "The Louisiana Legislation of 1940," Louisiana 
Law Review, November, 1940, p. 98.
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the Louisiana Municipal Association eagerly sought their repeal. 
Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell noted at the 1940 LMA convention that 
the absence of home rule in municipal governments led to morale and 
control problems. If an employee knew that his job was a state ap­
pointment, Caldwell asked, how were municipal officials to influence 
him not to neglect his work?^
The major legislation concerning local revenue passed at the 1940 
regular session was Act 70, which repealed Act 10 of the 1934 Extra­
ordinary Session and restored full authority to municipalities and 
parishes to impose taxes, license fees and taxes without seeking 
legislative approval. Jones had little trouble with repeal, which
originated in the Senate where it passed with a 30-6 vote. The
18measure passed the House unanimously.
"Rights Restored to Police Juries," Louisiana Policy Jury Review, 
April, 1941, p. 27; S. S. Caldwell, "Address," Louisiana Municipal 
Review, May-June, 1940, p. 7.
18Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana at the 
Regular Session (1940) (Baton Rouge, published by authority of the 
State, 1940), p. 383 (hereinafter cited as Acts Passed by the Legisla­
ture, 1940); Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Rep­
resentatives of the State of Louisiana at the Tenth Regular Session 
(Baton Rouge, published by authority, 1940), p. 1631 (hereinafter cited 
as Proceedings of the House, 1940); Calendar of the House of Represen­
tatives of the State of Louisiana at the Tenth Regular Session of the 
Legislature Under the Constitution of 1921 (Baton Rouge, published by 
authority, 1940), p. 507 (hereinafter cited as House Calendar, 1940); 
Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the State of 
Louisiana at the Tenth Regular Session of the Legislature Under the 
Adoption of the Constitution of 1921 (Baton Rouge, published by 
authority, 1940), p. 493 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings of the Sen­
ate, 1940); Senate Calendar 1940 of the State of Louisiana Tenth Regu­
lar Session of the Legislature Under the Constitution of 1921 (Baton 
Rouge, published by authority, 1940), p. 65 (hereinafter cited as 
Senate Calendar, 1940).
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Local municipalities of 12,500 or more persons also received 
authorization to install and operate parking meters on their streets, 
provided that they called an election after a three-month trial period 
to decide whether the meters should remain permanently. Alexandria, 
which was soon swamped by vehicles from nearby army camps, was one of 
the first major Louisiana cities to experiment with parking meters, 
not so much for revenue as for some effort to control traffic itself 
in the increasingly congested downtown area. The legislature also 
authorized local governing bodies in Louisiana to participate in the 
federal government's national defense program by authorizing them to 
donate or other wise transfer land to the United States for national 
defense purposes, especially for the maintenance or construction of
19waterways.
Jones also sought legislative authorization to pursue wrongdoers 
who had stolen the state's property or money through creation of a 
State Crime Commission to consist of the governor, the executive 
counsel to the governor, and the attorney general. The agency was 
set to remain in existence for four years with a $1,000,000 appropri­
ation for its operation. With this $1,000,000, Jones hoped to recover
$4,000,000 which had been illegally taken from the state. His bill 
was introduced in the House on June 3, and after an unsuccessful at­
tempt by Representative James E. Bolin to reduce its appropriations 
to $250,000, and opposition from Representative Lloyd Hendrick who 
preferred a legislative investigating commission, the bill passed the
T9Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 392, 441; Town Talk,
August 16, 1941, January 22, 1942.
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House on June 19 on an 87—7 vote, with most of the nay votes cast by
rural north Louisiana Longites. The bill passed the Senate on July 4,
by a 32-4 vote, with opposition from a combination of north and south
20Louisiana Senators. Jones thus obtained in Act 13 his Crime Commis­
sion with wide-ranging authority "to investigate and inquire into the 
affairs of the State, to investigate the functions, transactions, con­
tracts, purchases, sales and expenditures of the State to the extent 
it may deem necessary or desirable," and the authority to institute
civil proceedings to recover "any money, property or thing of value"
21it found fraudulently acquired from the state.
Despite the ease with which former legislatures had granted ex­
traordinary powers to the governor during the years of Longite con­
trol, some Longite legislators feared that the Crime Commission (the 
"Hitleristic, dictatorial, tyrannical crime commission" as Senator 
Boucher called it) gave too much power to the governor. On the other 
hand, the reformers applauded the new authority. The Longites, how­
ever, chose not to criticize the purpose of the Crime Commission, but
22instead attacked the legality of its appropriations.
The Longites challenged the constitutionality of the Crime Com­
mission's appropriations in the case Harold G. Falkenstein, Et. Als.
20Proceedings of the House, 1940, pp. 1055-1057; House Calendar, 1940, 
p. 251; Proceedings of the Senate, 1940, pp. 403-404; Senate Calendar, 
1940, pp. 1779-1780; Times-Picayune, June 3, 13, 1940; States, June 3, 
1940.
21Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 73.
22Morning Advocate, September 9, 1940.
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v. Sam Houston Jones, Governor, Member of Commission Created by Act
13 of 1940, filed in the 19th Judicial District Court presided over
by Judge James D. Womack in Baton Rouge. In this and other cases
brought before him, Judge Womack proved to be a thoroughgoing Longite,
whose court district in East Baton Rouge Parish normally heard cases
which questioned the constitutionality of state government actions.
Womack issued a preliminary injunction against the Crime Commission
on June 21, 1941, in which he prohibited it from expending any funds
made available to it because be found that the Commission had no legal
source of funds. The original legislation provided appropriations to
it from state funds not otherwise appropriated, at a time when all
23funds were in fact earmarked. Womack then began hearings into the 
legality of the funding plan.
These hearings led to a heated conflict between Jones and Womack 
over the limits of executive privilege of the Louisiana governor. 
Womack wanted to call Jones into his courtroom to testify about the 
Crime Commission bill and issued a subpoena to require . his attendance. 
Jones, in turn, asked the Louisiana Supreme Court to issue a writ 
prohibiting Womack from forcing the governor's appearance in his 
courtroom, surrounded himself with 30 state troopers, and announced 
that he did not intend to be taken from his duties by "frivolous ef­
forts of a few demagogues and enemies of good government." In his
23"Louisiana Crime Commission Report to the Legislature," May 11, 1942; 
Harold G. Falkenstein, Et. Als. v. Sam Houston Jones, Governor, Member 
of Commission Created by Act 13 of 1940, Supreme Court of Louisiana,
No. 36,416 (hereinafter cited as Falkenstein v. Jones); John B. Four- 
net Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton 
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (herein­
after cited as Foumet Collection).
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opposition to Jones’ plea to the Supreme Court, Womack sarcastically 
remarked that "this court had hoped that the governor would refrain 
from his speechmaking activities and . . .  come into court and testi­
fy in the case and thus . . .  assist respondent judge in arriving at 
an intelligent decision ..." Histrionics aside, the Supreme Court 
five days later declined to dissolve Womack's restraining order 
which paralyzed the Crime Commission and also denied Jones' request 
that he not be forced to appear in Womack’s court.
Jones, however, had no intention of honoring the subpoena. He 
cited as precedent Thomas Jefferson’s refusal to appear before a 
court during his years as President of the United States. If he were 
to appear in every political suit brought against the state, Jones 
maintained, he would have no time to attend to his duties as governor. 
Besides, he added, the Attorney General had issued an opinion that "I 
am not amenable to subpoenas." Womack, however, was neither ready to 
recognize Jones' claim nor to establish the precedent of executive 
immunity in Louisiana and declined to reissue a subpoena for Jones, 
thus never forcing the issue to a conclusion. Judge Womack did, how­
ever, issue a ringing statement in which he reiterated his belief in 
judicial supremacy over the executive:
I grant that he has defied my authority and I 
have tolerated it, but he has not by any means 
intimidated this court and I want to say at 
this time that in the event I signed an order 
compelling his attendance and it became . . .  
my personal duty to serve that order, I would
24Morning Advocate, July 3, 8, 1941.
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bring him into court regardless of the
consequences.25
Womack closed his Crime Commission hearings on July 10, and on 
July 14 ruled that the appropriation plan was defective and issued an 
injunction to replace his temporary restraining order paralyzing the 
Commission. The Louisiana Supreme Court lent its final stamp of 
authority to the case when it upheld Womack’s ruling in an appeal by 
the state, and in addition, in its later ruling on the Elmer Stewart, 
Et. Al. v. Eugene Stanley, Attorney General, Et. Al. case, held that
26the Commission’s right to institute suits was also unconstitutional.
As a result of these court decisions, Sam Jones’ Crime Commission 
perished.
Jones similarly lost his bid to reorganize the bewildering con­
glomeration of 179 state departments into a more manageable 20 depart­
ments. He began studying the problem of government reorganization be­
fore his inauguration, and on April 31, 1940, announced that he had 
hired the "nationally known firm of Griffenhagen & Associates of 
Washington, Chicago, New York, Boston, and Milwaukee" to survey 
Louisiana’s state government and design a more efficient arrangement.
25Ibid., July 11, 1941; Sam Jones to J. D. Womack, June 28, 1941, 
William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, 
Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane 
University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
26Morning Advocate, July 11, 15, August 3, 1941; Item, December 1, 
1941; "Louisiana Crime Commission Report to the Legislature," May 11, 
1941; Faleknstein v. Jones. The Stewart v. Stanley suit was insti­
gated by Leander.Perez, the political boss of Plaquemines parish. See 
Glen Jeansonne, Leander Perez, Boss of the Delta (Baton Rouge, Louisi­
ana State University Press, 1977), pp. 124-127.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
The resulting "Griffenhagen Report" produced a reorganization plan 
modeled on arrangements already in effect in Virginia, Illinois, New 
York, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Minnesota. The report and the subse­
quent reorganization bill in the legislature called for consolidation 
of the state government into 20 departments: Revenue, Treasury, Fi­
nance, State, Education, Occupational Standards, State Lands, Agricul­
ture, Labor, Banking, Public Service, Public Welfare, Institutions,
Public Safety, Highways, Public Works, Conservation, Minerals, Mili-
27tary Affairs, and Independent Establishments. The plan also created 
an executive cabinet (consisting of the department heads, the governor, 
and his executive counsel and special assistants) which was to meet 
each week to coordinate governmental affairs. The key to the reorgani­
zation plan was to be the new Finance Department, divided into bureaus 
for the budget, accounts and control, purchases and property control, 
buildings, local governments, and administrative services. In addi­
tion, a new fiscal code proposed in a separate bill further buttressed 
the Finance Department's enhanced importance. The fiscal code provided 
that the Finance Department would construct preliminary budgets for 
all other state departments, supervise all expenditures, and make all 
purchases, while the Treasurer continued as custodian of all state 
funds, the disbursing officer and supervisor of state investments.
The State Auditor examined all state accounts and reported any
27Morning Advocate, May 1, June 2, 1940; Proceedings of the House, 1940, 
pp. 1245-1251; Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 220; Charles 
S. Hyneman, "Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legisla­
ture," Louisiana Law Review, November, 1940, p. 147; Mortimer Barr,
"The Louisiana Public Service Commission" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1941), pp. 102-103.
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unauthorized or illegal transactions to the legislature. In addition,
the fiscal code provided a new Board of Finance consisting of three
members appointed by the governor for overlapping 9-year terms to
represent the public, approve all rules in the Finance Department,
approve depositories of state monies, approve the borrowing of funds,
28and make any investigations deemed necessary.
Introduction of the companion reorganization and fiscal code
bills engendered a storm of protest from the Longites. Representative
Wilbur T. McCain of Grant Parish complained that the bills were too
long (the reorganization bill alone ran to more than 100 pages), and
legislators were asked to vote without sufficient time to consider
them. Representative C. 0. Webb of Red River Parish added that "I
have read [these bills] twice and all I could get was a headache. I
defy any member of this House to say truthfully that he knows what
these bills mean." Other legislators, however, thought that they
knew exactly what the bills meant —  Teutonic dictatorship on the Nazi
model. Senator Ernest Clements asserted on the Senate floor that "it
is not necessary to go all the way to Chicago and bring the firm of
Griffenhagen to Louisiana to tell us how to write our laws and how we
»
shall live.” Griffenhagen, he said, was "an emissary of Adolph Hit­
ler." Moreover, Griffenhagen had devised "an attempt in a most dicta­
torial manner through the governor to take charge of our state." 
Clements emerged as the most vituperative critic of the reorganization 
plan. In floor debate on a bill to appropriate $100,000 to fund
28Morning Advocate, June 2, 1940; Proceedings of the House, 1940, pp. 
1242-1245; Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 288.
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preliminary investigation of state departments, he charged again that 
the proposed law was the "most high-handed and dictatorial ever known 
in the state," and again in an absurd statement drew the Griffenhagen/ 
Hitler parallel:
Why should Griffenhagen want to reorganize 
the government of Louisiana? Hitler trampled 
down the bloodstained poppies of Flanders 
Field and overran the hallowed soil of France.
In the cafe the other day, I saw one of 
Griffenhagen’s associates and he had the map 
of Germany written all over his face.
If the reorganization passed, Clements worried, "We will have a combi­
nation of Fascism, Naziism and Bolshevism that will be known as the
29Jones Four Year Plan."
Senator Frank Ellis defended the reorganization plan by reminding 
Clements that "It is as necessary for the government to adjust itself 
to progress and social change as for individuals to become adjusted," 
and pointedly asked the Senators "Are you statesmen or are you poli­
ticians?" Jones in a radio address also defended reorganization 
("the heart and core of reformation in Louisiana") and attempted to 
allay any fears of dictatorship by reminding the voters that "the
administration is not 30 days old yet, but we have seen the restor-
30ation of democracy and abolition of dictatorship."
Despite vocal opposition, the reorganization bill (Act 47) passed 
the House with an 89-2 vote and the Senate with a 35-3 vote (Clements
29Times-Picayune, June 11, 24, 28, 1940.
30States, June 13, 18, 1940.
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persuaded two others to vote with him)- The companion fiscal code
bill (Act 48) passed by similar margins: 87-1 in the House and 36-1
31(Clements voted nay) in the Senate.
The reorganization bill passed the legislature as a constitutional
amendment and thus required ratification in the November, 1940, general
election. Earl Long and other Longites waged a strenuous campaign
against the amendment, but the voters approved it 140,543 to 113,876.
Jones proceeded to establish the new governmental order in Louisiana,
but his efforts ultimately came to nothing. The reorganization and
fiscal code acts faced the same gauntlet as the Crime Commission:
32the 19th judicial district courtroom of Judge J. D. Womack.
A group of six Louisiana taxpayers filed suit in Womack’s court 
in late December, 1940 (Earl R. Graham, Et. Als., v. Sam H. Jones,
Et. Als., later amended to Earl R. Graham, Et. Als. v. A. P. Tugwell, 
Et. Als.). Graham and the other plaintiffs in the case contended that 
the Reorganization Act was unconstitutional on three grounds: 1. it
violated the fundamental principles of the republican form of govern­
ment guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, "because it 
is arbitrary, undemocratic, and denies and limits petitioners’ voice 
in the election of public officials directly responsible to the elec­
torate and places unlimited; centralized power in the Governor of
~̂ Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 220-228; Proceedings of 
the House, 1940, pp. 1242-1251; House Calendar, 1940, pp. 248, 258- 
259; Proceedings of the Senate, 1940, pp. 1604-1605; Senate Calendar, 
pp. 400, 410; Times-Picayune, July 3, 1940.
32Times-Picayune, August 16, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 3, 14, 
1940.
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Louisiana without due process of law"; 2. the legislature had failed to 
designate the specific election at which the amendment was to be sub­
mitted to the voters as required in Article 21, Section 1 of the state 
constitution; 3. the statute as presented to the voters also violated 
the requirement in Article 21, Section 1 of the state constitution 
which provided that "when more than one amendment has been submitted 
at the same election, they shall be so submitted as to enable the 
electors to vote on each amendment separately."
Judge Womack in his decision and the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
its subsequent review of his decision both dismissed the plaintiffs' 
first contention, the Supreme Court noting that American legal prece­
dent had established that enforcement of the constitutional guarantee 
of a republican form of government was a political question over which 
the courts have no jurisdiction. Both courts agreed, however, that 
the statute was invalid because of sloppy procedure. The legislature 
had failed to specify the date of the election when the voters were 
to vote on the amendment as provided by the amending procedure of the 
1921 Constitution. Womack also ruled that the reorganization act was 
too broad: it amended laws covering various functions of the state
government which were too divergent to be covered with one amendment, 
thereby failing to fulfill the constitutional requirement that voters 
be allowed to vote on each amendment separately. The amendment as 
presented to the voters provided only one choice: reorganization of
the entire state government. The plaintiffs contended that a voter 
may want to approve the reorganization of one department of state 
government but not approve reorganization of another department, and 
could not do so under the amendment as it appeared on the ballot.
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Womack on March 18, 1941, therefore, ruled the entire reorganization
33amendment unconstitutional.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed Womack’s decision on appeal 
by the state, and by a 5-2 vote upheld his ruling. The complex 
supreme court decision left Jones in an odd situation: his state
government now had no clear lines of authority or organization. The 
court invalidated the enactment of the amendment on two points —  the 
legislature failed to specify the date the amendment was to be sub­
mitted to the voters, and the act should have been submitted as at 
least two separate amendments (a practice dating from the 1879 Consti­
tution and its stipulation that acts of the legislature must deal with 
one subject only). In the murky majority opinion written by Justice 
Wynne G. Rogers, the high court appeared to rule that while the enact­
ment of the reorganization was completed improperly and was thus uncon­
stitutional, the enabling acts relating to the reorganization and the
34fiscal codes were not unconstitutional. The original suit had not 
attacked any possibly dangerous centralization of power, and the 
supreme court apparently saw none.
State attorneys argued that loss of the reorganization amendment 
would not cause the collapse of the entire new governmental structure; 
that the reorganization and the attendant fiscal code would be intact 
except in those areas where it specifically conflicted with the 1921
33James D. Womack, The Griffenhagen-Jones Reorganization Amendment:
The Decision Rendered by a Competent, Honest and Courageous Judge 
Holding the Scheme Flagrantly Unconstitutional (n.p., n.d., 1941?) 
pp. 2-23; Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941; States, July 1, 1941.
34Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941; States, July 1, 1941.
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Constitution, which contained a vague authorization for consolidation 
of departments. Opposition attorneys maintained, however, that loss 
of the amendment resulted in loss of the entire reorganization. Gov­
ernor Jones questioned the court's authority to declare an amendment 
unconstitutional: "Its effect is to declare the constitution uncon­
stitutional . . . The decision says that [the people] don't have [the] 
right to change their own constitution." He also admitted that the 
state had no alternative plan for the reorganization, but reaffirmed 
his determination to bring it about. The Supreme Court anticipated 
Jones’ question, and in its opinion cited the American and English 
Enclyclopedia of Law: "The courts have full power to declare that an
amendment to the constitution has not been properly adopted, even 
though it has been so declared by the political department of the 
state," and the Miller v. Johnson decision cited in the Lawyers’ Re­
ports Annotated, which declared that "the question of lawful adoption
35of an amendment to the constitution is a judicial question."
Jones began a strenuous public campaign to restore state reorgan­
ization. He portrayed the decision as an assumption of judicial power 
unprecedented in Louisiana: "Never . . .  have the people of Louisiana
been denied the right to say what their constitution may contain . . . 
every amendment adopted since 1921 can be declared null and void."
Earl Long and Ernest Clements announced that they would follow Jones 
everywhere he spoke and counter his arguments. The state asked the 
Supreme Court to rehear the case, or, failing that, to issue a clari­
fication of its incomprehensible ruling. Otherwise, state officials
35Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941.
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will be confronted with a presumptively valid 
administrative organization under a presump­
tively valid act of the legislature, but under 
which no operations may possibly be had be­
cause of the impossibility of determination ĝ
of exactly what the court means by its decree.
As the state awaited the outcome of its request, House Speaker 
Norman Bauer hinted that if the court denied the rehearing, Jones 
might call the legislature back into a special session either to re­
pass the reorganization or to call a constitutional convention to 
write the reorganization into the organic law of the state. In the 
end, neither happened. In 1942 the supreme court also invalidated 
the reorganization acts themselves in the case of 0. Dolan Ricks v. 
Martin Close, on the basis "of inseparability of those provisions de­
pending on constitutional change from the other provisions." Jones 
salvaged some of his reorganization plan when the 1942 legislature 
by statute reinstituted the Departments of Public Works, Finance, and 
Occupational Standards, but generally the state government reverted 
to its inefficient pre-1940 organization. Careless drafting of legis­
lation on the part of the reformers thus made their attempts to re-
37organize the state administration vulnerable to nullification.
*Jones was more successful in his efforts to establish a Classified 
State Civil Service System to replace the old order in which state 
employees had been subject to dismissal at the whim of their super-
36Ibid., July 16-17, 1941.
37Ibid., July 1-2, 4, 16-17, 23, 30, 1941; Report of the Committee to 
Consider Changes in the Powers, Duties, and Responsibilities of the 
Governor, May 11, 1966, p. E-12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
visors, and had been compelled to provide "deducts" from their pay­
checks to finance Longite machine campaigns. To eliminate these 
abuses and protect state employees, Jones appointed prominent New 
Orleans attorney Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., who had worked for institu­
tion of the merit system since Governor John M. Parker’s administra­
tion in 1920, to head a committee to draft proposed Civil Service 
bills for the state and for the city of New Orleans. Dunbar's com­
mittee responded with two separate bills modeled after the Civil Ser-
38vice laws of the federal government and other states.
The two bills were introduced in 1940 as administration bills 
with Jones’ full backing. The proposed Civil Service laws were 
further strengthened by a proposed constitutional amendment which 
provided that they could not be amended or repealed by any subsequent 
legislature except by a two-thirds vote of both houses. Therefore, 
while the Civil Service bills did not face the November hurdle of 
popular ratification, their protecting amendment did. The bills orig­
inated in the House, where they passed by wide margins following sur­
prisingly mild debate and passed the Senate after the defeat of 
several proposed diluting amendments, thus becoming Act 171 (New
Orleans) and Act 172 (state) of the 1940 regular session of the 
39legislature.
OOHoward, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 75-76.
39Hyneman, "Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legisla­
ture," pp. 15-16; Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," 
pp. 75-76; Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 687-729; Pro­
ceedings of the House, 1940, pp. 833-834, 2071-2072; House Calendar, 
1940, pp. 220-223; Times-Picayune, June 12, 15, July 5, 1940; States, 
June 14, 1940.
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The Louisiana Civil Service bill provided for a State Civil 
Service Commission consisting of five members appointed by the gover­
nor for staggered 6 year terms from lists provided by the presidents 
of five Louisiana colleges: LSU (public), Tulane University (indepen­
dent private), Loyola University (Catholic), Centenary College (Metho­
dist) , and Louisiana College (Baptist)- Dunbar and his associates 
assumed that future governors could be hostile to Civil Service and 
therefore designed several safeguards into their system. If the 
governor failed to appoint a member to a vacancy on the Commission 
within six months of its occurance, for example, the person whose name 
appeared first on the list prepared by the college president who had 
recommended the member whose seat became vacant automatically became 
a full member of the Commission. The bill also provided for a state 
director of personnel whom the Commission was to appoint from a list 
prepared by a special examining committee consisting of three persons 
skilled in personnel management. The act brought into the classified 
Civil Service most of the employees of all the executive departments 
and agencies except the offices of the governor, the attorney general, 
and the Crime Commission. Entrance into the Civil Service was to be 
by "truly competitive" examinations. The Louisiana Civil Service law 
faced the problem of how to start the system. It rejected the proce­
dures used in other states which called for state employees to take 
competitive examinations along with prospective employees in order to 
keep their jobs, or freezing all state employees on their job without 
any test at all. Instead, current Louisiana employees had to pass 
special "noncompetitive” examinations proving their minimum competence
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to hold their job, after which they were "blanketed in" under Civil 
Service protection. The act forbade the use of political pressure 
for employment or promotion and also forbade employees to pay "any 
assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political organi­
zation or purpose . . ."a direct response to the Long machine*s 
"deducts" and forced Progress subscriptions. The law was not to be­
come effective until July 1, 1942 (the legislature later delayed the 
effective date to January 1, 1943), thus allowing time for the Commis­
sion and the personnel director to be appointed and the tests de- 
signed.
The other administration-sponsored Civil Service bill applied only 
to cities with a population in excess of 100,000, i.e., New Orleans. 
That measure differed from the state law only in establishing a sepa­
rate commission and providing that all current city employees would 
be blanketed in on July 1, 1942, without any examinations at all, a 
concession to Mayor Maestri and members of the New Orleans legislative 
delegation who threatened to oppose Civil Service if the test require­
ment was not dropped. The reformers thought that Civil Service could 
not be enacted without their support and so agreed to this major
concession, which, in effect, made meaningful implementation of Civil
41Service in New Orleans a matter of employee attrition.
40Acts of the Legislature (1940), p. 687; Hyneman, "Political and Ad­
ministrative Reform in the 1940 Legislature," pp. 16-22; Howard, "Civil 
Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 77-79; Willard E. Parker, Report 
Department of State Civil Service 1943-1944 (Baton Rouge, 1945), pp. 
18-20. Of the 9,531 state employees judged eligible to take the origi­
nal non-competitive exam, only 86 failed to qualify.
41Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 79-80, 92;
Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 157; Edward F. Haas, "New 
Orleans on the Half-Shell: The Maestri Era, 1936-1846," Louisiana
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The voters approved the Civil Service protection amendment by 
more than 9,000 votes in the November, 1940, election, and six days 
later Jones appointed his Civil Service Commission, which began its 
search for a personnel director. Jones’ Commission survived a tax­
payer suit brought against it when District Judge Charles A. Holcombe 
in December, 1941, ruled that plaintiff 0. Dolan Ricks (a Longite 
former deputy fire marshal) was not directly affected by the pro­
visions of the act and could therefore properly contest only the
constitutionality of the act and not the expenditure of general reve-
42nue funds to pay for its operation.
But Civil Service in Louisiana, as enacted by the Jones admini­
stration, proved to be short lived. Newly-elected governor Earl Long 
mustered a two-thirds vote in the 1948 regular legislative session to 
emasculate Civil Service and then mustered a two-thirds vote in the 
1948 extraordinary session which destroyed Civil Service except for 
employees of the social security agencies (where the federal government
History, Summer, 1972, p. 298; Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison 
and the Image of Reform New Orleans Politics, 1946-1961 (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1974), p. 21; Joseph B. Parker, The 
Morrison Era Reform Politics in New Orleans (Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican 
Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 59-60.
42Item, November 8, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 14, 1940; Times- 
Picayune, December 9, 1941; States, March 30, 1942; 0. Dolan Hicks V. 
Department of State Civil Service, Et. Als., Supreme Court of Louisi­
ana No. 36,529, Foumet Collection. A third Civil Service act passed 
in the 1940 legislature provided protection to municipal firemen and 
policemen in cities with populations in excess of 16,000 persons. This 
bill did not have administrative backing, and Jones vetoed it when it 
reached his desk. He created a minor legal flap when he later recon­
sidered and signed it into law. The court ruling in State v. Junkin 
(1907), he said, provided that as long as the bill remained in the 
governor’s possession, it was subject to consideration, and he had 
never filed his veto with the Secretary of.State. His action was sub­
sequently not questioned. See Howard, ’’Civil Service Development in 
Louisiana," pp. 81-83 and Bugea, Et. Als., "The Louisiana Legislation
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required it). Permanent, fully protected Civil Service did not arrive 
in Louisiana until Governor Robert Kennon's administration wrote Civil 
Service into the constitution at the beginning of his administration 
in 1952.43
Governor Jones’ efforts to reform Louisiana’s electoral proce­
dures survived judicial and political challenges. The legislature 
passed administration bills prohibitng any state office from "padding 
the payrolls" of any department by increasing the number of employees 
in the six months preceeding a gubernatorial election; prohibiting 
any person from allowing his or her name to be carried on a state, 
parish, or municipal payroll for services not actually rendered; pro­
hibiting political advertisements on public property; prohibiting any 
employee of the state or any of its political subdivisions making 
$200 or less per month to contribute to political campaigns for pri­
mary or general elections, either directly or indirectly; providing 
that illiterate voters could obtain help from poll commissioners only 
if they produced an affidavit certifying their inability to read; and
providing that parish registrars of voters -must have their poll rec-
44ords available for public inspection for part of each day.
of 1940," p. 99.
43Howard, "Civil-Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 108-109; 
Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 243; Michael Kirtz, "Government By 
the Civics Books: The Administration of Robert F. Kennon, 1952-1956,"
North Louisiana Historical Association Journal, Spring/Summer, 1981, 
p. 56.
44Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 14, 377, 832, 1141, 1197; 
Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, pp. 155-156; States, May 30, June 4, 
1940; Times-Picayune, May 17, June 12, 14, 19, 28, July 10, 1940; 
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, July 7, 1940.
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Another electoral reform that caused a great legal and political 
storm was Act 84 which authorized the use of voting machines in pri­
mary and general elections- and made their use mandatory in all muni­
cipalities with populations in excess of 150,000 (New Orleans). Even 
though the measure passed the legislature with little difficulty, it 
faced both judicial challenges in new "taxpayer suits" and official 
resistance on the part of New Orleans officials reluctant to implement 
the reform, which would make manipulation of the city vote more diffi­
cult. Nevertheless, Jones pushed ahead with his reform. In June,
1941, the state let a contract by which the Shoup Voting Machine Cor­
poration of Philadelphia was to supply 435 machines at a cost of 
$1,136 each, or a total of $464,160 with a two per cent discount for 
paying cash. The state paid the total bill and the city of New Orleans 
was to reimburse the state treasury $25,000 immediately, $100,000 the 
next fiscal year, and the rest of its one-half share of the machines’ 
cost over the next several years. The funding scheme was quickly 
challenged in a suit instituted by 0. Dolan Ricks (the same 0. Dolan 
Ricks who challenged the Civil Service act), represented by attorney 
Charles Rivet of New Orleans, special assistant attorney general and 
revenue department attorney in former Longite administrations. In his 
suit, Ricks alleged that the legislatively-created board in charge of 
the voting machine purchase had no power to bind the state to pay the 
$464,160 debt and asked that the purchase be prevented. Judge J. D. 
Womack again struck down an administration measure when he agreed that 
the voting machine purchase board had indeed far exceeded its authority 
in contracting the debt, and issued a temporary order restraining the
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state treasurer from spending any money on the purchase of the machines. 
In addition, the voting machine act faced other suits. In August, 1941, 
Adam J. Falkenstein '(brother of Harold G. Falkenstein who had chal­
lenged the state Crime Commission) filed a separate suit seeking to 
restrain State Treasurer Andrew P. Tugwell from withholding funds for 
purchasing the machines from money due New Orleans for homestead 
exemptions. The homestead exemption provided that homes up to a cer­
tain value were exempt from property taxes. Falkenstein's suit was 
dismissed, however, because he had received his full homestead exemp­
tion on his New Orleans property in 1941 and had thus paid no taxes.
The third suit brought against the voting machine act was filed by 
Lafayette policeman Alphonse Peck, who challenged the law because it 
required the state to pay one-half the cost of New Orleans voting 
machines but did not provide state help for any other municipality 
choosing to use them. Judge Womack again struck at the reformers by 
deciding that the entire Act 84 was invalid, "a striking and glaring 
example of loosely written, hastily prepared and ill-considered legis­
lation," and prohibiting the state and the city from buying, leasing, 
or renting the machines. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, over­
ruled Womack in the Peck case and found Act 84 to be legal and correct
in all sections, neither too broad nor dealing with more than one
. . 45subject.
Local resistance to the implementation of the voting machine law
45Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 406; States, May 21, 1940; 
Morning Advocate, June 11, 22, July 9, August 14, 1941; Times-Picayune, 
June 13, 1940; August 15, September 26, December 2, 23, 1941; Town 
Talk, September 23, 1941; Item, December 1, 1941.
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surfaced in the New Orleans Commission Council headed by Mayor Robert 
Maestri, who informed the governor that it would be impossible for New 
Orleans to pay its share of the cost because the money had not been 
provided in the city's 1941 budget. Jones, however, noted that the 
Commission Council had amended city budgets before to pay for unfore­
seen expenses. Meanwhile, a groundswell of reform opinion in favor 
of installing the machines swept the city. The Citizens' Voluntary 
Committee of Louisiana offered to arrange a loan to the city to pro­
vide its half of the voting machine money although city attorney 
Francis P. Burns quickly ruled this move illegal. Five organizations 
—  the Optimist Club, the Woman Citizen's Union, the People's League, 
the Citizens' Voluntary Committee, and the Louisiana League of War 
Veterans —  joined the New Orleans Junior Chamber of Commerce’s offer 
to support a subscription drive to raise the money. In addition, the 
Woman Citizen’s Union formed a picket line in front of City Hall to 
remind the administration that the citizens demanded voting machines. 
(Mayor Maestri warily eyed the pickets as he- passed by on his way to 
his office, but said only "Keep up the good work.") At last the Com­
mission Council in September voted to set aside money in the 1942 
budget (to be adopted in December 1941) to pay for the voting 
machines.^
Other measures passed by the 1940 legislature dealt with the more 
mundane aspects of governing the state: taxes, education, and housing.
46Times-Picayune, August 15, 20, 21, 28, September 3, 4, 6, October 4, 
11, 1941; Town Talk, August 21, 25, 28, 1941; Haas, "New Orleans on the 
Half-Shell," p. 302; Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison, p. 21.
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Jones had campaigned in 1939-40 on a platform including a pledge to 
repeal the Louisiana sales tax, a revenue device of Longite Governor 
Richard Leche. In fulfillment of that promise, Representatives De- 
Lesseps S. Morrison and Welbom Jack introduced in the House a sales 
tax bill which specified no termination date for the tax because the 
authors expected the Ways and Means Committee to fit the repeal into 
a general tax reorganization and not leave the state without sufficient 
revenue to meet its expenses. Senator Joe Cawthom simultaneously 
introduced a Senate bill for repeal, but his bill provided a specific 
termination date of October 1, 1940, after which the sales tax would 
no longer be collected. The Ways and Means Committee decided on 
December 31, 1940, as the termination date to be inserted in the 
House bill.^
Jones' entire new tax package, introduced to the legislature in 
early June, included increases in the tax rates on liquor and tobacco 
products, income, gasoline, extension of the severance tax, and imposi­
tion of a distribution tax on natural gas. The new liquor taxes pro­
vided for.increases ranging from 10 cents per gallon (on still wines 
of 15 per cent or less alcohol) to 50 cents per gallon (still wines of 
25. per cent or more alcohol), while the tax on liquor and sparkling 
wines was increased a flat 50 cents per gallon. (Beer escaped the up­
ward revision completely.) In addition, the cost of selling liquor 
also increased; a sliding scale of $200 for saloon permits and $100
47 !States, May 15, June 17, 1940; Times-Picayune, May 16, 1940; Acts 
Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 402; Edward J. Gay, Jr., "Louisi­
ana Housing Legislation Urban and Rural," Louisiana Municipal Review, 
January/February, 1941, pp. 9-11.
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for package house permits in cities of 5,000 or more and $100 for 
saloon permits and $50 for package house permits, in cities with less 
than 5,000 replaced the old standard $5 permit fee for all dealers in 
alcoholic beverages. Wine-only package house permits cost $50 regard­
less of location. Jones* tobacco tax raised the rate from $10 to $20 
per thousand cheap cigars (15 cents to 20 cents) and from $13 to $27 
per thousand on more expensive cigars (21 cents-up), while the cigar­
ette tax increased from one-fifth to one-fourth cent per cigarette.
One-third of the increase in tobacco tax revenue was earmarked for
48the General Fund while two-thirds went to the Public School Fund.
Readjustments to the severance tax included extension to tax 
pulpwood at the rate of 6 cents per standard cord and to tax distil­
late, casing head gasoline, and natural gasoline at the rate of 11 
cents per barrel, while tax rates on previously-taxed oil increased. 
The tax package also included a one-half cent per thousand cubic feet 
tax on the gathering of natural gas, a temporary measure, the admini­
stration said, to help liquidate the huge public debt left by Longite 
spendthrift programs, meet the state's emergency financial needs
caused by the repeal of other taxes, and carry on state public assis- 
49tance programs.
Surprisingly for an administration which its enemies attempted to
48Morning Advocate, June 3, 1940; Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940; M. G. 
Dakin, "Louisiana Tax Legislation of 1940," Louisiana Law Review, 
November, 1940, pp. 74—76.
49Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940; Dakin, ’Louisiana Tax Legislation of 
1940,” pp. 74-76; W. Scott Heywood to Gene B. Hejwood, June 3, 1940, 
Jennings-Heywood Collection.
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portray as a friend of the rich and the corporations, Jones’ tax
package also raised income taxes and tightened loopholes in the gift
tax. The new rates taxed incomes at the rate of two per cent on the
first $4,000 of income in excess of credits, four per cent on the next
$4,000, and six per cent on all income above $8,000. The old Longite
rates had been two per cent on the first $1,000; four per cent on the
next $40,000; and six per cent on all above $50,000. In addition, the
tax on corporate incomes increased from four per cent to six per cent
and applied to all taxable net income without the $3,000 exemption
allowed by the Longites. Also, individuals and corporations faced a
five per cent surtax on net income in excess of $5,000 resulting from
sales of unimproved land, sale of mineral rights or oil royalties, or
lease of land for oil exploration. The gift tax provision closed the
loophole by which an individual could save taxes by spreading large
cash gifts over several years. Under the new tax, the amount paid
would be the same whether the gift was made in one year or in several 
50years.
While the governor's sales tax repeal successfully passed the 
legislature, the income tax increases, which had to be framed as a 
constitutional amendment because prevailing rates were written into 
that document, failed to gain approval in the November election. This 
failure left Jonfes a dire problem with which he wrestled until 1942: 
how to fund a $154,002,641.58 biennial budget without a major source
^̂ Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940; Dakin, "Louisiana Tax Legislation of 
1940,” pp. 55-60.
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of revenue he had expected to receive.^
Education bills passed by the 1940 legislature provided improved 
benefits for the state’s teachers and public school funding at unpre­
cedented levels. Teachers received ten days per school year leave of 
absence for illness or other emergency without loss of pay, sabbatical 
leaves in all parishes, and the establishment of a Teacher’s Retire­
ment System. The legislature, with Jones' urging, dedicated the 
severance tax to public education to provide a maximum $20 per edu- 
cable child, and also reserved a portion of the tobacco tax revenue 
for education. Teachers also received slight pay increases: the
average white teacher’s salary rose to $1,331.88, while the average 
black teacher's salary was less than half that -- $558.81. The state 
also tightened its requirements for certification, and for the first 
time required a minimum bachelor's degree rather than the sketchy 
college training course required before. The main criticism of the 
1940 education legislation was that it did not go far enough. Repre­
sentative William J. Dodd, an Allen parish teacher and president of 
the Louisiana Teacher’s Association, pointed out that even with the 
pay raise, the average Louisiana teacher received $83 per month after 
taxes and also publicly scored Jones and Superintendent of Education 
John E. Coxe because they failed to back a bill to extend Louisiana's
^̂ Times-Picayune, June 18, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 3, 1940. 
The sales tax repeal also brought another problem:' what to do with 
the left-over sales tax tokens the government had produced in the mil­
lions (6,806,400 one-mill pieces and 1,599,750 five-mill pieces re­
mained in storage and another 53,709,860 one-mill and 7,812,564 five- 
mill pieces remained in circulation). Louisiana tried to sell them to 
Mississippi, which had a shortage because of curtailed war production, 
but state law prevented Mississippi from accepting another state's 
tokens in payment of its tax.
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school requirements from eleven to twelve years for high school gradu-
. . 52ation.
On the whole, Jones was well pleased with his first legislative 
session. It was, he said, a legislature that ’’cannot be bought, bull­
dozed or browbeaten." He reported to the people that he had worked 
with the legislature, but pointedly reminded them that he "never ap­
peared on the floor of either House and . . . never appeared before 
any committee." Perhaps if he had, more of his legislation 'might have 
fared better. He strove to dispel the old Longite image of him as an
unfeeling corporation lawyer. In addition, he said, the people had
53been freed from political dictatorship. The subsequent taxpayer 
suits, of course, dampened his optimism.
Not all members of the legislature shared Jones’ positive opinion 
of the session. While Senator Joe Cawthorn remarked that "I. am happy 
that the vicious deduct system, dual jobholding and graft, that was 
fought so hard by my close personal friend, former Governor James A. 
Noe, have been successfully eliminated from the political system of
Times-Picayune, June 26-27, 1940; "Legislation of 1940," Louisiana 
Schools, September, 1940, pp. 22-23; "Address by President W. J. Dodd," 
Louisiana Schools, November, 1941, p. 4; Charles E. Sutton, Charles L. 
Foxworth, Robert E. Hearn, Louisiana’s Story of Public Education (Rus- 
ton, Louisiana, Bureau of Educational Research and Publications, Col­
lege of Education, Louisiana Tech University, 1971), pp. 10-11; Minns 
Sledge Robertson, Public Education in Louisiana After 1898 (Baton Rouge, 
Bureau of Educational Materials and Research, College of Education, 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 
1952), pp. 149-153, 157; Charles E. Weimer, "John Easterly Coxe, Louisi­
ana Educator" (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1974), 
p. 23.
53Times-Picayune, June 13, July 12, 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
this state," Representative Charlie Webb of Red River parish, a "self­
admitted Earl Long member of the House," called the legislative ses­
sion "a disappointment," and further remarked that "The [employment] 
of Yankees from Chicago to throw aside a form of government we have 
been using for 100 years and substituting a plan that no one under­
stands is an unnecessary experiment. The crime commission will prob­
ably be used to persecute and intimidate those connected with the past
54administration ..."
Following the legislative session, Jones faced the problem of 
maintaining much of his reform program as the entrenched remnants of 
Longism filed taxpayer suits against it. He and his followers also 
had to grasp and learn to manipulate better the levers of power in the 
state government. Jones found that even the best good government in­
tentions did not protect him from problems with patronage. In many 
cases, he appointed businessmen to government positions: sugar planter
W. Prescott Foster of St. Mary parish became chairman of the Highway 
Commission, while Alexandria produce merchant Martin L. Close, and 
Franklin parish planter and businessman W. E. Gilbert became members 
of the same body. New Orleans engineer Frank Grevemberg became busi­
ness manager of executive buildings; independent oil operator B. A. 
Hardy of Shreveport became Conservation Commissioner; while another 
Shreveport oil man, Charlton H. Lyons, became president of the board
^States, July 11, 1940..
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of supervisors of elections for Caddo parish-^ Jones had relatively 
little trouble with these appointments, but the agreement by which 
Jones’ camp agreed to share state patronage 50-50 with James A. Noe's 
supporters slowly came unraveled, and as it did, Jones gained a foe 
as implacably anti-Jones as he had been anti-Long. Moreover, he took 
many of his vocal supporters into the anti-Jones camp.
Governor Jones shrewdly did not begin a serious turnover of state 
jobs until the legislative session neared adjournment. He therefore 
retained the leverage provided by a promise or even a hint of a state 
job for a legislator's favored supporter. He and Noe, however, held 
several preliminary meetings in Baton Rouge in which they discussed 
patronage. Noe denied rumors that he and Jones had failed to reach 
an early agreement: "I'm 100 per cent behind whomever Governor Jones
wants to appoint.
After the legislative session, however, the serious competition 
for state jobs began as rumors raced across the state that "Long men" 
were to be purged from state payrolls and replaced by men loyal to 
Sam Jones. Hundreds of people —  hopeful Jones supporters, legisla­
tors, and James A. Noe —  converged on the state capitol and the 
executive mansion during late July, 1940, for a series of patronage
~*~*Town Talk, May 4, 1940; "Major Hardey Looks Ahead At the 'Golden Age 
of Louisiana,"' Louisiana Conservation Review, Spring, 1940, p. 7; Sam 
Jones to Charlton H. Lyons, Sr., October 16, 1942, Charlton Havard 
Lyons, Sr. Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. 
Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
^Morning Advocate, May 17-18, 1940.
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57meetings.
Jones’ eventual plan for the distribution of state patronage was 
typical of him —  business-like and multi-layered. All job changes 
under his original plan were to be made under recommendation of parish 
political units of the Jones administration. He also planned for a 
"district representative" in each Congressional district to smooth over 
problems which arose. The district representatives, in turn, were to 
forward recommendations for jobs to the department with the opening.
In his public announcement, Jones reiterated his plan that the men 
appointed must be qualified to fill their posts and perform their job. 
He planned a major turnover in state jobs to begin August 1, when the 
state composed its new payrolls. Several legislators complained that 
the plan had no place for them except for having a final veto over 
job offers in their districts. That meant, they said, that when some­
one received a job he or she would feel indebted to the Jones organi­
zation, but when someone failed to receive a job he or she would damn 
58the legislator.
Jockeying for control of patronage brought strange bedfellows 
together: Old Regular Assessor James E. Comisky and Property Commis­
sioner Joseph P. Skelley met in Baton Rouge with Jones and Noe to ar­
range for Old Regular input into selection of state workers in New 
Orleans, in exchange for Old Regular support for Jones-Noe candidates 
in city elections. Remnants of the Leche-Long administration, mean-
^ Times-Picayune, July 26, 1940-
^Times-Picayune, July 26-27, 1940; Item, July 17, 1940.
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while, announced formation of the American Democratic Association led 
by George W. Flynn, who had worked in Earl Long's campaign headquar­
ters in the recent gubernatorial election, to seek votes from voters
who lost jobs, failed to get jobs, or generally opposed the Jones-
59Noe-Old Regular alliance.
Despite his careful planning, Jones' guidelines to distribute 
patronage through the district representative system failed as Noe’s 
forces protested their lack of influence in the selection process. 
Noe, however, remained loyal ("everything is lovely"), and Jones' 
forces formulated a new plan which allowed Noe to establish his own 
parish committees to be consulted on the patronage distribution at 
the local level. Jones also announced a new "high command" composed 
of Vance Plauche of Lake Charles, Francis Whitehead of Port Allen 
(both former members of his campaign team) and Charles E. McKenzie
of Monroe, Noe's first Democratic primary campaign manager, to handle
_ _ _ 60 all requests for patronage.
Jones’ hope, however, was not fulfilled. Three months after
their organizations promulgated the second patronage plan, Jones and
Noe met again, and neither was satisfied with the outcome of their
conference. Noe remarked in a restrained understatement that "We
haven’t been so very well pleased with what we've been getting," but
added that "we hope things will get better.” He adamantly rejected a
suggestion to solve the problem by merging their two organizations:
59 .............Times-Picayune, July 30-31, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States
July 28, 1940.
^Times-Picayune, July 31—August 2, 1940.
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"As long as Jimmy Noe is able and Mrs. Noe is by his side . . .we'll 
never leave our organization." Jones ruefully remarked, "I guess this 
will be going on up to 1944." Following this meeting, Jones leaders 
unveiled yet a third patronage plan to replace the old system. Now, 
Jones and Noe would each appoint three members to a special patronage 
committee. A Jones member and a Noe member from the committee would
61then contact state department heads and discusss patronage with them.
The new arrangement also failed to satisfy Noe. Ill tempers 
flared again at patronage conferences in the spring of 1941, and the 
conflict fueled rumors of an impending Jones-Noe split. Noe termed 
their April 7, 1941, meeting "highly unsatisfactory." Noe's organi­
zation then began to crack apart. Five New Orleans ward leaders an­
nounced that they did not attend a meeting of his city organization 
because they felt that total amalgamation of the Noe and Jones organi­
zations was the essential requirement for full participation in the 
patronage. They also wondered if perhaps Noe's determination to hold 
his organization together showed his dedication to political ideals, 
or his "ambitions for personal political advancement," a pointed 
reference to his publicly announced intention to run for the United 
States Senate seat held by Allen J. Ellbnder. Noe delayed for two days 
before replying that he would continue to fight for the complete inde­
pendence of the Noe organization as the best guarantee of good govern­
ment in Louisiana, but that he still continued to back "every
^Morning Advocate, December 17, 22, 1940.
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62constructive move" Jones made.
On April 17, however, Noe left Baton Rouge, saying that the 
governor had been too busy to hear his request to meet with New Or­
leans Noe leaders to reassure them about patronage. That same day 
Noe's organization continued to deteriorate as three Noe leaders in 
New Orleans became co-leaders of their wards in the Jones organization. 
Noe hurriedly sought and received Jones' assurances that the defecting 
leaders would have no effect on the Noe followers who had received 
state jobs, yet remained loyal to Noe. He reiterated, though, that
"we haven’t been treated right, either in the country or the city,"
63and threatened to devise his own plan to divide the jobs.
Noe rapidly became disillusioned with his perceived slights in 
the patronage controversy, and angrily charged that even though he 
favored Civil Service, he wondered whether the Jones camp was attemp­
ting to install its followers in all the state jobs to blanket them in 
when the Civil Service became effective. The final break between the 
erstwhile allies occurred after Noe charged on May 14, 1941 that Jones 
was merely erecting a new dictatorship in Louisiana. Jones planted 
spies in the Noe organization meetings, Noe charged, and then fired 
from state jobs Noe supporters who would not join his organization, 
or who spoke against him. "This is nothing more than dictatorship 
dressed up in silk stockings and under a new name ..." Noe
62Ibid., April 8-9, 1941.
63Ibid., April 17-18, 1941.
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fumed.^
The alliance of convenience forged between Jones and Noe seemed 
almost destined to disintegrate. They were, after all, unlikely 
allies, one the idealistic reformer, the other a consummate politician 
schooled by the master, Huey Long. Jones* need for Noe’s help was 
most acute during the second primary campaign in 1940, and thus he 
may have agreed to provide more patronage than reality later allowed 
him to supply to Noe's supporters.
Not all Jones' time during his first two gubernatorial years was 
occupied by formulating or defending his reform plans or in attempting 
to pacify James A. Noe. The unfolding European war caused a boom in 
defense industries throughout the United States, and Jones traveled to 
Washington, D.C., to plead with President Roosevelt "for anything and 
everything that will help Louisiana." New defense stations, he said,
64Morning Advocate, May 15, 1941. Even though the bitter split with 
Noe cost Jones some of the support with which he established his re­
form program at the beginning of his administration, it was not as 
costly as it may appear at first glance betcause Noe's days as an 
asset were numbered. In late 1940 he was indicted by a federal grand 
jury for alleged income tax evasion committed in 1935 by the Win or 
Lose Oil Corporation, in which Noe (who served as president), Seymour 
Weiss, Oscar K. Allen, and Huey Long (Allen and Long secretly) shared 
the profits. Noe was acquitted on all counts following a tearful 
court appearance, but his statewide political influence was on the 
wane. He threatened on several later occasions to run for either 
governor or United States Senator, but his only campaign for an im­
portant state post, his ill-fated 1959-1960 gubernatorial candidacy 
in Earl Long’s bizarre attempt to retain political power, ended in a 
crushing defeat. See (for Noe's trial) Morning Advocate, June 12, 
August 17, 1941, April 12, 1942; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, 
April 12, 1942; (for Noe’s subsequent career) Glen S. Jeansonne, Race, 
Religion and Politics The Louisiana Gubernatorial Elections of 1959- 
60 (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of 
Southwestern Louisiana, 1977), pp. 31-32.
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expansion of present army, navy, and marine organizations, opening of
airplane factories, anything that would bring money into Louisiana
would be considered: "If there are any federal funds to be got, I am
65going to do my damdest to get them."
Shortly after his trip to Washington, Jones attended the Southern 
Governor's Conference and proposed a study of all states to determine 
what each had to contribute to the national defense and preparedness 
program, and called for a Southern Defense Council, composed of one 
representative appointed by each southern governor. He was not ready, 
however, to gear Louisiana's economy solely on defense. He announced 
that Louisiana would join in the "Balanced Prosperity" program, a ten- 
year effort to bring a more balanced economy to the south, sponsored 
by the Southern Governor's Conference, and warned a Lake Charles 
audience that Louisiana would enjoy only a "false prosperity" based 
only on defense spending. "There will be better times, much better 
times," he said, but "there will be a repercussion when that [defense] 
spending stops.
As Jones worked tirelessly to attract United States dollars to 
Louisiana, he also established himself as a staunch advocate of im­
proved United States relations with Latin America, a pet project of 
President Franklin Roosevelt. Jones’ efforts in improving these re­
lations, however, resulted from his pragmatic attempts to reestablish 
New Orleans as the premier port connecting the Upper Mississippi
^Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940.
^ Times-Picayune, June 3, 4, 11, 19; September 24, 1940; Morning Advo­
cate, February 16, May 9, 1941.
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Valley and outside world, especially Latin America. He also en­
visioned New Orleans as the new "air hub of America" connecting the 
great Mississippi valley and South America, and pledged his admini­
stration to fostering better understandings and relations among all 
the Americas. Jones proposed increased study of Spanish and Portu­
guese at LSU to ease communication problems. He also proposed an ex­
change student program, and encouraged nationals of all American 
countries to visit other countries so that nonrepresentative nationals 
in a foreign land would not discredit the entire citizenship of their 
country. He set an example himself by vacationing in several Caribbean 
countries to unwind after his grueling campaign to win approval of 
his constitutional amendments in the fall, 1940 general election. He 
chaired the five-member committee formed by the Southern Governor’s 
Conference to promote trade, defense preparedness, and friendship 
with Latin American countries.^
Perhaps Jones’ most flamboyant effort toward establishing his 
personal diplomacy toward Latin America occurred during the summer of 
1941 when the "Greater Louisiana Special Train" brought a group of 
prominent Louisianians to Mexico City for a good will visit from July 
12 until July 24 to promote Louisiana-Mexico trade. Jones planned to 
lead the "special," but legal challenges to his reform plan kept him
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August 4, 1940; Times-Picyaune, 
August 7, 1940; Monroe Morning World, September 17, 1904; Morning 
Advocate, November 23, 1940; Town Talk, December 11, 1940; A. E. 
Pradillo, "Louisiana's Governor ’Sells’ Middle West," New Orleans Port 
Record, October, 1943, pp. 9-10; Willard Range, Franklin D. Roose­
velt's World Order (Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia Press,
1959), pp. 52-66; Gary Arnold Bolding, "Efforts to Develop New Orleans 
as a World Trade Center, 1910-1960" (M-A. thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1966), pp. 62-64.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
in Baton Rouge to help plan strategy. In his stead, Mrs. Jones and
68Agriculture Commissioner Harry D. Wilson led the delegation.
Victory, joy, challenge, frustration, defeat —  Governor Sam 
Jones experienced all these emotions during his first two years in 
office. He established his reform laws for Louisiana but saw some of 
his efforts washed away in court battles. Little did he know, as he 
struggled to save his reformation and bring more industry to Louisiana, 
that even greater challenges lay ahead. His break with Noe and his 
lack of a strong political base in the legislature, however, led to 
even further defeat in the 1942 regular session.
68Morning Advocate, July 10, 1941; Greater Louisiana Special Train 
(n.p., n.d.); Justin E. Wilson to W. Scott Heywood, June 28, 1941, 
Heywood to Harry D. Wilson, June 30, 1941, Heywood to Sam Jones, June 
30, 1941, Jones to Heywood, July 2, 1941, Jennings-Heywood Collection.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONTINUING BATTLE FOR REFORM (1942-1944)
Louisiana politics in 1942 began with the Democratic primary for 
the New Orleans mayor’s race. Early speculation suggested freshman 
United States Representative F. Edward Hebert as a possible reform 
candidate. Hebert, however, had no interest in the office, so some 
reformers initially chose as their candidate former Old Regular Con­
gressman Paul H. Maloney, whom T. Hale Boggs had defeated in 1940. 
Governor Sam Jones briefly considered lending his support to Maloney, 
but purists among the Governor’s supporters dissuaded him from doing 
so. The Old Regulars, meanwhile, promised to support Maloney for 
Congress again in the 1942 fall election in exchange for his with­
drawal from the January mayoral primary, a deal which Maloney accepted. 
The reformers then turned to 38-year-old .attorney Herve Racivitch, a 
veteran politician from the Jones campaign. The Old Regulars backed 
incumbent Mayor Robert Sidney Maestri in his election bid. Two minor 
candidates, Shirley G. Wimberly and John T. Knoop, entered the race 
as independent Democrats who attacked Maestri as the close ally of 
thet "thieving" Long machine and Racivitch as the candidate of a new 
reform machine.^
"̂Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison and the Image of Reform New 
Orleans Politics, 1946-1961 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University 
Press, 1974), pp. 14-15, 21-22; Joseph B. Parker, The Morrison Era 
Reform Politics in New Orleans (Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican Publishing 
Company, 1974), p. 60; F. Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of 
the Titans" The Life and Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of 
Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, Univer­
sity of Southwestern Louisiana, '1976), pp. 164-165; New Orleans Times- 
Picayune, September 16, 18-19, October 2, 11, December 16, 18, 1941; 
New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, November 16, 1941; New
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Maestri and the Old Regulars campaigned as a "complete the work" 
ticket, citing improvements in New Orleans finances made since 1936.
Sam Jones did not enthusiastically support Racivitch, evidently because 
Jones hope to continue the working relationship with Maestri which had 
allowed at least some of his legislative proposals to pass the 1940 
legislature. Governor Jones did, however, accompany Racivitch to a 
New Orleans dinner commemorating the transfer of Louisiana from France 
to the United States, and in his speech that night remarked that during 
the war in which the United States found itself currently embroiled, 
"Derelictions and backgrounds which in times of peace might be over­
looked are now reason enough for instantaneous repudiation of any man 
in high office," a direct allusion to Maestri. Again in New Orleans 
for services commemorating the 127th anniversary of peace between the 
United States and Great Britain following the Battle of New Orleans, 
he reminded voters that any appeals to the old "don’t-change-horses- 
in-the-middle-of-the-stream" slogan, "[are] now as ludicrous as [they 
were] always fallacious . . . if your horse can no longer make progress 
under its own power because of riding so long on a machine —  then
Orleans Item, July 31, 1941; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, August 1-2, 
1941; New Orleans States, December 18, 1941. Maestri had become 
mayor in the aftermath of Huey Long's political war with New Orleans 
which led to mayor T. Semms Walmsley's resignation in 1936. Governor- 
elect Richard Leche, Conservation Commissioner Maestri, and New Orleans 
Dock Board president Seymour Weiss agreed that Maestri should be ap­
pointed to replace Walmsley. Maestri's one opponent in the primary 
election called in 1936 to fill Walmsley’s unexpired term withdrew 
from the campaign and the Republicans did not enter a candidate in the 
general election. Maestri thus became mayor without facing the voters. 
The Longites then pushed through the legislature a constitutional 
amendment which cancelled the regular 1938 mayoralty race. Therefore, 
in 1942 Maestri had been mayor for 6 years, but was conducting his 
first campaign for the office.
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2you'd better change horses ..."
Jones' former ally, James A. Noe, felt no reluctance at cam­
paigning in the New Orleans election. Noe had already announced his 
intention to run for either Allen J. Ellender's United States Senate 
seat in 1942, or for the governorship in 1944, and planned to use the
1942 mayor's race to forge political alliances for use in his later
campaigns. Noe the reformer thus mended his political fences with 
the machine and endorsed Maestri and the Old Regular ticket: "[they]
have my blessings and my best wishes . . ." Maestri replied that he
3was "happy" to accept the endorsement.
Noe, however, unwittingly created a split within his New Orleans 
organization. A small group of twelve ward leaders who had originally 
backed Noe in the 1940 gubernatorial primary sought to oppose the 
Maestri endorsement. Their spokesman, Harry Cabral, one of Noe's 
earliest supporters in the city, asserted that they stood by the origi­
nal intent of the Noe organization "to bring an end to the Maestri- 
Leche-Long dictatorship ..." James D. McNeill, chairman of the Noe 
city caucus sought to discredit the dissidents by charging that they 
had accepted state jobs in exchange for their disavowal of the Noe . 
organization. The Jones-Noe failure to fulfill their patronage agree­
ment in 1941 thus surfaced to harry Jones' reform effort. Noe, how­
ever, retained control of his organization. "I am still Kingfish of
2Times-Picayune New Orleans States, December 21, 1941; Times-Picayune, 
September 22, 1941, January 9, 30, 1942.
M̂orning Advocate, October 5, 1940, July 16, 1941, January 17, 1942; 
Times-Picayune, January 3, 1942.
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the Noe lodge ..." and announced that "we are 100 per cent with Bob
4Maestri in this fight."
The reformers’ campaign centered on Maestri's ties to the Long 
machine and its attendant corruption, while the Old Regular-Noe alli­
ance attacked Jones for his efforts to help Racivitch. Rumors of a 
renewal of the infamous deduct system to finance Maestri’s campaign 
caused a brief flurry of excitement and a quick response from the 
mayor: "I have given no orders to make any ’deducts.’" Reformers 
thought they had uncovered a new sophistication of the deduct scheme 
when they discovered that city employees were buying tickets to a 
"lotto party" to benefit Maestri's campaign, but the sponsoring Old 
Regular ward leaders innocently explained that instead, the proceeds 
"are to be used for baskets for poor families and for no other pur­
pose." Telephone calls made on the night of the supposed party to the 
address shown on the tickets, however, failed to ascertain whether the 
lotto games were in progress.̂
Charges of corruption, past or present, failed to bring the re­
formers victory in New Orleans. Maestri received 76,008 votes to 
Racivitch’s 49,762, Wimberley’s 11,029, and Knoop's 788. Sam Jones 
attempted to put the best possible face on the returns, noting that 
the Old Regulars carried 3,000 less votes for Maestri than they 
carried for Earl Long in the governor's race two years previously, but 
the reformers could take little comfort in the election returns as
^Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 4, 1942; Morning Advocate, 
January 17, 1942; Times-Picayune, January 6, 8, 16, 21, 23, 28-29, 1942.
^Times-Picayune, September 20-21, October 10, 12, 1942.
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Maestri remained safely in power. The governor on March 30 cancelled 
the general election as state law required if the Democratic candi­
dates had been unopposed and the deadline for qualifying had passed
6with no other party candidates in contention.
The 1942 mayoralty campaign proved to be only the preliminary 
bout to the major political battles of the year: the regular and sub­
sequent extraordinary sessions of the legislature. Governor Jones' 
primary problem stemmed in part from the voters' failure to approve 
the constitutional amendment providing for increased income taxes de­
signed to replace some of the revenue lost with the sales tax repeal 
in the 1940 legislative session. Jones dealt with the problem immedi­
ately after the income tax amendment failed, receiving authority from 
the State Board of Liquidation to poll the legislature for permission 
to borrow up to $5,000,000 in case of a possible shortfall to tide the 
state over until Jones could call a special legislative session to deal 
with the situation. Prompt action became necessary because State 
Treasurer A. P. Tugwell announced on November 29, 1940, that as a re­
sult of the new tax structure, the state could run out of money by 
March or April, 1941, and by then also have an $8,000,000 deficit.
Jones subsequently polled the legislature and received permission to 
make the loan. Despite Jones' attempts at establishing more efficient 
public administration, by the end of 1940 the state faced a biennial
^Ibid., January 28-29, February 1, March 31, 1942; Morning Advocate, 
May 16, 1942. Maestri thus served as New Orleans mayor for 10 years 
(1936-1946) and placed his record on the line only twice, this success­
ful 1942 campaign and the 1946 contest which he lost to the young war 
hero-reformer DeLesseps Morrison. After the 1942 election, Jones com­
pensated Racivitch by appointing him attorney to collect delinquent 
taxes in Orleans parish.
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deficit of $14,000,000, chiefly caused by public largesse distributed 
by the 1940 legislature, continued state borrowing, and Jones' in­
ability to implement his administrative and fiscal controls because 
the Longites had successfully challenged him. Also, the Governor’s 
split with Noe caused Noe’s fiery young protege, State Senator Joe T. 
Cawthorn of DeSoto parish, to become one of Jones' most ardent and 
vocal critics. The state's dire fiscal condition became apparent 
in early 1941, when the New Orleans Charity Hospital closed its two 
uppermost floors, thus eliminating 497 patient beds, a move that pre­
saged later developments.̂
During early 1942, Jones attempted to impress upon his department 
heads the gravity of the situation and also to persuade them to save 
as much money as possible by issuing guidelines to adapt the state 
government to the war effort. These guidelines included returning to 
the state treasury as much of their current appropriations "as humanly 
possible," not replacing personnel taken for military service, elimi­
nating desirable but non-essential services, and cultivating all 
available state land for food and fuel requirements of state agencies. 
Jones* attempted economies, however, were not sufficient to obliterate 
the deficit. State financial officers in 1942 estimated that the 1940 
legislature had increased state expenditures for schools, hospitals, 
and relief by about $8,000,000 per year, while state income had
Âllan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana State Politics, 1920-1952 
(Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 169-170; Morning 
Advocate, November 20, 30, December 8, 12, 1940, February 20, March 3, 
13, May 26-27, June 7, 12, 28, August 11, 1941; Alexandria Daily Town 
Talk, December 20, 1940, August 27, 1941 (hereinafter cited as Town 
Talk).
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increased by only about $5,000,000. The state would require at least 
$3,000,000 to relieve the existing deficit; an additional $4,000,000 
for each of the next two years to prevent a recurring deficit; and 
about $3,000,000 more to fund built-in increases in salaries, materi­
als, and other expenses. Jones blamed the failure of the 1940 income 
tax amendment and the state’s bonded indebtedness leftover from the 
Long-Allen-Leche administrations for the state's fiscal problems, 
but Senator Cawthom, Jones' most persistent critic, charged instead 
that "waste and inefficiency" since 1940 had led to the current situ­
ation: "The governor was not satisfied with the help and advice he
could get from the elected officials . . .  He had to go up to Chicago
gand get a Mr. Griffenhagen ..."
Problems concerning both Louisiana's role in the war and the 
state's fiscal condition dominated the 1942 regular session which 
opened in May. Reform elements in the state hoped that the legisla­
ture would "[avoid] all kinds of petty legislation introduced in the 
name of the war effort which has no real purpose ..." and propose 
only measures to "provide for the orderly conduct of state business." 
Their hopeful attitude found some basis in the Old Regular announcement 
that they would not oppose Norman Bauer'for re-election as Speaker of 
the House. The reformer’s hopes, however, were short lived. The 
first skirmish of the new session occurred in the vote to replace the 
late J. Martin Hamley as Secretary of the Senate. The administration 
first supported William Gladney of New Orleans for the post but, in an
—
Shreveport Tiroes, January 10, February 11, 1942; States, March 21, 
1942; Morning Advocate, April 9, 29, 1942; Item, May 14, 1942.
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effort to find a more popular candidate, switched to Robert A. Gilbert 
of Napoleonville, brother of the late Senator Philip Gilbert, formerly 
aligned with Huey Long’s regime. The staunch anti-Jones group of 
senators headed by Cawthorn nominated former Acadia parish representa­
tive N. Smith Hoffpauir, but when they realized that the administration 
commanded enough votes to block Hoffpauir’s selection, they agreed to 
a compromise of Gilbert for secretary andHoffpauir for assistant 
secretary. The potential deadlock created by the virtually equal sup­
port of each side in the Senate was revealed when Lieutenant-Governor 
Marc Mouton ruled that the two appointments were separate and had to 
be considered separately. Cawthorn retorted that the Senate could make 
its own rules, and a 20—19 vote sustained him. The Senate then elected 
Gilbert and Hoffpauir by the same 20-19 vote. The Senate secretary 
vote also revealed an additional problem Jones faced. His ally from 
the 1940 session, President-Pro-Tempore Frank B. Ellis, voted against 
the administration. Ellis maintained that he had not broken with the 
administration, but instead merely exercised his right to make indepen­
dent decisions. Jones’ enemies, however, had counted Ellis as one of 
their own, or at least expected him to vote with them more than against
9them. (Jones later maintained that Ellis had "sold out to Maestri.")
Governor Jones, in his opening address to the legislature, called 
for enactment of measures to provide for Louisiana’s role in the war 
effort, to solve problems created by invalidation of some of his 1940
~9States, May 7, 11, 1942; Morning Advocate, May 8, 10, 12, 1942; Item, 
May 12, 1942; Sam Jones interviewed by Dennis Daugherty, May 6, 1970, 
Dennis Daugherty Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy 
H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisi­
ana.
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reforms, and to finance necessary and desirable governmental activities 
for the next biennium. His proposed war measures included mundane pro­
posals regulating blackouts, penalizing anyone trespassing in or at­
tempting to sabotage a war industry, as well as election reforms 
guaranteeing the right of servicemen to register and vote absentee, 
providing leaves of absence to servicemen in state employ, and per­
mitting servicemen to run for public office absentee by a simple noti­
fication procedure instead of the regular formalities and fees required 
by law. His principal proposals to solve the reorganization problem 
included legislative recognition of the departments of state govern­
ment not invalidated by the adverse decision on the constitutional 
amendments, especially certain provisions of the fiscal code. Admini­
stration fiscal proposals strangely provided no detailed plan to raise 
necessary additional revenue. Jones had already stated that it was the 
Legislature’s role to provide the money necessary to fund the state 
government, and thus confined himself to general platitudes about re­
duction of appropriations and unnamed additional revenue sources needed 
to balance the budget.^
Reactions to Jones’ speech were mixed, understandably along fac­
tional lines. Cawthorn accused him of "attempting to hide the failure 
of his administration behind the war." Senator Brooks Oliver of Bas­
trop stated that "I think it was a bunch of hooey. All of us be­
lieve in defense and co-operation," and asked pointedly, "Why didn't 
he cooperate with us during the past two years?" Earl Long, however,
^ Morning Advocate, May 13, 1942; States, May 13, 1942; Shreveport 
Journal, May 13, 1942.
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probably best typified a widespread feeling in Longite ranks. He 
attended the opening of the legislative session, and when asked his 
opinion of Jones’ speech, he replied, "I didn't hear it. I wouldn’t 
waste time that way." Nine Longite Senators apparently agreed with 
Long’s assessment when they followed Senator Ernest Clements' lead in 
voting not to recess the Senate to hear Jones' address. (The Senate 
voted 29-10 in favor of recess.) They did, however, attend the joint 
legislative session which Jones addressed. Jones' supporters described 
the speech as "excellent and most timely," and "wonderful."**
Jones' troubles with the legislature, however, had only begun. 
Robert Maestri rented Longite Registrar of State Lands Lucille May 
Grace’s house in Baton Rouge to serve as a convenient political and 
entertainment headquarters for Longite members of the legislature. 
Jones' allies failed in attempts both to pass resolutions asking 
Maestri to leave the city and quit attempting to influence legisla­
tors, and also to pass bills stripping the New Orleans mayor's office
of extraordinary powers granted to it at the expense of the city coun-
12cil during Leche's administration.
Governor Jones and the reform forces were most successful in 
passing the measures he called for in his opening speech to facilitate 
Louisiana's participation in the war effort. The legislature provided 
authorization (Act 6) for "forces of Louisiana" other than the National 
Guard to serve outside the boundaries of the state, to pursue enemies
**Morning Advocate, May 13, 1942; Item, May 13, May 22, 1942; States, 
May 13-14, 1942.
12Morning Advocate, May 15, 19-20, 1942; Item, May 19-20, June 2, 16, 
1942; States, May 19-20, 1942.
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of the state into other states with reciprocity agreements, and also 
authorized other states' military forces to pursue their enemies into 
Louisiana. They also authorized the Governor (Act 7) to provide pro­
tection from air raids by ordering practice blackouts, radio silences, 
and other precautionary measures. In order to protect vital war in­
dustries located in the state, the legislature made trespassing il­
legal on any premises engaged in defense activities (Act 22); estab­
lished the crime of sabotage and provided prison terms of one to ten 
years at hard labor for those convicted of tampering with or inten­
tionally damaging public or private property engaged in war production, 
or intentionally producing faulty articles destined for war or defense 
of the United States (Acts 24, 25, 26). To protect harbors, ships, 
and navigable waters, Act 117 provided that anyone on any of them or 
on land within 200 feet of a navigable stream must have a valid 
identification and approval by the Coast Guard. Moreover, Act 242 made 
it unlawful to encourage violence, sabotage, or disloyalty to the 
United States or Louisiana, or to give information on military se­
crets, operations, or plans of defense, and Act 290 prohibited employ­
ment of known enemy aliens or conscientious objectors. The Louisiana 
Commission of Labor received extraordinary authorization to dispense 
with lessor labor laws for six month periods for businesses producing 
goods under army or navy contracts (Act 41), while the Director of 
Highways could close, partially close, or restrict the civilian use of 
any public or private highway or street used in the American war ef­
fort, or in troop movements. To help conserve gasoline and tires, 
the legislature decreed (Act 228) that service stations be closed be­
tween midnight Saturday and midnight Sunday, except for five per cent
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of the stations (chosen by lot every three months), which would remain 
open as emergency stations. The legislators authorized the Governor 
to grant leaves of absence (Act 33) to appointed officials and No­
taries Public (Act 9) who joined or were drafted into the armed ser­
vices. To allow full participation in the United States Government’s 
War Bond Program, the legislature allowed (Act 12) businesses char­
tered under state law to act as issuing agents for United States 
Government obligations. The legislature also authorized the state 
(Act 28), Police Juries (Act 29), School Boards (Act 30), and munici­
palities (Acts 39 and 150) to invest surplus funds in "E," "F," and
”G" war bonds, and allowed state and parish employees to dedicate a
13portion of their paycheck to the purchase of series "E" bonds.
Despite occasional agreement on the necessity of war measures, 
not all of them enjoyed bifactional support. Sam Jones' plan for a 
"state guard," composed of volunteers between 18 and 64 years of age, 
for example, drew heavy Longite fire. Representative DeLesseps Morri­
son introduced the bill in the House, and the original draft included 
provisions for drafting men into the guard if not enough volunteers 
emerged to fill the ranks. Representative William J. Dodd of Allen
"l3Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana At the 
Regular Session 1942 (hereinafter cited as Acts of the Legislature, 
1942 Regular Session), pp. 52, 59, 61, 64, 71, 106, 11-112, 117-119, 
121, 123, 129, 133, 378, 516-517, 801, 824, 968. The new easements of 
labor laws reflected some of the requests of United States Secretary 
of Labor Frances Perkins that the exemptions be limited to war indus­
tries and retention of certain aspects of labor laws passed to protect 
women workers. Frances Perkins to Sam Jones, June 13, 1942, William 
Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special 
Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane Univer­
sity, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Jones Collection).
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Parish rose to announce that while he was in favor of creating the
guard, he was against creating a "buzzard roost" of deadheads on the
state payroll. Why not, he asked, rely strictly on volunteers? The
governor considered the bill to be in such grave danger that he made
a rare appearance before a legislative committee along with Adjutant
General Raymond H. Fleming of the Louisiana National Guard, testifying
14in behalf of the guard bill.
Most war measures passed the legislature easily. The bill allow­
ing pursuit of "enemies of the state," for example, passed the House 
of Representatives with an 83-6 vote. Three of the "nays" saw fit to 
include a rare "Explanation of Vote" in the House Journal. Beatrice 
Moore, W. 0. Noble, and T. C. Brister opposed the bill, not because it 
was an administration bill, they said, but instead because they felt 
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies 
could better handle interstate troubles. The state guard bill also 
passed by a wide margin, 85-5, but Noble again gave an explanation of 
his "nay": he believed the draft clause "an insult to the patriotism
of the male citizens of Louisiana." (Representative Dodd did not
14Item, May 21, June 4-5, 19, 1942; States, June 2, 1942; Morning 
Advocate, June 5, 1942; Town Talk, July 18, 1942; W. Scott Heywood to 
Neal Whisenhunt, July 6, 1942, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Records, 
Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (hereinafter cited 
as Jennings-Heywood Collection). General Fleming understandably felt 
some initial reluctance to help establish the State Guard because he 
feared that it might infringe on his own National Guard. After passage 
of the law, however, he helped to supply arms and uniforms to the 
State Guard and helped to establish standards for examining officer 
candidates. Major General Raymond H. Fleming to Sam Jones, September 
15, 18, 22, 25, 1942, Jones Collection.
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overcome his objections, and also voted against the bill.)^
The governor was also successful in his attempts to push through 
the legislature new laws to salvage part of his state government re­
organization struck down by the state Supreme Court in a ruling issued 
May 25, 1942, while the legislature was in session. The Jones admini­
stration quickly created a new package of bills, each of which created 
and provided for the continued operation of one state department 
(Public Welfare, Occupational Standards, Labor, Public Safety, Insti­
tutions, Highway, and Finance), each headed by a director appointed 
by the governor. While all of the reorganization package faced oppo­
sition, the proposed fiscal code drew the strongest Longite ire. The 
fiscal code passed the Senate by a slim 20-18 vote, with Senator 
Cawthorn in strong opposition.^
While the reorganization faced stiff challenges, but eventually 
succeeded,-Longite and reformers reached a stalemate on Jones' Civil 
Service program. Representative Moseman Simoneaux of New Orleans, 
a Maestri ally, on May 31 introduced a resolution providing for the 
suspension of New Orleans Civil Service until after the 1944 regular 
session of the legislature (at which time the Longites hoped to
^ Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives 
of the State of Louisiana at the Eleventh Regular Session of the Legis­
lature Under the Adoption of the constitution of 1921, pp. 495-496. 
Unfortunately, the Senate Journal for this session is virtually inac­
cessible because the complete Senate Calendar was never published. The 
fragmentary Calendar only covers the first four weeks of the session 
and is incomplete even for that short period. Some House bills which 
the Senate considered then are not listed in the fragment.
^States, May 25, June 3, July 13, 1942; Item, June 3, 1942; Morning 
Advocate, June 13, 1942. Jones later vetoed the bills creating the 
Public Welfare and Labor departments, claiming that they were suffi­
ciently established by laws already on the books.
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control the governorship again). Meanwhile, a coalition of rural 
legislators (Horace Wilkinson of West Baton Rouge, C. 0. Webb of Red 
River, and A. D. Flowers of LaSalle) introduced a similar resolution 
to delay implementation of the state Civil Service- The Longites 
sought to achieve the desired delay by resolution in an attempt to 
circumvent the governor's veto power.^
Reformers again rallied to the Civil Service banner. They
interpreted the move to delay the acts as pure politics: "[The
Longites] want political jobs they can pass out, and they want office
holders under their control ..." The New Orleans Ministerial Union
tied Civil Service to the war effort: If we are going to ask soldiers
to give their lives and our people to give their money for national
survival, they asked, "why does this community tolerate the defiance
of law and the diversion of millions of dollars from constructive use
18into the coffers of greedy, immoral ghouls?"
While reformers in the House beat back an attempt by Representa­
tive Flowers to cramp Civil Service by reducing its appropriation 
about $83,000 in its first year, and $71,000 in its second year, the 
Civil Service League and the governor eventually agreed to delay 
implementation of New Orleans Civil Service —  ostensibly because the 
administrative apparatus was not yet in place —  and also agreed to 
postpone implementation of state Civil Service in order to avoid 
further factional animosity and suspicion. The delay, however,
*̂ Morning Advocate, June 1, 1942; States, June 5, 1942.
18Morning Advocate, June 4, 1942; Item, June 9, 1942.
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was not as long as the Longites originally desired. Civil Service 
implementation was now delayed from July 1, 1942 (original implemen­
tation date) to January 1, 1943, instead of July 1, 1944, as the 
19Longites wished.
The primary battle (and the most important stalemate) between 
the two factions occurred over Jones* budget and tax proposals. He 
submitted two budget bills for legislative consideration, an "A" 
budget maintaining approximately the current spending levels, and a 
"B" budget with reduced appropriations. The "A" budget called for the 
state spending $152,654,467.15 over the next biennium (fiscal 1942-43 
and 1943-44) with a state sales tax enacted to generate $8,500,000, 
and a natural gas gathering tax enacted to generate $1,600,000 in 
needed additional revenue. The "B" budget provided for spending 
$133,178,365.29 over the biennium without the sales tax. But as 
Budget Director James I. Smith explained to the legislature, the reduc­
tion in funding would require the removal of approximately 4,000 
patients from state hospitals, dropping approximately 2,400 students 
from state colleges and 700 from trade schools, removing approximately 
19,000 recipients from the welfare rolls, closing an unspecified num­
ber of health units, and losing countless dollars in federal matching 
funds. The governor reiterated his belief that it was the legisla­
ture’s proper task to determine budget appropriations but warned that
19Morning Advocate, June 7, 1942; States, June 25, July 1, 1942; Sind- 
ler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 172- Sam Jones maintained that after 
the regular session adjourned, emissaries from Leander Perez offered 
him a deal by which the Longites would drop their opposition to the 
sales tax in a special session if Jones would agree to dismantle the 
Civil Service. Maestri and Perez both hotly denied offering such a 
deal. See Morning Advocate, July 15, 1942; States, July 15, 1942.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
he felt duty-bound to veto all appropriations for which sufficient„ 20revenue was not provided.
Moreover, the governor warned the legislature of impending major 
deficits in state expenditures: $9,647,462.86 by the end of the 1942-
43 fiscal year, and $9,989,831.27 by the close of the 1943-44 fiscal 
year, unless the provided additional funding for "the present ser­
vices of our state agencies which have been authorized by you." The 
House and then the Senate, however, approved a budget of $175,000,000 
for the biennium.^
While the eventual legislative budget was approximately 
$25,000,000 above Jones' most optimistic proposals, the legislature 
would have seemed less irresponsible had it provided sufficient reve­
nue to fund its appropriation. Early in the session, however, leaders 
of the "country group" of Longites announced their opposition to in­
creased taxation. Nevertheless, Representative Paul F. Stinson of 
Jackson parish, a Jones ally, introduced a two per cent state sales 
tax bill on wholesalers expected to generate $11,000,000 to 
$15,000,000. Opposition to Stinson's bill surfaced immediately from 
Longites, reformers, and business groups. The States called the whole­
sale tax only a "camouflaged sales tax" and called on the administra­
tion to present its case of need, ask for a statewide sales tax, "and 
try to fool no one." State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell endorsed a general 
sales tax. A sizeable delegation of merchants under the leadership of
20Times-Picayune, May 19, 1942; Item, May 19, 1942; States, May 21, 
1942.
^ States, May 26, June 22, 29, 1942.
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the New Orleans Association of Commerce and Young Man's Business Club 
(friendly to Jones since 1939), called the proposal "unfair, imprac­
ticable, and unworkable," primarily because the bill provided no 
mandatory clause that retailers pass along the increased cost of the 
tax to their customers- The businessmen thus thought that the federal 
wartime agency, the Office of Price Administration, would object to 
increased retail prices resulting from the wholesale tax. Subsequent 
to this storm of protest, the House Ways and Means Committee dropped 
the wholesale sales tax in favor of a retail sales tax to be reported 
in the form of an amendment to a bill which had been introduced by 
title only by Representative H. H. Huckabay of Caddo parish. The new 
bill provided a one per cent sales tax on all retail purchases from 
thirteen cents to sixty-two cents and two per cent on sales above 
sixty-two cents, but exempted gasoline and natural gas purchases, as 
well as taxes under other laws, and purchases of water flowing through 
pipes in its natural state. The Ways and Means Committee attempted to 
make the increased tax rate more acceptable by titling the sales tax 
a "War Emergency Tax" to provide additional funds made necessary by
the war effort, limiting its term to two years, and expressly for-
22bidding a return to the tokens of the Long sales tax program.
Battle lines between the two factions appeared almost immediately. 
James A. Noe, James H. Morrison, and Senators Cawthorn and Clements 
all appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee, and each re­
called that Jones had promised that the state would have no sales tax
^States, May 12, 28, June 5-6, 9, 1942; Item, June 1, 4-5, 9, 1942.
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during his term of office. Jones, in a public response to a request 
for advice from24 legislators, replied that even though he was not an 
advocate of sales taxes, in this case it had become a necessary evil: 
"I would rather defend my support of the sales tax than explain closed 
hospitals and hungry old people, and bankrupt local governments, and 
unbalanced budgets, and underpaid teachers, and impassable roads . . . 
[and] I am confronted, with these alternatives." Superintendent of 
Education John E. Coxe sent letters to school board members, parish 
superintendents and supervisors, and school principals asking their 
support for the sales tax and its proposed $2,135,000 increase in
school funds. As a result, 40 parish superintendents endorsed the
„ 23tax.
House floor debate on the sales tax lasted a stormy four hours. 
Representative Theo Cangelosi (East Baton Rouge) warned that the 
people were in favor of retrenchment, not excessive taxation. Repre­
sentative James E. Bolin of Webster parish appeared in his army 
lieutenant’s uniform to plead for defeat of the tax, telling fellow 
legislators that they should "leave as much money with the people as
we can to pay federal war taxes and to buy war bonds and stamps."
*Speaker Norman Bauer and other pro-Jones representatives repeatedly 
referred to benefits of the tax: $20 per educable child for public
schools, regular equalization fund payments, regular contributions to 
the teacher retirement fund, additional old-age pension funds, and 
added revenue for hospitals. The House at last passed the Jones sales
23Morning Advocate, June 12, 16, 1942; States, June 13, 16, 1942;
Item, June 17, 1942.
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24tax on June 17, 1942, by a vote of 51 yeas and 43 nays.
The thin margin by which the sales tax passed the House, where it 
had a friendly presiding officer, did not augur well for the bill in 
the Senate. Jones attempted to lobby the Senators as he had the 
Representatives: ". . . if I were a member of the Senate, I should
most assuredly vote for the proposed sales tax. It is a grim neces­
sity. The war has tak[en] huge slices of our tax revenues; oil and 
gas products, which supply us with sixty per cent of our revenues, 
will yield smaller and smaller sums as the rubber shortage grows more 
severe ..." Despite Jones’ pleas, the Senate voted on June 24 to 
kill the sales tax in a complex bit of parliamentary maneuvering. The 
Senate first voted 21-17 to indefinitely postpone (and thus kill) the 
bill. Senator Grove Stafford, a Jones floor leader from Rapides 
Parish who voted against the indefinite postponement, then announced 
that he wished to switch his vote to the prevailing side so he could 
give notice of reconsideration and bring the bill back before the 
Senate the next day. Senator Cawthorn maintained that Stafford was 
out of order, but Lieutenant-Governor Marc Mouton ruled that a Senator 
could indeed change his vote and give notice of reconsideration. 
Cawthorn and Senator Dudley LeBlanc objected to Mouton's ruling, and 
Cawthorn moved a suspension of the rules to revert to the bill in 
order to move that it be laid on the table (again effectively killing 
it). Mouton denied Cawthorn's suspension of the rules motion, but 
Cawthorn asked for a Senate vote and carried his motion by 20 yeas to
24States, June 17-18, 1942; Item, June 18, 1942; Morning Advocate,
June 18, 1942.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
18 nays- With the rules thus suspended, Cawthorn made his final
motion to table the entire bill and carried it, thereby killing the
25sales tax for the 1942 regular session.
Jones’ supporters were outraged by the Senate action. Senator 
Lloyd Hendrick of Shreveport called the Byzantine maneuvering "one 
of the most cowardly, contemptible, most reprehensible things I have 
ever heard of." Much of the reformers’ rage was directed toward 
Robert Maestri, whom they saw as the mastermind who "sits down on the 
highland road (sic) and sends his delegation up here" to thwart the 
will of the people. Jones blamed "three millionaires" —  Maestri, 
oilman William Helis, and political boss of Plaquemines and St. Ber­
nard parishes Leander Perez —  for defeat of his tax proposal. The 
Alexandria Daily Town Talk warned its readers•to expect a barrage from 
the "Jones smearing crew" whom it expected to appear shortly in north 
and central Louisiana to attack the governor. They will say, the 
newspaper predicted, that "we told you so. We knew Sam Jones would 
not help the poor people, the lame, the halt, and the blind. Where 
is all the money he was going to use to help feed you, and send your 
sons to school, give medical attention to your sick and aid for your 
old and feeble?
Rhetoric aside, Louisiana still faced the problem of its looming 
deficits. The House passed new revenue bills adjusting income tax 
rates, and the Senate talked of reviving the wholesale sales tax, but
25Morning Advocate, June 21, 1942; States, June 24, 1942.
26States, June 24, 1942; Item, June 24, 1942; Morning Advocate, June 
28, 1942; Town Talk, July 1, 1942.
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the only major piece of revenue legislation passed by both houses 
was the gas-gathering tax, estimated to raise about $1,500,000 per 
year. Jones announced that he had made one last appeal to the Regular 
Democratic Organization for fiscal sanity but had failed to win their 
support, so his war-time tax program was indeed dead. The governor 
did not totally despair, however. He still had one possible, though 
unpleasant, option: "The only thing left for me to do is to veto
sufficient items to balance the budget." An independent citizen’s 
committee investigating state finances reported that the 1942 legis­
lature had appropriated $8,000,000 to $11,000,000 in excess of esti­
mated revenue for 1942-43, and between $7,000,000 and $9,000,000 ex- 
27cess for 1943-44. The governor clearly had a difficult task.
The performance of the rebellious 1942 legislature reveals the 
fiscal irresponsibility of Jones’ opponents. They assumed the mantle 
of "fiscal integrity" and reiterated their compassion for the "com­
mon man" by defeating the tax increases proposed by the reformers.
At the same time, however, they expected their own lavish programs 
to be financed, apparently out of thin air. When the legislature 
adjourned, therefore, it left the governor as the scapegoat who had 
to reduce state expenditures to balance state income by eliminating 
desirable programs.
Jones' Longite opponents were pleased as the legislature adjourned
27Acts Passed by the Legislature, 1942 Regular Session, p. 80; States, 
June 26, July 3, 6, August 7, 1942; Morning Advocate, July 6, 1942;
Town Talk, July 8, 1942.
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"sine die" on July 9, 1942. They had not completely obliterated
Civil Service, but they had beaten back attempts to curb their leader,
Robert Maestri’s, power, had forced Sam Jones to endorse a distasteful
sales tax in violation of his campaign pledge, and had then brought
him to his knees by failing to pass it, and had custom-tailored a
campaign issue to use against the reformers in 1944 (Where is your
health care? Where are you schools?). The Longites, however, had
underestimated the governor's resilience and his willingness to take
28a political gamble to obtain his balanced budget.
Jones' gamble involved vetoing enough necessary or popular pro­
grams to at once balance the budget and also create enough public 
pressure on legislators that they would vote to provide the revenue 
needed to continue state services with a balanced budget. (The Louisi­
ana governor had no power to reduce appropriations made by the legis­
lature. He could only approve or veto them.) Jones' vetoes resulted 
in approximately 11,000 families leaving the relief rolls; a $342,000 
reduction in LSD’s appropriations; loss of a $2,000,000 appropriation 
to aid unemployables not covered by federal programs; loss of 
$1,000,000 for the teachers' retirement system, among others. Jones'
biggest gamble, however, was his veto of the $6,500,000 biennial main-
29tenance appropriation for the New Orleans Charity Hospital.
The governor attempted to place blame for the Charity Hospital's 
problems squarely on the Old Regulars. "Your political party [sic]
28Glen Jeansonne, Leander Perez Boss of the Delta (Baton Rouge, Louisi­
ana State University Press, 1977), p. 124.
^Morning Advocate, July 11, 13, 1942; States, July 11, 1942.
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is primarily responsible . . ." he wrote to Old Regular caucus chair­
man George Montgomery. "When the sick are turned away from your 
hospitals, it will be your fault." Montgomery shot back that, "As an 
organization we feel that it would be undemocratic to attempt to dic­
tate to [the New Orleans delegation] as to how they must vote." Mrs. 
Helen N. Farris in an open letter to Jones and the legislature placed 
the blame on both factions for their shortsightedness: "... what
are you thinking about," she asked, "when you close the door of health 
of thousands of people?"- The premier Longite, former governor Earl 
Long, blamed Sam Jones solely for the hospital's problems. "I don't 
understand why it is that Gov. Jones had to pick on the hospitals and 
welfare when in the same appropriation bill was an appropriation of
over a million dollars for a civil service bureau that is not neces- 
,.30sary.
The New Orleans Charity Hospital had fallen on lean times even
before it was caught in the bifactional conflict. By June 23, 1942,
it had lost eighty resident physicians, ninety-three nurses, thirty-
eight junior interns, and forty-nine members of the visiting staff to
the armed services. Hospital officials feared that in case of an air
raid or other serious emergency, the remaining staff would be unable
31to provide adequate medical service.
The Longites resorted to their familiar tactic of filing a law­
suit to overturn Jones' veto. In this case, New Orleans attorney
InStates, July 1-2, 8, 1942; Morning Advocate, July 18, 1942.
^States, June 23, 27, 1942.
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Alfred 0. Danziger, represented by attorneys Leander Perez, George M. 
Wallace, and Wade 0. Martin, Jr., filed suit in Judge J. D. Womack’s 
court seeking to block Jones' veto on the grounds that it prevented 
payment on the state’s $800,000 bonded indebtedness for the hospital, 
of which Danziger himself held two bonds. The administration filed 
writs in the Louisiana Supreme Court asking that the suit be dismissed 
because Womack's court lacked jurisdiction in the case. The Supreme 
Court declined to issue the writ. Womack declared Jones' veto uncon­
stitutional on two grounds: it cancelled the obligation of contract
(the state, he reasoned, had entered into a contract with its bond­
holders and was obligated to complete payment), and he also declared 
that Jones should have returned the veto to the legislature for action 
prior to adjournment. The state then filed a.suspensive appeal with 
the State Supreme Court seeking to overturn Womack's injunction 
ordering the state to meet the Charity Hospital obligations. Danziger, 
through Perez, maintained that if the court granted the suspensive 
appeal, he would be denied protection of the law and divested of his 
rights without due process of law. The Supreme Court, however, 
granted the state's suspensive appeal and made it returnable on Sep­
tember 4, when both sides were to submit briefs and a date was to be 
set for hearing the injunction. This action effectively nullified 
Womack's decision, because the court on the same day announced its 
summer recess, meaning that the case could not be heard until October,
weeks after the September closing date set for the Charity Hospital
32unless it received more money.
^ Morning Advocate, July 28, 1942; States, July 31, August 1, 6, 10,
12, 14-15, 1942; Item, August 15, 1942.
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The obvious answer to the state’s fiscal problem appeared to lie 
in a special legislative session. Rumors of a special session surfaced 
after the Senate voted down the sales tax during the regular session.
The governor, however, was reluctant to cause the state additional 
expense unless he obtained reasonable assurance of success: "It would
be a waste of the state’s money to have a special session that would 
result in a cat and dog fight." Requests for a special session, how­
ever, came from various sources. Sixteen Senators on July 26 urged 
Jones to call a special session empowered to raise money for all the 
curtailed state services. The vacillating Senator Ellis called for a 
session to provide funds for the Charity Hospital but remained opposed 
to the sales tax, and proposed a transfer scheme by which a surplus 
in the Confederate pension fund could be used as the foundation of a 
bond issue to pay for programs for the aged and needy, thus freeing 
money set aside for them in the general fund which could then be used
for the hospital. The Young Men’s Business Club of New Orleans ap-
33pealed to the governor for relief for the hospital.
The governor continued to seek assurances that a special session 
would be worth the money it cost. During mid-August, he informed 
Mayor Maestri that he was contemplating issuing a call for an extra­
ordinary session and asked Maestri to meet with him to discuss ways 
of raising enough revenue to keep Charity Hospital open and other 
state services functioning. Maestri, xchen asked by newspaper reporters, 
testily denied receiving Jones’ telegraphed invitation, declaring that
33States, July 7, 27, August 10, 14, 1942; Item, August 13, 1942.
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he did "not propose to be dictated to by his excellency" and main­
taining that he had no more to do with the legislature than did any 
other mayor- (He also noted, however, that "several of my friends" 
had confided that they would vote for any tax necessary to raise reve­
nue except a sales tax).̂
■While Maestri maintained his refusal to meet with Jones, Old 
Regular floor leaders Representative Frank Stitch and Senator J.
Aubry Gaiennie met with the governor and announced that they opposed 
"anything in the form of a sales tax" but would consider other taxes. 
The participants in this meeting declined to announce the exact pro­
posals discussed, but political observers reported that the primary 
topic of discussion was a one and one-half per cent sales tax and an 
alternate one per cent sales tax with increased additional taxes.
Stitch and Gaiennie favored the latter proposal- The Longites, how­
ever, continued to question the need for a special session before the 
September Congressional primaries- Ex-govemor Earl Long declared 
that Jones only wanted to use the session to. help his "stoogey” Con­
gressional candidates. MaestriTs representatives reportedly offered 
support for a sales tax in exchange for a delayed session. The extra­
ordinary session, however, met August 20, 1942, in response to the 
governor's call, which did not limit it to consider a sales tax only
but instead authorized consideration of various revenue measures that
35the legislators wished to propose.
34States, August 16, 18, 1942; Morning Advocate, August 17, 1942; Item, 
August 18, 1942.
35States, August 18-20, 1942; Item, August 18-20, 1942; Morning Advo­
cate, August 20, 1942.
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The legislators responded to Jones' wide authorization by intro­
ducing a number of proposals. Senator Ernest Clements, for example, 
urged a widening of the call to include revision of the appropriations, 
in order to eliminate funds for state Civil Service, "the greatest 
army of high-salaried, super-colossal, streamline 18-karat deadheads" 
the state had even known. The governor, however, recommended the one 
and one-half per cent retail sales tax, and Representatives Bonnie Baker 
of East Baton Rouge Parish and H. H. Huckabay of Caddo Parish intro­
duced the bill in the House. The major Longite alternative to the 
sales tax was framed in bills introduced by Representative W. 0.
Noble of Richland parish and Senator Joe Cawthorn.. These bills would 
have funded the Charity Hospital completely by cutting all other state 
expenditures by thirty per cent. Administration leaders, of course, 
immediately saw this move as the political ploy it was intended to be: 
though the Charity Hospital would remain open, Longites could campaign 
over the rest of the state against Sam Jones, telling audiences that 
he had mishandled the state's funds so badly that it had to reduce its 
benefits to them."̂
The House passed the one and one-half per cent sales tax by 51- 
33 vote, and then only after adding an amendment providing that if 
the people approved a proposed increased income tax amendment in the 
November election, the sales tax would expire. In addition, the House 
Ways and Means Committee also ruled unfavorably on six revenue bills 
(1 cent soft drink tax, increased common carrier tax, increased gas
Morning Advocate, August 21, 24, 1942; States, August 21-22, 24,
1942.
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gathering tax, among others) introduced by anti-Jones members as sub-
37stitutes for the sales tax.
■While House debate on the unpopular tax proceeded normally, de­
bate in the Senate broke into open warfare. The melee began when 
Senator Dudley LeBlanc took the floor and roundly attacked the gover­
nor. Representative Fred J. Heintz of St. Tammany parish, who was 
standing nearby, began exchanging words with LeBlanc and invited him 
outside the Senate chamber to continue the exchange. Instead, LeBlanc 
removed his glasses, and both men began swinging their fists. Other 
Senators immediatley joined the fracas. Representatives present in 
the chamber vaulted the low railing onto the floor. Calls arose to 
"call the police" and Lieutenant-Governor Mouton repeatedly pled for 
order: "This is just a trivial matter. Please return to your seats,
gentlemen." Mouton’s gentle admonition went unheeded as one legisla­
tor grabbed a brass cuspidor and bandied it about before he was dis­
armed. The members eventually returned to order. Even though anger 
continued to seethe within the chamber, the adjournment was generally 
peaceful, with only fistfights between spectators, but not legislators. 
Senator Cawthorn and Louisiana State Police Superintendent Steve Alford 
began a fight in the corridor just outside the governor's office, but 
their friends quickly separated them. Earlier on the day of the 
melee, however, former governor James A. Noe signaled a break in 
Longite opposition to the sales tax when he testified to the Senate
37States, August 24-26, 1942; Morning Advocate, August 25, 1942; Acts 
Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana at the Extraordi 
nary Session 1942, p. 6, 28.
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Finance Committee that he favored the tax only as a last resort to
keep the hospitals open and to provide state services to the poor,
sick, blind, and insane. (Noe also told the Senators that he would
38remove the sales tax after he was elected governor in 1944.)
Despite Maestri's protests earlier that he had no extraordinary 
influence in the legislature, final negotiations to break the sales 
tax deadlock occurred in his Heidelberg Hotel room at a meeting of Old 
Regulars, the New Orleans legislative delegation, and non-city Long- 
ites. One last-minute hitch developed on the Senate floor when Sena­
tor Grove Stafford of Rapides parish objected to dedicating $1,750,000 
of the proposed revenue to parish police juries. Nevertheless, the 
Senate passed an amended version of the House sales tax (the Senate 
voted a one per cent levy) on a close 20-15 vote following a complex 
session filled with legal and parliamentary points of order. The 
House the next day concurred in the Senate amendment, thus giving 
Jones a source of revenue expected to yield about $6,000,000 per 
biennium.^
Predictably, neither Jones nor Maestri could resist attempting
38Morning Advocate, August 26, 1942; States, August 26, 1942. The 
States commented that many of the legislators were "young enough to 
hurl bombs at Hitler and Hirohito" and added that if their performance 
in the fight was any indication "many of them should make good com­
mandos."
39States, August 27-29, 1942; Item, August 27-28, 1942; Official Jour­
nal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of 
Louisiana at the Seventeenth Extraordinary Session of the Legislature 
Under the Adoption of the Constitution of 1921, pp. 40-41; House Cal­
endar Seventeenth Extraordinary Session, 1942, pp. 1—2; Official Jour­
nal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the States of Louisiana at the 
Seventeenth Extra Session of the Legislature Under the Adoption of 
the Constitution of 1921, pp. 116-130.
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to make political mileage out of the results of the special session. 
Jones exulted that the opposition "has taken a political shellacking 
and they know it," and hoped that after the Congressional primary "we 
can all settle down and give the people a breathing spell from parti­
san politics." Maestri, on the other hand, reminded the people that 
Jones had originally proposed a two per cent sales tax "which he 
claimed was absolutely necessary ..." but "the resistance of the 
city delegation and their country friends resulted in reducing this
40tax to 1 per cent ..." with a proportionate saving to the voters.
Even though the new sales tax began generating revenue at mid­
night, August 31 (the legislature gave its final approval only on 
August 29), Charity Hospital's troubles did not suddenly end. Hospi­
tal Superintendent Dr. Oliver P. Daly, announced that while the in­
fusion of revenue would allow an expansion of the hospital's capacity 
from 1,600 to 2,200 or 2,300 patients and would reopen the seventh 
floor, it would not be possible to use all 3,300 beds until after the 
war because of the shortage of doctors, nurses, and other staff 
members.^
The records of the 1942 legislative sessions reveal that despite 
national and state calls for setting politics aside for the duration 
of the war, combative bifactionalism continued in Louisiana. If Sam 
Jones was correct in his later assessment that in 1940 the Longites 
were convinced that they had the votes to do as they pleased, but
40Morning Advocate, August 30, 1942.
^States, August 31, 1942; Item, August 31, 1942.
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decided to cooperate with him in hopes of a share of the patronage, 
then by 1942 that hope was gone. Moreover, the "country Longite" 
group held out even longer against rapprochement with Jones than did 
the Old Regulars. Senator Clements of Allen parish, for example, was 
one of the fifteen Senators who voted against the resuscitated sales 
tax in the extraordinary session, even after Senator Cawthorn had 
abandoned his opposition to the tax. Clements also held true to his 
principles and cast the lone dissenting vote against creating the War 
Emergency Revenue Fund, which channeled the sales tax receipts into 
the hospital, welfare, and school funds. Both sides went through the 
motions of appealing for unity, but neither was willing to set aside 
their differences. Each looked forward hopefully to the 1944 state 
campaign and attempted to establish a strong foundation for its appeal 
to the voters.
Even with Louisiana's fiscal problems solved more or less to his 
satisfaction, Sam Jones still faced one more major challenge to his 
control of the state —  the infamous "little war of 1943." This chal­
lenge surfaced when Plaquemines Parish Sheriff L. D. Dauterive died on 
June 1, 1943. Jones and Attorney General Eugene Stanley contended 
that the constitution provided that in such instances in which the 
late official had less than one year left to serve, the governor could 
appoint a successor to fill the office until the next regular election. 
The next election following June 1, 1943, was the state-wide general 
election to be held April 18, 1944, thirty days after which (May 19, 
1944) the governor could issue a commission to the newly-elected 
official. Therefore, Jones and Stanley automatically assumed that the 
governor should appoint Dauterive's successor. Plaquemines District
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Attorney Leander Perez, a Longite since Huey's day, staunch anti- 
Jones man, and undisputed boss of the parish, thought otherwise. 
Dauterive, he held, had not filed his oath of office until June 14, 
1940, so his term lasted until June 14, 1944, clearly more than one 
year past his death. Therefore, he concluded, the constitution did 
not authorize Jones to appoint Dauterive's successor but instead pro­
vided that he call a special election to fill the parish vacancy. In 
fact, Perez's convoluted interpretation sprang from his fear that 
Jones planned to appoint an anti-Perez sheriff. (It was also in direct 
contradiction of the terms of Perez's original appointment to public 
office as district judge in 1919 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
had established the legality of the less-than-a-year appointment 
4?procedure.)
Each side held firm to its convictions. Perez had Plaquemines 
Coroner Dr. Benjamin R. Slater sworn in as acting sheriff on June 2. 
According to the state constitution, however, Slater could only assume 
an incapacitated sheriff’s tax collection duties. Jones, after a 
frantic search for an anti-Perez man willing to challenge the boss, 
appointed Walter Blaize as sheriff. Blaize, a Buras automobile repair 
shop owner, former police juror, and chairman of the Grand Prairie 
levee board, was a recognized staunch anti—Perez man who possessed the 
courage to run repeatedly on an anti-Perez platform and to suffer
42Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 127-128; James Conaway, Judge The 
Life and Times of Leander Perez (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 
p. 66; Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South Stars of 
the New Confederacy (New York, Grossman Publishers, 1968), pp. 15-16; 
Harnett T. Kane, Deep Delta Country (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 
1944), p. 210; Morning Adovcate, June 12, 1942.
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defeat after defeat. Dr. Slater refused to relinquish the office to 
Blaize, and Perez installed approximately twenty parish deputies in
the sheriff's office and barricaded the court house at Point a la
s % 43Hache.
Jones, meanwhile, gathered a force of State Guardsmen in Baton 
Rouge, evidently hoping to frighten Perez into submission with an im­
plied threat of invasion, but dismissed the State Guard after only a 
roll call and a brief drill on the grounds of the Old State Capitol. 
Instead of being frightened, however, the pugnacious Perez gathered 
his own army. Using one of the wartime measures passed by the legis­
lature which authorized local officials to call upon local citizens 
to quell a public emergency, he created the Plaquemines Wartime Emer­
gency Patrol, ostensibly to guard the parish's coast from German
submarine attack, but in reality to keep Walter Blaize and the State
44Guard away from the courthouse.
Confrontation seemed likely as the protagonists drew their armies 
around them, but the first clash occurred in court. The "little war" 
caused a number of court cases filed in various state and federal 
courts. Jones initially filed a friendly suit against the supervisor 
of public funds and the collector of revenue, claiming that they
43Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 128-129; Conaway, Judge, p. 66;
Morning Advocate, June 12, 1943; Times-Picayune, June 12, 1943.
44Jeansonne, Leander Perez, p. 130; Conaway, Judge, pp. 66-67; Times- 
Picayune , 9-11, 1943- Perez had opposed the legislature's passage of 
the State Guard bill, fearing that Jones would use it against local 
governments, but Longites were not concerned. Senator Cawthorn com­
mented that "Jones doesn’t know how to use power so he won't abuse 
power. That fellow Jones could go into a Boy Scout camp with a can­
non and come out without his pants." See Item, June 19, 1942.
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refused to yield their roles as temporary Plaquemines tax collectors 
to Blaize. This move allowed the administration to establish the 
legality of the governor's action in a district court other than the 
Plaquemines-St. Bernard district court which Perez dominated. Despite 
Perez's.argument that the Plaquemines deputy tax collector (his nephew, 
Wilson Dauterive) had never surrendered the tax records to the state 
officials, the Baton Rouge district court on June 18 ruled that 
Blaize's appointment was indeed valid. In order to lend a further 
stamp of authority to the decision, the defendants appealed the dis­
trict court decision to the Louisiana Supreme Court which on July 13
45upheld the lower court’s ruling.
Blaize's legal right to the Plaquemines sheriff’s office proved 
to be easier to obtain than physical possession of the office. His 
initial foray to Pointe a la Hache ended at the northern parish line 
where he saw a group of deputies stopping cars at Braithwaite and 
checking the occupants' identification before allowing them to enter 
the parish. Perez had the Pointe a la Hache highway blocked in front 
of his house and traffic diverted through his yard where he stationed 
his guards to detain undesirables. Blaize announced that he would 
not attempt to force his possession of the sheriff's office. "We're
45Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 131-132; Morning Advocate, July 15,
17, 1943; Walter J. Blaize v. Jerome A. Hayes, Supervisor of Public 
Funds, Et. Al., Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37190, John B. Foumet 
Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton 
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Jones' 
hand was strengthened in the East Baton Rouge district court when 
Judge Womack lost a 1942 re-election bid.
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working on something else," he said.^
Blaize and Jones eventually had to resort to outright invasion 
to place the new sheriff in office. On October 8, 1943, the State 
Supreme Court reiterated their decision that Blaize legally possessed 
the office by refusing Perez's application for a rehearing of their 
June 13 decision upholding the appointment. On October 9, Jones de­
clared martial law in Plaquemines parish and ordered State Guard com­
mander Brigadier General Thomas F. Porter to install Blaize in office. 
Perez obtained a restraining order from "his" District Judge Albert 
Estopinal, Jr., stopping the State Guard from attempting to install 
Blaize in office, but it proved useless. The State Guard gathered at 
Camp Pontchartrain in Orleans Parish, and Perez made his last minute 
preparations for invasion. One Plaquemines deputy reported that the 
courthouse was "bristling with machine guns" but also added signifi­
cantly that "we don't have the men to shoot them if the going gets 
tough.
The State Guard rolled into Plaquemines parish early on the 
morning of October 9, 1943, on 31 trucks, with two command cars and 
an ambulance. They met resistance only three times: three deputies
met them at Braithwaite and attempted to serve Estopinal's court order, 
but they were arrested and the court order torn up; the main highway 
before Perez's home was blocked by oil field equipment which had to 
be removed; and burning oyster shells blocked the highway at the
46Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 133-134; Morning Advocate, June 12,
July 15, 1943.
47Jeansonne, Leander Perez, p. 134; Morning Advocate, October 8-9,
1943; Times-Picayune, October 8-9, 1943.
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outskirts of Pointe a la Hache. As the State Guard approached the 
parish seat, Perez and his followers abandoned their stand inside the 
courthouse after looting the sheriff’s office, and fled on the Pointe 
a la Hache ferry to the middle of the Mississippi River. Slater re­
fused to leave his office and had to be carried from the building be­
fore Blaize could be installed in the wrecked room. One Slater deputy 
remarked that the lack of office equipment really did not matter be­
cause "I give Blaize two weeks in office. Then he will have to call
48the State Guard again."
Threats of continued violence proved groundless. Blaize, the 
State Guard, and newspaper reporters who accompanied them had to cope 
with harassment from local citizens who spoke, whistled, sang into, 
or turned the crank of their old-fashioned telephones, thus disrupting 
contact with the outside world. Also, a mysterious blackout left the 
courthouse without electricity while nearby residential customers con­
tinued receiving power. The only physical combat, however, was aimed
49against the swarms of delta mosquitoes.
The quietness of the situation led Jones and Porter to remove all 
but one hundred of the State Guardsmen within three days. The con-
rtingent was soon reduced to about seventeen, then to a symbolic two 
men and one officer. Even though a surface quiet prevailed, Blaize 
was still not the effective sheriff of the parish. He soon located
48Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 135-136; Conaway, Judge, pp. 72-76; 
Morning Advocate, October 10, 1943; Times-Picayune Mew Orleans States, 
October 10, 1943.
49Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 137-138; Morning Advocate, October 11- 
12, 16, 1943.
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missing tax records left behind in a locked courthouse safe, but 
desultory efforts to collect taxes met with failure. Meanwhile,
Perez continued his propaganda and legal battle against the state ad­
ministration, filing as many as fifteen lawsuits at one time. The 
administration, in turn, fought back with lawsuits of its own, filing 
impeachment proceedings against Perez and Estopinal and filing a 
murder conspiracy suit against Perez, among others.^
Louisiana’s "little war" occurred against the backdrop of the 
1943 statewide primary election campaign. In Plaquemines parish, both 
Dr. Slater and Blaize qualified to run for sheriff, but not surpris­
ingly, Slater with Perez’s help defeated Blaize by an approximately 
four to one margin. Slater's election, however, did not end the con­
troversy- In April, 1944, Judge R. R. Reeves of the Catahoula-Con- 
cordia parishes district, who had been installed to replace Estopinal 
until the impeachment charges against him could be heard, ruled that 
Jones had acted illegally when he declared martial law in Plaquemines 
Parish. Jones maintained that he was merely enforcing the judgment of 
the Supreme Court- Almost a year after the fact, the Supreme Court on 
October 4, 1944, laid to rest the last of the Plaquemines cases before 
it, dismissing charges of conspiracy to commit murder brought against
^Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 137-140; Morning Advocate, October 16, 
November 6, 18, 1943; Benjamin R. Slater v. Walter J. Blaize, Et. A1-, 
Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37,237; Benjamin R. Slater v. Walter 
J. Blaize, Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37,341, Fournet Collection. 
Perez's propaganda barrage included a speech entitled "The Truth About 
the Plaquemines Situation" which detailed his side of the conflict.
He delivered the speech on WNOE, and Representative F. Edward Hebert 
also inserted the text into the Congressional Record. See Congres­
sional Record Proceedings and Debates of the 78th Congress First Ses­
sion Appendix, Volume 89 Part 12 (Washington, D.Ĉ , United States 
Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. A4598-A4600.
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Jones and Stanley, fraud charges against Stanley, and the impeachment 
proceedings against Perez and Estopinal. Most of these charges were' 
dropped because of lack of evidence or because the points of law they 
were based on were by then moot, because Jones, Stanley, and Blaize 
were out of office. This ruling did not end litigation in the case, 
however. On October 9, 1944, former Plaquemines deputy sheriff 
Joseph Cappielo sued Jones, Stanley, and eight others for injuries he 
allegedly suffered at the hands of the State Guard during the invasion. 
The final decision in the "little war" cases occurred on February 7, 
1945, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans upheld 
Federal District Court Judge Adrian J. Caillouet's dismissal of the 
damage suit for lack of jurisdiction.^
The Plaquemines "little war" can be seen as merely a reprehensible 
waste of precious fuel and manpower during wartime, but it should also 
be seen in the context of its part in the larger theme of continued 
bifactionalism, another opportunity for Longites to harry Sam Jones 
and ridicule his reforms. (Perez did not split with Earl Long until 
the race issue surfaced in the 1950s.) The thread of continued bitter 
bifactionalism ran through Jones' administration, especially from 1942 
until the end. The unnamed "oppositionist" Senator who said during 
the 1942 regular session that, "We don't expect to get bills we really 
want . . -We're just concentrating on keeping Jones from getting what 
he wants," accurately summarized the situation. The reluctance of the 
1942 regular session to pass the sales tax while increasing state
^Morning Advocate, October 10, 1944, February 8, 1945.
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expenditures stemmed in part from Longite desire to put Jones in an 
uncomfortable position, as well as from their philosophical opposition 
to a regressive sales tax (many of them, however, had approved Leche's 
sales tax in 1936). The bitter last-ditch stand by "country" Longites 
against the sales tax in the 1942 extraordinary session likewise re­
vealed a continued bifactionalism even though Jones cagily split the 
opposition by retaining appropriations for state charity hospitals out­
side New Orleans in part because much of his support came from these 
areas, while establishing much political pressure on the New Orleans 
legislative delegation by withholding the funds for the city charity 
hospital. The Morning Advocate editorially saw the "little war" as 
only a continuation of the Jones opposition and sadly commented that 
"folks —  especially in Louisiana —  have to accept such shenanigans 
as more or less to be expected ..." Expected or not, however, the 
little war exploded across the news reports of the state as a major 
challenge to Sam Jones, a challenge in which he ultimately failed.
He won the battle; he installed Walter Blaize as sheriff; but he lost 
the war. Leander Perez reestablished an iron control over Plaquemines
parish that was never again successfully challenged until his death 
52 9in 1969.
As his administration drew to a close in late 1943 and early 
1944, Sam Jones judged that his efforts had met with a great deal of. 
success. He had fulfilled, he said, 43 of 45 campaign promises made
52Item, June 26, 1942; Morning Advocate, October 16, 1943; Jeansonne, 
Leander Perez, p. 141; Kane, Deep Delta Country, p. 213; Sherrill, 
Gothic Politics in the Deep South, p. 17.
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in 1939, and his failure to eliminate the sale tax and provide old 
age pensions at the level he anticipated were due to Longite obstruc­
tionism, not to failures on his part. In fact, however, Jones left a 
mixed legacy to both his supporters and his critics. As Allan Sindler 
observes, many of the pure reformers, expecting a renewal of John M. 
Parker's holy war against machine politics, stood by aghast as Jones 
made the necessary deals with Noe and Maestri to implement his admini­
stration's reform program. Jones simultaneously disappointed Longites 
by not mindlessly attempting to reduce Longism's social services, as 
they had expected he would, thus demonstrating that Jones was no poli­
tical naif. Comparison of Jones’ and Earl Long’s 1939 platforms re­
veals, indeed, striking similarities: they both had promised in­
creased aid to education, free school books, a school lunch program,
53increased old age assistance, and homestead exemptions.
Jones, in fact, fully realized by 1940 that it was no longer 
possible in Louisiana politics for an anti-Long gubernatorial candi­
date to campaign openly and sincerely against public services (as 
did Old Regular candidate Hewitt Bouanchaud in 1928) and still seri­
ously expect to be elected. This practical realization marked a new 
maturity and political realism in anti-Long ranks. "My pappy was for 
Huey," Jones reminded the voters, but it was not until Jones' admini­
stration that the anti-Long, anti-machine reform group had a chance 
to prove the state's ability to provide many of Huey's services
53Shreveport Times, December 11, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 11, 
14, 1943; Sam Jones Report to the People, December, 1943; Barney 
Krebs to "Mr. Healy," n.d. (1948?), DeLesseps Story Morrison Papers, 
Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane 
University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
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without the concurrent corruption and semi-dictatorial political 
apparatus.
Perhaps it took the shock of Huey Long to focus conservative 
Louisiana's attention on poor people's problems, but Jones aptly 
demonstrated that by 1940-1944, conservative Louisiana had learned 
its lesson. No longer would it retreat so far into fiscal conserva­
tism that it would rip apart Long’s social program.' Even so, the re­
formers were still not as comfortable as the Longites in spending 
large sums on many of Long's favorite programs.
Sam Jones, the amateur politician, learned much about political 
reality during his four years in the governor's office —  the neces­
sity of forming alliances with people not normally considered as 
allies, the demands for patronage, the frustration of being unable to 
save a legislative program from defeat in the legislature or in the 
courts, and the desertion of friends. Jones remakred on Jimmie Davis' 
inauguration day: "One thing I found out in my four years as governor
is that all of the saints were not in my political faction, and all 
of the sinners were not in the opposing faction." Despite his prob­
lems, however, Jones provided not the hidebound conservatism of the 
past past but a "progressive conservatism" which Sindler accurately
maintains "became impressed upon large numbers of voters ... as a
. 54reasonable alternative to the bucaneering liberalism of the Longs."
Louisiana’s Constitutions since 1898 forbade the governor from 
succeeding himself for a second term. Therefore, as Jones prepared
54Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 177-180; Shreveport Times, May 
10, 1944.
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to leave office and return to his Lake Charles law practice, the 1943- 
44 gubernatorial campaign, while quieter than the 1939-40 contest, 
brought politics back into focus as the reformers sought a candidate 
to take up the reform banner, while the Longites regrouped for a 
strong attempt to regain control of all state offices.^
This departure was not the end of Jones’ public career. He ran for 
governor again in 1948 and suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of 
Earl Long. During the 1960s, Governor John McKeithen appointed Jones 
to head a committee studying reorganization of the state government. 
Jones died on February 8, 1978, two years after his son, Robert, re­
ceived his own drubbing in a campaign for the governorship against 
Edwin W. Edwards.
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CHAPTER V
THE EMERGENCE OF JIMMIE DAVIS (1943-1944)
The Louisiana gubernatorial campaign of 1943-44 commanded much 
attention, even though many people continued to be preoccupied with 
war news. Speculation centered on two questions: Would the reformers
be able to retain the state government offices they had won in 1940, 
or would the Longites sweep back into full control? Would the United 
States involvement in World War II have any effect on the campaign? 
These questions were answered as the campaign unfolded.
Governor Sam Jones, curiously, did not openly endorse a potential 
successor to carry on his reform efforts in the state government. In­
stead he broadcast a series of ten radio addresses in December, 1943, 
the scripts of which were collected into a pamphlet and distributed 
throughout the state. In this pamphlet, Jones underscored the bene­
fits provided by his own reform administration. Even though he wanted 
a reformer to follow him into office, Jones felt constrained by his 
political principles not to use his power as governor to help sway the 
election. He thought that such activity would contribute to the 
appearance of his building a state administration political machine, 
an image that he, archfoe of Huey Long's political machine, did not 
want to project.*
Even though Jones did not publicly involve himself in the cam­
*Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, March 10, 1944; Sam H. Jones to Denny 
Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department of 
Atchives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Daugherty 
Collection); Sam Jones Report to the People, 1943.
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paign, it was an open secret throughout Louisiana that he desired
Public Service Commissioner James Houston (Jimmie) Davis of Shreveport
to follow him into office, even though Jones had doubts about Davis'
ability to govern the state. He was "not a good candidate" Jones
2later recalled of Davis, "but he was a good campaigner."
The reform faction had to locate a new candidate because the 1921 
Louisiana Constitution prohibited governors from succeeding themselves, 
thus eliminating any possibility of Jones running for re-election.
Jones sent two emissaries, Prescott Foster and Louisiana Highway De­
partment Director D. Y. Smith, to Shreveport to discuss a possible 
candidacy with Davis, but Davis refused to see them because he was not 
yet interested in aspiring to higher office. Soon afterward, however, 
Davis attended a Public Service Commission meeting in Baton Rouge.
While he was in the city, Lee Laycock, Clerk of the Louisiana House of 
Representatives, persuaded Davis to meet with the governor. Davis' 
agreement led to an informal meeting between him and Jones along the 
shore of Lake Bruin, near the small town of St. Joseph in Tensas parish, 
where Jones was visiting. Jones told Davis that some of the reformers 
had mentioned him as a possible gubernatorial candidate and that he 
favored Davis’ candidacy. Davis, however, remained reluctant to run 
for governor, fearing the potential for scandal associated with the 
oil business in Louisiana and the unpopularity of superceding local 
officials to prosecute gamblers in the state. He feared that he had
—2
Sam Jones interviewed by James Godfrey, February, 1977, LSU Oral 
History Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. 
Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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too little experience with the oil business to understand its com­
plexities and could thus enmesh himself unwittingly in improper agree­
ments. He also realized the popularity of gambling, especially in 
the southern part of the state, and did not wish to appear dictatorial 
in enforcing the state’s anti-gambling laws. Jones reassured Davis 
that the Mineral Board insulated the governor from the oil business, 
and as for gambling, "I guess the best thing on that subject is just 
to let [the local officials] handle their own business."
The reason behind Jones' lack of public support for Davis re­
mains unclear. Gus Weill maintains (based on Davis' recollections) 
that Davis told the reformers at a meeting at the governor’s mansion 
that he would not accept their offers to campaign for him because "I 
don't believe the people will go for the show of a lot of power."̂  
Jones, however, maintained that he refrained from campaigning because 
he had no plans to construct a state machine.The important specter 
overhanging both interpretations is that of the Longite machine and 
its Louisiana Scandals of 1939. The deep impression made by the 
Scandals on Louisiana politics is amply illustrated by the attempts by
both Jones and Davis to disavow any hint of connection to a powerful
*_
Gus Weill, You Are My Sunshine The Jimmie Davis Story (Waco, Texas, 
Word Books, 1977), pp. 61—63. Weill’s book is useful because he re­
cords Davis’ thoughts and memories in sometimes quite lengthy state­
ments. Interpretations included in the book, though, must be care­
fully scrutinized. It is, after all, a self-proclaimed "affectionate" 
(uncritical) biography.
AIbid., pp. 63-64.
~*Ibid., p. 64; Morning Advocate, March 10, 1944; Jones to Daugherty, 
July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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political organization. The anti-Longites, of course, had long been 
opponents of political machines —  their own lack of an effective 
organization had prevented their winning elections prior to 1939 —  
but the Scandals made it imperative that the reformers avoid machine 
tactics in the 1943-44 contest. In addition, Jones’ failure to en­
dorse Davis, as Allan Sindler maintained, allowed Davis to attract 
a cross-factional support that may not have been possible had he 
publicly enjoyed strong support from Jones.̂
In Jimmie Davis, the reformers selected the most popular candi­
date willing to carry the reform banner in the election. Davis was 
bom in an autumn, sometime around the beginning of the twentieth 
century, one of the eleven children of Sam Jones Davis and Sara Eliza­
beth Works Davis.^ The elder Davis worked as a tenant on the farm of 
W. R. Guess located in the tiny Beech Springs community near the small 
town of Quitman in rural Jackson parish. Jackson parish and its 
neighbor immediately to the south, Winn parish, shared many traits. 
They were both populated by a heavily Anglo-Saxon Protestant popula­
tion wresting a living from the poor, hill soil. "We were the same 
kind of people as those at Winnfield," Davis later wrote, "My Dad
Âllan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana State Politics, 1920-1952 
(Baltimore, Maryland, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 182-183.
^Davis’ precise birthday is unknown. Robert Sobel and John Raimo in 
Biographical Directory of the Governors of the United States Volume 
II (Iowa-Missouri) (Meckler Books, Westport, Connecticut, 1978), p. 
588, list September 11, 1902 as the date, but they also have Davis’ 
father's name wrong. Davis' birth was not recorded, a practice which 
continued well into the twentieth century in rural Louisiana, so his 
exact birthday is impossible to determine.
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gfarmed —  cotton. . . peanuts, corn, hay, and watermelons.”
Jimmie Davis began his education at the small elementary school 
at Beech Springs, graduated from Beech Springs High School in 1920, 
and entered Louisiana College, a small Baptist college in Pineville, 
in the freshman class of 1920. There he worked in the college kitchen 
and found additional odd jobs to help finance his education. He gradu­
ated from Louisiana College in 1924, then returned to Beech Springs 
High as a teacher and coach. He remained there two years before
entering Louisiana State University from which he received a Master
9of Education degree in 1927.
Following his LSU graduation, Davis taught social studies at Dodd 
College, a Baptist girl's college in Shreveport, and also began his 
professional music career, writing "country" songs and performing on 
radio station KWKH in Shreveport. Davis came from a musical family.
He.wrote in 1969 that "Grandma Davis . . . was the only one in the 
family who never tried to hit a note, or play a guitar, or anything," 
and the few recreational opportunities in rural Beech Springs —  the
g
Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 8-10; Jimmie Davis, "Country Music 
is Part of the People," Louisiana Heritage, Summer, 1969, p. 17.
9Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 35-36; Shreveport Times, May 9, 1944; 
Morgan Peoples, "The Sunshine Governor From Jackson Parish," paper pre­
sented to the Louisiana Historical Association Annual Convention, March 
25, 1983; The Pine Knot 1924, Keatchie-Mt. Lebanon Collection, Richard 
W. Norton Memorial Library, Louisiana College, Pineville, Louisiana; 
Jimmie Davis interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, April 9,
1984. Davis in his very brief master's thesis observed that "among 
the negroes [sic] themselves there are certain individuals who are 
capable of taking on that type of training which will qualify them for 
leadership in the betterment of their race," and advocated early recog­
nition of those individuals by a test battery so that "the most intel­
ligent negro [sic] children" would receive "the advantage of better 
training," but also concluded that black intelligence is raised in pro­
portion to the amount of Caucasian inheritance of an individual.
James Houston Davis, "Comparative Intelligence of Whites, Blacks, and
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Baptist church and Saturday night or Sunday afternoon sing-alongs —  
provided ample practice. The future governor had supplemented his 
college income by singing on the streetcorners of Alexandria and later 
Baton Rouge, but his first regular check from his singing was the $5 
per week he received from KWKH. His regional success led to recording 
contracts with nationally-known labels. Davis' early hits included 
"Nobody's Darling But Mine," recorded in 1934, but his biggest hit was 
unquestionably "You Are My Sunshine," recorded in 1939, which became 
his campaign theme song.^
In addition to his teaching and singing careers, Davis entered 
politics in 1929, when he became clerk of the Shreveport city court.
In 1938 he defeated two opponents (one backed by Richard Leche and 
the Long machine) to become Shreveport Public Safety Commissioner. 
Davis in this local campaign learned the effectiveness of using his 
band to attract a crowd to his rallies, a tactic he used to good ad­
vantage in the.1943-44 governor's race. Davis also used his singing
Mulattoes" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1927), p. 14.
^Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 47-49; Davis, "Country Music is Part 
of the People," pp. 16-17; Peoples, "The Sunshine Governor From Jack­
son Parish;" S. A. Wilkins, "Dodd College: A Brief History," North
Louisiana Historical Association Journal, Summer, 1980, pp. 29-30; 
Alexandria Daily Town Talk, May 22, 1983 (hereinafter cited as Town 
Talk); Jimmie Davis interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, April 
16, 1984. "You Are My Sunshine" was eventually recorded by more than 
350 artists. A 1983 survey found that it is the third most widely- 
known song in the English language (preceded by "Happy Birthday" and 
"White Christmas"). Davis mused in 1983 that "You can go anywhere in 
the world and they’ll sing it with you." I argue no brief in the cur­
rent disagreement in country music history circles about whether Davis 
actually wrote "You Are My Sunshine." His recording of and association 
with the song (he holds the copyright) made him famous, and that fame 
helped propel him into statewide politics.
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ability to "sell" Shreveport on public safety: his talks on traffic
safety to school children, for example, included his rendition of 
several ballads.^
The years between 1938 and 1942 brought Davis both increased 
fame as an entertainer and growing political ambition. In 1942, he 
began a movie career in the musical "Strictly in the Groove," which 
led to other roles, usually as the leading man’s best friend and side­
kick. Also in 1942, he defeated Longite John S. Patton for Louisi­
ana's Public Service Commission Third District seat. By 1943, there­
fore, when the reformers cast about for.a gubernatorial candidate, 
they found that Jimmie Davis was widely known through his entertaining, 
was electable (moreover, he had defeated two Longites), and that his 
pleasant personality and soothing campaign style had left him with few 
political scars.^
*̂ Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 49, 54-55; Morning Advocate, Septem­
ber 12, 1943; Louisiana Municipal Review, March-April, 1941, p. 61.
12Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 57-60; Times-Picayune, April 8, 1943; 
Morning Advocate, December 28, 1943. "Strictly in the Groove," also 
featured Ozzie Nelson and Shemp Howard, among others. According to 
advertisements, the story centered on "a group of jumpin' [sic], 
jivin’ [sic], jitterbugs, who, by some mistake, provide the right 
answers to their college exams and graduate." Davis' other films were 
almost exclusively westerns. Hollywood columnist Hedda Hopper, for 
example, reported that he held up shooting a scene of "Cyclone Prairie 
Rangers" while he answered a long-distance telephone call from friends 
in Louisiana asking him to run for governor. Shreveport Times, July 
30, 1943. Davis' singing career introduced him to Louisianians in 
non-traditional ways. Merle Weigel asked her soldier-husband "What do 
you think about Jimmie Davis for our Governor?" and added, "The first 
time I ever heard him was on a 'Juke Box* at Felders." Merle Weigel 
to H. S. Weigel, March 3, 1944, H. S. Weigel Family Papers, Department 
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge.
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Davis received numerous delegations of reformers asking him to 
enter the race, but he postponed an official announcement of his 
gubernatorial candidacy until September 11, 1943- He delayed, he 
said, until he was sure that
the people of our state were interested in a 
candidate who they believe can amalgamate the 
forces of our state so that after the war, we 
will be able to give our returning soldiers 
and sailors the opportunity of making a de­
cent living and returning to a normal civilian 
life with the least friction and resistance.
Davis* prepared statement reveals that he planned to run a harmonizing, 
soothing campaign. He called for retention of
all constructive legislation of all past ad­
ministrations, including an adequate system 
of old age pensions and social welfare, free 
school books, the civil service system . . . 
homestead exemptions, adequate funds [for 
road construction], hospital privileges, and 
proper accounting in state financing. 3̂
Davis efforts to be non-controversial and his pleasant personal­
ity, however, should not be confused with, neutrality. He recalled in 
1983 that the strength of Huey Long’s dictatorship and the Louisiana 
Scandals convinced him that Sam Jones’ reforms required four more 
years to cleanse the state. Davis, however, hoped to transcend fac­
tion: "We had a'lot of dissension," he said in 1983, "I wanted to get 
those people together. I said I didn’t care if they were Long or anti-
13Morning Advocate, August 29, September 12, 1943; Times—Picayune New 
Orleans States, September 12, 1943; Shreveport _Times, September 12, 
1943.
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Long . . .  I wanted them to be a Davis man," or, as he said in 1943,
"I shall do all in my power to bury the hates and distrusts of the 
past and raise the curtain that will let in the sunshine of Louisi­
ana’s future greatness.
While Jimmie Davis hoped to bring all Democratic factions in 
Louisiana together under his banner, the Longites experienced an un­
precedented disunity. The Longites easily agreed that the primary 
goal of the campaign was to defeat the reformers, but they were un­
able to agree on a candidate to lead their fight. James A. Noe an­
nounced in January, 1943, that he planned to run for governor, but 
his campaign failed to attract adequate support. Noe subsequently 
withdrew from the race "as a first step toward uniting Louisiana and 
promoting harmony and eliminating political disunity . . . "^
The major split within Longite ranks, however, occurred between 
the New Orleans Old Regulars and the "country" Longites from North 
Louisiana. To combat the Old Regular political organization, the 
upcountry Longites created the Louisiana Democratic Organization at a 
conference held at the Hotel Bentley in Alexandria during February,
1943. The LDO was also strongly anti-Sam Jones. Longite state Sena-
*tor A. A. Fredericks of Natchitoches remarked in the statewide radio 
speech launching the LDO campaign that "the strategy of the Jones ad­
ministration should be well understood. It is like the one used by
^Morning Advocate, September 12, 1943; Town Talk, May 22, 1983.
^ Morning Advocate, January 14, September 19, 1943; Town Talk, Septem­
ber 18, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 19, 1943.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
196
16[Adolph] Hitler." The LDO, however, appears to have been primarily 
a political front for Earl Long's quest for the gubernatorial nomina­
tion.
Even though the 1921 constitutional prohibition against two suc­
cessive gubernatorial terms prevented a direct Sam Jones-Earl Long 
confrontation, Long was eager to unseat the reform faction which had 
turned him out of office in 1940. He spoke at LDO meetings throughout 
the state, and LDO leaders negotiated with Robert Maestri and the Old 
Regulars about the gubernatorial nomination. LDO leader A. L. Kil­
patrick of Monroe reported on July 29, 1943, following such a meeting, 
that neither the LDO nor the Old Regulars had selected a candidate 
yet, but "It was unanimously decided that we continue our efforts as 
strictly opposing the Sam Jones administration or any candidate that 
he might suggest or offer." The LDO, however, maintained that the 
Longite candidate should come from outside New Orleans. Alexandria 
businessman, J. A. "Brother" Blackman, LDO chairman for the Eighth 
Congressional District, remarked on August 22, that the organization 
had to find a way to choose, as the Longite gubernatorial candidate, 
either James A. Noe, Earl Long, or Senator Ernest Clements.
All three candidates, however, failed to develop a strong enough 
base of support to claim the nomination. Long enjoyed support from 
old-line Longite state administration employees thrown out of office
TZMorning Advocate, April 6, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 29, 1943; 
Town Talk, August 23, 1943.
*̂ Morning Advocate, June 14, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 29, 1943; 
Town Talk, August 23, 1943. It was not until the 1948 gubernatorial 
campaign that Earl Long obtained his revenge in his stunning defeat 
of Sam Jones which ended Jones' elective political career.
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by tbe reformers, and from the rural areas of the state. Clements re­
mained the choice of labor leaders of Louiisiana. Maestri and the Old
Regulars thus held a key bloc of Longite support which each contender
18hoped to add to his following.
Maestri, however, kept his own counsel as delegation after dele­
gation of up-country Longites visited him seeking some sign of Old 
Regular preference in the struggle. Earl Long, meanwhile, in early 
September, received the LDO endorsement to run for governor after 
agreeing to support the organization’s anti-Jones platform, which 
included planks calling for abolishing all unnecessary state depart­
ments (especially the Finance Department), a twelve-month pay plan for 
schoolteachers, a retirement system for teachers after thirty years’ 
service, an increase in old-age pensions to $30 per month, lowering 
the voting age in state elections to eighteen years and calling a con­
stitutional convention "to remedy ills and defects in our present 
system of laws." Many of these planks, including the education and 
voting age reforms, are remarkably similar to planks in the platform 
Earl Long promulgated when he announced his candidacy six months be­
fore in March, 1943.*̂
Long gratefully accepted the LDO endorsement in his opening 
statewide radio address originating from WDSU in New Orleans. Long, 
in his speech, sought to reassure the businessman who might be tempted 
to vote for the reformers, noting that his experience as a lawyer,
To
Town Talk, August 24, 1943.
19Morning Advocate, March 28, 1943; Town Talk, August 24, September 6,
1943.
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farmer, and livestock producer qualified him to understand the busi­
nessman's point of view. He also sought to quell immediately any 
doubts about his honesty still lingering in the minds of the voters: 
"I stand before you tonight as one man in our state at least who has 
been investigated from top to bottom, from morning until night, from 
cradle to the present time and I have yet to find any man who could 
point the finger of suspicion at me for breach of the public trust." 
He also dismissed Sam Jones' administration as "one of the saddest 
failures in the history of Louisiana . . . [a failure] no longer 
necessary to discuss," but also branded Jimmie Davis as "The Sam 
Jones candidate for governor," who would "turn this state government
back to Sam Jones and his henchmen for the next four years," and
20called Davis a "banjo-picking song and dance man."
20Morning Advocate, September 15, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 15, 
1943; States, September 15, 1943. Earl Long's most damning comment 
about Jimmie Davis occurred after the campaign: "Jimmie Davis," he
said, "loves money like a hog loves slop."
The statewide radio broadcast was a standard fixture of Louisiana 
politics during the 1940s, and the evidence suggests that a politician 
utilizing it could reach a large audience. One survey of Louisiana’s 
radio use in 1940 revealed that 307,883 of the 577,965 households in 
the state (53.3 per cent) contained a radio. The study also revealed, 
however, that 72.6 per cent of Louisiana urban dwellings were fur­
nished with a radio. Moreover, 70.1 per cent of radio owners reported 
the radio as their primary news source, while only 18.1 per cent of 
them relied on newspapers as their primary news source. A politician 
making a radio speech, therefore, could expect to reach many potential 
voters. Edgar A. Schuler, Survey of Radio Listeners in Louisiana 
(Baton Rouge, General Extension Division, Louisiana State University, 
1943), pp. 9, 62, 67. Reaching those voters and convincing them to 
vote for a particular candidate, however, were not always the same. 
Frank T. Lewis, Jr. found no correlation between the amount of radio 
time used and the number of votes received by the candidates in the 
1948 gubernatorial campaign. Frank T. Lewis, Jr., "The Political Use 
of Radio in the Louisiana Gubernatorial Campaign of 1947-1948" (M.A. 
thesis, Louisiana State University, 1952), pp. 73-76.
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Longite ranks became further confused when United States Senator 
Allen J. Ellender announced on September 15, 1943, that he was 
"seriously considering" running for governor at the behest of individu­
als and groups who considered him to be the only candidate capable of 
uniting all factions within the Longite camp. Ellender's consider­
ations, however, included two unalterable conditions: all other
Longite candidates would have to withdraw from the race so he could
conduct a strictly anti-Jones campaign, and he would not trade his
21Senate seat for support from the Jones faction.
The Old Regulars welcomed a possible Ellender candidacy. Rumors 
circulating in New Orleans held that the Ring had decided to support 
Ellender for governor and Ernest Clements for lieutenant governor.
But the Ellender candidacy encountered trouble on two fronts: the
other Longites refused to withdraw from the race, and, more seriously, 
William L. Donnels, editor of the Federationist, the state labor news­
paper, announced at a New Orleans labor rally that organized labor was 
"unalterably opposed" to Ellender. "If the Old Regulars endorse Ellen­
der," he said, "we will work for his defeat. If he runs for governor, 
we’ll snow him under ..." Donnels also presented labor's opposition 
to Ellender at an Old Regular caucus ("labor here and now expresses 
its unqualified opposition to Senator Ellender's gubernatorial aspir­
ations"), and, in addition, presented a resolution passed at a New 
Orleans labor rally calling on Ellender to "stay in Washington and 
carry out the campaign pledges he made." Ellender's estrangement from
21Morning Advocate, September 16, 22, 1943; States, September 21, 1943; 
Times-Picayune, September 21, 1943; Town Talk, September 21, 1943.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
200
organized labor apparently stemmed from his personal dislike of Con­
gress of Industrial Organizations president John L. Lewis in particu­
lar and other labor union heads he considered dictatorial. Moreover, 
in June, 1943, Ellender also voted for the Smith-Connally (War Labor
Disputes) Act, which authorized presidential seizure of war plants on
22strike, and thus further incurred the wrath of labor unions.
The collapse of the Ellender boomlet left Earl Long as the
strongest Longite candidate in the field. The Old Regulars had not
dismissed Long, but negotiations among Old Regular leaders, Long and
LDO president, state Representative T. C. Brister of Pineville, had
left unresolved differences. Moreover, in 1943, Earl Long was not
the proven commodity he later became in Louisiana politics. He was,
in fact, a two-time loser —  once for lieutenant governor and once for
governor —  and the Old Regulars were "anxious to be with a winner,"
23as one Ring leader remarked.
Despite their lack of confidence in him, Earl Long was too strong 
for the Old Regulars to ignore completely. On September 20, rumors
22States, September 29, October 1, 1943; Times-Picayune, October 1, 
1943; Thomas Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1980), pp. 24-27.
23States, September 16, 21, 1943; Morning Advocate, September 21, 1943. 
As George Briwar wrote to James H. Morrison: ”. . .  looks like Earl
Long wants to make another try, but the City Hall boys don’t think he 
can make it. [T]hey seem to think the name ’Long’ will hurt ..." 
George Briwar to James H. Morrison, April 3, 1943, James H. Morrison 
Papers, Center for Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University, 
Hammond, Louisiana.
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in New Orleans hinted that a newly-concluded political agreement be­
tween them created a virtual "co-governorship." The terms of the 
agreement included provisions that Long would abandon his gubernatorial 
candidacy in exchange for Old Regular endorsement for lieutenant- 
governor on a ticket headed by Lewis Morgan of St. Tammany parish, 
and in return receive control of all state jobs and state government 
activities in Louisiana north of Alexandria.^
The final Longite ticket for the campaign was not completed until 
October 25: Morgan for Governor, Long for Lieutenant Governor, Wade
0. Martin, Jr. for Secretary of State, Joe T. Cawthorn for Attorney 
General, E. J. Bourg (treasurer of the Louisiana Federation of Labor) 
for State Auditor, John B. Daigle for State Treasurer, Lucille May 
Grace for Registrar of State Lands, and Harry D. Wilson for Commis­
sioner of Agriculture. The Old Regulars endorsed this ticket on
25October 27, and added Lether Frazar for Superintendent of Education.
The new nominal leader of the Longites, Lewis Morgan, was a 
sixty-seven year old St. Tammany parish native who had graduated from 
Tulane University in 1901, served on the St. Tammany Parish School 
Board from 1904 to 1908, served briefly in the Louisiana House of 
Representatives in 1908 before resigning to accept a post as district 
attorney for the 22nd District (St. Tammany and Washington parishes), 
where he remained until 1912. He served as Louisiana’s Sixth District 
United States Representative from 1912 until 1917, when he retired to
24States, September 21, 1943.
25States, October 23, 1943; Morning Advocate, October 26, 28, 1943; 
Times-Picayune, October 28, 1943.
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private law practice. He returned to state government in 1929 as 
Counsel for the Highway Commission and was also one of the attorneys 
representing LSU during the 1939 Scandals investigation. Morgan 
originally announced that he would run for Attorney General in the 
1943-44 campaign, but political observers speculated as early as
26August, 1943, that he would make a strong gubernatorial candidate.
Despite the apparent unity in October, 1943, when the Longite 
ticket was formed, the intra-factional dissension continued throughout 
the campaign. Morgan's age and health problems (heart trouble) 
branded him as a weak, ineffective leader in the eyes of many potential 
Longites. In addition, some of Earl Long's up-country Longites voted 
for their hero for lieutenant governor, but deserted Morgan in the 
governor's race. Long later maintained that the Longite ticket would 
have been successful at the polls if only he had been tapped to run 
for governor instead of the second spot.
While Morgan and Davis were the major candidates in the guberna­
torial campaign, other candidates joined the fray. James H. Morrison, 
by then Louisiana's Sixth District United States Representative, an­
nounced his candidacy in August, 1943. This campaign was not as 
colorful as his 1939-40 effort. There was no "Convict Parade" this 
time, but Morrison offered in its place "Jimmy Morrison's Victory 
Parade," a pale copy that lacked the vitality and timeliness of the 
original, and also included in his entourage a band similar to that
26Town Talk, August 27, 1943; Morning Advocate, August 28, October 17, 
26, 1943; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, October 17, 1943; States, 
October 23-24, 1943; Times-Picayune, October 28, 1943.
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of Jimmie Davis. Morrison’s rhetoric, however, was as sharp as ever:
Just as the American people have shown that they 
will not obey or bow to the will of any dictator, 
the people of Louisiana feel likewise. No man 
[who seeks] to be crammed down their throats by 
Tojo, Mussolini, Hitler, Sam Jones, or any other 
dictator, foreign or domestic, can expect any­
thing but defeat.
Louisianians, Morrison thought, wanted no part of either a continu­
ation of Jones’ brand of reform or a return to Longite control, but 
instead wanted "new blood, youth, aggressiveness, and ability to get 
the job done." Morrison campaigned against both the Jones and Longite
factions, but after his elimination in the first primary, he endorsed
27Morgan in the second primary.
Shreveport Mayor Sam S. Caldwell also ran for governor in the
1943-44 campaign. Caldwell, a fifty-year-old native of Mooringsport 
then serving his third term as Shreveport mayor, centered his campaign 
on his promises to "return home rule to every parish and to every city 
in the state," freeing them "from domination from Baton Rouge," just 
as "our state must be freed from fundamental control from Washington." 
Caldwell also maintained that he wanted to bring all political fac­
tions together, even though Earl Long called him a "trial balloon for 
Sam Jones." (Caldwell’s reply: "I have no time to waste on dead
politicians nor ammunition to waste on chattering sparrows.") Cald­
well eventually formed a ticket with state Senator Frank B. Ellis, who
27Morning Advocate, April 29, August 15, December 7, 1943; Times- 
Picayune New Orleans States, October 22, 1943; James H. Morrison 
interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, May 18, 1982.
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had originally announced to run for governor, but withdrew to join
28Caldwell's ticket as the candidate for lieutenant governor.
In addition to Morgan, Davis, Morrison, and Caldwell, four other 
gubernatorial candidates appeared on the ballot in the first Demo­
cratic primary in January, 1944: state Senators Ernest Clements and
Dudley LeBlanc, Opelousas lawyer Vincent Moseley, and editor of the 
Amite News Digest, Lee Lanier. The minor candidates spent most of 
their time attempting to convince the Louisiana electorate that they 
were serious candidates. Lanier, LeBlanc, and Moseley campaigned 
against both Davis and Morgan as independent reformers. As Moseley 
asked in a speech to the women of Louisiana, "Must you swoon to a 
'Sinatra' hillbilly [singer], or, in the alternative, be taken over by 
the 'Wheelchair' Morgan crowd?" Moseley promised an administration 
"that will end factionalism and vindictiveness ..." but his most 
novel political idea in this campaign was endorsement of Lewis Morgan 
and Davis' candidate for lieutenant governor, J. Emile Verret in the
second primary. Moseley encouraged voters to "split the two machine
29tickets wide open and let Earl Long die a natural political death."
The actual campaigning for governor did not begin until October,
23Shreveport Times, July 29, August 1, October 26, 1943; Morning 
Advocate, July 29-30, August 1, 1943; States, October 25, 1943-
29Times-Picayune, September 23, October 22, December 16, 1943, Janu­
ary 5, 1944; Shreveport Times, September 23, 1943, January 16, 1944; 
Morning Advocate, October 30, December 22, 1943, January 16, 1944.
Rev. John L. Williams, a Methodist clergyman and superintendent of 
the Louisiana Child Finding and Home Society, J. C. Feldman, president 
of the Louisiana Cooperative Poultry Association, and State Treasurer 
A. P. Tugwell announced their gubernatorial candidacies, but withdrew 
from the race before the first primary.
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1943. Sam Caldwell began his campaign on September 30 with a speech 
in which he promised a strong state system of public health, state 
aid to farmers, state aid to provide education and employment to re­
turning servicemen, conservation of Louisiana's water resources, and
30twelve-month pay for the state's public school teachers.
Jimmie Davis opened his campaign two weeks later, October 13, 
with a state-wide radio address in which he said that "Until the 
[world] war is won, there can be no other vital issue," but he also 
outlined his plans for the future of Louisiana. Davis proposed a new 
state project to bring Louisiana's marginal farmland into food produc­
tion but also called for increased industrialization to ease Louisi­
ana's economic dependence on agriculture. "We must," he said, "hold 
the war-built industries. But we must not be content with these 
alone. We must stop the flow of our raw materials and learn to con­
vert them to the finished product here at home." Davis also in this 
speech reiterated his independence ("I am running on the ticket of 
Jimmie Davis strictly and Jimmie Davis alone . . promised to
conduct a "positive" campaign without saying anything derogatory 
about his opponents, and closed his speech with a rendition of "You
Are My Sunshine," a practice which became a standard feature of Davis'
31campaign appearances.
Davis also broadened the appeal of his campaign during October 
when he and Sam Jones persuaded Iberia parish insurance agent J. Emile
30Morning Advocate, October 1, 1943.
^ Town Talk, October 15, 1943; Shreveport Times, October 15, 1943; 
Morning Advocate, October 15, 1943.
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Verret to join his ticket as the candidate for lieutenant governor.
Davis, recognizing the weakness of his appeal as an unabashed North
Louisiana Protestant in Catholic South Louisiana, sought a running
32mate from South Louisiana. Verret undoubtedly increased Davis’
South Louisiana popularity. He was born on a farm at Loreauville, 
fifteen miles north of New Iberia on September 13, 1886, and graduated 
from Southwestern Louisiana Institute (now the University of South­
western Louisiana) in 1905. He worked as an assistant overseer and 
store clerk on Morbihan Plantation, invested in sugar cane land and a 
sugar mill, and in 1927 entered the insurance business. He gained 
his political experience on the Iberia Parish School Board to which 
he was elected in 1912. He became president of the parish school board 
in 1914 and held the post until 1944. In addition, he was president
of the Louisiana School Boards Association in 1942, and thus had a
33network of political contacts throughout the state.
32"Speech Delivered by Governor James H. Davis, Rotary Banquet Held 
June 6, 1945," transcript; "Address" (n.d., 1943), transcript copy; 
"Biography of J. Emile Verret, Candidate for Lieutenant-Governor on 
the Sam Jones Ticket," (n.d., 1948), J. Emile Verret Papers, Archives 
and Manuscripts Collection, Dupre Library, University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Verret Collec­
tion) . Davis in this instance followed the example of Governor Sam 
Jones. Even though Jones was a native of Beauregard parish, which is 
geographically but not culturally in South Louisiana, he chose Lafay­
ette physician Marc Mouton as his running mate in 1939 to bolster his 
campaign in the French areas of the state, then retained Verret in 
the same role in his unsuccessful 1948 campaign.
33"Biography of J. Emile Verret, Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana,
1944-1948," typescript copy, Verret Collection; Shreveport Times, 
October 30, 1943; Times-Picayune, January 26, 1944.
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Following the completion of his bob-tailed ticket in late Octo- 
34ber, Davis spent November spreading his "You Are My Sunshine" phil­
osophy in a campaign that was part political rally and part North 
Louisiana tent revival. He called for less state government inter­
ference with local governments and pledged a comprehensive program to 
conserve the state's exhaustible natural resources (especially natural 
gas). This program was a favorite of Sam Jones, who envisioned a 
vast industrial boom in post-war Louisiana, fueled by cheap natural 
gas. Davis also promised to provide college programs or trade school 
training to returning war veterans, wholeheartedly endorsed Civil 
Service (it "should not be tampered with"), and adopted Sam Jones'
35calls to develop Louisiana as the "air terminal of the two Americas."
In his role as peacemaker, Davis acknowledged that Louisianians 
appreciated improvements in the state, whether they were in the form 
of clean government or of increased benefits from the state govern­
ment, no matter whose administration had instituted the benefits. He 
therefore incorporated some of the old Longite measures into his cam­
paign: more adequate old age pensions, increased services for the
poor and dependent, and construction of a preventive medicine program. 
He couched the last suggestion in terms'of saving the state money. It 
cost the state less, he said, to keep a poor person well than to treat
3̂ The four original members of Davis’ ticket were Davis, Verret, Fred
LeBlanc of Baton Rouge for Attorney General, and James Gremillion of 
Crowley for Secretary of State. In the second primary campaign, Davis 
added incumbents John E. Coxe for Superintendent of Education, and A.
P. Tugwell for State Treasurer.
Times-Picayune, November 3, 15, 18, 1943; Morning Advocate, November
16, 18, 28, 1943; Town Talk, November 17, 1943.
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an illness. Even as he promised state benefits, however, he acknowl­
edged that scarcity of goods and manpower caused by the war neces­
sarily limited the services he expected his administration to provide.
I could "promise you the moon with a fence around it," he told a 
Sunset audience, but "I wouldn’t do that . . . because my policy on
36promises has always been ’if you can’t fulfill them, don’t make them.’" 
Davis also cast his campaign as a crusade. He wanted, he said, 
to make the governor and the citizens of the state into "good friends." 
When asked why his band appeared with him on the political stage,
Davis replied; "We always found [at Beech Springs] that people who 
liked to gather around the organ or music box and sing [were good 
friends] and that’s what the people of Louisiana want to be with their 
governor —  good friends." He repeated many times that "Our meetings 
are friendly and happy. We are trying to spread sunshine and good 
will as we go along . . . "  Davis reached the height of the religious 
overtones in his campaign in a speech at St. Martinville:
I think we should have more music and song and 
less fighting. When people are singing they 
are not fighting. X take this attitude about 
my so-called 'corn fed’ music —  down this life's 
pathway, which way I'll go but once —  if some­
where down the road we can make someone’s burden 
a little lighter and scatter some sunshine along 
the way, I’m only glad I've had the opportunity 
to do s o . 3 7
36Town Talk, November 17, 1943; Morning Advocate, November 19, 29, 
1943.
37Morning Advocate, November 20, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 10,
1943.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
While Jimmie Davis administered his soothing homilies to the 
voters, Lewis Morgan spent November combatting rumors about his ill 
health and attempting to heal the bitterness caused by the bruising 
fight for the Longite nomination. He opened the Longite campaign on 
November 3 with a Baton Rouge speech in which he promised a "sane and 
economical" administration, no use of state power to harass individu­
als, and freedom of parishes from state control. Morgan was almost 
immediately removed from active campaigning, however, by serious in­
juries incurred when a gas heater exploded in his Covington home.
In his stead, the Longite ticket embarked on a campaign tour of the
„ . 38state.
At early rallies on this tour, Earl Long tackled the question
uppermost in the minds of many Longites: why had he abandoned his
quest for the governorship? Long answered that he agreed to run on
the Morgan ticket in the interest of "harmony and unity" and added,
"I would run for dog catcher on any ticket that would end the regime
39of Sam Jones and his crowd."
James A. Noe's appearance at Longite campaign rallies in Monroe 
and West Monroe sparked a revival of reform interest in the Scandal 
era. The New Orleans States editorially recounted the charges and 
countercharges hurled between Earl Long and Noe during the 1939-40 
campaign, and asked, "If Earl Long is what Jimmy Noe said he was, why 
does Mr. Noe support him? If Mr. Noe is the kind of character Earl
OgMorning Advocate, November 4, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 8, 1943.
39Times-Picayune, November 8, 1943.
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said he was, why does he accept his support?" An even more relevant
question, the States mused, is "Why Mr. Morgan as head of the Maestri
40ticket accepts the support of either of them."
United States Senator John Overton partially answered this last 
question early in 1944 when he charged that he had been "stabbed in 
the back" by his Longite friends. According to Overton, Noe had 
abandoned his 1943-44 gubernatorial candidacy and agreed to support 
the Morgan-Long ticket in exchange for his protege, Joe Cawthom's, 
place on the ticket and promises by Long and the Old Regulars to un­
seat Overton and support Noe in the fall, 1944, United States Senate 
race. The breach between Overton and the other Longites was healed 
before the second Democratic primary and caused only a minor stir in
the campaign, but it revealed the most probable cause for Noe's with-
41drawal of his candidacy.
Rumor about Lewis Morgan's ill health caused concern among some 
Longites, and Morgan sought to allay those fears. He returned to 
active campaigning on November 11, declaring that his health was good, 
that he was able to serve "every single moment of a four year term," 
and that he was not merely a "stalking horse" for Earl Long: he had
no intention of resigning the governorship and turning the office 
over to anyone else. Any attempt to do so, he said, would be
40States, November 9, 1943.
^ Morning Advocate, January 6, February 16, 1944. The Shreveport 
Times (January 6, 1944) commented that "If greater infamy could be 
added to such stabbing in the back, it would be added by the further 
fact that the Win or Lose Oil Company Jimmie Noe was to be the bene­
ficiary."
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4 9"infamous." “ He reiterated his theme in a speech broadcast on both 
WNOE and WDSU radio stations:
Knowledge, experience, and sound judgment 
are qualities which can be acquired only 
through the passing of years.
■Where youth brings to a cause fire and en­
thusiasm, maturity brings wisdom and courage . . .
Two days later, he asked in another radio speech, "Since when must a 
man defend his ability to continue to serve the people of his state 
because he is in his sixties? When, before, has maturity ... been 
a matter which one must attempt to excuse, to vindicate, to live 
down?"^
Morgan unveiled his platform on November 27 in a New Orleans 
speech. He made an obligatory attack on Sam Jones: "Sound economy
means that no state administration . . . should neglect roads, schools 
or hospitals to glorify a surplus . . . "  and revealed an ambitious, 
typically Longite platform of public services. Morgan's program in­
cluded (for health care) well-equipped trailers to provide free 
dental care, free ambulance service in each parish, traveling tubercu­
losis X-ray clinics, and an improved system of charity hospitals;
(for education) additional work scholarships for students, a trade 
school in every parish, and increased pay for school bus drivers and 
teachers; (for roads) rebuilding of farm to market roads, and widening 
existing main highways; (and in general) hiring Louisiana people for
42Shreveport Times, November 12, 1943; States, November 12, 1943.
43States, November 26, 1943; Morning Advocate, November 28, 1943.
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state jobs, lending every effort toward winning the war, reclaiming 
waste land, replenishing streams regularly with fish, teaching re­
forestation in high schools and colleges, "favoring" Civil Service,
44and providing $30 monthly old age pension checks.
Sam Caldwell opened his campaign in his Shreveport stronghold and 
called for adoption of a "Louisiana Charter," based loosely on the 
Atlantic Charter. The Louisiana Charter, he said, would include 
"Freedom from graft and corruption, political bosses, from those who 
could exploit our state for selfish gain, from inefficiency, waste, 
extravagance, punitive and vindictive legislation, bigotry, intoler­
ance, bureaucrats, and dictators or control from whatever souce it 
45may come.” Caldwell also received several important endorsements
during November: the Shreveport Times and both Monroe newspapers, the
Monroe Morning World and the Monroe News-Star, endorsed him, as did
the American Democratic Association (despite its name, it was a state
organization), which rescinded its original endorsement of Jimmie
46Davis because of his supposed involvement with Prescott Foster.
James H. Morrison's early campaign focused on two themes: estab­
lishing himself as the only true "Huey Long man" in the race, and 
protecting himself from charges that he misused his Congressional 
office in his campaign for governor. Morrison declared that Lewis
44Times-Picayune, November 28, 1943.
^ Shreveport Times, November 5, .1943; States, November 5, 1943; Times- 
Picayune , November 5, 1943.
^ Shreveport Times, November 7, 28, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 11, 
1943; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 183-184.
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Morgan was really seventy-one years old instead of sixty—seven, as
Morgan and the Old Regulars claimed, and that "I [Morrison] used to
help him on all his harder court cases. Whenever he made a 15 minute
speech, he had to go home and go to bed the next day." Morrison told
an Abbeville audience that "You can't fight the Sam Jones faction with
Davis [because of his ties to it], or with Morgan [because he is too
infirm], but you can do it if you elect me." Morrison continued to
draw the Morrison/Long parallel: "The only way you can get something
for the people is to fight for it, just like Huey Long fought to get
you roads, free school books, school busses, homestead exemption, and
free hospitals." Elect me, he said, because "It is my hope to fight
47the battle for the people, just as Huey did ..."
Morrison had to fight charges of his own political impropriety 
because of a series of letters he inserted in the Congressional 
Record, then mailed to Louisiana voters using his Congressional frank. 
The series included two general letters, one concerning, the military 
situation ("I have supported President Roosevelt and the armed forces 
on every war measure"), the other recounting the "thousands" of mis­
takes in family allotment checks received from servicemen, mistakes 
he helped to correct and also cases in which he tried to help worried 
family members locate a missing or wounded serviceman. He also in­
serted letters directed to "Dear Pellow Elected Officials," and "Dear 
School Bus Driver," as well as his response to a letter of inquiry 
(obviously contrived) from Alfred Bateman, Manager of the Ascension
^ Morning Advocate, November 20, 1943; States, November 22, 1943; 
Shreveport Times, November 28, 1943.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
214
Farmers’ Cooperative Association, in which Morrison detailed forty
48ways in which he had helped his district or the state. United
States Postal officials investigated whether Morrison’s action could
be considered improper and announced before the first primary that he
was entirely within his rights as a Congressman to insert material in
the Congressional Record and then frank it to his state. Morrison,
they added, used his own funds to pay the duplication costs for the
49copies mailed to Louisiana. Even though he was cleared of any im­
proper behavior in the episode, the investigation provided an aura of 
questionable ethics which Morrison’s opponents exploited.
State Senator Ernest S. Clements was the only other candidate to 
draw statewide attention in the opening phase of the campaign. Clem­
ents attempted to establish himself as the only truly independent 
candidate in the race. Morgan and Davis, he said, were both "hand 
picked" candidates. "Elect me governor of Louisiana," he told a home­
town Oberlin audience, "and show the Maestri and Jones gangs in New 
Orleans that the people in the country don't want them to hand-pick
48Congressional Record, 78 Congress 2 Session Appendix, Volume 90 Part 
10 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 
pp. A3267, A3348-A3349, A3598; Times-Picayune, November 18, 1943. 
Morrison did help a number of servicemen's dependents who had trouble 
either receiving their allotment check or hearing from their loved 
one. His papers still contain copies of hundreds, if not thousands, 
of letters he wrote to federal government agencies on behalf of his 
constituents who experienced these problems during the war years.
Just prior to the first Democratic primary, Morrison admitted using 
his frank to mail the letters and commented that instead of condemning 
him, the federal investiators congratulated him on keeping "the folks 
back home" informed on current events. Times-Picayune, January 18,
1944.
49States, December 31, 1943; James H. Morrison interviewed by Jerry 
Purvis Sanson, May 13, 1982.
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candidates and cram them down your throats." Clements also reminded 
Louisianians that he had stood alone in his fight against the Crime 
Commission, Reorganization Act, and the sales tax. He unveiled a 
decidedly rural Longite platform calling for extensions of mail and 
school bus routes, restocking lakes and woods with wildlife, protec­
tion of trappers and fishermen, as well as old age pensions and 
"rehabilitation" of needy World War II veterans.^
The candidates continued their campaigns during December, 1943. 
Sam Caldwell and Frank Ellis spent the month attempting to convince 
voters that they were the only independent candidates in the race. On 
December 1, Caldwell's most influential backer, the Shreveport Times, 
blasted both the Prescott Foster-Jimmie Davis and Maestri-Morgan-Earl 
Long political machines for a recent "whispering campaign" which held 
that "Sam Caldwell is the best candidate in the governor's race, but 
he can't be elected without a machine." Instead, the Shreveport Times 
maintained, Caldwell will be elected because he has no political 
machine behind him.̂ *
Caldwell repeatedly returned to this theme during the month.
"The day of the political bosses in Louisiana is at an end," he said 
on December 3, "whether the machine that supports a candidate be in 
New Orleans or Baton Rouge, the voters of the state ... resent this 
organized attempt to force a candidate down their throats." Or, as 
he said more simply in a later speech stressing his own independence:
^States, November 15, 25, 1943; Tnmes-Picayune, November 15, 1943.
Shreveport Times, December 1, 1943.
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52"I have no strings tied to me."
Caldwell also charged that Prescott Foster had first attempted 
to run State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell for governor. The Tugwell 
candidacy, however, disintegrated when Tugwell’s questionable associ­
ation with businessman William T. Burton was revealed at Burton's
tax evasion trial. Foster then endorsed Davis, Caldwell said, "whom
53he had guffawed at before."
In a series of North Louisiana speeches during the first half of 
December, Caldwell also attacked Jimmie Davis because Davis' singing 
career added nothing to. his political experience: "Do the people of
Louisiana want to become the laughing stock of other states?" he 
asked a Lake Providence audience. "If so, all they must do is to 
elect a crooner of sweet nothings to the highest and most dignified 
office within their gift." Or, as he said more pointedly in an Oak 
Ridge speech, "If we must have an entertainer to lead us in these
[perilous times], then let's send to Hollywood and get a good one. I
52Ibid., December 9, 11-12, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 4, 1943.
53Shreveport Times, December 12, 1943. Tugwell testified during 
Burton's trial that Burton had given him $5,000 in 1936 to speed up 
payment due Burton for shells, dredging, towing, barge rentals, and 
other services he provided the Louisiana Highway Commission because 
Burton was afraid that incoming governor Richard Leche thought that 
a recent $15,000 business payment from Burton to James A. Noe was a 
political contribution and would therefore withhold or delay the 
$84,000 payment in retaliation. While Tugwell’s acceptance of the 
$5,000 payment may not have been technically illegal (he provided, 
after all, only his normal service in paying the legitimate $84,000 
debt), it was unethical, and it ended his brief boomlet for governor 
in 1943. Shreveport Times, July 21, 1943.
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54believe Mickey Rooney is available."
Jimmie Davis began December pleasantly with the endorsement of 
the Times-Picayune-New Orleans States in an editorial that recounted 
the fight for reform four years earlier, as a result of which "we have 
had clean, efficient, scandal-free government," and urged Davis’ elec­
tion "because we are convinced he will give Louisiana the honorable, 
constructive administration every good citizen wants . . through the 
four years ahead.
Davis maintained his relaxed campaign style developed during the 
previous month. An appearance in his hometown of Shreveport, for 
example, included his brief recapitulation of his life, general sug­
gestions for various improvements needed in the state, a comment that 
if the constantly warring peoples of Europe would "gather ’round (sic) 
the organ, take the old fiddle down from the fireplace and sing a 
while, there would be less trouble in the world," followed by a music 
program during which Davis interspersed political comment between 
songs. He sang "Live and Let Live" ("Live and let live. Don't break 
may heart . . .") and remarked that the attitude suggested by the 
lyrics "would be a good policy for any governor.
Jimmie Davis and Emile Verret also further defined the reform
^Shreveport Times, December 9, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 11,
1943.
~*~*Times-Picyaune New Orleans States, December 5, 1943. The other 
major New Orleans newspapers also endorsed Davis, the States on Decem­
ber 24, 1943 in an action separate from the Times-Picayune New Orleans 
States endorsement, and the Item on January 8, 1944.
^Shreveport Times, December 15, 1943.
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platform during December. Davis in a speech at Clarks publicly 
endorsed a $30 minimum old-age pension, vocational education, and in­
creased services for the poor. Verret, meanwhile, reiterated the 
general provisions of the platform: ridding the state of bifactional
hate and preserving the positive achievements of past administrations. 
Both candidates promised continued economic development in Louisiana 
after the war. Davis told an Alexandria audience that servicemen 
from all forty-eight states had received military training in Louisi­
ana, and he hoped that many would return after the war to become 
permanent residents. Verret noted that "with our reserve of resources, 
we can attain as great a prosperity in time of peace.,as we attained 
during the war . . . built upon firm, enduring foundations not subject 
to curtailment of any Armistice day." Davis in a Mangham speech 
stressed his belief that Louisiana should reduce its exports of natural 
gas in order to conserve its natural resources for an attempt to be­
come one of the great industrial centers of the south following the 
57war.
Davis’ campaign received a small boost during the last days of 
December when Theodore Hotard, president of the Orleans parish school 
board, and Samuel J. Boylan, tax assessor for the fifth municipal dis­
trict (Algiers), both members of the Old Regular faction, bolted from 
the Morgan-Long ticket ("a set of candidates who were repudiated at 
the polls four years ago," they termed the Longites) in order to
^ Morning Advocate, December 17, 1943; Times—Picayune New Orleans 
States, December 19, 1943; Times-Picayune, December 23, 1943; Verret 
Address (n.d., 1943?), Verret Address (December 3, 1943), Verret 
Collection.
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support Davis. The Times-Picayune editorially applauded Hotard and 
Boylan for their farsightedness. The newspaper also took full advan­
tage of the opportunity to remind the voters of the Scandals and
called the Old Regular endorsement of Morgan and Long "a flat defi—
58ance of the public will and the public interest."
Jimmie Davis also suffered sharp criticism during December. The 
Shreveport Times attacked "Absentee Ace" Davis for his excessive ab­
sence from Shreveport city commission council meetings when he was 
Commissioner of Public Safety: ". . . he didn’t have much time at
home those days," the newspaper noted, "what with going east to make
juke box records, eyeing Hollywood, and keeping the old hill-billy
59band tuned up for ’come election time.’"
The sharpest criticism of Davis, however, came from Sam Caldwell, 
who charged that the speeches attributed to Davis in newspapers were 
"but figments of the imagination of his roving press agent." Caldwell 
commented that one of his friends attended a Davis rally during which
Davis acted as master of ceremonies, sang, and mumbled a few "inaud­
ible" words. Caldwell's friend was surprised to read in the next
day's newspapers that Davis had "discussed reforestation and the lum-
* 60ber industry in the manner of an expert."
Caldwell’s ally, the Shreveport Times, immediately took up his 
theme. The newspaper on December 17 editorially charged that Davis'
Times-Picayune Hew Orleans States, December 26, 1943; Times-Picayune. 
December 27, 1943.
59Shreveport Times, December 8, 1943.
^Morning Advocate, December 10, 1943.
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press agents filed reports that Davis made wide-ranging erudite 
speeches on various subjects, when, in fact, he had not done so. The 
Shreveport Times also revealed that the situation had arisen because 
of the wartime shortages of gasoline, tires, and manpower. Major news­
papers which normally assigned a reporter to travel with each major 
candidate in a gubernatorial campaign and file reports did not do so 
this time because of the shortages, but instead relied on reports 
wired in from each candidate. Later in the month, the Shreveport Times 
reported that because of its revelation of the fraudulent speeches, 
the Associated Press would no longer quote Davis directly in its dis­
patches, but instead only noted that his press agent quoted him as 
saying something.^
In fact, the charges that Davis or his agents reported more com­
plete and meaty speeches than he actually made appears to have been 
more than mere campaign rhetoric. During the 1947-48 gubernatorial 
campaign, for example, Dave McGuire reported to candidate Sam Jones 
that the Times-Picayune refused to take road quotes from candidates 
"because they were badly burned by phony reporting during the 1944
T, * * «62Davis campaign . . .
The Lewis Morgan/Earl Long ticket exhibited a rare unity during 
December. Morgan in a speech at 011a on December 1 pledged to rebuild 
the state highway system, provide $30 per month old age pensions to
^ Shreveport Times, December 17, 29, 1943.
62Dave McGuire to Sam Jones, October 22, 1947, DeLesseps Story Morrison 
Papers, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, 
Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as D. 
Morrison Collection).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
221
every needy person above sixty years of age, and admission to chari­
table health institutions by presenting a certificate of medical need 
from a practicing physician. Then on December 6, he also pledged full
gosupport to both New Orleans and state Civil Service systems.
Morgan also attacked the reformers by attacking Sam Jones. In a 
speech at Columbia, he attacked the surplus generated by the sales 
tax but not used—  ". . . no administration . . .should neglect our 
roads, our schools, our hospitals to glorify a surplus and to cast 
upon the succeeding administration the burden not only of its current 
expenses but the additional burden of repairing and replacing the 
normal wear and tear which occurred during the proceeding four years." 
Morgan and his running mate also charged that the reformers were using 
the state governmental apparatus to coerce voters by ordering state 
officials to "put Davis over if you want to hold your jobs."^
Earl Long appeared with Morgan at various political rallies 
throughout the month and joined his attacks on the reformers: he
asked the voters to defeat the "Jones-Davis do-nothing ticket" and 
return liberal government to the state; he charged that Davis in fact 
had a contract which provided that he would appear in Hollywood 
several months of each year and called on Davis to tell the people if 
they would have a full-time or a part-time governor if they voted him 
into office; he joined in the charges that Davis did not deliver the 
speeches attributed to him and added that, moreover, Sam Jones’
Morning Advocate, December 2, 7, 12, 1943-
64Ibid., December 11, 1943; Shreveport Times, December 12, 1943.
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publicity agents wrote Davis’ speeches.^
New Orleans Mayor Robert Maestri joined the Longite campaign 
against Davis by speaking at Morgan-Long rallies in New Orleans and 
Algiers, where he commanded some political support and would not stir 
up resentment from angry rural voters. Maestri reminded his audiences 
that some of the legislation the reformers claimed was in fact passed
with the help of legislators supported and elected by the Old Regu-, 66 lars.
The other candidates and their allies, meanwhile, struck at Mor­
gan. Jimmie Morrison stressed that Morgan, "a fine old gentleman," 
was nevertheless ”71 years old with a weak heart and in bad health."
The Shreveport Times charged that Morgan’s pledge to build a vocation­
al school in every parish was merely a ploy to provide building con­
tracts to his friends. The Times-Picayune, however, struck hardest 
at Morgan in an editorial intimating that even though "so far as we 
know, he was not personally involved" in the Louisiana Scandals, Morgan 
had served in the Longite administrations guilty of looting the state, 
and was thus guilty by association: "he continued to occupy a luxuri­
ous rumble seat on the state machine until Louisiana voters junked 
it . . ."67
^ Morning Advocate, December 2, 5, 11, 12, 1943; Shreveport Times, 
December 12, 22, 1943.
66Item, December 13, 1943; States, December 23, 1943. Even though he 
confined his campaign appearances to his New Orleans base, Maestri had 
to defend himself against charges that he was attempting to establish 
himself as dictator by endorsing Morgan. See Times-Picayune, January 
13, 1944.
^Shreveport Times, December 15, 17, 1943; Times-Picayune, December 18,
1943.
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The candidates continued their campaigns until the date of the
first Democratic primary, in January of 1944, on the same issues.
Jimmie Davis maintained his "sunshine" campaign: "we must elect to
office men who have no hatred in their hearts and whose records prove
that they have the interests of the masses of the people at heart,"
and stressed his independence ("the man doesn't live who will tell me
what to do in politics"). Earl Long, however, harbored no doubts
about Davis' supposed independence. As he told an audience at Rayne,
"Any one with a thimble full of sense would know that Jimmie Davis
has the full blessing of the Jones group ..." Long also attempted
to throw Huey’s mantle over the Morgan-Long ticket: "Don't lose all
68the benefits that my brother Huey worked his life out to give you."
The lack of substantive issues in the 1943-44 gubernatorial cam­
paign is revealed in a minor smear attempt which developed after 
Shirley Wimberly, president of the American,Democratic Association in 
New Orleans, called on Jimmie Davis to defend himself against whis­
pered rumors that he had written and recorded songs with serial 
numbers 60836AB and 60837AB on the Decca Records label, namely "Bed 
Bug Blues" and "High Geared Mama." "To say that these songs are 
suggestive, indecent, and vile," Wimberly judged, "would be a decided 
understatement. They were obviously designed for the entertainment of 
the denizens of the lowest dives and dens of inequity." The East 
Baton Rouge Morgan Committee added that not only had Davis recorded 
those two songs, he had also written and performed other equally
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 2, 1944.
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questionable tunes entitled "High Geared Daddy," Honkey-Tonk Blues," 
"Mama's Getting Hot," "Papa's Getting Cold," and "Shirt Tail Blues."
A political advertisement the committee placed in the Morning Advocate 
maintained that the words to these songs were "unprintable, but suf­
fice it to say that they glorify the 'Bottom' or red light district 
in Shreveport which ran wide open while Jimmie Davis was Commissioner 
of Public Safety.
Jimmie Morrison joined in the attack on Davis, who, he said, "has 
no political record that can be seen [but does have] several obscene 
records that no decent people would like to hear." Both Morrison 
and the Longites, however, found it difficult to label as "obscene" 
a man who had so successfully cultivated the image of "sunshine, peace, 
and harmony" as had Jimmie Davis. When they attempted to stigmatize 
Davis as crude and indecent, Morrison and Long were themselves force­
fully rebuffed. When Morrison, for example, played "Red Nightgown 
Blues," another of Davis' risque records, at a Shreveport rally, the 
audience began dancing! Morrison became enraged, broke the record, 
and exclaimed "Elect him if you want him." Earl Long, faring no 
better, played "Bed Bug Blues" for a group of ministers, expecting to 
hear comments of shock and outrage, but instead, heard a thankful ex­
pression that even though Davis "used to be on the wrong side of the
70fence . . . now he's seen the light! Thank the Lord!"
^Morning Advocate, January 16, 1944; Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 
68-69; Gary Mills and Grady McWhiney, "Jimmie Davis As A Figure of 
Continuity in Country Music," paper presented to the Louisiana Histori­
cal Association Annual Convention, March 25, 1983.
^Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 68-69.
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Despite these charges, the Jones administration swung more openly 
behind Davis' candidacy during the week before the first Democratic 
primary. On January 11, Lieutenant-Governor Marc Mouton announced 
from his sickbed that he realized that he was fighting a losing battle 
for his life and that he therefore had nothing to lose by speaking out 
on the race. He recalled the "days of political plunder and shame and 
disgrace," and pled with voters to elect Jimmie Davis in order to keep 
Louisiana from returning to those bad days.̂ *
Sam Jones, in his election-eve broadcast, still declined to en­
dorse Davis by name, but he also reminded his audience of Louisiana's 
sordid political past:
It is easy to forget some of the things of the 
past. It is easy to forget the fraud, the cor­
ruption, the abuses, the crimes, and the suicides.
The wholesale thievery and the rest are easily 
forgotten, but let me remind you that a man you 
once honored as governor of this state paid his 
visit to the Atlanta penitentiary.
Despite Jones' refusal to endorse Davis, his remarks clearly indicated
that he preferred a reformer to follow him: ". . . every single gain
you the people have made over these years can be wiped out in a period
of five months after the next governor takes office,” he advised his
audience, "and I tell you that at least some of the candidates for the
72office would like to do that very thing."
^*Times-Picayune, January 12, 1944; Morning Advocate, January 12, 1944. 
Mouton died on August 21, 1944.
7?"Times-Picayune, January 18, 1944; Shreveport Times, January 18, 1944.
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Perry H. Howard maintains that the 1943-44 election was the first
of a "new competitive Louisiana politics" in which first Democratic
primaries became "sorting out contests as increasingly more candi-
73dates . . .  vied for a position in the runoff." While Howard’s 
observation is accurate, the 1943-44 election, even though it marked 
a new evolution of Louisiana politics, also remained firmly in the 
bifactional tradition of recent Louisiana politics. The two leading 
candidates in the first primary were Jimmie Davis (34.9 per cent of 
the vote), and Lewis Morgan (27.5 per cent). The Longites and the 
established reformers left both the independent Longites and the in­
dependent reformers in the dust. Davis received 167,343 votes and
scored a plurality in 34 parishes, while Morgan received 131,682
74votes and achieved a plurality in 11 parishes.
Even though the reformers took comfort in Davis' lead over Mor­
gan, the first primary returns revealed that they also had cause for 
concern. The combined "Longite" votes (Morgan+Morrison+Clements+ 
LeBlanc) was 56.1 per cent of the total, while the combined "reform" 
vote (Davis+Caldwell+Lanier+Moseley) was only 43.9 per cent of the 
total. Moreover, reformers had trailed badly in several of the races 
for lesser state offices. Verret trailed Long in the lieutenant- 
governor's race by 128,232 votes to Long's 194,155; Gremillion trailed 
Martin in the secretary of state race; LeBlanc trailed Cawthom in
the attorney general race; Coxe trailed Frazar in the superintendent
73Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, rev. ed., 1971), p. 269.
74Ibid., p. 270; Item, January 26, 1944.
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of education race; and Registrar of State Lands Lucille May Grace and 
Commissioner of Agriculture Harry D. Wilson won re-election to their 
offices.^ These results showed that the taxpayer suits and legisla­
tive opposition to Sam Jones’ program had not been the dying gasp of 
a beaten faction. Instead, Longism, discredited and battered four 
years before, had bounded back marvelously. Reform forces still 
faced a stiff battle to preserve their control of the government.
The two candidates remaining in the gubernatorial race after the 
first primary immediately began collecting endorsements for their 
second primary efforts. Ernest Clements endorsed Lewis Morgan on 
January 20, as did Lee Lanier on January 25, Vincent Moseley on Jan­
uary 30 (Moseley announced his endorsemment of a split ticket of
Morgan and Emile Verret for lieutenant-governor), and Jimmie Morrison 
76on February 18. Sam Caldwell congratulated both Morgan and Davis
for their success in the first Democratic primary but announced his
neutrality in the second primary, as did the Ewing newspapers in
North Louisiana (the Shreveport Times, the Monroe Morning World, and
Monroe News-Star), which had formed his bedrock support.^ Jimmie
Davis received the endorsement only of Dudley LeBlanc among the un-
78successful gubernatorial aspirants.
^Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 270; Item, January 26,
1944.
^ Times-Picayune, January 21, 26, 31, 1944; Item, February 19, 1944; 
Morning Advocate, February 19, 1944.
^Shreveport Times, January 22, 1944; Morning Advocate, January 22,
1944.
78Item, January 29, 1944; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 
30, 1944.
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In addition to the scramble for support from unsuccessful guber­
natorial candidates, Morgan and Davis also sought help from candi­
dates for lesser state offices. On January 26, James A. Gremillion, 
the incumbent secretary of state for whom the reformers had fought 
so hard against Earl Long's backdoor attempt to stay in public office 
in 1940, withdrew from his second primary re-election campaign,
leaving his Longite opponent, Wade 0. Martin, Jr., as the Democratic 
79nominee. Attorney General candidate Joe Cawthorn reaffirmed his
steadfast support for the entire Morgan-Long ticket, and the Long
SOmachine promised its continued support of him. Jimmie Davis, mean­
while, received endorsements from incumbent Superintendent of Edu­
cation John E. Coxe, and incumbent Treasurer Andrew P. Tugwell, and
81added them to his ticket.
No new issues emerged in the second primary campaign. Morgan 
continued to attack the reform administration of Sam Jones: "Never
will you find Lewis Morgan using the power of his office to oppress 
people by threatening to close the largest state hospital in Louisiana 
as a means of gaining political legislation, such as was done by the 
present administration in 1942." Morgan also charged that Jones was
70Times-Picayune, January 27, 1944; Item, January 27, 1944. In re­
sponse to Gremillion's defection, Davis’ campaign manager, W. H.
Talbot, referred vaguely to "a huge slush fund” the Longites were ex­
ploiting to regain control of the state and its natural resources.
80Morning Advocate, January 29, 1944; Henry D. Larcade, Jr. to Joseph 
T. Cawthorn, December 27, 1943, John B. Foumet Papers, Department of 
Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection).
81Morning Advocate, January 29, 1944; Times-Picayune, February 4, 1944.
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82attempting to coerce Civil Service employees into supporting Davis.
In addition to his offensive, Morgan also attempted to draw Huey's 
mantle even more tightly around himself: "[I]f you want the kind of
government originated by Huey Long in 1928," he told a Coushatta audi­
ence, "then go to the polls and vote for Lewis Morgan." The next day 
at Homer, he called Huey "That sandy-haired boy who came from Winn
parish in 1928," and declared that "he was the most affectionate and
83beloved friend I ever had."
The reform faction continued its drumbeat of denunciation of 
Longite corruption. The Times-Picayune New Orleans States commented 
that "... very few will vote deliberately for Louisiana’s betrayal 
and forced retreat to the scandalous deals that stained Louisiana's 
good name and wasted her funds and resources during the previous 
Maestri-Leche-Long dictatorship." Davis, in a state-wide radio speech 
(we know he delivered this one!), asked whether the voters thought 
that "the city ring [can] bring harmony to you? So long as one part 
of the state tries to dominate the other, this can never be. All the 
great fights in Louisiana politics came about because of this attemp-
8 Ated domination." Even though Davis’ speech reveals an incomplete 
understanding of Louisiana politics, the sentiment is clear. It was 
a surprisingly strident presentation for Davis.
Easily the most explosive event of the second primary was the
goMorning Advocate, January 30, February 17, 25, 1944.
83Ibid., February 17-18, 1944.
^ Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 23, 1944; Morning Advo­
cate, February 18, 1944.
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threatened disintegration of the Longite faction. The trouble stemmed 
from a quirky provision of the 1921 Constitution which provided that 
if there was no second primary for governor, either because a candi­
date was nominated in the first primary or because one of the candi­
dates selected for the second primary withdrew from that race, then 
there would be no second primary for any other state office, and the 
candidate with the highest number of votes in each of the lesser state 
wide races would automatically be declared the Democratic nominee. 
Immediately after the results of the first primary became apparent 
the Longites realized that if Lewis Morgan withdrew from the second 
primary they would obviously lose the governorship again but would 
gain control of powerful, though lesser, state offices. Despite this
realization, the Old Regulars on January 20 announced that they would
85continue the fight through the second primary.
Other Longites, however, apparently harbored reservations about 
the wisdom of continuing the contest. Lewis Morgan announced on Janu­
ary 21 that he intended to stay in the race, even though current 
rumors suggested that he would withdraw. Scarcely a week later, how­
ever, Morgan announced that "a political friend” was negotiating with 
Jimmie Davis forces to bring the campaign to a quick end. On February 
1, after a speech in Lafayette, Morgan replied "Yes, that's right" 
when asked whether Earl Long was the "political friend" negotiating
n - 86with Davis.
O C Shreveport Times, January 21, 1944.
86Times-Picayune, January 22, February 1-2, 1944; Morning Advocate, 
February 2, 1944.
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Morgan’s announcement split Longite ranks. Lucille May Grace 
and Wade 0. Martin, Jr. announced that they would "stick by Lewis 
Morgan" through his "darkest hour" filled with "terrific sabotage." 
Earl Long, however, denied any knowledge of Morgan's charge: "You
can tell 'em (sic) I expressed utter surprise," he told a Times- 
Picayune reporter. W. H. Talbot announced that he knew of no contacts 
between the Davis and Long forces. Maestri declined to comment on 
the charge.̂
Former Judge James D. Womack dropped a bombshell into Longite 
ranks during an address broadcast over WNOE and WDSU radio on February 
4, in which he revealed the alleged details of the Davis-Long deal. 
Womack claimed that he had attended a Longite conference at the Monte- 
leone Hotel in New Orleans on January 25 at which Earl Long announced 
that John Fred Odom, E. A. Stephens, and Wade Gamier of the reform 
camp, had requested a meeting with him. Long obtained Maestri*s per­
mission for the meeting, and then heard the reformers' proposition: 
Morgan would be "prevented" from contesting the second primary, thus 
electing Davis and the high man in each of the other races. In ex­
change for Longite derailment of Morgan's campaign, Davis would leave
*the state six months following his inauguration to make movies in 
Hollywood, leaving Earl Long in charge as acting governor. Davis 
would also resign his office eight months before the 1948 primary, 
thus giving Long the additional perquisites of the incumbancy to use 
in his campaign for the governorship. In addition, Womack said, Long
g7 *Times-Picayune, February 2-3, 1944.
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reported that both Davis and Sam Jones promised to support his 1948
88bid for the governorship.
The principals named in Womack's speech immediately issued hot 
denials. Davis —  "I have never had a political conference with Earl 
Long in my life;" Stephens —  "unqualifiedly untrue;" Odom —  "pre­
posterous and untrue;" Long —  "nonsense." (Long also paid Davis an
uncharacteristic compliment during the episode. Davis, he said, told
89"the absolute truth" when he denied the alleged negotiations.)
The accuracy of Womack’s fantastic charges cannot be determined.
90The absurdity ("giddiest absurdity” the Item characterized it) of 
the political shenanigans he outlined, however, undermines his credi­
bility. It is difficult to imagine the reformers willingly yielding 
control of the state to Earl Long six months after Davis' inauguration. 
It is virtually impossible to imagine Sam Jones agreeing to support 
Earl Long for governor in 1948. It is possible, however, that Womack's 
charge did stem from knowledge of a meeting that had taken place.
Earl Long admitted that he had, in fact, met with a group of men whom 
he "presumed to represent Davis," but that they only sought to estab­
lish the basis for a smooth adminisration in case he and Davis were 
91elected to office.
goTimes-Picayune, February 5, 1944; Item, February 5, 1944; Morning 
Advocate, February 6, 1944. When he repeated these charges during a 
speech broadcast over WJBO in Baton Rouge the night following his New 
Orleans broadcast, Womack changed the site of the political meeting 
he attended on January 25 from the Monteleone to the Roosevelt Hotel.
89Times-Picayune, February 5, 1944; Item, February 7, 1944.
90Item, February 7, 1944.
^Morning Advocate, February 7, 1944; Town Talk, February 7, 1944.
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Even though the breach in Longite ranks was healed by the Old
Regular announcement that they would endorse the same ticket in the
second primary that they had backed in the first primary (i.e.,
Morgan-Long with no exceptions), the rifts were only papered over.
Morgan in a Winnsboro speech on February 19, asked his audience to
vote for "every solitary man" on his ticket —  the first time he had
asked for support for the entire ticket since the disagreement with
Long. Joe Cawthorn in Gonzales on February 20 announced that "we've
all joined hands . . . There is no more confusion in our ranks. We’ll
never split again." But Morgan and Long did not appear together until
92their closing New Orleans rally at Municipal Auditorium.
The results of the second primary revealed that even though the
Longites had shown a surprising strength in the campaign, they were
not strong enough to overcome the reformers. . Jimmie Davis was elected
governor with 251,228 votes (54 per cent, of the total) to Morgan's
217,915. Moreover, reform candidates swept into all the contested
state offices: Verret for lieutenant governor, LeBlanc for attorney
general, Tugwell for treasurer, and Coxe for superintendent of edu- 
93cation.
^Morning Advocate, February 20-21, 28, 1944.
93Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 271; Morning Advocate, 
March 8, 1944. Davis carried 44 parishes and 7 of Louisiana's 8 Con­
gressional Districts, losing only the First District, which consisted 
of lower Orleans parish, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes. Davis 
remembered this loss, and during an appearance at Port Sulphur in 
Plaquemines parish in 1945, dedicated a song to its residents, then 
burst into a chorus of "It Makes No Difference Now." Item, August 1,
1945. The race issue which became important in Louisiana politics 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s caused several new and strange 
(by previous standards) alliances within the state, one of which was 
Leander Perez and Jimmie Davis. See Glen Jeansonne, Race, Religion, 
and Politics The Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1959-60
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Observation of the 1944 second Democratic primary results shows 
that while Davis added to the number of parishes voting anti-Long in 
north Louisiana compared to the 1940 results, he lost some of the 
southern and Florida parishes Sam Jones had carried. Davis' native 
Jackson parish, East and West Carroll, Franklin, and Concordia 
parishes joined the ranks of the reformers in 1944, while Grant and 
Caldwell left the reformers and voted for Lewis Morgan. Beauregard 
joined Calcasieu and Jefferson Davis parishes in southwest Louisiana 
in voting for Davis, but Allen and Cameron parishes remained Longite. 
Acadia and St. Martin parishes in south Louisiana voted for Morgan by 
comfortable margins, 52.6 per cent to 47.4 per cent in Acadia and 55.6 
per cent to 44.4 per cent in St. Martin, but Davis carried St. Bernard, 
which had voted for Earl Long in 1940. Morgan's lifelong association 
with the Florida parishes allowed him to erode anti-Long strength in 
this region. St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Livingston parishes all 
voted for the Longite in 1944.
Nevertheless, with the continued exception of Orleans, Davis held 
on to the urban areas of the state. East Baton Rouge parish preferred 
him 66.8 per cent to 33.2 per cent for Morgan; Calcasieu by 52.8 per 
cent to 47.2 per cent; Rapides by 58.3 per cent to 41.7 per cent; 
Ouachita by 64.1 per cent to 35.9 per cent; and Caddo by 75.4 per 
cent to 24.6 per cent.
9
The reformers, of course, were well pleased with the second 
primary results. Sam Jones remarked that Davis' election demonstrated
(Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of 
Southwestern Louisiana, 1977), p. 112; and Jeansonne, Leander Perez, 
pp. 257-260.
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MAP 5-1
ANTI-LONGITE VOTE, SECOND DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY, 1944
Parishes C arried  By James H. Davis 
I | Parishes C arried  By Lewis Morgan
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that his own election four years before had not been merely a "flash 
in the pan." The 1940 campaign, he said, "was won by the flame of 
spontaneous revolt against shocking scandal." The 1944 reform vic­
tory, in contrast, "was brought about by the unspectacular but deliber­
ate determination of the people to continue clean, independent govern­
ment." Former reform United States Representative T. Hale Boggs 
wrote to Emile Verret congratulating him on his victory over Earl Long: 
"In defeating him you have earned the everlasting gratitude of the 
people of Louisiana." State Representative DeLesseps Morrison, a 
thoroughgoing reformer then on army duty overseas, wrote to his mother 
that "[It] looks like ... a prolonged era of good government is in 
for Louisiana . . . Thank God, we are through with Joe Cawthom, Earl 
Long, and the like. Here’s hoping [the reformers] don't start making
deals with the Old Regulars ... as long as you play with dogs,
94you're bound to catch fleas."
The Longites, meanwhile, were gracious in their defeat. Robert 
Maestri said that "Because I have always been of the democratic opin­
ion that the rule of the majority prevails, [!] I congratulate Mr.
Davis on his election . . ." Lewis Morgan extended his "sincere and 
hearty" congratulations to Davis, and hoped "that his administration 
will be one to which the people may point with some satisfaction at 
its close . . .
94Morning Advocate, March 1, April 29, 1944; DeLesseps S. Morrison to 
Anita 0. Morrison, March 12, 1944, D. Morrison Collection; Hale Boggs 
to Emile Verret, March 6, 1944, Verret Collection.
95Morning Advocate, March 2, 1944.
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In contrast to the 1939-AO campaign, the 1943-44 contest had been 
tame. Even the war, which dominated so much of American life, failed 
to dominate Louisiana's political agenda. Gas rationing caused the can­
didates some minor transportation problems, even though the Office of
Price Administration in Washington, D.C., empowered local ration boards
96in Louisiana to issue special gasoline rations to the candidates.
The war issue entered the campaign only in two minor themes.
First, calls came from various sources to conduct a serious campaign
without the ballyhoo, innuendo, distortion, and lies usually present
in Louisiana campaigns (admonitions that went unheeded). The second
war theme which entered the campaign was the pledges made by both
Jimmie Davis and Lewis Morgan to provide "rehabilitation" and jobs
97for the returning servicemen and servicewomen. Neither of these 
war-related issues achieved major importance in the campaign.
Jimmie Davis' election to Louisiana's highest office in 1944 
allowed reform elements in Louisiana another four years in which to
96Times-Picayune, September 16, 1943; Weill, You Are My Sunshine,~p.
66; W. Scott Heywood to Prentiss M. Brown, October 4, 1943, Jennings- 
Heywood Collection. J. E. Brumfield, district director of the OPA 
said in Shreveport that all properly qualified candidates would re­
ceive enough gas coupons to carry on their campaign, but would not re­
ceive coupons for transportation of bands, sound trucks, or campaign 
workers.
97Morning Advocate, August 19, 21, 1943; "Address," (n.d., 1943),
Verret Collection. The concerns about providing "rehabilitation" to 
returning combat servicemen after the end of the war were shared by 
people throughout the United States who wanted their loved ones back 
from the battlefields, but realized that the veteran would not be the 
same person as the recruit they had sent away to war. As the war wound 
to its conclusion, a real concern developed that battle-hardened and 
—scarred veterans might wreak havoc in the country, either because of 
psychological disorders or by turning their military training to crim­
inal uses. See Joseph C. Goulden, The Best Years 1945-1950 (New York, 
Antheneum, 1976), pp. 37-51, the chapter entitled "Preparing for 
Ulysses."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
govern the state. Relations between the outgoing and incoming admini­
strations remained cordial. Governor and Mrs. Jones invited the 
Davises to move into the governor's mansion with them on May 1, to 
allow them to become accustomed to their new quarters and also to 
simplify some of the confusion of inauguration day. Jimmie Davis, 
however, served notice to the reformers that even though he would 
preserve those aspects of their program he considered useful, he was 
not Sam Jones. When asked whether he endorsed all of Jones' reform
program, Davis replied, "I never take stock in anybody's politics ex- 
98cept my own."
Even though some of the reformers never fully accepted a profes­
sional country singer as the champion of good government in Louisi- 
99ana, Jimmie Davis in 1944 began establishing his own very different 
leadership of the state.
Shortly after winning the second Democratic primary in February, 
1944, which ensured his election as Louisiana's sixty-eighth governor, 
Davis made two announcements. He believed he would be too busy to 
make more films or record any songs for a while, and also rejected an 
offer to star in a special movie, "The Singing Governor," based 
loosely on his life, planned by Columbia Studios in Hollywood.
98Morning Advocate, April 16, 25, 1944.
99Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 198-199.
^ M̂orning Advocate, March 5, 17, 1944; Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 
79-80. The eventual movie based on Davis' life, "Louisiana," was not 
made until 1947 by Monogram Pictures. Davis' prediction that he would 
neglect his entertainment career was wrong. He spent 44 days out of 
state in fiscal 1944-45, and 68 days in fiscal 1945-46. See Sindler, 
Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 19.0. Davis later excused his action by main­
taining that many of these days were on week-ends when he flew to re­
cording sessions in Nashville or New York. Nevertheless, he twice ex­
hausted the contingency fund which pays the lieutenant governor the
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Davis was officially elected governor of Louisiana in the general 
election on April 18, 1944. He was unopposed and the voter turnout 
was typically low.
Davis’ inauguration was much simpler than Sam Jones’ extravaganza 
held four years before. Gasoline and tire rationing reduced the crowd 
to an estimated 10,000 people, compared to the approximately 100,000 
who had crowded into Baton Rouge to witness Jones* inauguration.
The simple inaugural ceremony was held on the capitol steps, rather 
than in the Louisiana State University football stadium, and there 
were no inaugural balls. Following the inaugural speech, Governor and 
Mrs. Davis held an open house at the governor’s mansion.
Jimmie Davis worked even before his inauguration to translate 
his "peace and harmony" campaign style into administrative reality.
He endorsed incumbent House Speaker Norman Bauer of St. Mary parish 
for re-election to that post, and reformer Grove Stafford of Rapides 
parish as President-Pro-Tempore of the Senate. He also announced, 
however, that in issuing these endorsements, he was not attempting to 
downgrade the qualifications of any other candidates for the posts. 
Davis also met with legislators from around the state, including those 
from the First and Second Congressional districts (in and around New 
Orleans) who possessed slightly more than one—fifth of the votes in 
the legislature.* He revealed in the meeting with the Orleans delega-
governor’s salary when the subordinate official must substitute for 
the chief executive.
^^Morning Advocate, April 19, May 7, 10, 1944; Item, May 9, 1944; 
Shreveport Times, May 10, 1944. The inaugural crowd included Davis’ 
mother, but his father was too ill to attend the ceremony and died on 
February 6, 1945.
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tion that he had no "must" legislation, but that he expected wide­
spread support for his "non-political" program which included renewal 
of the sales tax, re-enactment of the gas-gathering tax, and separa­
tion of the Conservation Department into two agencies —  one for wild­
life and one for minerals. The initial success of his effort to estab­
lish "peace and harmony" was revealed in a public letter from Longite 
Secretary of State Wade 0. Martin, Jr. to Davis pledging "my . . . 
active support, co-operation, and assistance in every matter which
shall have for its purpose the advancement and improvement of the
102state of Louisiana."
The dove of peace had apparently settled over the legislature
by the time it convened on May 8, 1944. Old Regular leaders told
the members of their delegation to the legislature that they would
"play ball" with Davis, and entered no candidates in the races for
House Speaker or Senate President-Pro-Tempore. Some reform elements
in the state hoped that the new legislative mood signaled an improved
political climate in Louisiana: the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate
commented, "Politically speaking, there is today more unity and good
will among the people of Louisiana than has been seen in a long while
. . . [We] believe that, in a manner of'speaking, the sun will shine
103in Louisiana for the next four years."
The legislature met in joint session on May 15 to hear the new 
governor's plans for the state. Davis, however, revealed no specific
102Morning Advocate, May 2, 6, 1944; States, May 4, 1944; Item, May
6, 1944.
103Morning Advocate, May 8, 1944; Item, May 8, 1944.
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recommendations in his address. He spoke in general terms about the 
need for improved flood control, highways, hospitals, and penal in­
stitutions, but reminded the legislators that "Many of these improve­
ments involve construction and the use of materials and supplies.
These needs must continue to yield to the greater needs of war."
Davis called the legislators to endure a period of austerity until 
"the greater needs of war [are] lessened" and the victory won. ". . . 
it behooves all of us here," he said, "to do everything that is humanly 
possible to accomplish this one common desire that is felt in the 
heart of every real American.
Despite his pleas for austerity and careful husbanding of the 
state's resources, Davis presented the legislators with a budget 
calling for expenditures of §197,768,787.26 for the 1944-45 biennium 
(§15,540,292.55 above Sam Jones' 1942-43 budget). State fiscal offi­
cers anticipated income for the biennium covered by the new budget to 
be approximately §42,000,000 less than the proposed expenditures.
The original estimates of the deficit, however, did not include ap­
proximately §16,000,000 in revenue to be realized if the legislature 
re-enacted the sales tax, and approximately §3,500,000 additional 
revenue from Davis' proposed re-enactment of the gas-gathering tax.
It also did not include the possibility of reducing the deficit by 
using part of the §12,500,000 surplus left in the state treasury by
104Address by Governor Jimmie H. Davis Before the Joint Session of the 
Legislature —  May 15, 1944 (Baton Rouge, House of Representatives, 
1944), pp. 2, 6; Shreveport Times, May 16, 1944.
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Governor Jones Davis described the executive budget (actually pre­
pared by the executive department before he took office) "considerably 
out of balance" and called upon legislators to cut appropriations 
"where necessary to provide an economical and balanced budget ..."
The state’s expenditures, he said, "must be kept within the means of 
the state to pay."^^
In addition, Davis favored renewal of the two taxes which could 
generate enough income to lessen the deficit considerably, the gas- 
gathering tax and the sales tax. Renewal of the sales tax met with 
less opposition than did renewal of the gas-gathering tax. Davis ap­
peared before a House caucus on May 29 and pleaded for renewal of 
the one-cent sales tax. "It was not a campaign pledge,” he said, "but 
after study from every angle, I believe it is necessary." The House 
then approved the measure on a 94-0 vote with no debate. The Senate 
similarly passed the sales tax, and Davis signed it into law.̂ ^̂
Renewal of the gas-gathering tax, however, roused the ire of 
both large and small natural gas producers throughout the state.
They maintained that they had accepted the original gas gathering tax 
in 1940 and agreed not to subject it to litigation only because Sam
^^Item, May 16, 1944; Morning Advocate, May 16, 1944; Sindler, Huey 
Long’s Louisiana, p. 191. Sindler maintains that "The administra­
tion’s budgetary miscalculations were so gross as to warrant a judg­
ment of intentional deceit ..."
^ ^Item, May 23, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 5, 1944.
^ ^Moming Advocate, May 30, June 13, 1944; Item, May 30, 1944; Shreve­
port Times, May 31, 1944; Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State 
of Louisiana at the Regular Session 1944, p. 138 (hereinafter cited 
as Acts Passed by the Legislature 1944).
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Jones assured them that it would be in effect for only two years, and
that he desperately needed it to pay the state debt left behind by
the Longites. Then in 1942, the producers maintained, they agreed to
a two-year extension of the tax in order to help ease the state's
financial crunch, and, in exchange, received a distinct pledge from
the Jones administration that the tax would positively not extend
beyond 1944. Davis' spokesmen, however, maintained that he could not
be held responsible for a pledge made by the previous administration,
and that it was just as important for him to achieve a balanced bud-
108get as it had been for Sam Jones. Despite the protests from the
natural gas spokesmen, the legislature renewed the gas-gathering 
109tax.
The "peace and harmony" facade of the legislative session dis­
appeared on June 12. The first bill to create division was the ad­
ministration proposal to remove the Education Department from poli­
tics by providing for an appointed rather than an elected Superinten­
dent of Education. The bill caused a sharp debate between legisla­
tors who thought it a reasonable reform and those who saw it as a 
dangerous concentration of power in the governor's hands. The latter 
group drew enough support to dispose of the measure. Davis also lost 
when he endorsed a proposal to "freeze" $10,000,000 of the $12,000,000 
treasury surplus by investing it in war bonds. ($2,000,000 of the 
surplus was earmarked for salary increases for teachers but was
 ̂ Item, May 16, 1944.
109Acts Passed by the Legislature 1944, p. 354-360.
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entangled in a lawsuit against the Board of Liquidation of the State 
Debt and was not included in the "freeze" proposal.) The legisla­
tors, however, preferred to keep the surplus liquid, even though the 
war-time scarcity of construction materials limited its use.
Davis received his sharpest rebuff from the legislature when he 
attempted to institute an additional one cent state retail sales tax. 
Davis and the other major supporters of the proposal —  Executive 
Counsel to the Governor, James I. Smith; State Treasurer A. P. Tug- 
well; Highway Director D. Y. Smith; and Public Works Adminstrator 
DeWitt Pybum —  urged the legislature to pass the additional tax to 
help veterans after the war. They recognized the pent-up need for 
state projects including construction or repair of roads, hospitals, 
and mental institutions, as well as other state projects which would 
demand large amounts of money as soon as the end of the war made con­
struction materials plentiful. At just that time, the supporters 
reasoned, the Louisiana economy would also enter a slump because of 
the sharp reductions in military and industrial spending expected at 
the end of the war. James I. Smith explained to the legislators that 
the state could raise money it needed for post-war projects (which 
would incidentally create jobs for returning servicemen) in either of 
two ways: it could wait until the end of the war and issue state
bonds, or it could impose the additional one cent sales tax in 1944, 
while the Louisiana economy was booming and save the revenue generated
*^Item, June 13, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 191.
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by the tax for postwar projects.
Despite Davis' assertion that "... since it is for the soldiers, 
1 think we can all agree to be for it," the additional sales tax drew 
a storm of protest. E. H. "Lige" Williams, president of the Louisiana 
Federation of Labor, called the appeal to patriotism in remarks sup­
porting the tax, a "transparent mockery." The New Orleans legislative 
delegation opposed the measure because they thought that residents of 
the city already paid a high sales tax (two cents city tax and one 
cent state tax) and the additional one cent would push sales taxes in 
the city to an unacceptable level. Opposition also arose from re­
formers, some of whom thought the additional levy unnecessary because 
of the large surplus generated by the state sales tax instituted in 
1.942.112
Despite the strong opposition, the additional sales tax passed 
the House Ways and Means Committee, but only on a close 8-6 vote.
Floor debate on the proposal was sharp. Speaker Norman Bauer pled 
for passage, but the opposition to the tax overwhelmed him. Repre­
sentative J. Duff Smith of Union parish charged that Tugwell had 
threatened that if Smith did not vote for the bill, "I couldn't get 
the things we need in Union parish." Representative Sidney Sylvester
of St. Landry parish warned darkly that the additional tax would
113created a "slush*fund to perpetuate a political machine."
^ ^ Item, June 15, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 192.
1 1 oItem, June 15, 22, 1944; States, June 26, 1944.
^^Item, June 15, 28, 1944.
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After a prolonged debate before packed galleries, the House voted 
against the additional sales tax 48-47. Governor Davis announced that 
he was disappointed that the state would not be collecting the addi­
tional revenue from the money then circulating in Louisiana but, 
typically, also announced that he was not bitter about the defeat.
He had thought that the proposal was useful and necessary, but a 
majority of the House members had thought differently, "and that was 
their priviledge."^^ ..
As the legislative session unfolded, the reformers found that 
Jimmie Davis was indeed not another Sam Jones. While Jones’ belief 
in an "unbossed" legislature led him to refrain from appearing in be­
half of administration bills, sometimes to the detriment of his pro­
gram, he worked behind the scenes to build coalitions in support of 
his program. Davis, however, provided little legislative leadership, 
overt or otherwise. Ttfithout direction from the governor, the legis­
lative sessions quickly disintegrated into a welter of confused ef­
forts and cross purposes within the reform faction.
The administration's position on many issues became so unclear 
that Davis held a series of caucuses with legislators to emphasize 
which bills had administration support.' But these sessions did not 
stop the flow of criticism directed at the governor. Representative 
R. Brownell of Morgan City, a staunch reform supporter, on a point 
of personal privilege, remarked that there was a vast difference 
between an independent legislature and a disorganized legislature.
Tl4Ibid., June 28, 1944; Shreveport Times, June 29, 1944; Morning 
Advocate, June 29, 1944.
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Legislators not invited to the early caucuses became incensed at 
being omitted. As Representative A. R. deNux remarked, bis constitu­
ents in Avoyelles parish felt that "You’re not representing us if 
you’re not called in to decide on what’s going to be done in the legis­
lature.”*^
Criticism of Davis' lackadaisical legislative leadership spilled 
over into other reform elements in the state. The Item entitled its 
June 19, 1944, editorial "The Lack . . Leadership," and remarked that
When legislators go about in circles saying they 
don't know what measures are favored or opposed 
by the Governor . . . the situation has got to a 
sad pass.
. . .  the idea of bringing the Governor into 
'secret caucusses' to inform [the Legislature] 
of his views is bizarre. The only right way to 
do that is to have the Governor express himself 
to the Assembly in messages or personal addresses 
. . . The leadership and incentive have to come 
from the Governor and none other.
In addition, veteran New Orleans political journalist Hermann B. 
Deutsch analyzed the legislature and reached an equally dismal con­
clusion:
In the House of Representatives, there is no one 
to call signals, and when anyone gets hold of 
the ball, he carries it as his individual fancy 
dictates . . . [and] apparently no one is author­
ized to make decisions. All the players are in­
dependent, and quite proud of that fact, as well
**~*States, June 9, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 16, 19-20, 1944; 
Shreveport Times, June 20, 1944; Item, June 20, 1944.
**̂ Item, June 19, 1944.
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they might be. But they are not merely in­
dependent, they are unorganized. And between 
those two terms yawns a tremendous difference.
The States noted as the legislative session ended, that the 
"State Pays Price for Peace, Harmony." The "price" cited in this 
editorial included broken pledges, a dissipated $10,000,000 surplus, 
no postwar legislation of any consequence, and no "great constructive
legislation . . . for the benefit of the people or the returning sol-
.. ,,118 diers.
Whatever their cost, peace and harmony prevailed at the closing 
meeting of the legislature. Governor Davis attended the House ses­
sion, harmonized with the representatives on several songs, and ren­
dered a solo performance of "It Makes No Difference Now." Represen­
tative Leonard Santos of Orleans parish released two pigeons labeled
119"Peace" and "Harmony" in the House chamber.
The legislature left the governor a seriously imbalanced budget, 
but Davis vetoed $15,000,000 of appropriations, thus bringing expendi­
ture into line. His two major vetoes eliminated $5,000,000 each for 
state drainage programs and for highway construction to be paid from 
the general appropriations fund. His other vetoes were for lesser 
amounts: $1,280,000 payment to police juries for parish roadwork;
$75,000 for construction of an agricultural experiment station in
117-.,Ibid.
118States, July 6, 1944.
119Ibid.; Morning Advocate, July 7, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisi­
ana, pp. 196-197.
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Washington Parish and $100,000 for a similar project in Red River 
Parish among others- By July 12, State Treasurer Tugwell announced 
that with Davis’ vetoes, he projected a $1,000,000 budget surplus for 
the next biennium.
Projections of a budget surplus kept Davis from calling a special 
legislative session to reconsider imposition of the additional one 
cent state retail sales tax that the regular session had failed to 
pass. Speculation about the extraordinary session began when the 
regular session rejected the additional sales tax, and as the legis­
lators considered the idea after the regular session, some of them 
decided that the administration proposal to "stockpile” revenue with 
the additional tax had merit, after all. Representative Drayton 
Boucher of Spring Hill announced that he had found that "my people 
and the other members of the Legislature from my district are in 
favor of the bill." By early September, however, the administration 
had abandoned all thoughts of the special session. A "high unnamed 
administration source" gave no official reason for abandoning the 
idea, but the Item pointed out that during the first two months of 
the new fiscal year (July and August, 1944), Treasurer Tugwell's rec­
ords showed that the state received $12,021,761.98 total revenue, 
compared to $10,375,318.71 during the same two months of the previous 
fiscal year, and that the previous year had produced the $12,000,000
^ ^Morning Advocate, July 8, 11-12, 1944.
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121 *-surplus. Administration leaders thus felt great reluctance at the 
prospect: of attempting to "sell’’ increased taxes when the state expec­
ted: a healthy surplus .from available revenues. Davis on February 14,
1945, announced.that he would call no special session "until the end
■ 122 ■' ■of the European war was in sight."
During the months between the end of the first regular session of 
the legislature in July, 1944, and the end of World War II in Septem­
ber, 1945, Davis remained involved with governing the state and par­
ticipating in the war:effort. Hemet with President Franklin Roose­
velt, and following Roosevelt’s death, with President Harry Truman, 
"talking politics" and also asking them to retain Louisiana’s war 
production plants and military training camps during the post-war 
years.. He attempted to halt "floggings or other, mistreatment" of 
prisoners at. the state; penitentiary by executive order. Sam Jones 
had issued a similar order,;but prison officials had ignored it - 
Davis’ order met a similar fate and flogging of state prisoners con­
tinued into the 1950s. He and his band made public appearances at 
war bond sales rallies, and made an eight-state "postwar business 
tour" of the south attempting to persuade businessmen to build 
commercial establishments in Louisiana after the war. Davis also 
did not forget his entertainment career. He and cowboy singer Tex
121 ■ ■ ■States, August 17, 1944; Item, September 7, 1944. Louisiana re­
mained in a healthy economic condition for the remainder of Davis’ 
term. The 1945 special session appropriated $16,500,000 for highway 
and drainage construction, and yet the budget surplus in 1946 was 
still $19,000,000. See Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 192.
12 2States, February 7, 15, 1945.
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Ritter completed the score for a musical comedy entitled "Start 
Cheering. •
Following the 1944 regular session, the legislature met only once 
more to deal with war issues —  in the postwar extraordinary session 
Davis promised to call immediately after the end of the war. This 
short session quickly passed bills providing for expenditure of 
$16,500,000 — $7,500,000 to match federal funds for construction of 
highways and bridges, $4,000,000 to the State Department of Highways 
for the construction or improvement of roads and bridges not included 
in the state highway system and not included in the federal aid sys­
tem, and $5,000,000 to the Department of Public Works for draining 
and reclaiming undrained or partially drained marsh, swamp, and over— 
flow lands.
The war years proved to be the most peaceful and harmonious of 
Davis' administration. He became embroiled in the attempts to re­
strict organized labor’s powers in the 1946 regular session when he 
vetoed the "right to work" bill the legislature passed outlawing the 
union shop, calling it "an interference with the right of collective 
bargaining.” In 1946 and again in 1947, Davis' (and Sam Jones') 
"conservationist" policy of restricting exports of natural gas from 
Louisiana came Under heavy fire from legislators ready to exploit the
123 ' 1 v7- ’Morning Advocate, September 7, December 2,.1944, May 12, June 1,
1945; States, May 16, 1945; Weill,: You Are My Sunshine, pp. 73-74;
Mark T. Carleton, Politics and Punishment - The History of the Louisi­
ana State Penal System (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 
1971), p. 144.
124 ■ '■ • ■ ■ ■.Morning Advocate, October 12-13, 1945; Acts Passed By the Legisla­
ture of the State of Louisiana at the Extraordinary Session, 1945,
. pp. 5-7.
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125state's resources for short-term gain.
: Despite these -setbacks, Jimmie Davis' administration, as Allan 
Sindler correctly maintains, was more than the "do-nothing" void in 
Louisiana politics that the Longites (on purpose) and Sam Jones (un- 
wittingly) branded it. Davis was partially successful in his ef­
forts to establish ;"peace and harmony" in Louisiana, hut bifactional­
ism did not disappear. Davis’ lack of legislative leadership allowed 
new coalitions of Longites and reformers to form around specific 
proposals. Moreover, the facade of harmonious relations was also 
nurtured by the plentiful supply of money in the state treasury. This 
surplus, along with the dearth of construction materials caused by 
the war,' necessarily limited the conflict over state funding for the 
legislators’ pet projects. In addition, the two most visible fac­
tional symbols in the state, Sam Jones and Earl Long, either of whom 
could enrage the opposing faction merely by the mention of his name, 
were both out of office during Davis’ administration. Their reappear­
ance in the 1948 gubernatorial election caused a rerun of the 1939-40 
contest, a bitter struggle that ended in Long's sweeping victory.
Davis’ administration, therefore, was only a continuation of the 
reform interlude in Louisiana politics between the era of unbroken 
Longite control (1928-1940) and the renewed success of the Long 
machine under Earl Long's leadership in the late 1940s and 1950s. 
Davis’ initial retirement from politics lasted from 1948 until 1960,
125  : "  ’ ’Sincler, Huey Long’s Louisiana., pp. 195-196; Weill, You Are My Sun­
shine, pp. 75-77.
126 'Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, pp. 196—199.
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when he was elected to a second gubernatorial term. .Bis third try for 
the governorship ended' in failure in 1972; and he retired permanently 
to his entertainment interests , by then consisting almost exclusively 
of performing and recording gospel music —  and he was deservedly 
elected to the Country Music Hall of Fame.
While Davis’ second gubernatorial term would he marred by discord 
and violence arising from court-ordered school desegregation, and by 
two costly projects of questionable ŵorth, his ̂ first term generated no 
equally disruptive controversy. Instead, the first Davis administra­
tion provided, a friendly atmosphere for continued reform, even though 
Davis himself was not an ardent or aggressive reformer. As Allan 
Sindler correctly maintains, Davis’ reputation suffered from Sam 
Jones’ campaign tactics-in the 1948 gubernatorial campaign, when Jones 
focused on the 1939 Scandals and his.own gubernatorial term, and thus
acquiesced in Earl Long’s contention that Davis had presided over a
127’’do-nothing” administration. "Good government" has always been 
the underdog in Louisiana politics, and the surprise in the state’s 
political history during the 1940s was not that Earl Long devastated 
reformism’s white knight, Sam Jones, in 1948,. but rather that Jimmie 
Davis had been able to defeat a Longite resurgence in 1944.
127Ibid., pp. 190-191.
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CHAPTER V I
LOUISIANA AND NATIONAL POLITICS, 1940-1944
Louisiana’s participation in national politics, together with 
voter behavior in federal elections, reflected the state's ongoing bi­
factionalism during World War II. "Longite" and "reform" candidates 
contested for seats in Congress as well as for local and state offi­
ces. Political unity in Louisiana came nearer to realization in the 
two wartime presidential elections, but even then President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt's successful quest in 1940 for an unprecedented third 
term, combined with his choice of the unpopular Henry A. Wallace for 
vice president, met with opposition and caused some defections from 
state Democratic ranks. While Louisiana did not abandon the party in 
either 1940 or 1944, the two wartime presidential campaigns revealed 
increasing discontent with Roosevelt's "Grand Coalition" which in­
cluded organized labor, intellectuals, and blacks —  a discontent 
Louisiana shared with the rest of the South —  and which blossomed 
into full rebellion in the first post-war presidential election in 
1948.1
An essay written by Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture Tom 
Linder, to Louisiana Commissioner of Agriculture Harry D. Wilson, re­
vealed emerging southern restiveness. Linder wrote that the historic 
Democratic party was no more, and that "the nefarious practices begun 
by Abraham Lincoln are now being carried to completion by Roosevelt
"̂Robert A. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Section­
alism, 1941-1948 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 
pp. 1-30.
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and the New Deal party.” Linder even suggested that the South boycott
the national Democratic convention and nominate its own presidential
candidate, who would then hold the balance of power between the "New
2Deal and the Republicans."
Beyond Southern concern with "liberal" tendencies within the 
national Democratic party, two other issues dominated the 1940 presi­
dential election: should Franklin Roosevelt be granted a third term
as president, and how realistic were the President's plans to defend
3the country in a world at war? The third-term issue split the 
national Democratic party as Vice President John Nance Gamer, Post­
master General (and Democratic national chairman) James A. Farley, 
and conservative United States Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland 
attempted to wrest the Democratic presidential nomination from Roose­
velt, who nevertheless won an easy renomination on the first ballot at
4the Democratic national convention at Chicago.
2Tom Linder to Harry D. Wilson (n.d., 1940), William Walter Jones Col­
lection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collection Divi­
sion, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, 
Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Jones Collection).
3Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, p. 13; 
Robert E. Burke, "Election of 1940," in The Coming to Power Critical 
Presidential Elections in American History, ed. by Arthur M. Schle- 
singer, Jr. (New York, Chelsea House Publishers, 1972), pp. 360-363.
4Bruke, "Election of 1940," pp. 369-373; Geoffrey Perret, Days of Sad­
ness, Years of Triumph (New York, Coward, McCann and Geoghagan, 1973), 
pp. 48-50. This was the convention in which the famous "voice from 
the sewer," Chicago's Superintendent of Sewers Tom Garry, chanted over 
the public address system in the convention hall that "Illinois," 
"America," and "the world" wanted Roosevelt as the Democratic nominee. 
The contrived demonstration he led following Senator Alben Barkley's 
speech announcing Roosevelt's professed reluctance to run again for 
president last more than one hour. The continued demonstration al­
lowed Roosevelt to note coyly in his acceptance speech that even though 
he did not want to run for a third term, the overseas war emergency 
made it imperative that he "not reject the call of the party to run"
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Roosevelt \s muted pursuit of a third nomination upset some Louisi­
anians, just as it did many other Americans. Anti-third-term senti­
ment in Louisiana was best expressed in a front-page editorial pub­
lished in the New Orleans Item in July, 1940, just before the Demo­
cratic convention opened. The Item recounted its support of Roosevelt 
in both the 1932 and 1936 elections. The newspaper also claimed that
it had supported "most of his [Congressional] measures." It further
promised to "[continue] to support him in all steps for the national 
welfare, so long as he remains President." But the newspaper also 
stated that "The Item believes that a President who has served two 
terms should retire." The Item, a strong reform voice in Sam Jones' 
recent victory over the Longites in the 1939-1940 gubernatorial cam­
paign, feared the potential danger in establishing the precedent of a 
three-term president:
In our state we have had a terrible example
of the abuse of democratic government by
officeholders for officeholders, and for their 
associated plunderers. We have no feeling 
that there is any such intent as this in the 
'draft Roosevelt’ movement. But our interpre­
tation of democracy in our own country makes 
us believe that the two-term tradition in the 
presidency, established by Washington and per­
petuated by Jefferson and Jackson, is a safe 
anchor to which to tie in this time of world­
wide storm.̂
That Louisiana would in fact support Roosevelt in the 1940
and if elected, "the call of the country to serve." Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940 Volume, War —  And Aid to 
Democracies (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 293-303.
”*New Orleans Item, July 9, 1940.
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presidential election was not clearly evident earlier in the year. In 
April, Governor Jones met with Postmaster General Farley at Shreveport, 
as Farley awaited a train connection to Jackson,.Mississippi. Jones, 
however, disclaimed any endorsement of Farley: "I am absolutely un­
committed to any candidate for presidential nomination. It is not the 
province of the governor to dictate to the people whom to nominate for 
president.
The intrusion of Louisiana's bifactional division into national 
politics was clearly revealed during the Louisiana State Democratic 
Convention held in the Louisiana State University Gymnasium to choose 
Louisiana's delegates to the Democratic National Convention. The 
state meeting became uncontrollable when United States Senator Allen 
J. Ellender walked to the podium to move that Louisiana's delegates 
to the national convention be instructed to vote for a third nomina­
tion for Franklin Roosevelt. The state convention delegates, domi­
nated by the reform faction, had booed Ellender as he entered the 
building, and as he attempted to address the convention, a chorus of 
boos again greeted him.̂
"I thought Louisiana had returned to a democracy," Ellender com­
mented as the rising volume of noise made it evident that he would 
not be heard. "It has," several delegates rejoined from the floor. 
Despite his reception, Ellender gamely attempted to deliver his pro­
posal. He described his visit to the White House the day before to
N̂ew Orleans Times-Picayune, April 5, 1940.
^Ibid., June 5, 1940; New Orleans States, June 5, 1940.
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inform Roosevelt that he planned to submit a resolution to the state 
convention calling for Roosevelt’s renomination. More boos rang out 
from the delegates. "The president asked me to deliver to you his 
sincere wishes for a successful convention," Ellender said. "Then why 
don't you sit down?" a delegate shouted back. In an apparent attempt 
to placate the delegates with small talk, Ellender said, "The presi­
dent expressed his sincere desire to come back to Louisiana and par­
take of our fishing and perhaps duck shooting." Ellender must have 
instantly regretted his choice of words. Upon his mention of the 
word "duck," a delegate shouted "de-duct!", and the crowd began 
chanting, "What about the de-ducts?" Ellender became livid and asked 
convention chairman Vance Plauche to restore order, but the crowd 
would not be silent. Plauche and then James A. Noe asked for quiet
so that Ellender could be heard, but cries of "No! No!" drove Ellender 
8from the stage.
While the delegates were eager to vent their resentment at the 
Long machine by humiliating its most visible public spokesman, they 
did not want the President to believe that their repudiation of Ellen­
der was also a repudiation of Roosevelt. After Ellender resumed his 
seat on the floor of the convention as a delegate from Terrebonne 
parish, Hewitt Bouanchaud, a delegate of Pointe Coupee Parish, 
offered a resolution that the convention action not be construed in 
any way as a reflection upon Roosevelt. Bouanchaud’s resolution
Times-Picayune, June 5, 1940.
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9passed unanimously.
It must be remembered that the rank and file of the Louisiana 
Democratic party had no opportunity to express its feelings during 
the years of Longite control. The 1940 meeting was the first state 
Democratic party convention since 1924. It must also be remembered 
that Ellender had played an integral part in the recent 1939-40 guber­
natorial campaign, raising the race issue in his futile attempt to 
help Earl Long defeat Sam Jones, and that a majority of state conven­
tion delegates were Jones partisans.
The delegates declined to instruct Louisiana’s delegates to the 
national convention to vote for Roosevelt. Instead, they left the 
delegation uninstructed except for an admonition to keep the state’s 
votes together as a unit.^ That none of the state's delegates to 
the 1936 national convention were selected to attend the 1940 conven­
tion clearly revealed reform domination of the official state party
, 11 apparatus.
Ellender maintained later that the humiliating incident at the 
state convention was an attack on him and not on Roosevelt. He sus­
pected beforehand that he would not be allowed to speak, he said, 
because the "powers that be," whom he identified as "a few disgruntled 
sugar planters, cotton exchange brokers, and bond dealers," had de-
^Ibid.; "Resolution," June 4, 1940, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen 
J. Ellender Archives, Allen J. Ellender Memorial Library, Nicholls 
State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Ellender 
Collection).
^ Times-Picayune, June 5, 1940; States, June 5, 1940.
 ̂̂ Shreveport Journal, July 3, 1940.
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12cided that he should not speak.
When asked how he would cast his vote for the presidential nomi­
nation at the Democratic national convention, Governor Jones replied 
"I don't know." Asked who his favorite was among the Democratic con­
tenders for the nomination, Jones facetiously replied, "0. John Rogge."
Jones also reiterated that he would not dictate the Louisiana dele-
13gation's vote on the nomination.
The Louisiana delegation to the Chicago convention, however, 
caucused and agreed to support Rogge on the first ballot for the pres­
idential nomination with a tacit understanding that they would switch 
to Roosevelt on later ballots. The proposal to vote for Rogge re­
sulted partially from the reformers* wish to honor the man who had 
successfully exposed the corruption of their political opponents, and 
partially from- the delegates’ efforts to apply a bit of political 
pressure to Roosevelt to accept a Louisiana-proposed plank in the 
Democratic platform calling for strong protection of the American 
sugar industry. Rogge immediately dispatched a telegram asking the 
delegation not to support him any longer. He notified them that he 
"cleaned up the state through a desire for justice" and not for
12Joseph P. McCormick to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 6, 1940; Allen 
J. Ellender to T. E. Bird, June 25, 1940, Ellender Collection.
Roosevelt had been careful to avoid any entanglement in the infighting 
in the Louisiana Democratic party. When asked, "Is there anything in 
the Louisiana situation that you would like to comment on?" Roosevelt 
carefully replied, "I don't know a thing about it except that they 
have a runoff primary. That is all I know." Complete Press Confer­
ences of Franklin D. Roosevelt Volume 15 1940 (New York, DaCapo
Press, 1972), p. 103.
13Times-Picayune, July 15, 1940; Item, July 15, 1940.
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political acclaim.^
The support for Rogge, however, at least partially achieved the 
delegates' objective —  consideration of Louisiana's goal of protec­
tion for American (i.e., Louisiana) sugar producers. Roosevelt’s 
emissaries, including Harry Hopkins, well-known in New Orleans be­
cause of his flood relief work there with the Red Cross following 
World War I, met with Louisiana's delegates and produced a compromise 
agricultural plank which induced the Louisiana delegates to abandon 
Rogge and vote as a unit for Roosevelt’s nomination on the first 
ballot.15
The Louisiana delegation was concerned about reform of American 
sugar policy because of unrest felt among Louisiana sugar planters who 
were displeased with New Deal agricultural policies which limited 
their crop and thus limited their income. The New Deal sugar policy 
was embodied in the Sugar Act of 1934 (the Jones-Costigan Act) and 
the subsequent Sugar Act of 1937. The Sugar Act of 1934 established 
a sugar quota system guaranteeing to each producing area a portion of 
the estimated United States sugar requirements during a calendar year. 
The act thus regulated mainland production and limited imports. In 
addition, mainland producers received Federal payments for compliance 
with various requirements of the act, including limitation of crop acre­
age, payment of minimum wages to sugar workers, and soil conservation 
practices. Money to pay for the provisions of this act came from a 
processing tax of one-half cent per pound of raw sugar placed on the
^States, July 15, 17., 1940.
15New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, July 21, 1940.
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manufacture and importation of sugar. The Sugar Act of 1937 primarily 
retained the same objective of sugar acreage reduction but adopted 
funding methods which circumvented the United States Supreme Court’s 
1936 ruling which invalidated the processing taxes and contractual 
method of controlling production. The year 1937 also saw completion 
of a new international sugar agreement in which the sugar exporting 
countries of the world won a concession from the importing countries 
which also produced part of their domestic demand (including the 
United States) by which the exporters could continue their substantial 
output.Therefore, Louisiana sugar producers felt that their pro­
duction at home was being curtailed and that they had little hope of 
expanding their market overseas.
While Franklin Roosevelt neatly sidestepped the ire of the sugar 
interests in his bid for a third nomination, his handpicked vice presi­
dential candidate was not so fortunate. Great disappointment settled 
over the 1940 Democratic convention when Roosevelt announced soon af­
ter his own nomination for president that he was endorsing Secretary 
of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace as his vice presidential running mate. 
Wallace had few friends on the convention floor, and had only recently 
converted from his original Republicanism to the Democratic party.
^Earl B. Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls 1941-1947 Volume I 
(New York, Statistical Press, Inc., n.d.), pp. 8-9; Murry R. Benedict, 
Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950 A Study of their Origin 
and Development (New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), p. 399. 
Louisiana sugar farmers considered the 1937 act an improvement over 
the 1934 act, because it increased the number of tons of sugar cane 
they could produce, but still chafed at any restrictions. See Thomas 
Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment Louisiana, 1887- 
1976 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1980), p. 73.
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Wallace won the vice presidential nomination on the first ballot, 
but only by the close vote of 628 to 459 ballots cast for various 
other rivals for the nomination.^
Roosevelt, in choosing Wallace, chose the bete noir of Louisiana 
sugar interests. J. Y. Sanders, Jr., a member of the Louisiana dele­
gation and a member of the resolutions committee, tried to persuade 
the committee to adopt a strong plank for the party platform in favor 
of domestic sugar production. Sanders’ proposed resolution included 
assertions that American farmers were entitled to priority and pref­
erences in the home market; that farmers producing a non-surplus crop 
should be encouraged to increase production; that essential foods 
should be produced within the United States as part of the defense 
program; that continental producers, who supplied less than 30 per 
cent of United States consumption of sugar, should be permitted to in­
crease their production to their physical limits in order to safeguard 
against shortages; and that the sugar policy of the United States
should be based on adequate tariffs and quotas against foreign coun-
18tries to allow expansion of the domestic sugar industry. Sanders 
understandably marshalled support for his resolution among delegates 
from sugar beet producing states and Florida, but ran into opposition 
from Wallace and his supporters. The Wallace partisans pointed out in 
committee hearings that Sanders’ proposals, if adopted, would threaten
*̂ Burke, "Election of 1940," pp. 369-375; Bernard F. Donohoe, Private 
Plans and Public Dangers: The Story of F D R’s Third Nomination
(Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), pp. 174- 
177.
Îtera, July 16, 1940.
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the agreements that the United States had signed with other countries 
setting the level of sugar production. Wallace himself told Sanders <
that the proposed plank might "upset our foreign policy regarding 
Cuba, and seriously affect the economic life of Hawaii, the Philip­
pines, and Puerto Rico." Sanders cared little about the international 
implications of United States sugar policy in peacetime. Instead, he 
replied to his critics that one-third of Louisiana was directly af­
fected by the sugar policy ("It's more important for us not to upset 
the domestic economy of the United States"), and moreover, that normal 
peacetime agreements may no longer be valid in a world at war. Now
is the time, Sanders told the committee, to produce all necessary food
19in increased volume. Despite Sanders' valiant efforts, the Demo­
cratic platform contained only a weak, general agricultural plank with 
no specific mention of sugar. The Democratic party pledged "To safe­
guard the farmer’s foreign market and expand his domestic market for
20all domestic crops." While this generously-worded plank pledged 
nothing specifically-for protection of sugar farmers, its protection­
ist cast allowed-some o'f them to support Roosevelt in good faith.
Wallace’s opposition to Sanders' sugar plank led the Louisiana 
delegation to endorse Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson for the 
vice presidential nomination. Johnson had been a University of Vir­
ginia classmate of Prescott Foster, and an American Legion friend of 
Sam Jones. Governor Jones, in fact, led the opposition to Wallace
19States, July 18, 1940; Sunday Item-Tribune, July 21, 1940.
^Item, July 18, 1940.
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within the Louisiana delegation. He informed Roosevelt's convention
leaders Harry Hopkins and Senators James F. Byrnes of South Carolina
and Pat Harrison of Mississippi, that Wallace’s nomination would
"split the party wide open in the state." The Louisiana delegation
agreed to stay with Johnson as long as he remained in the race, and
if he withdrew, switch to Congressman Sam Rayburn of Texas or Speaker
21of the House William B. Bankhead of Alabama.
Louisiana’s Democratic delegation headed home from Chicago dis­
pleased with Wallace’s first ballot nomination. Governor Jones an­
nounced that he was against Wallace "1000 per cent." One irate Louisi­
ana delegate, storming out of the convention, demanded of Washington 
columnist George Allen, "Name me one, just one, man [who wanted Wal­
lace]." Allen replied, "Brother, that I can do —  and that one man 
22was Roosevelt."
Some Louisiana delegates reported after they returned to Louisi­
ana that they had been displeased with more than the Wallace nomina­
tion. John Caffery, a south Louisiana sugar planter, revealed that 
he had planned to speak in favor of an anti-third term plank, but when 
delegates debated the plank, convention chairman Alben Barkley refused 
to recognize those delegates wishing to support it. Caffery maintained 
that anti-third term sentiment remained strong in the Louisiana dele­
gation until it became apparent that Roosevelt commanded enough 
support to ensure his nomination. They climbed on the Roosevelt band-
^ States, July 18, 1940.
22Alexandria Daily Town Talk, July 18, 1940 (hereinafter cited as Town 
Talk); Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers, pp. 177-178.
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wagon "in the best interests of Louisiana." While most of the Louisi­
ana delegates believed that the state would close ranks, soft-pedal 
the third-term issue, and support the president, Caffery announced 
that he planned to support Republican candidate Wendell Willkie, and 
predicted the largest Republican vote in Louisiana’s Third Congres­
sional District (heart of the sugar-growing area) since Reconstruc-
23tion.
Caffery was correct in his predictions of a drift away from 
Roosevelt and toward Willkie in south Louisiana. Charles A. Farwell, 
chairman of the education committee of the American Sugar Cane League 
in New Orleans, called Wallace "the worst enemy Louisiana sugar ever 
had," and announced that "I’m voting for Willkie." Farwell recited 
a litany of complaints the sugar interest had against the Democrats: 
Roosevelt in 1932 promised not to lower United States tariff rates 
when a reduction would hurt a domestic crop, and then lowered the 
tariff on Cuban sugar from two dollars to ninety cents per ton; in 
1936, the administration promised production of all the sugar the mar­
ket could absorb plus creation of a reserve supply, then in 1937, 
promulgated the new sugar act with continued sugar quotas; Wallace, 
while he was Secretary of Agriculture, had made a speech during 1934 
in Ruston, Louisiana, in which he called sugar "an inefficient indus­
try," and commented that "I would not kill it outright . . . But I
^  Item, July 19, 1940; States, July 19, 1940.
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would expose it gradually."2̂
Prescott Foster announced upon his return from Chicago that he 
would wait a while before deciding for whom to vote in the presiden­
tial election, but that "I imagine the sugar planters will get to-
25gether . - - and confer on the whole question." The sugar planters 
did indeed "confer on the whole question," and some of them reached 
the conclusion that they must support the Republicans. Allen Ramsey 
Wurtele, a New Roads sugar planter and businessman, announced his 
plans to run as a Republican for Louisiana's Sixth District House 
seat. "Democracy is escaping from the United States under the Roose­
velt dictatorship," Wurtele said, "Unless the Republicans take over
26this country immediately, democracy is ended for us."
Louisiana Republicans welcomed the defecting Democrats. Louisi­
ana's delegation to the Republican national convention that summer in 
Philadelphia had not originally voted as a unit, preferring instead 
for each, delegate to vote individually, and they had split into two 
groups: those who supported New York District Attorney Thomas E.
Dewey, and those who supported Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft. The ama­
teur attempt to nominate utilities president Wendell Willkie of New 
York and Indiana stampeded the Philadelpia convention, however. 
Louisiana delegates supported Taft after Dewey withdrew following the
24States, July 20, 1940. Farwell also recalled that John E. Dalton, 
United States Department of Agriculture Sugar Administrator, told 
them after passage of the 1937 Sugar Act that "Unless you do as you're 
told, we will throw the doors open and let the gales of tropical com­
petition blast you from the face of the earth."
25Item, July 20, 1940
26Ibid., July 22, 1940. Republicans also entered the First, Second,
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fourth ballot, and climbed on the Willkie bandwagon when Ohio governor
John W. Bricker called for a unanimous nomination after Willkie had
27won a majority of the delegates. Nevertheless, Louisiana Republi­
cans were comfortable with Willkie and worked for his election.
New Orleans attorney John E. Jackson joined Willkie's advisory 
council in Washington, D.C., and local Republicans created political 
associations to attract disgruntled Democrats to Wendell Willkie.
These organizations, called the Jeffersonian Democratic Clubs, were 
part of Willkie’s effort throughout the South to attract Democratic 
support without demanding that life-long Democrats abandon the preju­
dices of their youth and join a Republican organization. They party 
also created the Louisiana Young Republican Club, a New Orleans-based 
organization courting the "dyed in the wool Republicans and dis­
gruntled Democrats." The Republicans had to attract Democrats if 
Willkie was to have any hope of success in Louisiana. The state in
October, 1940, recorded a total of 702,545 voters —  700,727 Demo-
28crats, 1,573 Republicans, 242 Independents, and 3 Socailists.
and Third District races. Only David Pipes in the Third District re­
mained in the campaign. John P. Conway withdrew from the First Dis­
trict race, Joseph 0. Schwartz withdrew from the Second District race, 
and Wurtele withdrew from the Sixth District race.
27Times-Picayune, June 25, 1940; States, July 8, 1940; Warren Moscow, 
Roosevelt and Willkie (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1968), p. 104.
28Item, July 10, 31, 1940; States, August 2, 1940; Donald Bruce John­
son, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie (Drbana, Illinois, Uni­
versity of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 134; Alden L. Powell, "Your De­
mocracy Is In Your Hands," Louisiana Municipal Review, September-Octo- 
ber, 1941, p. 146. Jeffersonian Democratic clubs sprang up in Tennes­
see, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas, Texas, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina, in addition to Louisiana. Jackson rep­
resented the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and 
Georgia on Willkie’s advisory committee.
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Many prominent Louisiana Democrats, even those opposed to Wallace,
however, did not join in the Willkie boom in the state. Governor Jones
announced on August 4, that "I am a Democrat. We fight out our fights
in the family," and gave the Roosevelt-Wallace ticket his "complete
endorsement." Louisiana Democratic Central Committee Chairman, Frank
J. Looney of Shreveport, announced that any Democrat who bolted the
party to join the Jeffersonian Democratic clubs and boost Willkie's
candidacy would forfeit the right to vote in all future Democratic 
29primaries.
The Roosevelt administration assisted loyal Democrats in Louisi­
ana by supplying statistics to refute the sugar interest’s claim that 
New Deal farm policy had hurt the domestic sugar industry. Undersecre­
tary of Agriculture Paul Appleby wrote to Sam Jones that Secretary 
Wallace had, in fact, helped to increase mainland sugar area base 
quotas in the 1937 Sugar Act from 160,000 tons to 420,000 tons, and 
had also helped to free conditional payments to Louisiana farmers who 
violated the child employment provisions of the 1937 act. In addi­
tion, Appleby said that Wallace had never ordered Louisiana sugar 
farmers to plow up any of their crop, as had been done in other New
States, August 5, 1940; Town Talk, August 13, 1940. Asking for 
votes for a Republican candidate in the South in 1940 was a ticklish 
job. While it is true that it was the twilight of the Solid (Demo­
cratic) South, many southerners still "voted the way they (or their 
father, or their grandfather) shot" in the Civil War. Looney on 
another occasion urged Louisiana Democrats to "Be faithful to the 
traditions of the tried and true; of [Robert E.] Lee, of [P. T. G.] 
Beauregard, of [Francis T.] Nicholls."
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30Deal crop reduction programs.
Governor Jones again endorsed Roosevelt’s candidacy in a speech 
which attacked the Republicans in terms strangely reminiscent of the 
Longite attacks on him: "If the Republicans get into power, you'll
see more destitution, hunger, and starvation than you’ve ever seen in
■ ..31your lives.
Jones’ later assessment of the 1940 presidential campaign, how­
ever, reveals that he may have been less than sincere in his endorse­
ment of Roosevelt. Instead of being won over because of New Deal 
agricultural policy, or vague promises of increased opportunities for 
agriculture, Jones thought that Roosevelt’s experience would help him 
guide the country successfully through the perilous war-torn years 
which lay ahead.
By the time of the American political conventions during the 
summer of 1940, Hitler's armies had swept through the Low Countries 
and into Paris —  a dark and scary time for Western democracies. The 
1940 presidential election in the United States turned more on the 
"experience" issue than on any other. Indeed, Roosevelt expressed 
his wish to the Democratic convention to retire to his home at Hyde 
Park, New York, but held open the possibility that if the delegates 
wanted a candidate with his experience, he would be amenable to a
30Paul Appleby to Sam Jones, September 19, 1940, Jones Collection. 
Appelby’s information was incorrect. The USDA ordered Louisiana 
sugar farmers to plow up portions of the 1939 crop. See Becnel, 
Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, p. 74.
31Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, October 19, 1940.
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draft. Willkie, a political novice, had no comparable record in
foreign policy. Or as Jones phrased it, "If your house catches on
32fire, you want a fireman who knows what he’s doing."
Jones reiterated this same theme in another speech he delivered 
defending Roosevelt from Republican charges that Roosevelt was trying 
to establish a dictatorship with the third term:
The issue, which might carry weight in an 
election conducted down the sunny lanes of 
peace and world security, shrinks to mere 
obstructionism, to a strained quibbling and 
peevish yapping now that the earth has become 
over much of its surface, a cockpit of 
fighting ships and men and planes.
Now that each day's fearful developments 
brings us teetering nearer and nearer the 
act of seizing the sword to defend all that 
we have in this hemisphere, I cannot worry 
too much about whether Mr. Roosevelt will 
serve eight years or twelve.33
In spite of his public pronouncements favoring Roosevelt in 1940, 
Jones also later recalled that the Democrat’s victory in Louisiana 
was not automatic: "With three speeches, Willkie could have carried
32Sam Jones interviewed by Denny Daugherty, May 6, 1970, tape re­
cording, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department of Archives and 
Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection).
33Sam Jones, "Address," (n.d., 1940), James B- Aswell, Jr., and Family 
Papers, Divisions of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton 
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as 
Aswell Collection).
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34the state." The considerable disaffection among Democratic sugar 
planters in south Louisiana was not the only criticism Roosevelt 
suffered. His liberal experiments in New Deal social programs and 
his strengthening alliance with urban and labor groups at the ex­
pense of agricultural interests had left many southern Democrats dis-
35illusioned. W. Scott Heywood wrote to his son in 1940 that Willkie
was "just as good a democrat and probably more of a democrat than
Roosevelt." In addition, Heywood objected to Roosevelt's support of
"Ma Perkins" (Frances Perkins) as Secretary of Labor. Furthermore,
Heywood objected to Roosevelt "allowing his wife [Eleanor] to be
36popping off the way she has been doing ..."
The Willkie boomlet in Louisiana proved to have less support 
than the sugar planters and the traditional Republicans hoped. A 
Gallup poll published on November 4, 1940, revealed that Roosevelt 
still commanded much support in Louisiana —  82 per cent for Roosevelt,
34Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection. 
Jones himself followed a political path from the old-line Democracy to 
Republicanism. He told Daugherty that he started voting against the 
Regular Democrats after Roosevelt's third term. He voted for Dixie- 
crat Strom Thrumond in 1948, and then left that halfway house and 
voted for Republican presidential candidates. Like many other Louisi­
anians, however, he remained a registered Democrat.
35Hubert H. Humphrey, The Political Philosophy of the New Deal (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 23-29; Robert A. 
Rutland, The Democrats From Jefferson to Carter (Baton Rouge, Louisi­
ana State University Press, 1979), p. 197. Humphrey catalogs the dis­
parate elements that constituted the support of the New Deal. Rutland 
adds that during the New Deal, "the city-dwelling organized laborer in 
a sense had replaced the farmer as the yeoman Democrat.”
36W. Scott Heywood to Gene B. Heywood, August 14, 1940, Jennings-Hey- 
wood Oil Syndicate Records, Department of Archives and Manuscripts., 
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge 
(hereinafter cited as Jennings-Heywood Collection).
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18 per cent for Willkie. Roosevelt's support in Louisiana was less 
than that found in Mississippi, equal to his support in Arkansas, and 
more than his support in Texas. In Mississippi, Roosevelt had 94 per 
cent support compared to Willkie's 6 per cent; in Arkansas, the presi­
dent commanded the support of 82 per cent of the respondents to Will-
kie’s 18 per cent; and Texas respondents supported the president by
37seventy-nine per cent to Willkie's twenty-one per cent. The sugar
planters, the Republicans, the businessmen in Louisiana may have been
disillusioned with Roosevelt, but the president still commanded the
allegiance of the people.
Roosevelt's supporters also turned out to vote on election day.
The president carried Louisiana by a margin of 267,510 votes, re-
38ceiving 319,751 ballots compared to Wendell Willkie's 52,241. Obvi­
ously, if Willkie could have carried Louisiana "with three speeches," 
as Sam Jones later maintained, then those speeches would have had to 
have been blockbusters. Even the sugar areas of Louisiana voted for 
Roosevelt. The South Louisiana Bayou voter type voted 84 per cent for
Roosevelt, while the South Louisiana Planter vote type voted 83 per
39cent for the president.
37Item, November 4, 1940.
38Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, p. 189. Moscow also notes that Roose­
velt did well in the south because the regional economy was then still 
based on cotton exports to Europe, and thus southerners felt at ease 
with Roosevelt's internationalist foreign policy.
39Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, rev. ed., 1971), p. 299. The two 
voter types include Louisiana’s major sugar parishes. Many sugar 
growers returned to Roosevelt after the Democratic Senate in 1940 sus­
pended domestic sugar quotas with Senate Joint Resolution 225, which 
provided that a grower could harvest all of his domestic quota plus
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The Congressional elections held in Louisiana during the fall of 
1940,. in conjunction with the presidential election, maintained Louisi­
ana's reputation for spirited politics, except for the Seventh Dis­
trict race. (In that district, Sam Jones' friend Vance Plauche ran 
unopposed.) Governor Jones hoped that his reform forces could ride 
the crest of his success in the spring gubernatorial election and 
turn all the incumbent Longite Congressmen out of office in the fall
elections. The Longites, he thought, no longer represented the will
40of the people of Louisiana. Subsequently, Jones endorsed reform 
candidates in most Congressional races and campaigned for his "reform 
slate" of candidates. In a radio speech broadcast in late August, 
he attempted to persuade Louisiana voters to complete the sweep of 
Longites out of office they had begun in February:
Every vote you cast for this discredited group 
is a vote against good government. It is a 
vote to revive hopes in the hardened hearts of 
the corruptionists, the grafters, the crooks, 
and the despoilers of democratic institutions.
After many years of administration of rotten­
ness and corruption, the task of restoring 
democracy and public confidence is herculean.
Remember, this is a task that cannot be accomp­
lished without the continued support and
twenty-five additional acres without losing benefit payments. See 
Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, pp. 74-75. The 
President’s popularity in Louisiana was not seriously threatened by 
the sugar planters' disillusionment. The comment of Harold H. Young, 
the political strategist who headed Roosevelt’s campaign in the Dallas- 
Ft. Worth, Texas area, "Nobody's for FDR except small voices —  the 
people," was also true in Louisiana. Quoted in Robert A. Caro, The 
Years of Lyndon Johnson The Path to Power (New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
1982), p. 581.,
40Town Talk, July 2, 1940.
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The reform effort to unseat all incumbent Congressman, however, 
was not successful. Representatives Overton Brooks (Fourth District), 
Newt Mills (Fifth District), and A. Leonard Allen (Eighth District
congressman and brother of former governor Oscar Allen) were all re-
* 42 elected.
The most bitter campaigns for Louisiana’s Congressional seats 
during 1940 occurred in the First and Second Districts (in and around 
New Orleans). The campaign opened when First District Representative 
Joachim 0. Fernandez and Second District Representative Paul H. 
Maloney, both Longite allies, qualified to run for re-election. Re­
formers in the city quickly fielded their own candidates: New Orleans
attorneys Herve Racivitch in the First District and T. Hale Boggs in
43the Second District. Both Racivitch and Boggs had been active in 
Jones' gubernatorial campaign. The clearest bifactional competition 
emerged in the Second District race where Boggs flatly stated that
The incumbent Congressman represented a vicious 
dictatorship foreign to everything in America 
rather than the people of Louisiana. That dic­
tatorship has now been thoroughly repudiated.
And its representatives can be of no service
^ Ibid., August 28, 1940.
42Ibid., September 1,, 1940; Morning Advocate, September 14-15, Octo­
ber 16, 1940.
43Times-Picayune, July 12, 15, 1940.
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44to our people.
The clear bifactionalism in the First District race was clouded 
by New Orleans States city editor, F. Edward Hebert, who entered the 
campaign on July 15. Hebert’s friend James A. Noe attempted to per­
suade him to run for mayor of New Orleans in 1942, an office which
Hebert did not want, so Hebert attempted to placate Noe by agreeing
45to run for Congress in 1940.
Hebert built a strong coalition of support through his associ­
ation with Noe. Jones, Noe, and Old Regular leader George Montgomery 
reached an agreement which divided the-offices in the New Orleans 
area: the Jones-Noe reform forces agreed not to oppose incumbent
judges seeking re-election in the area, and not to interfere directly 
in the 1942 New Orleans mayor's race, and in exchange, the Old Regu­
lars agreed to support Jones-Noe candidates in the 1940 First and 
Second Congressional Districts, the First and Second Public Service
Commission Districts, the Orleans Parish School Board, and Orleans
46Parish Juvenile Court. This agreement, however, did not take into
44Ibid., July 15, 1940. Boggs had organized the People's League to 
support Jones' gubernatorial candidacy, and had served on Jones' cam­
paign Speakers, Legal, and Finance Committees-
45F. Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "last of the Titans” The Life 
and Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, 
Louisiana,. Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, 1976), pp. 152-153. Hebert also realized that even if he 
served only one term in the House, the lifetime access to the House 
floor accorded former Congressmen would provide him a priceless news 
source when he returned to journalism.
46Times-Picayune, July 16, 18, 1940; Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the 
Titans”, pp. 153-154. Hebert adds that Maestri agreed to support 
Jones-Noe candidates in hope that his new alliance with the reformers 
would blunt the ongoing federal investigation of his political faction.
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consideration the ambition of the incumbent Congressman.
Nevertheless, the Old Regulars and the reformers continued their
loose alliance through the campaign. New Orleans Mayor Robert Maestri
announced to an Old Regular caucus on August 22 that "we are all Jones
boys now,” and instructed Old Regular leaders to "get out in [your]
wards and work hard" for the Jones-Noe candidates. In return, several
reform candidates for the Civil District Court withdrew from their
campaigns. Harry A. Cabral withdrew from the Division B race "at the
request of both Senator Noe and Governor Jones," ostensibly to devote
full time to the reformers' efforts to "instruct the electorate on the
value of passage of the [constitutional] amendments" which embodied
much of Jones’ reform program.^
Jones' association with Maestri, however, did not please all the
reformers. George Piazza, an independent candidate in the District A
Civil District Court race, refused to withdraw. "You cannot have
honest courts," he announced, "when you allow political organizations
to name your judges ... A judge who is elected by a political machine
becomes part and parcel of that political machine ... He becomes a
48politician like the ward leader or the precinct captain."
Despite its unpopularity among some reformers, Jones' agreement 
with Maestri ensured F. Edward Hebert's election in the First District 
race. Any candidate with support from Jones, Noe, and Maestri had 
little to fear, even from an incumbent Congressman. Fernandez received
47*Times-Picayune, August 13, 1940.
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support from organized labor groups,but the principal endorsements 
in New Orleans went to his opponent.
Both Hebert and Fernandez virtually ignored Racivitch and cam­
paigned primarily against each other. Hebert called for an American 
two-ocean navy, an adequate army, a "first-rate air force," federal 
aid for Louisiana to stimulate industry, and new outlet from New Or­
leans to the Gulf of Mexico to facilitate movement of wartime supplies 
and commerce. Hebert also tied Fernandez inextricably to the Longite 
machine: "I believe that the incumbent . . . represents that which
has been repudiated by the people of Louisiana ..." And on another 
occasion commented that "[Fernandez is one of] the diehards who can’t 
understand the writing on the wall. They can't believe that after 
twelve years of plunderbund they have been counted out by the free and 
independent people of the state.
Fernandez, in return, characterized Hebert as an enemy of labor, 
and called Hebert’s platform "pure, simple, unadulterated political 
fakery." He also read aloud letters of support from United States 
House Speaker William B. Bankhead and House Democratic Leader Sam 
Rayburn, and cited his memberships on the important House Appropria­
tions Committee and its Naval Appropriations Subcommittee as reasons
■>UIbid., p. 158; New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August 
4, 1940.
^̂ Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 159; Times-Picayune, 
August 13, 1940.
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52why Louisiana needed to return him to Congress.
While the Jones-Noe-Maestri understanding aligned the city's dom­
inant powers behind the reform candidate who then stood toe-to-toe 
with the incumbent, who was stripped of his power base, it threw the 
Second District race somewhat into disarray. Political stances in the 
Second District had been unclear from the beginning of the campaign. 
Some reformers, remembering that incumbent Congressman Paul H. Maloney 
had occasionally supported reform movements in the past, originally
wanted to maintain Maloney in Congress in order to improve their re-
53lations with the Old Regulars. The wishes of the reformers, however, 
ran into the political ambitions of New Orleans attorney T. Hale Boggs. 
While the administration hoped that Boggs would run for the Public 
Service Commission, Boggs preferred to run for Congress, and George
52Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," pp. 157-161; Times- 
Picayune , August 15, 1940; Congressional Record 76th Congress Third 
Session Appendix Volume 86 Part 17 (Washington, D.C., United States 
Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 5526.
53Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 154. Maloney's entire 
political career was marked by the indecisiveness he exhibited during 
the 1940 campaign. He began his political life as an Old Regular mem­
ber of the New Orleans Commission Council, on which he served from 
1920 until 1925. He bolted from the Old Regulars in 1925, ran for 
mayor against Martin Behrman, and was defeated. In 1928, he again 
opposed the Old Regulars when he supported Oramel Simpson for governor 
instead of Riley Wilson, the Old Regular candidate. Maloney announced 
his support of Huey Long in the second primary before Wilson withdrew, 
and as a reward, was elected to Congress in 1930 with Huey Long's help. 
Thereafter, he remained identified with the Longites. It is therefore 
not surprising that the Old Regulars were willing to dump Maloney in 
1940. See Times-Picayune, August 9, 1940, and Martin Behrman of New 
Orleans Memoirs of a City Boss,- ed. by John R. Kemp (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1977), pp. 335-341. During their 
1925 mayoralty campaign, Behrman called Maloney "a champion of medi­
ocrity."
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Montgomery's indication of Old Regular willingness to drop Maloney 
opened the way for a Boggs candidacy in 1940, even though some re­
formers remained reluctant to endorse him.*^
Maloney, after he realized the strength of his opposition, de­
clared that he would withdraw from the Second District race. Any loss 
of Old Regular support, he said, "would in effect strip my candidacy 
. . .  of election machinery," and bitterly added that
The imperfections and uncertainties of politics 
under the guise of political expediency deny the 
people of my district the advantages that would 
unquestionably be forthcoming from the position 
of prominence and influence that I have reached 
in the United States Congress after almost 10 
years of honorable, efficient, and attentive 
service.^
Almost immediately after he made his announcement, however, Ma­
loney announced that he had decided to remain in the race. An organi­
zation named the "Friends of Honest, Efficient Government," in a news­
paper advertisement called upon Second District voters to "send back 
to Congress an efficient and experienced Congressman ... We believe 
we are not asking too much when we seek to elect our Congressional
representative without interference from any political machine.*
Even though the United States Senate quickly confirmed Maloney as
54Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans,", pp. 153-154; Lindy Boggs 
to Jerry Purvis Sanson, February 28, 1984.
^ Times-Picayune, July 20, 1940.
56Times-Picayune New Orleans States, July 21, 1940; Times-Picayune, 
July 25, 1940.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
281
Collector of Internal Revenue for the New Orleans District when Presi­
dent Roosevelt nominated him on August 8 (a tempting offer provided by 
Senators John Overton and Allen Ellender who recommended Maloney to 
Roosevelt), Maloney chose to remain in the Second District race:
If the voters of this district return me to office 
in spite of the coalition of the reform administra­
tion with the very ones they promised to strip 
'branch from stem and leaf from twig' I shall be 
the proudest man in L o u i s i a n a . "57
Hale Boggs, however, registered the last word on Maloney's vacillation:
"No man can be a serious candidate if he cannot make up his mind
58whether or not he is in the race."
Boggs firmly aligned himself with the new tide of reform sweeping 
through Louisiana, and Maloney retained support from many Longites in 
the city. Boggs attacked Maloney for his past ties to the Longite 
machine. In one campaign address, he noted the dangerous world situ­
ation in which the United States found itself, and asked his audience, 
"Isn't it a dangerous thing to have representing us as our Congressman 
a man who has expressed so much sympathy, tolerance, and understanding 
of Dictatorship?" In an address following Governor Jones' endorsement 
of him, Boggs commented that "If your governor, whom you elected . . . 
over a scandal-ridden machine of which Paul Maloney was part and par— 
cal, has faith and confidence in Hale Boggs, I believe you . . . can
^^Times-Picayune, August 9, 13-15, 1940.
^Ibid., August 17, 1940.
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59well follow his recommendation."
Maloney struck back with a scurrilous attack on Boggs for alleged 
leftist activities during Boggs’ days as a student at Tulane Univer­
sity. "T. Hale Boggs Exposed!" screamed one Maloney leaflet which 
contained the charge that Boggs had joined the American Student Union 
in 1937 while studying at Tulane. The American Student Union, ac­
cording to the leaflet, promoted the pacifist "Oxford Pledge" by 
which Union members promised not to fight for the United States 
either in a defensive or an offensive war.
Think of an organization that tells red-blooded 
American men that you shall not fight in de­
fense of the United States of America —  de­
manding that if this country should be invaded 
by brutal forces of a cruel and consciousless 
dictator that you must stand cowardly by while 
your wives, mothers, sweethearts, and sisters 
fall helpless prey to the wild desires of human 
beasts.
Another Maloney leaflet was more to the point: "Shall It Be Ameri­
canism and Maloney or Communism and Boggs?" This leaflet added the 
"information" that the Dies Committee (The House Unamerican Activities 
Committee) had labeled the American Student Union "one of the eleven 
Border Patrols of the Communist Party," and called Boggs "a disciple
Ibid., July 21, 1940; T. Hale Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), T.
Hale Boggs Papers, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial 
Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited 
as Boggs Collection).
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of the bristle-moustached Stalin."^
Boggs fought off Maloney’s charges by outright denial:
I have never been a member of the American 
Student Union; [but] I was chairman of the 
student union building committee at the 
University . . .  I have ever been ready and 
willing and am now ready and willing to take ^
up arms to defend the United States of America.
Boggs also issued statements by Rufus Harris, president of Tulane, 
and Paul Brosman, dean of the Tulane Law School, affirming that he
62had never been involved in any "subversive movements while at Tulane."
Both candidates sought to buttress their appeals to the voters 
by supporting strong national defense. Maloney issued statements 
from members of Congress urging his re-election. The statement of 
Representative Pat Boland of Pennsylvania was typical: "We are going
through a period of important history-making, and these are most im­
portant times in the nation's capital . . . This is the time that we
63need the sound counsel that comes from experience."
"T. Hale Boggs Exposed!" (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection; "Shall It Be 
Americanism and Maloney or Communism and Boggs?" (n.d., 1940), Ellender 
Collection. It must be remembered that the 1940 election occurred 
while Russian Premier Joseph Stalin was in alliance with Adolph Hitler 
by the terms of the Russo-German Pact signed in August, 1939. Stalin 
was thus "bristle-moustached." His rehabilitation into a vaguely af­
fable "Uncle Joe" Stalin did not occur in the United States press un­
til after Hitler turned on Russia with a vengeance in June, 1941.
61Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection.
62Rufus Harris Statement, (n.d., 1940), Paul Brosman Statement, (n.d., 
1940), Boggs Collection.
63"What National Leaders in Congress Say About Paul H. Maloney,"
(n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection.
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Boggs, meanwhile, also capitalized on the national defense emer­
gency issue in his campaign. After the fall of France to the Nazi 
onslaught in June, 1940, which sent a sudden chill through the United 
States, Boggs delivered a speech in which he belittled Maloney's claim 
to governmental experience: "For years France left her destiny in the
hands of old men who were re-elected year after year, and where is 
France today but under the dictator's yoke." Again in a later speech, 
Boggs noted that the United States had failed to fortify the Gulf of
Mexico coastline, an oversight which "will be remedied when Hale Boggs
64goes to Washington as your Congressman."
Boggs also did not fail to reiterate that coastal protection 
would incidentally provide jobs as well: "money and pay rolls to
Jefferson parish and New Orleans," he remarked in one speech. In 
other speeches, he urged New Orleanians to make a strong bid for their 
fair share of the money spent on the United States rearmament program.^ 
Boggs, with his combined reform/Old Regular support, swept into 
office in the Democratic primary in September, 1940. He received 
33,636 votes to Maloney's 25,590.
The spirited contest for the Third District seat occurred not in 
the Democratic primary, but in the general election. James Domen- 
geaux, who had Governor Jones' endorsement, defeated incumbent Con­
gressman Robert L. Mouton in the Democratic primary in September, but 
faced David W. Pipes, a Democrat-turned-Republican because of Henry A.
^Hale Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection.
65Hale Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection; Times-Picayune, 
August 13, 1940
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Wallace, in the general election.^ The Third District, a wedge- 
shaped area surrounding Lafayette in south central Louisiana, con­
tained much sugar country, and some sugar planters had not forgotten 
their antipathy to Wallace after his nomination on the Democratic 
ticket. James Domengeaux, in fact, found himself in legal trouble 
after he publicly admitted slapping Dudley LeBlanc’s face following 
a radio address in which LeBlanc compared Domengeaux to Wallace:
"Henry A. Wallace ... is not a friend of the farmer and Jimmy 
Domengeaux is not a friend of the farmer and the poor people." Domen­
geaux paid a $25 fine, but stated that he was willing to pay the cost
of the satisfaction he received from physically assaulting a man who
68compared him to Wallace.
Pipes had telegraphed Prescott Foster at the Chicago Democratic 
convention asking that Foster exert all possible efforts to secure
Domengeaux had been Sam Jones' campaign manager in the Third District 
during the recent gubernatorial election. Pipes was a sugar planter 
who had gained something of a national reputation during the 1920s.
The Mosiac disease struck Louisiana's sugar cane during that decade 
and caused serious reductions in the sugar crop. Pipes obtained seed 
stalks of disease-resistant P. 0. J. cane from the Dutch East Java Ex­
periment Station and grew enough of thisvariety to supply the American 
Sugar Cane League with seed stalks for distribution to other areas. 
Times-Picayune, August 2, 1940; Stuart 0. Landry to Dr. Rufus C.
Harris, May 20, 1940, David W. Pipes Papers, Department of Archives 
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Pipes Collection).
68Town Talk, July 22, 1940; Shreveport Journal, July 23, 1940. The 
Democrats could not safely count on the Third District voting Demo­
cratic. In 1914, for example, the voters elected Progressive W. P. 
Martin of Thibodaux to Congress over his Democratic opponent because 
of their displeasure with President Woodrow Wilson’s sugar policy. 
Martin subsequently served in Congress until April 6, 1929 when he
died after his election to an eighth term.
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administration support for the sugar industry: "Your support of this
request is the only action which will discourage entry of Republican 
candidates [in the Third District race] with formidible support from 
sugar industry and in addition from many loyal Jones supporters-
Pipes’ supporters included people with sugar interests who were 
disillusioned not only with Henry A. Wallace in particular, but who 
were also disillusioned with the leftward drift of the Democratic 
party. U. S- G. Pettycrew wrote to Pipes that "I saw in the news that 
you was (sic) a real Democrat and not a New Dealer." Jules Godchaux 
wrote more perceptively that "... I think it is in the best interest 
of the sugar industry that we show the Democratic party our dissatis­
faction of the way they have been treating us, a vote for the Republi­
can candidates is the most effective way to register our protest."7̂  
Pipes indicated the depth of his protest when he switched his politi­
cal allegiance from Democrat to Republican on July 17 and announced 
his intention to run for the Third District seat.7^
Pipes waged his Congressional campaign more against Henry A. 
Wallace than against James Domengeaux. He opened his campaign on
September 15 with the following remarks:
»
I say to you here and now that the Louisiana 
sugar industry has withstood and conquered 
plagues of plant disease and insects, the
David W. Pipes to Prescott Foster, July 13, 1940; Pipes to C. J. 
Bourg, September 26, 1940; C. J. Martin to Pipes, n.d., 1940, Pipes 
Collection.
70U. S. G. Pettycrew to David W. Pipes, October 3, 1940; Jules Godchaux 
to Pierre Chastant, August 2, 1940, Pipes Collection.
7 T̂imes—Picayune, July 30, 1940.
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ravages of frost and flood and drouth, [hut] 
can better face all these than the prospect 
of four more years of Henry Wallace . . .
[The] curtailment of production means idle 
people and empty main streets in South 
Louisiana —  and this is the treatment ac­
corded us by the New Deal Democratic party
and Henry Wallace. This is the Democratic 
party's appreciation of the 'Solid South.'̂ 2
Again, six days later, Pipes reiterated that "Up till (sic) now, the 
Democrats took us for granted and the Republicans did nothing for us 
because we were Democrats." He also struck.directly at Wallace: "I
believe . . .  that as long as Henry A. Wallace has a position of im­
portance in the councils of government, agriculture will be in a
73straitjacket of ruin."
Domengeaux and his supporters struck back at Pipes, not with a
defense of Wallace, but instead with appeals to the Third District
voters to remain loyal to the Democratic party in spite of Wallace.
Sam Jones in a speech delivered at Abbeville in support of Domengeaux,
urged voters to "Do as I'm going to do on November 5 -—  stamp the
74[Democratic] rooster from tip of beak to end of claws." The large 
French population in the Third District led to a bilingual campaign 
for Domengeaux. Lieutenant-governor Marc Mouton urged Third District 
voters "allons faire le vieux coq crier" ("Let's make the old rooster
72Morning Advocate, September 16, 1940.
^Ibid., September 22, 1940.
^The rooster, not the donkey, is the symbol of the Louisiana Demo­
cratic party.
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75crow ).
Domengeaux attacked Pipes as merely a spokesman for the sugar 
establishment, an associate of "big shots," and charged that Pipes 
worked laborers on his sugar lands long hours at the low wages of 
eighty cents a day. Domengeaux also promised that he would "never 
vote for a declaration of war which would mean sending American boys 
overseas"^ —  a reflection of the public wish to remain out of the 
European war, just as Domengeaux's eventual vote for the declaration 
of war reflected the profound change in public opinion by December 8, 
1941.
Pipes waged a spirited campaign and attracted attention from both
the national Republican party and the national press, but he failed to
defeat Domengeaux.^ Third District voters instead chose the Democrat
78to represent them in Congress.
Compared to the spirited contests for the First, Second, and 
Third District seats, the campaigns in the Fourth and Fifth Districts 
were relatively tame. The Fourth District race drew five contestants
^ Morning Advocate, October 31, 1940; Town Talk, November 4, 1940. 
^Morning Advocate, October 31, 1940.
^Dudley A. White to David Pipes, September 16, 1940; Washington, D.C. 
Sunday Star, New York Herald Tribune, Chicago Sunday Tribune, New York 
Times, Washington Times Herald, Baltimore The Sun, all July 21, 1940, 
clippings in Pipes Collection.
78Now that we are used to political campaigns for inconsequential of­
fices costing many thousands of dollars, it is striking to note that 
Pipes reported spending only $2,955.02 on his Congressional campaign. 
"Statement of Income and Expenses From Pipes Campaign to be Filed In 
the House of Representatives," November 5, 1940, Pipes Collection.
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incumbent T. Overton Brooks, Shreveport insurance agent Henry O'Neal,
Caddo Parish District Attorney James U. Galloway, former Webster
Parish Registrar of Voters and State Representative J. Frank Colbert,
and Shreveport attorney and Caddo Parish State Representative Wellborn 
79Jack. O’Neal, Galloway, and Jack had all supported Sam Jones’ 
gubernatorial candidacy, and the Governor remained neutral in the first 
Democratic primary but endorsed O’Neal in his second Democratic pri­
mary battle with Brooks, citing O’Neal’s "ability, honor, and integ­
rity," as well as his personal friendship with the new Speaker of the
United States House of Representatives, Sam Rayburn, who had replaced
80William Bankhead upon Bankhead's death.
In the face of his challenge from four opponents, Overton Brooks 
stressed the importance of his Congressional experience and the im­
portance of national defense during the deteriorating world situation. 
While he did not advocate active American involvement in the shooting 
war, Brooks' stance accurately reflected public opinion in northwest
Louisiana, which was somewhat stronger than opinion in the rest of the
81state in accepting possible American intervention in the war.
"79Shreveport Journal, May 31, June 5, 24, August 6, 16, 1940; Shreve­
port Times, August 6, 1940.
8°"Morning Advocate, September 8, October 3, 1940. Rayburn became 
Speaker on September 16, 1940, after Speaker Bankhead died of a stomach 
hemorrhage. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson The Path to Power, pp. 
593-594 chronicles this transfer of power.
81Brooks inserted into the Congressional Record statements from both 
individual constituents and various civic organization in northwest 
Louisiana stressing the need for strong American defense, and even one 
resolution which proposed United States defense of the entire Western 
Hemisphere. Congressional Record 76 Congress 3d Session Appendix 
Volume 86 Part 16 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
290
Brooks repeatedly allied himself with northwest Louisiana's con­
servative attitude. He scored the Roosevelt administration for its 
failure to prepare the nation's defense for any eventuality during the 
past eight years: "stuffing money into our national defense system
will not revitalize it overnight." In his formal statement of his 
candidacy, Brooks pledged continued support for the nation's prepared­
ness program, support for the "Dies Americanism Committee," adequate 
federal old-age pensions, and assistance "for the farmers and working­
men of Louisiana." Brooks' campaign slogan was "Defense to the Ut­
most," and a letter to his constituents reflected his concern in the 
following sentence with confused syntax, but clear meaning: "If you
endorse the program of national defense to the utmost, 100 per cent
Americanism, and to rid the country of all spies, traitors, and 'fifth
82columnists,' I claim your active support."
Fourth District voters apparently agreed with Brooks’ supporters
who pled with them to return a man of experience to Congress. (Fred
Wilson of Coushatta wrote that experienced men "should not be swapped
in the middle of this ocean of hell.") Brooks' campaign advertisements
stressed that Brooks was "At His Post of Duty," and pleaded "Don.’t 
83swap in a crisis." Despite the reformers' efforts to elect Henry
Office, 1940), pp. 4062, 4211-4212, 4622-4623.
82Shreveport Journal, July 18, 1940; Shreveport Times, August 6, 1940; 
Congressional Record 76 Congress 3d Session Appendix Volume 86 Part 
II (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 
p. 5378; Congressional Record 77 Congress 1 Session Appendix Volume 
87 Part 12 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 
1941), pp. A2550-A2551.
83Congressional Record 76 Congress 3 Session Appendix Volume 86 
Part 16, p. 4483; The Mansfield Enterprise, September 5, 1940.
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O’Neal in his stead, Fourth District voters returned Brooks to 
Congress.̂
While the Fourth District campaign stirred little emotion (’’De­
fense to the Utmost" is not, after all, a stirring call to arms), the 
Fifth District race stirred even less. Even though his five opponents 
included Lincoln Parish District Attorney Truett L. Scarborough, and 
State Senators Edward Gladney and D. Y. Smith, incumbent Congressman
Newt V. Mills received more votes than any other single candidate in
85the first primary, and then defeated Gladney in the second primary.
The campaign for Louisiana's Sixth District seat in 1940 centered
not on national defense but on Sam Jones and the reformers’ efforts
to overhaul the state. The Sixth District race originally drew four
candidates, incumbent Dr. John K. Griffith; attorney Jared Young
Sanders, Jr., son of former Governor Sanders; former Louisiana State
University football player Sidney Bowman from Hammond; and New Roads
86sugar businessman Allen Ramsey Wurtele, a Republican. Sanders,
Morning Advocate, October 16, 1940. Brooks’ friends evidently could
not resist a bit of highjinks following his victory. On the morning 
after their victory parade in downtown Shreveport, groundskeepers at 
the Caddo parish courthouse found a stuffed effigy bearing the name 
"Sam Jones" hanging from a tree on the courthouse square. Overton 
Brooks remained in Congress until his death in 1961, when his seat was 
filled by Joe D. Waggonner in a special election. Congressional Direc­
tory 88th Congress 1st Session (Washington, D.C., United States Gov­
ernment Printing*Office, 1963), p. 65.
85Times-Picayune, July 23, 1940; Monroe Morning World, September 11,
15, October 16, 1940.
86Morning Advocate, August 20, 1940; Congressional Directory 77th 
Congress 1st Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government 
Printing Office, 1941), p. 43. Wurtele is an interesting character.
In addition to his New Roads sugar interests, he owned a factory in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, had invented a process to turn white sugar
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scion of a family whose anti-Longism had included the elder Sanders’
celebrated fisticuffs with Huey Long in the lobby of the Roosevelt
Hotel in New Orleans during late 1927, had campaigned for Sam Jones
in the 1939-40 gubernatorial campaign, and allied himself firmly with
87Jones and the reformers in this Congressional campaign. Griffith and 
Bowman both attacked Jones and the reformers, while Wurtele conducted 
an anti-New Deal campaign.
Sanders received widespread support from Jones leaders throughout 
the Sixth District, and Jones in his written endorsement cited the 
advantages of Sanders’ prior service in Congress, as well as "his
into synthetic rubber, and had designed a mechanical cane harvester.
He had also attempted to dabble in international politics. When 
Adolph Hitler demanded the city of Danzig and the Polish Corridor in 
1938, Wurtele posted $5,000 as a start toward collecting $70,000,000 
to buy the area and turn it over to Hitler in order to avoid spending 
"5,000,000 human-lives and $100,'000,000'." Wurtele-'remarked when he 
announced his Congressional candidacy that the plan "sounded silly when 
it really was an extremely sane solution to the crisis at the time."
87T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 
271-272; Hammond Vindicator, July 5, 1940. The younger Sanders had 
served in Congress from 1934 until 1936, when, he claimed, Richard 
Leche and the Longites counted him out of office. Congressional Direc­
tory 77th Congress 1 Session, p. 43. Sanders' 1934 election revealed 
the strength with which good government forces had to fight the Longite 
machine. Incumbent Sixth District Congressman Boliver Kemp died in 
1933. Huey Long and Governor Oscar Allfen preferred to appoint a Long­
ite as Kemp's successor, but a group of Sixth District residents led 
by former United States Senator E. J. Gay demanded an election, and 
threatened to hold one with or without Allen's approval. Allen subse­
quently called an election to be held five days later, in which Mrs. 
Boliver Kemp was elected. The citizens’ committee held its own elec­
tion twenty-two days later, in which Sanders was elected. The House 
refused to seat either Mrs. Kemp or Sanders, so Allen called another 
election, and the Longite machine backed Agriculture Commissioner 
Harry D. Wilson. Sanders was elected again, and this time the House 
accepted the legitimacy of his election. J. Y. Sanders, Sr. commented 
of the Sixth District that it was "the only one Huey Long has never been 
able to dominate." Item, September 1, 1939.
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intimate knowledge of the,strawberry and dairy problems" as reasons 
for his support- The Hammond Democratic Club endorsed Sanders because 
"we are all desirous of carrying on the work of reconstruction begun 
by the recent gubernatorial election of the Hon. Sam Jones," and "[you 
have] carried the banner of decency and honest government shoulder to 
shoulder with us in our recent fight for the restoration of democracy
T • n 8 8m  Louisiana.
Sanders gratefully accepted the proffered support of the re­
formers. He expressed his sympathy with Jones' reform program and 
told a Sixth District Sam Jones rally in Baton Rouge that the main 
choice in the race was "between the two schools of thought in Louisiana,
those who believe in the graft and corruption of the past 12 years,
89and those who are for honesty and decency in government."
Sanders opened his campaign in Franklinton with a speech in which 
he declared that democracy was indeed on trial "right here in the 
United States." He commented, "Not only were these people who stole 
public funds at fault, but the system in the state of Louisiana which 
allowed such stealing and grafting to take place was also at fault." 
Sanders touched on the national defense issue in a speech at Mandeville 
in which he warned of the need for the United States to be armed and 
trained now that only the British fleet stood between the New World 
and the Nazis, but he concentrated his attack on the "Maestri-Long-
ggHammond Vindicator, August 9, 16, 1940; Times—Picayune, August 14, 
1940.
89Town Talk, August 6, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, August 9, 16, 1940.
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90Leche machine" which had supported Griffith in 1936 and 1938.
Representative Griffith began his campaign in absentia, with a 
political advertisement in which he maintained that "world conditions 
are such that it is necessary for Congress to remain in session and 
this prevents my returning home at this time to conduct a personal 
campaign"and stressed the importance of his membership on a "major 
committee" (Naval Affairs). "Local Democratic Friends" paid for an­
other advertisement which asked voters to "Return John K. Griffith to 
Congress" because "This is no time to play petty politics in National
Affairs and there should be no change made in our Congressmen or Sena-
91tors in Washington that would delay the preparedness program."
Griffith also launched virulent attacks on both Sanders and Jones. 
He charged that Jones "is attempting to drive the people like cattle 
and to tell them how to vote" with his endorsement of Sanders and re­
marked that "there has never been in Louisiana's political history a 
dictator so oppressive in his domination, a governor so arrogant and 
vindictive as the present occupant of the executive mansion in Baton 
Rouge. He holds that any man who raises his voice against him is un­
fit for public office." Griffith also attacked Sanders ("It is not safe 
to send such a man to Congress in perilous times.") for alleged exces-
90Morning Advocate, August 18, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, August 30,
1940.
91Hammond Vindicator, August 23, 30, 1940.
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92sive absence during his previous Congressional term.
Sidney Bowman, the third candidate in the Sixth District race, 
also waged an anti—Jones and anti-Sanders campaign. Bowman also at­
tacked Sanders' absence on crucial Congressional roll call votes and 
charged that Sanders had been only a minor figure in Jones' guberna­
torial campaign and "only blossom[ed] forth after this administration 
went into power, and then he and they went haywire promising jobs." 
Furthermore, Bowman attacked Governor Jones, who, he said, "has re­
placed dictatorship with autocracy." He also remarked that the Jones 
reoganization amendment, which was also on the ballot in the 1940 
fall election, "does to the government of Louisiana what Hitler,
Stalin, and Mussolini did to their countries." Bowman asked rhetori­
cally "who do you imagine they found to do the job of reorganizing
Louisiana?" and answered his own question: "It was Griffenhagen & Co.,
93a good old German firm with a good old German background." Neverthe­
less, Sanders profited from his association with the reformers and de­
feated both his opponents in the first Democratic primary.
The Louisiana Seventh District campaign was no contest. Incumbent 
Congressman Rene L- DeRouen announced that he would not run for re- 
election because of poor health. The only candidate who qualified to 
run for DeRouen's seat was Vance Plauche, a Lake Charles attorney who
92Morning Advocate, Spetember 4, 9, 1940. Griffith-also attacked the
younger Sanders for the senior Sanders’ absences during his own Con­
gressional career. Griffith maintained that the elder Sanders missed 
every roll call during December, 1919, and January, 1920, while he was 
in Louisiana campaigning for gubernatorial candidate John M. Parker.
93Ibid., August 31, September 1, 9, 1940.
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was also Sam Jones' friend, campaign co-manager, and Jones' first head
of Civil Service. Jones enthusiastically endorsed Plauche's candidacy.
Plauche ran unopposed in both the Democratic primaries and the general 
94election.
The Eighth District race, in contrast, featured a thoroughgoing
Longite, a thoroughgoing reformer, and a genuine Long. Incumbent
Longite Congressman A. Leonard Allen was an educator in rural Grant
and Winn Parishes before entering the legal profession in Winnfield in
951922. Allen was first elected to Congress in 1936. The Long family
member in the race was Dr. George Shannon Long, Huey and Earl’s older
brother who had been a dentist and state representative in Oklahoma
before moving back to Louisiana in 1934, originally to Monroe, and then
to the small community of Dry Prong in rural Grant parish. George
Long, unlike his brothers, was a World War I veteran and thus avoided
96the cowardice charges which had dogged Huey and Earl.
James B. Aswell, Jr., ably represented the reformers in the Eighth 
District race. Aswell was the son of former State Superintendent of 
Education (1904-08) and Eighth District Congressman (1913-31) James 
B. Aswell, who, along with Governor Newton Crain Blanchard, had
Town Talk, July 18, 1940; Times-Picayune, July 19, 1940; Congression­
al Directory 77 Congress 1 Session, p. 43. John B. Foumet to Rene L. 
DeRouen, July 22, 1940, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives 
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection).
95Town Talk, September 6, 1940; Congressional Directory 77 Congress 
1 Session, p. 43.
^Town Talk, July 5, 1940; Williams, Huey Long, p. 16, 22; Congression­
al Directory 83 Congress 1 Session (Washington, D.C., United States 
Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 53.
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established a modem education system in the state- The younger
Aswell had a promising national literary career during the 1920s and
1930s. Short stories he wrote appeared in major magazines of those
decades, including Collier’s, and became a mainstay of College Humor.
Aswell by 1927 had also begun a newspaper column, "My New York," and
by 1931 became Broadway correspondent for the Central Press Associ- 
97ation. Increasing difficulty in selling his material during the
late 1930s, however, led to Aswell's deep disillusionment with the
American literary establishment and prompted his return to Natchitoches
Parish in September, 1938, to become a "Farmer-Writer," as he described
himself. Aswell hitched his wagon to the Sam Jones star in 1939 as a
Jones campaign leader in the Eighth District and became State Director
98of Publicity following Jones' election.
Aswell was displeased with Congressman Allen’s representation of
Rodney Cline, Builders of Louisiana Education (Baton Rouge, Bureau 
of Educational Materials and Research, College of Education, Louisiana 
State University, 1963), pp. 14-16; Merritt. Hubbard to Ann Watkins, 
October 28, 1929; Polly Hightower to James B. Aswell, Jr., December 
12, 1927; H. N. Swanson to Aswell, December 9, 1929; Swanson to Carol 
Hill, January 13, 1930; Anne L. Young to Aswell, November 11, 1929;
Mark Hellinger to Aswell, March, 1931, Aswell Collection.
98James B. Aswell, Jr. to Ann Watkins, January 15, 1935; Watkins to 
Aswell, January 8, 1935; H. N. Swanson to Aswell, July 31, 1933; re­
jection slips from Ladies Home Journal, April 4, 1930, Cosmopolitan, 
June 2, 1930; Aswell 1938 Voter Registration Certificate, Aswell Col­
lection; Morning 'Advocate, June 23, 1942. Aswell’s deepening bitter­
ness is clearly evident in his papers. On July 29, 1933, he wrote to 
Swanson that "I am interested in telling stories and this columning 
business is getting in my har . . .I'm sick of it and sick of New York. 
I want new stimuli, new surroundings, new color, new friends." By 
1939, however, he was much more blunti "To hell with the whole God 
damned bunch of pink old ladies who run the three or four magazines 
which can make or break a writer’s career. I'll devote myself to an­
other career which leads to a point where I can make or break them." 
Aswell to Sydney A. Sanders, July 3, 1939, Aswell Collection.
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the Eighth District. He remarked early in 1940 that "the people might 
as well send a postcard up there [Washington] as to depend upon the 
incumbent's efforts." This perception of Allen, plus Aswell's determi­
nation to help rid the state of all vestiges of Longism, led him to
99announce his candidacy for the Eighth District post.
Aswell waged a campaign at once anti-Long and pro-preparedness.
In his opening campaign speech, a radio broadcast from Alexandria, the
major city of the Eighth District, Aswell recalled that Allen "defended
the regime of graft and corruption from every stump he could get hold
of" in the recent gubernatorial campaign. He later dubbed Allen "the
zero Congressman of the United States" because no bill he introduced
had ever passed both houses of Congress, and called him "a little
,,100machine congressman.
Aswell also stressed his support for United States preparedness, 
referring often to the fall of the French republic to the Nazi jugger­
naut: "as Marshall Petain said, France fell because the citizens had
become soft and divided and self-indulgent. [Teachers] must toughen 
and steel the young people in their care for the greatest crisis this 
country has ever faced." His Fourth of July address brimmed with 
patriotic fervor: '
From here on out we must be tough; we must be
99Town Talk., April 26, 1940: Aswell to Mrs. J. W. Smith, July 30,
1939, Aswell Collection. Aswell wrote to Mrs, Smith that "I love this 
country and the people in it. They do not deserve to be governed by 
thieves and incompetents, and if enough of us yell 'Thief!' maybe a 
majority of them will be caught and jailed. I'm going to keep on 
yelling."
^^Town Talk, July 18, August 27, 30, 1940.
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tough in our determination to keep this island 
of democracy free in a world where chains clank 
and the marching feet of aggressors sound 
louder and louder . . .  Our Maginot line con­
sists in (sicy the steel resolution of our own 
characters. If that line holds, America is 
safe from any foe on earth.
Aswell also linked Allen with the tired old politicians who had lost
France: "France had too many Leonard Allens in office and we have too
.... fflOlmany xn washxngton.
Aswell did not wage only a negative campaign. He outlined his 
plans for conservation, reforestation, industrialization, and voca­
tional education, including a proposal to gear vocational training to
acutal industrial need, but centered most of his campaign on attacking
... 102 Allen.
The established reformers joined in his effort to unseat Allen.
Precinct captains, co-captains, and campaign workers of the Jones
organization in Alexandria endorsed Aswell. Jones-Noe alliance forces
throughout the Eighth District met in Alexandria and unconditionally
endorsed Aswell. Governor Jones formally endorsed him on August 12,
calling him "the only one of the candidates who supported the present
103administration and is able, courageous, and fearless."
Aswell also relied on a network of "Junior Jim Aswell Clubs," 
organizations of young voters dedicated to electing a young man (Aswell
^^Ibid., June 26, July 5, August 27, 1940.
102Ibid., July 18, August 27, 1940.
103Ibid., August 2, 5, 13, 1940.
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was born, in 1908, Allen in 1891, Long in 1883) to represent them- As 
club director Cecil Roberts remarked, ’’Since we are the ones to have 
to live under future governments, we want a young man who understands 
our needs to lay a strong foundation for that government.’’ Following 
the failure to defeat Allen in 1940, Aswell wrote to Roberts, ”Do your 
best to keep the Jim Aswell clubs alive during the next two years and 
we will hand Allen a defeat next time."^^
In the face of the reformers allied against him, Congressman Allen 
drew the mantle of his incumbency tightly around himself- "To dis­
charge an experienced representative at this critical time is like 
discharging a skilled surgeon in the midst of a major operation," he 
wrote. Allen’s secretary, D- M. Riddle, announced, however, that the
Congressman was too busy in Washington to campaign full-time in the
*  105 district.
Allen also identified himself as "a consistent foe of un-Ameri­
canism, [who has] supported every move in Congress to stamp out un- 
American ’isms’ and has always championed Congressman Dies," and noted
Ibid., July 17, 1940; James B. Aswell to Cecil Roberts, September
12, 1940, Aswell Collection; Congressional Directory 77 Congress 1
Session, p. 43; Congressional Directory 83 Congress 1 Session, p. 53.
Allen retained his Eighth District seat until 1952, when George Long 
was elected. Long, in turn, served until 1958, when he was defeated 
by Harold McSween. Congressional Directory 86 Congress 1 Session 
(Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1959), 
p. 60.
^ T̂own Talk, July 15, 1940. A Leonard Allen to Dr. Joseph Bath, July
27, 1940, Aswell Collection. Aswell thought Allen’s absence from the
district was only a coy deception. He recalled Allen’s two trips to 
Louisiana to campaign for Earl Long only a few months previously and 
remarked that Allen seemed to be willing "to go 2,000 miles ... to 
defend graft and corruption anywhere it cropped up." Town Talk, July
18, 1940.
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that he had authored a bill to deport American Communist Party leader 
Harry Bridges. While he defended his support of preparedness ("Mr. 
Allen has long supported adequate national defense . . . and time has 
proven the wisdom of his position"), he continued to oppose active 
American intervention in the shooting war ("We must not sentence the 
flower of American manhood to die on the battlefields of Europe . . . 
The mothers and fathers know that he can be depended upon to continue 
his fight to keep our boys out of Europe").
Allen eventually campaigned personally in the district, but he 
also utilized a new refinement of Huey Long's old practice of using 
sound equipment mounted on trucks. Sound trucks became staples of 
Huey Long’s campaign caravans. By 1940, however, new improvements in 
the quality of sound recording made the live politician unnecessary. 
Allen utilized two sound trucks equipped with tape recordings of his 
speeches and the amplifiers necessary to broadcast them.^^ Unfortu-
Town Talk, July 16, 1940- Allen's patriotic stance led Major Gen­
eral 0. R. Gellette, Adjutant General of the Order of the Stars and 
Bars, to call upon all Confederate veterans, and widows, children, and 
friends of Confederate veterans to vote for Allen because of "his 
fight against the sinister forces of foreign 'isms' which are now 
seeking to undermine and destroy our great nation." Town Talk, August 
1, 1940. Apparently, no one thought it strange for a Confederate vet­
eran to speak out against "forces . . . which are now seeking to under­
mine and destroy” the United States just as he had once done.
^ ^ Ibid., August 31, 1940. The Town Talk, however, immediately real­
ized the long-range implications of this campaign device and commented 
that "if television could be hooked up to the new type broadcast 
trucks, a politician could 'visit' in person and carry on a campaign 
throughout his district or state and remain comfortable in his office 
all at the same time.." The later widespread use of television re- 
cievers, of course, made it possible for politicians to wage their cam­
paigns without bothering with the sound trucks. Louisiana had received 
its first look at television on September 11, 1939., when RCA set up 
special broadcasting and receiving equipment at the D. H. Holmes depart­
ment store in New Orleans. The demonstration broadcast included state­
ments by Robert Lienhard, president of Holmes, Leo Hirsch, president of
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nately, no extant records reveal how many potential voters were willing 
to attend a political rally in which they looked at a truck and lis­
tened to a taped political speech.
Despite his largely absentee campaign, Allen was renominated in 
the first Democratic primary, but by only a slim 503 vote margin over 
the combined votes of his opponents. Allen received 21,835 votes to 
Aswell’s 17,013 and Long's 4,219.108
Overall, Governor Jones was pleased with the result of the 1940 
election. Even though the reformers failed to make a clean sweep of 
the Congressional seats, reformers now sat in five of them. Moreover, 
the three incumbent Congressmen, sensing the depth of reform sentiment, 
promised to cooperate with the state administration "toward the up­
building of a better and greater state and the securing of national 
,.109recognition.
The 1942 midterm Congressional elections in Louisiana were, as 
most midterm elections are, much less exciting than the elections which 
coincide with presidential elections- The 1942 political season was a 
relatively quiet interlude between the major campaigns of 1940 and 
1944. The 1942 contests are notable, however, for the Old Regular 
switch from their temporary alliance with the reformers supporting Hale
the local RCA supply company, and an interview with Tulane football 
coach Lowell "Red" Dawson and Athletic Director Dr- Wilbur C. Smith. 
Stores in Louisiana were not selling televisions in 1939 because there 
were no broadcast stations in the area, but Holmes assured its cus­
tomers that new RCA radios came equipped with adapters which would 
allow the radios to receive television signals when New Orleans built 
a television station.
108Town Talk, September 11, 1940.
109Morning Advocate, November 7, 1940.
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Boggs in the Second District, J. Y. Sanders’ loss to James H- Morrison 
in the Sixth District, and Longite Allen J. Ellender's re-election to 
the United States Senate even though reformer E. A. Stephens attempted 
to unseat him.
Early speculation that former Governor James A. Noe would run for 
Ellender’s Senate seat faded away in 1942 as federal investigators 
closed in on Noe in the Win or Lose Oil Company tax evasion case.^^
By 1942, moreover, Noe and Sam Jones had reached the end of their 
temporary alliance. Therefore, New Orleans businessman and former 
President of the New Orleans Dock Board, E. A. Stephens, a reformer 
who had worked in Jones’ gubernatorial campaign, took up the reform 
banner in the Senate campaign.
Stephens cast his campaign as an attempt to stop "dictatorship 
[that] is again attempting to raise its ugly head in this state with 
a carefully worked out and well-financed plan." Stephens portrayed 
Ellender as an integral component of the Longite machine who was 
serving as a point man in an attempted Longite resurgence with which 
the machine hoped to place Robert Maestri in the governor's chair in 
1944.111
Ellender and his allies struck back at the reformers. They had 
considered Stephens a suspicious character since Jones appointed him
*̂̂ Noe received a gold pen from the audience at a testimonial dinner 
in his honor held at Farmerville in April, 1940. The Master of Cere­
monies told him that they hoped he would sign committee reports with 
it "when you go to Washington to serve in that great body [the Senate]." 
Robert M. McGehee to Allen J. Ellender, April 19, 1940, Ellender Col­
lection.
* ̂ Morning Advocate, June 16, July 9, 14, 1942.
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to the Dock Board• The Farmer’s Friend, newspaper of the Farmers'
Protective Union and mouthpiece of James H. Morrison, attacked Stephens
113as a "pal and cohort of Hitler’s No. 1 U. S. Agent Baron von Spiegel." 
(Edgar von Spiegel was the German consul in New Orleans until he was 
expelled along with other German diplomats by President Roosevelt in 
June, 1941.) Stephens replied that while he served as president of 
the Dock Board, he was coolly civil to the German consul but had not 
developed a warm friendship with him.
Ellender also attempted to build a consensus of all Louisianians 
by playing on the war issue. "This is no time for factional or person­
al politics," he said in his formal statement of his candidacy. "I do 
not believe that anyone should turn their thoughts to personal politi­
cal matters, but that we should all pull together." This belief, how­
ever, did not prevent Ellender from launching a personal attack on 
Stephens for his supposed "foreign" birth (Stephens was a native of 
Virginia).
The Farmer’s Friend, a newspaper not noted for its objectivity, al­
so remarked that "This latest obnoxious appointment made by stupid Sam 
Jones will give the Nazis an inside track into the biggest and most 
important utility in the State of Louisiana." Farmer’s Friend, (n.d.), 
Fournet Collection. ,
113In fact, the reformers themselves had been suspicious of von Spiegel. 
Governor Jones requested Secretary of State Cordell Hull to investigate 
the German’s activities as early as the summer of 1940. Times-Picay- 
une, June 18, 1940; States, June 16, 1941.
114Morning Advocate July 22, August 19, 1942. Dr. George Long, in his 
statement endorsing Stephens, remarked of Ellender that "I know the 
friends of Huey Long. I know the Huey Long program inside out, and I 
also know a hypocrite when I see one.” Stephens wondered whether 
Maestri and Ellender, had they been alive in 1815, would have rushed 
to the Chalmette Battlefield and shouted to Andrew Jackson, "Stop! You 
can't save our city and our nation! You are a foreigner from Tennessee!"
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The striking feature of the 1942 Senate race in Louisiana is its 
aura of "politics as usual." The war became a poor second best issue 
as the factions battled for the Senate seat. Ellender retained the 
seat, and that, as a matter of fact, signaled something of a Longite 
resurgence, just as the reformers feared.
The Congressional races in 1942 were generally lackluster. Vance 
Plauche chose not to run for re-election from the Seventh District, 
leaving that race wide open. State Representative William J. Dodd 
considered a campaign for the office, but the Army draft called him 
into service, and he chose not to ask for a deferment to run for 
Congress. Opelousas insurance man Henry D. Larcade was subsequently
elected to the post over J. L. McHugh, who had Governor Jones’ active
«. 115 support.
Among Congressional races, however, the Sixth District proved to 
be the most rousing because of James H. Morrison’s entry in the cam­
paign. J. Y. Sanders opened his campaign in July with a ringing an­
nouncement of his support for President Roosevelt’s conduct of the war. 
Morrison, however, questioned Sanders’ participation in the conduct of 
that war. "While our beloved people were beset with worries that their 
sons in the armed forces be given adequate equipment," Morrison fumed, 
what was this Sam Jones rubber stamp doing?" He then answered his own 
question: ”. . . little J. Y. Sanders was helping to author, support,
and vote for a pension bill for himself . . . , was securing for him-
*^William J, Dodd to John B. Fournet, March 10, 1942, August 21, 1942, 
October 2, 1942, Fournet Collection; Congressional Directory 78 Con­
gress 1 Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing 
Office, 1942), p. 43; Morning Advocate, October 15, 1942.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
306
self an X [unlimited gasoline] rationing card, and playing petty 
politics at the request and dictates of Gov. Jones."^^
Morrison's platform was a mixture of planks pledging "to do every­
thing possible to win the war as soon as possible," as well as "to 
support President Roosevelt’s war policy 100%," and also planks 
promising jobs and benefits for the Sixth District: army camps along
with the civilian jobs they provided, more federal funds for old age 
pension and welfare rolls, and "100% cooperation with all labor organi­
zations." Sanders objected to Morrison promising to support the war 
in Congress when he had not supported it by serving in the armed 
forces. "By his own actions and utterances," Sanders said, "he has 
branded himself an Isolationist, and Obstructionist, an Objector to 
Military Service in time of war, an advocate of the America First Com­
mittee, and the German Bund, and a sympathizer of [Burton K.] Wheeler, 
[Hamilton] Fish, and [Charles] Lindbergh.
Despite Sanders' plea with Sixth District voters not to vote "a 
draft exemption to ’allergic-to-khaki’ Morrison," he lost the elec­
tion by the slim margin of 27,990 votes to 29,078 for Morrison.
While the 1942 off-year elections stirred little interest in 
Louisiana, the 1944 presidential election year attracted a great deal 
of attention within the state. President Franklin Roosevelt during 
his unprecedented four elections to the presidency created deep
*^Morning Advocate, July 8, 12, 1942. Sanders maintained that he 
had not voted for a $4,000 pension for himself, and that statements 
to the contrary were "either malicious fabrications of a perverted 
intellect or they are the delusions of a diseased imagination.”
**̂ Ibid., October 2, 4, 15, 1942.
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divisions within the Democratic party as it adopted a more liberal 
agenda to attract the allegiance of the increasingly urban American 
population. This shift left the conservative rural South behind. Its 
frustration led to overt attempts to wrest control of the party from 
the liberal forces which had increasingly controlled its agenda since 
Roosevelt’s election in 1932.
Governor Jones reflected the frustration felt by both Louisiana 
and the South in his article "Will Dixie Bolt the New Deal?" pub­
lished in the March 6, 1943, issue of the Saturday Evening Post.
Jones argued that Roosevelt, despite his lengthy residence at his 
"Little White House" at Warm Springs, Georgia, knew little about the 
South, and that New Deal economic policies "continued to kick an al­
ready prostrate South in the face." The national administration had 
denied the South its due share of public investments, and had contin­
ued the railroad freight-rate disparity between North and South which 
worked to the detriment of the South. Moreover, Roosevelt had shown 
sympathy for the stirrings of the black struggle for civil rights.
Therefore, Jones suggested, it was time for the Solid South to abandon
118its blind allegiance to the Democratic party.
Jones did not come suddenly to his conclusions. In late December 
1942, he had remarked:
I can’t see why we should continue to give ad­
herence to a party which has treated us worse 
than the Republican party has ever treated us
118Sam H. Jones, "Will Dixie Bolt the New Deal?" Saturday Evening 
Post, March 6, 1943, pp. 20-21, 42, 45; Garson, The Democratic Party 
and the Politics of Sectionalism, p. 95..
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on these issues [allocation of war contracts].
I can’t see why we should adhere to the Demo­
cratic party if we are going to be a step­
child. I don't see why we shouldn’t form our 
own Democratic party and join with the people 
of the Middle West.H9
The Morning Advocate editorially endorsed Jones' proposals. The 
governor’s concerns, the newspaper remarked, "highlights a growing re­
volt by Southern leaders against what they consider unfair legislation 
and economic discrimination." Furthermore, "What we have had in 
Washington for ten years is of all things, not the Democratic party 
the South knows." The answer to the problem appeared obvious to the 
editorial writers: "We should not be chased out of the home of our
fathers. Rather, we should throw out those who have usurped the party
*  a  ,,120raiment and its name.
Not all Louisianians shared these feelings. Roosevelt still re­
tained a strong and loyal following within the.state. J. F. McDougall 
wrote a letter to the editor of the New Orleans States in May, 1942, 
full of glowing praise for the president:
From George Washington, down through the years to 
the present time, He [God] has never failed us.
At this time when the whole world is at war, when 
if this nation ever needed a man of great wisdom 
and understanding, God has proved that He loves 
us and the things we are fighting for, humanity, 
peace, and honor, by giving us a great leader, our
119Morning Advocate, December 3, 1942.
120Ibid., December 10, 1942.
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beloved President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Senator Allen Ellender urged the United States Senate to designate 
Roosevelt as "supreme leader" of the Allied war effort during the 
summer of 1942. In April, 1944, the Louisiana State Federation of 
Labor urged Roosevelt to accept the Democratic party nomination for an 
unprecedented fourth term as president. New Orleans industrialist 
Andrew Jackson Higgins in a national radio speech in May, 1943, said 
that if the war lasted until 1944, Roosevelt should be returned to 
office because "This war is not time for discord." Higgins by then 
also realized the economic benefit Louisiana reaped from the war. He 
alone employed some 20,000 people at seven plants producing war goods 
in New Orleans
As usual, the main bout in Louisiana during the 1944 presidential 
election concerned the Democratic party. Louisiana's delegation to the 
Republican National Convention in Chicago unanimously voted to nominate 
the eventual Republican nominee, Thomas E. Dewey of New York, and 
Louisiana Republican National Committeeman John E. Jackson of New 
Orleans issued a statement that "The people of Louisiana, as well as 
the rest of the South, are tired of the New Deal, and I believe [they]
121States, May 5, 1942; Shreveport Journal, June. 25, 1942; Morning Ad­
vocate, April 9, .1943, April 5, 1944; Town Talk, May 17, 1943; Jack B. 
McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential Politics,” Louisiana His­
tory, Summer, 1974, pp. 274-275. Despite the State Federation of Labor 
endorsement, however, not all of Louisiana’s working class favored 
Roosevelt. Federal Marshals shot and wounded Cylton Moses of Rapides 
Parish when they arrested him in December, 1943, for "making threaten­
ing remarks against the bodily welfare of the president of the United 
States." In addition, Frank Joseph Daulong, a railroad telegraph oper­
ator from Ruston, pled "not guilty" in April, 1945, to charges that he 
had threatened Roosevelt’s life. Witnesses, however, claimed that he 
said, "If someone does not kill him soon, T have a notion of doing it 
myself," on one occasion, and "I hope someone gets him tonight. If
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122will go along with the Republican ticket." Republican politics in 
Louisiana, however, remained the sideshow while the Democrats dominated 
the midway.
The Democrats felt rumblings of discontent throughout 1943. Gov­
ernor Jones joined with Governor Ellis Amall of Georgia at the 1943 
Southern Governor’s Conference and called for an end of the Democratic 
Solid South so that both parties would have to solicit the South’s 
electoral votes. The Democratic National Committee called for cam­
paign funds, and Francis J. Whitehead, Assistant Secretary of the 
Louisiana Democratic Central Committee, replied that requests of funds 
would probably go unheeded "unless the Democrats soon straighten out 
their politics respecting the South ..." Louisiana Senator John 
Overton denounced a fourth term for Roosevelt: "I opposed a third
term and I will:even more strongly oppose a fourth term, war or no war. 
The precedent established when our government was formed should not be
123broken. We will be plagued in years to come for our present actions."
The election year of 1944 brought no end to the incipient Southern 
rebellion in Louisiana. Forty Democratic leaders from South Carolina
they don’t, I’ll go do it myself,” on another. Morning Advocate,
December 24, 1943, April 4,- 1945.
122Shreveport Times, June 26, 1944; States, June 29, 1944. Political 
contributions to the DNC from the South were an especially important 
lever because Southern Congressional elections were almost invariably 
settled in the Democratic primaries.. This meant that the Southern con­
tributions could be channeled into Northern Congressional races in 
which Democrats faced strong Republican challengers,.and thus needed 
extra money. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics'of Sec­
tionalism,. p. 97*
123 ■ • ■ ■........Town Talk, March 26, June 17;, 19, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 9,
1943.
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Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida met in Shreveport about one 
month before the Democratic National Convention in June. The dis­
gruntled delegates agreed "to drive the New Deal, the CIO Communists 
and negroes'(sic) out of control of the Democratic party and restore 
state’s rights." The delegates hoped to put together a one-hundred
vote block of delegates to the national convention who were opposed to
10/Roosevelt’s nomination.
Insurgent Louisiana Democrats threatened further action. Demo­
cratic State Chairman Frank Looney announced on July 4, that resolu­
tions to declare the Louisiana electors "free agents with the right to 
cast their vote for a Democrat for president and vice president other 
than the nominee of the party" would be introduced at the Committee’s 
next meeting in September. In addition, the Committee elected Repre­
sentative Henry Clay Sevier of Tallulah as the new national committee­
man to replace House Speaker Norman Bauer, who resigned to devote more
time to his personal and House business. Sevier was an avowed foe of
125Roosevelt and the New Deal.
Franklin Roosevelt announced during July that he would accept a 
fourth nomination. As the Democratic delegates gathered in Chicago 
for the national convention, Sam Jones met with the Louisiana delegates 
and announced that his informal poll of the delegation had revealed a 
great deal of support for conservative Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia
 ̂A  *    ‘ ‘
Shreveport Times, June 10, 1944; Morning Advocate,'June 10, 1944.
The Democrats had abandoned .the "two-thirds rule” only in 1932 (partly 
at the insistence of Huey Long),.when Roosevelt’s.supporters-attracted 
enough votes at the national convention to overturn it.
105   •Shreveport Times, July’5, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 5, 1944.
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for president, and that "we will join with other Southern states in 
opposing the nomination of Mr. Wallace for vice-president." Old Regu­
lar delegates, however, were not so sure that Louisiana should abandon 
the president. Typically, the Old Regulars held that Roosevelt's 
nomination was certain, even with the threatened Southern revolt, and
that Louisiana should protect its interests by staying with the 
126winner.
When the Louisiana delegation met in caucus to decide which candi­
date to support for president, the insurgents carried the day. Demo­
cratic Committeeman Sevier moved that Louisiana endorse Harry Byrd. 
Before Sevier's motion came to a vote, however, Old Regular James 
Comisky of New Orleans made a substitute motion to endorse Roosevelt. 
Comisky’s motion came to a vote first, and lost by a 14-6 margin. 
Sevier's original motion then carried on a 16-4 vote. Under the unit 
rule, therefore, all 22 of Louisiana's votes (two delegates were ab­
sent from the caucus) went to Senator Byrd. The caucus also approved 
by a voice vote ("a unanimous roar") a resolution presented by visitor 
Wright Morrow of Texas which included opposition "with all vigor" to 
any platform plank favoring social equality between the races, favoring 
anti-poll tax legislation, and advocating the right of all states to
manage their domestic affairs without restraint from the federal 
127 .government.
^ ^States, July 18., 1944.
127 ........
Item, July 19, 1944?' Morning Advocate, July 19, 1944.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
313
Even though he suffered defections on the Southern front, Roose­
velt easily garnered his fourth nomination as president. He received 
1,176 votes on the first ballot, compared to eighty-nine votes for 
Byrd (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia), and one vote for James A. 
Farley. Louisiana’s standard, however, did not join the exuberant 
victory demonstration on the convention floor. One of the anti- 
Roosevelt delegates tied it tightly in place with a handkerchief to 
keep an enthusiast from unauthorized use of it during the demonstra­
tion. (The Mississippi and Texas standards were similarly tied in
. 128 place.)
Following Roosevelt’s nomination, attention turned to the vice-
presidential nomination. The South was still opposed to Vice-president
Henry Wallace, and this time Roosevelt was not disposed to save him.
He still personally supported Wallace but bowed to the wishes of
leading urban party bosses who believed that Wallace had no chance of
nomination because of opposition from the Southern states and turned
129to United States Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri.
Sam Jones had to dampen a vice-presidential boomlet in his favor. 
Walter Sillers, chairman of the Mississippi delegation, George Butler 
of the Texas delegation, and Louisiana’£ John Fred Odom attempted to
128Item, July 21, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 21, 1944,.
129 ............. . ................................Garson, The Democratic Party and the-Politicsiof Sectionalism, pp.
119—122; Merle Miller, Plain Speaking An Oral Biography "of Barry S. 
Truman (New York, Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1974);, p. 189;. Cabell 
Phillips; The Truman Presidency 'The History of a'Triumphant Succes­
sion . (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1966)., p. 44; Alonzo .L.. Hamby, 
Beyond the New Deal: Harry'S. Truman and American Liberalism (New
York, Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 32,'41..
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start a stampede toward Jones for vice-president, but Jones thought
that the Southern delegates should not "scatter their shots" on the
vice-presidential ballot, and instead hold their votes together in an
attempt to defeat Wallace. Jones received promises of support from
five other states, but told a caucus of those states to focus their
support on a man who could obtain more national support than he could
count on. The Louisiana delegation subsequently voted unanimously to
support Truman to the bitter end in order to defeat Wallace. Truman
130received the vice-presidential nomination on the second ballot.
Truman's nomination removed some of the bluster from the Southern 
rebellion. Sam Jones, interviewed late in the convention by Major 
James E. Crown, remarked that "The defeat of the radical Easterners" 
was the major accomplishment of the convention. And the South, Jones 
said, had led "[a] bold, courageous and determined fight ... to pro­
tect the traditions and principles the South-holds dear.” Had it not 
been for the South, "the Democratic nominee for vice president would 
not have been Senator Truman, but would have been a man who brazenly 
flouted the traditions of the South." Southerners felt comfortable with 
Harry Truman, grandson of slaveholders, because of his background in a 
border state. Their desperate attempt to nominate "anybody but Wallace" 
however, caused them to overlook. Truman's support of the Hew Deal, and 
his exposure to the problems of urban minority groupis as an associate 
of the Pendergast organization in Kansas City. Truman, while not an 
ardent liberal, was more moderate than most of the South.. Southerners
130 * : ................. ............................................States, July 19-21, 1944'; Garson, The Democratic Party.: and the Poli­
tics of'Sectionalism, p. 122;- Phillips, The' Truman Presidency, p. 47.
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would, therefore, feel betrayed when he supported liberal causes 
during his own presidency, especially his order to desegregate the 
armed forces and his attempt to renew the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission.
Not all Louisianians swung to Roosevelt’s support in 1944, even 
with Truman nominated as his running mate. Irving L. Lyons wrote to 
the States editor that he was planning to vote for Thomas Dewey:
". . . I am enough of an optimist to believe that this country has 
not degenerated to the point where we have only one leader measuring 
up to the demands of the times, critical though they may he . . ."
The "Southern Anti-New Deal Association," headquartered in Shreveport, 
attacked Sidney Hillman, one of the founders of the Congress of In­
dustrial Organizations and its National Political Action Committee and 
a Roosevelt advisor: "today we have the foreign-born Hi liman pulling
the strings in the campaign to re-elect Roosevelt and the New Deal 
..." J. T. Powell, a New Orleans attorney, formed a "Democratic 
Committee in Favor of Dewey," which instructed Democrats how to split
their ballots and vote for Dewey for President and Democratic candi-
132dates for local offices.
The gravest challenge to the Roosevelt-Truman candidacy in 
Louisiana occurred when some of the state’s Democratic electors
131 ~  .......■ States, July 22, 1.944; Morning Advocate, July 22,-1944; Miller, 
Plain Speaking, pp. 79-80; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, pp, 41—56; 
Alonzo L-. Hamby,. ’.'The Liberals, Truman, and FDR as Symbol and Myth," 
Journal of American History; .March, 1970, pp.-859-867. Jonathan 
Daniels, The Man of Independence (New York, Lippincott> 1950), p. 234 
maintains .that "Truman was. nominated by men  ̂. . who. knew what they 
wanted, but did not know what .they were getting,.” •
13 2....  ........ 'States, July 25, 1944;-'Town Talk, October 18, November 4, 1944.
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refused to sign a pledge to vote for Roosevelt and Truman, as re­
quested by the Democratic State Central Committee. Most members of 
the state committee, except for a few Southern zealots, accepted the 
Democratic ticket with the addition of Truman. The zealots, however, 
caused the main fireworks in the campaign. The State Central Commit­
tee replaced seven electors in October because four resigned rather 
than sign the pledge, and an additional three electors refused to sign 
but hoped to retain their posts. These three, E. Wales Brown of 
Shreveport, Bronier Thibault of Donaldsonville, and George Billeaud 
of Broussard, filed suit seeking to overturn the Committee's action 
dismissing them, but the Nineteenth Judicial District Court and the 
First Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the Committee's action, citing 
the Louisiana Supreme Court ruling in the 1940 Earl K. Long v. Wade 
0. Martin, Sr. case, which upheld the State Central Committee's right
to determine Democratic nominees. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused
133to hear the case of the dissident electors.
Senator Truman personally brought the Democratic campaign into 
Louisiana with.a campaign trip to New Orleans in mid-October. He. 
toured the New Orleans waterfront and addressed the Mississippi Valley 
Flood Control Association. When asked about Democratic changes in the 
election, Truman confidently replied that the South would remain Demo­
cratic : "All a Southerner has to do is read the speeches of Dewey
and they will be all right." Furthermore, the continuation of the war 
provided a strong attraction to the incumbent president: "I.don't
^Morning Advocate, September 28, October 14-15, 1944;- States, 
October'7, 17, 1944; Town Talk,' October 8,"1944.
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think people interested in winning the war will take the chance of
upsetting the cordial relations with our Allies and losing any more
* «134of our young men.
Truman’s expectations for Democratic success were well founded in
Louisiana. The Democratic ticket carried the state, and all ten of
Louisiana’s electors cast their votes for Roosevelt when they met in 
135December. Moreover, the old threat of the summer before to with­
hold Louisiana contributions from Democratic coffers did not material­
ize. A Congressional committee examining campaign expenditures in 
April, 1945, found that Louisianians contributed $40,000 to Roose­
velt’s campaign. One-half the amount, however, came from New Orleans
industrialist Andrew J. Higgins, recipient of millions of dollars
136worth of war contracts, and his family.
The 1944 Congressional elections resulted in the re-election of 
all Louisiana's incumbent Congressmen. The only spirited campaign 
occurred in the Sixth District. Incumbent Congressman James H. Morri­
son drew several opponents, the most prominent of whom were East Baton 
Rouge State Senator H. Alva Brumfield, and Tangipahoa Parish District
134States, October 14-15, 1944. Truman later recalled of the 1944 
campaign that "I found little evidence of any inclination to change 
leaders during the war." He also remarked that people "just never 
did trust” Dewey: "He had a moustache, for one thing, and since in
those days, during the war, people were aware of Hitler, that mous­
tache didn’t do him any good.” Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. 
Truman One Year of Decisions (Garden City, New Jersey, Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1955), p. 193; Miller, Plain Speaking, p. 188.
135Morning Advocate, December 19, 1944.
136Ibid., May 1, 1945; McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential 
Politics," pp. 174-175.
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Attorney Boliver E. Kemp, Jr. Morrison required a second primary to 
137defeat Brumfield.
United States Senator John Holmes Overton also faced a challenge 
for his Senate seat when his term expired in 1944. Overton at first 
threw the race wide open when he announced in March, 1944, that he 
intended to retire from politics and return to his Alexandria home.
(He was then sixty-nine years old.) During Overton’s absence from 
the race, several other candidates emerged. Former Governor Noe an­
nounced his intention to run for Overton’s seat but withdrew when his 
campaign again failed to draw adequate support. Former Governor Earl 
Long announced that if Overton did not carry the Longite banner in the
Senate campaign, then he would become a candidate. E. A. Stephens
138also announced his candidacy. Sam Jones, however, announced that he 
would stick to his pledge to return to private life after his guber­
natorial term, but "if the time should come when other vital issues 
are at stake, I shall not hesitate to once again answer the call as I 
did in 1939." Overton, however, changed his mind at the behest of 
"Democratic colleagues in Washington," and "insistent demands from all
political factions in the state" and announced his candidacy for 
139re-election.
Overton based his campaign on both his record of support for the
^^Morning Advocate, December 19, 1944.
*̂ Ibid., May 12, July 23, September 21, 1944.
~̂̂ Ibid., May 18, 24, July 6, 9, 1944; Item, May 24, 1944? Town Talk, 
June 29, July 8, 1944; States, July 8, 1944; John H.. Overton to W. 
Scott Heywood, April 1, 1944, Heywood to Sam Jones, May 6, 1944, Jones 
to Heywood, May 12, 1944, Jennings-Heywood Collection.
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United States war effort and his efforts which provided "several 
hundred million dollars" worth of flood control, navigation, irriga­
tion, and reclamation projects to Louisiana. He also revealed an un­
easiness with the growth of the federal government. The war, he said, 
caused "a very appreciable amount of regimentation," but
I wish to assure you . . . that as soon as the 
battle flags are furled I shall do all in my 
power to abolish the mushroom agencies that have 
grown overnight as adjunct to the prosecution 
of the war and that I will undertake to drive 
bureaucrats out of our federal government and 
return to the basic principles of Americandemocracy.*40
Senator Overton, despite his announcement during 1943 that he 
had been "stabbed in the back" by the Old Regulars who planned to 
support James A. Noe in the 1944 Senatorial campaign, received support 
from the Old Regulars and also from Senator Allen J. Ellender, who 
asked Louisianians to "leave the team of Overton and Ellender intact 
to carry the ball for Louisiana." Overton also received support from 
some North Louisiana interests not normally associated with Longites.
The Shreveport Times revealed the reason for its support in its edi­
torial endorsing Overton: if Overton left the Senate, then both Louisi­
ana Senators would be from South Louisiana. His defeat would leave 
North and Central Louisiana without the one Senate seat they normally 
held by Louisiana political custom.
^ ^Morning Advocate, July 7, 25, August 9. 1944.
^Ibid., July 27, August 16, 1944; Shreveport Times, July 30, 1944.
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Harry Truman's nomination as the Democratic vice-presidential 
candidate permitted Overton to utilize the Missouri Senator’s support. 
Several of Overton's campaign advertisements featured quotes from Sen­
ator Truman praising Overton's defense preparedness record. A typical 
quote read, "we have need of you in the Congress, especially in the
furtherance of the war effort and in handling the very complicated
142problems following the war." It is impossible to imagine a Sena­
torial candidate in Louisiana using Henry Wallace's endorsement in a 
similar manner. Indeed, the candidate’s opponent would have reaped 
much more benefit than the candidate Wallace endorsed.
Overton's principal opponent in the 1944 Senate race was Stephens, 
a veteran of the Sam Jones and Jimmie Davis gubernatorial campaigns, 
and loser to Ellender in 1942. Stephens flailed away at Overton, 
attacking his age ("the country and this state need strongmen in the 
U. S. Senate who are both mentally and physically able to help win this 
peace"); his Longite alliance ("The issue is clear. It is to turn over 
the important post of United States Senator to [Robert] Maestri . . . 
through the medium of my opponent and thus give Maestri a toe hold to 
take over the state a few years from now . . ."); his opposition to 
Roosevelt’s successful attempts to change the arms embargo at the be­
ginning of World War II in order to ship arms to Britain and France
(Overton "joined hands with Senator [Gerald P.] Nye of North Dakota,
143an avowed champion of Hitler, before Pearl Harbor").
142 :Town Talk, August 30, 1944; Item, September 12, 1944.-
143 ■ •Morning Advocate, July 28, August 11, 1944; States August 11,
1944.
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Overton overcame his challengers in the first Democratic primary.
He defeated Stephens as well as his other two challengers in the race,
Fourteenth Judicial District Attorney Griffen T. Hawkins of Lake
Charles, and New Orleans real estate liquidator Charles S. Gerth. The
New Orleans Item, in a post-mortem editorial on Stephens* candidacy,
found three reasons why he had lost: Sam Jones and Jimmie Davis chose
not to support him openly; many reformers chose to support Overton;
and late in the campaign, Stephens attempted to swing toward a more
liberal stance by endorsing the New Deal, thus causing some voters to
144consider him indecisive and insincere.
The 1944 Presidential and Congressional races terminated federal 
elections in Louisiana during the World War II years. Contests for 
the federal offices had several times reflected the bifactional di­
vision in the state. Despite the agreements between reformers and 
Longites in some districts in the 1940 Congressional election, and the 
reformers* decision not to endorse John Overton’s opponent in 1944, 
federal elections in Louisiana during the war years were contested 
along bifactional lines. The two factions may have temporarily united 
in support of a given candidate, but the rival political organizations 
did not disappear. When a temporary alliance unraveled, as did the Old 
Regular/reformer alliance created in 1940, for example, the two fac­
tions remained intact and ready to oppose each other.
The victory of the reformers in the 1940 Congressional elections, 
following closely Sam Jones' displacement of the Longites on the state
^^Morhihg Advocate, September 21, 1944; Item, September 14, 1944.
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level, was the zenith of success for the anti-Long faction in federal 
elections during the war years. Voter displeasure with the Longites 
contributed to reform success in five districts that year, but the 
reformers failed to hold their gains as the excesses of the Louisiana 
Scandals became only a memory. Moreover, the reform faction could not 
dislodge Longite control of both Louisiana's Senate seats. Therefore, 
while reformers enjoyed their success in several races during the war, 
the Longite faction remained strong and fully capable of reasserting 
its control of the state as it did in Earl Long's triumphant return as 
governor in 1948.
Just as some Longites remained in power on the state level, other 
members of the faction retained federal office. After 1940, however, 
their domination of Louisiana's Congressional delegation was not as­
sured. The 1940 state elections proved that Longites could be dis­
lodged from state office and the 1940 federal elections proved that 
they could be dislodged from Congressional office. As the 1940s pro­
gressed, however, and the Longite faction recovered its strength and 
regained its voter appeal, that possibility became increasingly remote.
The war years also sowed the seeds of major discord in national 
politics which burst forth during the later days of peace. The Demo­
cratic party in 1940 and 1944 beat back full-fledged Southern revolts 
because of the political power, record of leadership, and overpowering 
personality of Franklin D. Roosevelt. By 1948, however, the South’s 
anger at the Democratic party —  by then well on its way to becoming 
even more urban, liberal, and northern and thus less rural, conserva­
tive, and Southern —  could no longer be contained by President Harry 
S.. Truman, and the party split apart. Louisiana’s role in the post­
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war era, however, lies beyond the scope of this study.
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CHAPTER VII
LOUISIANA OPINION AND THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II
As war spread across the European continent after the German
invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, public reaction in the
United States was divided, but generally supported the British and
French in their military opposition to German aggression.*- Robert
Dallek’s study of American reaction reveals that 80 per cent of the
American public in early September favored the Allies, and that from
50 per cent to 60 per cent specifically favored American aid to Bri- 
2tain and France. Even with their pronounced preference for the
Allies, however, a majority of Americans unequivocally wished to keep
the United States out of the war, although the South tended to be more
pro-British and to support a more interventionist foreign policy than
3did other sections of the country.
According to Leila Sussman, United States public opinion during
T. Harry Williams, ’’Interlude: 1918-1939” in The Selected Essays
of T. Harry Williams (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 
1983), pp. 129-130; Arnold A. Offner, ”F. D. R. Remembered: Statesman
of Peaceful Means," Organization of American Historians Newsletter, 
May, 1983, p. 24; Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt & the Isolationists 1932- 
45 (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 11.
2Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 
1932-1945 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 201, 208.
3James MacGregor Bums, Roosevelt the Soldier of Freedom 1940-1945 
(New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), pp. 37, 41, 43; 
Alfred 0. Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs (Baton Rouge, Louisi­
ana State University Press, 1965), pp. 74-76; Howard K. Smith inter­
viewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, November 29, 1983.
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1940 was divided into three distinct groups: an isolationist wing, a
pro-Ally wing, and a middle group sympathetic to the Allies, but
anxious to stay out of war- Sussman also found that the last group
4was larger than the other two.
Sources reflecting public opinion in Louisiana during the months 
between German invasion of Poland in 1939 and United States entry into 
the war in December, 1941, reveal that public reaction in Louisiana 
was also divided, and that Sussman's three divisions of opinion con­
form with sentiment in Louisiana as well as in the United States. No 
major Louisiana newspaper immediately called for United States entry 
into the war on either side, and no major Louisiana newspaper was pro- 
Axis. Most Louisiana editorial opinion clearly fell into Sussman's 
third category: sympathetic to the. Allies but wary of United States 
involvement in the war. In some newspapers, however, this wariness 
was so pronounced that it bordered on outright isolationism.^
The outbreak of war did not catch Louisiana newspapermen com­
pletely by surprise. They had reported Adolph Hitler's early threats 
to the safety of Europe, and as conflict neared, they focused on the 
attempts to settle the crisis peacefully.
As the attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement failed, the 
major Louisiana newspapers hoped that the United States would remain 
aloof from the conflict. For example, the New Orleans States on
—4Leila Sussman, Dear F. D. R. A Study of Political Letter-Writing 
(Totowa, New Jersey, The Bedminister Press, 1963), pp. 105-106.
^Jerry Purvis Sanson, "Louisiana Public Opinion and the Beginning of 
World War II," paper presented to the Louisiana Historical Association 
Annual Convention, March 26, 1983.
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September 1, 1939, maintained that the United States "must keep out of 
this conflict ... If European nations want to fight, let them spill 
their own blood and provide their own materials, munitions, and 
money." The New Orleans Item, meanwhile, was just as strongly com­
mitted to keeping the United States out of war. Citing a popular 
isolationist contention that American participation in World War I 
had come to nothing, the Item reminded its readers on September 2
that the unhappy nations of Europe, having 
slaughtered each other at frequent intervals 
for 2000 years, are not amenable to suasion 
by us, [and] that our effort to help compose 
their age-old quarrels for them and advance 
civilization as a whole, by intervening in 
their latest and greatest war, [World War I] 
was frightfully injurious to ourselves without 
doing them or civilization any proportional 
good . . . their wars are no longer any of 
our business.®
The strongest proponent in North Louisiana of strict American 
neutrality in the new war was the Monroe Morning World. It warned on 
the eve of war that "Europe is an unhappy, stricken land and nothing 
is to be gained by casting our lot with hers ... We will be worse 
than foolish if we travel three thousand miles to throw ourselves once 
again into the seething cauldron." The specter of World War I loomed 
large before the Morning World: "We have not forgotten that thousands
of American lives and untold billions in American wealth and resources 
were sacrificed. Only history will reveal what good, if any, came
C.New Orleans States, September 1, 1939, New Orleans Item, September 
2, 1939.
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from that war."^
Isolationism, however, was not the unanimous reaction in North 
Louisiana to the outbreak of war. The Monroe afternoon daily news­
paper, the News-Star, suggested that the new war began in part because 
the United States had remained too aloof from world affairs following 
World War I. "Now we shall find that World affairs are going to 
bother us." In addition, the major North Louisiana daily newspaper, 
the Shreveport Times, emerged in the early days of the war as a firm 
supporter of Britain and France. While the Morning World reminded its 
readers that "many of our people came here to escape [Europe's 
hatreds]," and the States regretted "that humanity is being shamefully 
violated in Europe, that the blood of innocents is being shed. But 
there’s nothing we can do about it . . .," the Shreveport Times as­
serted that the United States would only help Germany if it withheld 
aid from Britain and France. If the United States retained the ban on 
munitions sales, the Times maintained, "we give encouragement to 
further aggression ..." The Times also did not believe that the 
American people were either disillusioned with the outcome of World 
War I, or at least did not believe that the American people were so 
disillusioned that they would, abandon the democracies to a Nazi future: 
"Any attempt to do so, under the guise of safety and pacifism, would 
be an injury to the conscience of the nation." Even though it had 
no hesitation about accepting American material intervention in the 
war, the Times was not immediately ready to commit American soldiers
M̂onroe Morning World, August 30, 1939, September 20, 1939.
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to the fight- Instead, the Times hoped that the supplies would take 
the place of American soldiers." "Repeal of the [arms] embargo would 
in reality be a sensible compromise, giving the democracies helpful 
assistance but withholding from them the active military support of
Qthe United States."
In south Louisiana this sentiment in favor of supplying American 
material aid to the Allies emerged in the editorial pages of the 
Times-Picayune, which also considered judicious revision of national 
neutrality policy a necessary American reaction to the war. The 
Times-Picayune recognized at once that the United States could not 
allow a German victory. It noted on the eve of the war that the 
United States was "not prepared to let the present [neutrality] law 
work its crippling effect on France and Britain as it did on Loyalist 
Spain," and soon after the invasion of Poland the paper recognized 
that "A vast American majority feels that upon [Hitler’s] decisive 
defeat, with its demonstration that might does not make right, may 
depend survival of institutions, principles, and humane philosophies 
prized by all civilized men and women." The Times-Picayune, however, 
also wanted American aid to go no further than equipment and supplies.
The question of whether the United'States should revise its 
neutrality laws became an important issue after President Franklin 
Roosevelt on September 13, 1939, called a special session of Congress 
to meet on September 21 to consider a revision of the regulations in
OMonroe News-Star, September 23, 1939; Morning World, August 30, 1939 
States, September 4, 1939; Shreveport Times, September 9, 22, October 
23, 1939.
9New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 31, September 4, 1939-
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order to allow supply sales to the Allies on a "cash and carry" 
basis
Roosevelt’s move toward providing material aid to the Allies 
caused a strong reaction in Louisiana public opinion. The Item re­
ported that Louisianians were divided "about 50-50” on the question, 
but, unfortunately, it did not provide the results of any scientific 
polling by which it reached its conclusion. Its perception of the 
split in Louisiana, however, matches the split that newspaper columnist 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., found in his travels throughout the South 
and which he reported to Roosevelt.
The north Louisiana newspapers split on this first important 
issue of the new war into factions which lasted until June, 1940. The
Shreveport Times accepted Roosevelt's reasons for the amendments:
. . .  if we retain the ban on munitions sales, 
we merely help Germany by injuring her enemies.
That is, we say to Britain and France that de­
spite the sea supremacy which they have won at 
heavy cost, they are barred from buying munitions 
in the United States, even though they pay cash 
and carry the munitions on their own ships.
A silent acceptance of the need for Allied victory is implied in this
paragraph, and is given greater emphasis in the next paragraph of the 
same editorial:
*̂ Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 200.
**Item, September 21, 1939; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American 
Foreign Policy, p. 200.
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At a time when Germany is gathering fresh reserves 
of munitions and supplies through her conquest of 
Poland, we give encouragement to further aggres­
sion by depriving the two great democracies of ac­
cess to normal peacetime sources of supply.^
Even more strongly, the Shreveport Times stated ten days later:
This law, which effectively aligns the United 
States with the dictatorships by depriving 
Britain and France ... of an important source 
of war supplies, should be torn down. That is 
the least this country can do, in a time of 
peril abroad, to show that it opposes domination 
of the world by stark, merciless force.13
The Shreveport Times offered two reasons for maintaing its view­
point of the neutrality amendments. It first held that
. . . under any neutrality program, our own
belief is that an embargo system which chokes 
off the sales of goods to belligerents, thus 
causing unemployment and deepening the depres­
sion, would promote the war spirit far more 
quickly than would sale of munitions to all 
comers.1̂
It is important to remember that World War II broke out as the 
Great Depression began to diminish, though none of the editorial 
writers perceived at the time that economic conditions were improving 
steadily, if slowly. This explains why the Shreveport Times considered 
economic reasons early in its policy formulation. The United States 
had just survived ten years of misery and knew of the latent violence
12Shreveport Times, September 9, 1939. 
^Ibid., September 19, 1939.
^Ibid., September 13, 1939.
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among unemployed men. However fragile Roosevelt's recovery program, 
the Times desired to "keep . . . busines on an even keel, avoiding 
either a slump or a war boom." It had experienced enough of the 
former, and was unprepared for the unimagined horrors of the latter.
The Times' second reason for accepting changes in the neutrality 
law was more idealistic:
It is not in the mood of the American people 
to withhold all aid from Great Britain and 
France in the crucial struggle which they 
face. Any attempt to do so, under the guise 
of safety and pacifism, would be an injury 
to the conscience of the nation, and would 
in the end, generate the war spirit which all 
hope now to c u r b .
Nevertheless, the Times could not completely abandon its prag­
matic reasons for supporting the amendments:
Repeal of the embargo would in reality be a 
sensible compromise, giving the democracies 
helpful assistance but withholding from them 
the active military support of the United 
States —  support which might require sending 
American soldiers to fight on Europe's soil.-1®
Even though the Times * rhetoric was not jingoistic interventionism, 
the results of the policy it advocated proved to be a step toward 
sending American soldiers to fight on European soil, even though by 
then in a conflict generally regarded as the United States' war, also.
The Morning World, meanwhile, maintained in its Armistice Day
^  Ibid., Septmeber 22, 1939.
16Ibid., October 23, 1939.
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editorial that "Our business is here. We may be about all that is
left of a civilization where individual initiative has a fair chance.
The United States, it thought, was in continual danger, and it called
upon Congress for "a strong neutrality law which would be foolproof
and serve to discourage Europe from attempting to lure us into its
18endless and cruel disputes."
This idealization created an anomalous picture of the United 
States. One Morning World editorial portrayed the United States as 
the surviving hope for individual freedom and creativity in the world 
gone mad, while analysis of another editorial reveals a shoddy, hard­
hearted, calculating Uncle Sam:
News of air atrocities by Hitler's forces will 
continue to come over the cables, and every 
American deplores such barbarism.
But sympathy does not bring involvement in war 
in this the Twentieth century. Not a combatant 
in Europe today is in the war because of sym­
pathy for some other nation. The law of self- 
preservation has brought about the present 
line-up. The law of self-preservation will 
keep this nation out of it.*9
The Morning World continued to follow its noninterventionist line 
during December, 1939, when it held that the United States would 
actually harm the Allied cause if it joined in the fight:
^ Morning World, November 11, 1939.
18Ibid., September 6, 1939.
^Ibid., September 5, 1939.
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The messier this whole affair becomes, the more 
evident it should be to the United States that 
the biggest contribution we can make toward 
better world conditions is to remain aloof.
Our whole democratic spirit may revolt at the 
strangulation of helpless neutrals elsewhere 
. . . But we could do nothing more than compli­
cate things further by throwing ourselves into 
the international r i o t . 20
The Morning World thought that the United States must concentrate 
on itself with increased efforts toward self-purification and self- 
preservation, an outlook not unlike its acceptance of other puritani­
cal ideas for the country:
. We must concern ourselves with unemployment, 
with security, with national economy. We must 
try to set up a sound agricultural program and 
to improve housing conditions. We must do all 
these things while, at the same time, we keep 
out of Europe's struggle, except insofar as we 
can help in establishing peace.21
The Morning World, like the Shreveport Times, feared anything 
that promised to cause economic disruption, even though they dis­
agreed on how the United States should prevent that disruption. The 
Morning World was much more disillusioned by the outcome of World War 
I and thought that war-time experience sufficient reason for keeping 
the country out of the new war:
We have not forgotten the World war. It sowed 
the seeds for the years of social discontent and 
depression that followed. We have not forgotten 
that thousands of American lives and untold
^Ibid., December 29, 1939. 
^Ibid., December 31, 1939'.
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billions in American wealth and resources were 
sacrificed. Only history will reveal what good, 
if any, came from that war.22
The editorial writers of the Monroe News-Star remembered World 
War I, also, but used the experience to stand the Morning World’s 
reason for staying out of the new war on its head. The News-Star 
thought that the United States would indeed be involved in the new 
war because they were not sufficiently involved in the last one:
Had we done our duty by the cause of world peace 
and civilization, this war would have never got 
going. The fact is that we Americans welshed
after the world war was won . . . when we had
the job half completed, we quit ...
Had we been an active member of the League of 
Nations from its inception, the entire world 
picture today would be different . . .
But we in the United States simply did not wish 
to be bothered by world affairs. Now we shall 
find that world affairs are going to bother us. J
The Shreveport Journal recognized early that Britain and France
were waging a war for civilization as they knew it, a concept that che
Morning World did not recognize until later, but even so, the Journal
did not call for early American intervention in the struggle:*
The sympathies of America, naturally, are with 
the British and French and Polish peoples —  
three nations which are at war to preserve 
civilization from attack by forces directed by 
a maniac.
^ Ibid., September 20, 1939. 
^News-Star, September 23, 1939.
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[But] until there is some overt act aimed squarely 
at the rights of the American people, it is their 
duty to remain calm, do nothing that would provoke 
criticism, make no wild assertions or threats.24
A local battle for arms embargo revision occurred in the "Letters
to the Editor" column of the New Orleans States. Joseph William Flynn
began the controversy with a letter published on September 13, in
which he maintained that the "cash and carry clause will eventually
lead us into war. England will control the seas as she did in the
last war; we will then be aiding England. Germany will then find some
25way of retaliating and we will be drawn into the conflict."
Flynn soon received support from other New Orleanians who were 
also opposed to neutrality revision. T. M. Heidelburg wrote that "the 
forces of war, of intervention and of internationalism are again at 
work in America, determined, if possible, to break down the remaining 
barriers that separate our country from the perpetual infernos of death 
which sweep Europe every few years." Dr. J. C. Hary also warned New 
Orleanians not to be brainwashed by the film "Nurse Edith Cavell" then 
showing at the Orpheum Theater. Hary thought that the film about the 
World War I nurse executed by Germans for alleged spying was "pure 
British propaganda," and pled, "if you are opposed to propaganda, dis­
courage this form and try to keep our people out of Europe’s bloodshed.
26We were fools once; let history not repeat itself."
24Shreveport Journal, September 2, 4, 1939.
25States, September 19, 1939.
^Ibid., September 27-28, 1939.
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The pro-Allied side, meanwhile, was busy with its own letter-
writing campaign. These writers generally recognized that Britain and
France were fighting not only for their survival but for the survival
of the United States, as well. An individual using the pseudonym "A
Reader" noted that opponents of revision frequently stated that Germany
could not possibly invade the United States, but asked "in the event
that France and England are defeated in the present struggle, what
could stop Hitler, say in 10 or 15 years from now, from making an
attempt to conquer the United States?" "A Reader" was not yet ready
to send American troops to Europe but urged revision to allow the
27Allies any war materiel they required from the United States-
R. B. Pitkin best stated the deep-seated commitment to the Euro­
pean democracies felt by pro-Allied New Orleanians: "If Germany
chooses to force a war on France and Great Britain, I, an American, 
feel that it is the duty of all freedom-loving Americans to see that 
the right side wins. To me the right side is and will always be the 
Allies.’"28
The Times-Picayune added its editorial influence to the pro-Allied 
sentiment in New Orleans. As Congress debated Roosevelt's proposed 
adjustments, the Times-Picayune lamented "all our unfortunate adven­
tures with neutrality laws over the last four years," and applauded a
27Ibid., September 28, 1939. Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse 
Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York, The Free Press, 1947), p.
271, notes the fallacy behind the pro-neutrality argument: people who
thought the United States safe as long as Europe bled itself white 
missed the fact that victorious nations gain resources with each vic­
tory. Thus, as Germany continued to triumph, Hitler’s regime would 
grow materially and strategically stronger.
28States, October 2, 1939.
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coalition of Democratic and Republican leaders who supported the presi­
dent in his attempt to "allow this country to return to the rules of
29international law and again consent to the sales of arms ..."
Congress responded to Roosevelt's request for more flexibility in 
American "neutrality" by passing the Fourth Neutrality Law, which 
allowed the "cash and carry" sales of armaments he wanted in late 
October, 1939.
The event that awakened the United States from its reluctance to
consider possible involvement in the European war was the fall of
France in June, 1940, and its attendent threat to England, the country
then considered the last citadel of civilization in Europe. France
was to Louisiana, and especially to south Louisiana, a shining symbol
of freedom and its most immediate connection to the Old World. The
sentimental attachment to France, however, did not overshadow the
hard realization that with France gone, only Britain stood between
30civilization and barbarism. By June 7, any hesitation about the 
United States supplying material aid.to the Allies felt by some 
Louisianians during the previous autumn was gone. The States on that 
day recognized that "If Britain and France both go down ... it will 
dawn on us that, alone, deprived of the armies and fleets ... we
^Times-Picayune, September 23-24, 1939.
Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, pp. 258-261 chronicles this reali­
zation throughout the United States. See also John Morton Blum, V 
Was For Victory Politics and American Culture During World War II 
(New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 7; Robert E. Sherwood, 
Roosevelt and Hopkins An Intimate History (New York, Harper & Broth­
ers, 1948), pp. 150-151; Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American 
Neutrality 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 
1955), pp. 152-166.
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must face a victorious world superpower marching on in furious revo­
lution and destructive conquest." In addition, the faculty of Cente­
nary College told Fourth District Representative Overton Brooks that 
"(we believe) that it is vital to the interest of the United States 
that England not be defeated; that the President and Congress should
. . . give immediate and effective aid to England in the form of im-
31plements of war, munitions, and credits."
The Monroe Morning World also altered its opinion about American 
aid to the Allies. Between September, 1939, and June, 1940, the 
Morning World evolved from a strong proponent of isolation to a warm 
proponent of American aid to ensure an Allied victory. By mid-June, 
1940, it stopped just short of calling for armed American intervention:
If this war were between two nations of the same
kind ... we could well afford to take an abso­
lutely neutral stand and say it was none of our
business . . . But . . . it is a war to the
finish against reincarnated barbarism —  against 
the unleashed forces of evil . . . Just how it 
is possible for a nation with the ideals of the 
United States not to throw its influence against 
Germany in this struggle ... is beyond compre­
hension . . . Only through the defeat of Hitler 
and Mussolini, or by an armed state that will awe 
them, can the United States be reasonably certain 
that it will be spared the horrors that now beset 
France. ̂
The Shreveport Times recognized early the importance of French
31States, June 7, 1940; Congressional Record 77 Congress 1 Session 
Appendix Volume 87 Part 10 (Washington, D.C., United States Government 
Printing Office, 1941), p. A88; William M. Tuttle, "Aid-to-the-Allies- 
Short-of-War versus American Intervention, 1940: A Reappraisal of
William Allen White’s Leadership," The Journal of American History, 
March, 1970, pp. 840-841.
^Morning World, June 16, 18, 1940.
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contributions to Western European civilization, and lamented its pas­
sing to German puppet control:
It was freedom that made Paris great. Men and 
women were free to utilize their, full talents 
without restraints. . .
If the German armies march into Paris, all this 
will be plunged into the dustbin of history.
The event will send dour echoes down through 
the future, influencing the course of human 
thought and action. 3̂
The fall of Verdun reminded the Shreveport Times of a firebell 
warning the United States of the spreading danger. Contrasting stub­
born French defense of Verdun in 1915 with virtual abandonment in 1940,
it said: "It serves stern warning that the new way of war practiced
34by the Nazis is deadly for the old ways of defense." No amount of 
American aid would be too much in this new combat, and the Shreveport 
Times thought that aid must be delivered to France, even if American 
merchant ships had to carry it, a strong veer toward American inter­
vention in the war: "What the French ask for, they should be given,
at top speed ... If there is a shortage of trans-Atlantic shipping
space, then arrangements should be made to transfer merchants to
35registry allowing their use."
The Shreveport Times eclipsed even this belligerent attitude 
later in the month in an editorial that all but acknowledged that the
"33Shreveport Times, June 14, 1940.
3^Ibid., June 16, 1940.
35Ibid., June 12, 1940.
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United States was at war and needed to create a war economy and 
society. In support of a military draft bill introduced in Congress, 
the Shreveport Times recalled the 1917-1918 draft:
. . . the broad result of the draft system was 
good. It taught the nation discipline. Too, 
when one saw the whole country moving forward 
under a co-ordinated plan for summoning its man­
power, one could sense the might of democracy.
The draft system produced confidence which was 
an important factor in winning the war.36
The fall of France also welded the sentiments of two of the 
smaller north Louisiana dailies to the Allied cause. The Shreveport 
Journal wrote:
That the people of the United States regard Italy’s 
decision to fight on the side of the dictator as 
a distinct threat to the peace of the whole world, 
including the American continents, is the generally 
accepted view . . . Congress should put on 'full 
speed ahead' in the enactment of whatever legisla­
tion is necessary and in the providing of funds, 
regardless of the cost.
. . . there is no alternative for the United States 
save preparation to meet any emergency which may be 
forced by the German maniac and his Italian partner. 
For this work of preparedness the American people 
are ready to give their money unstintedly and of 
their lives if necessary, lest this great democracy 
of the western hemisphere suffer the fate that has 
befallen its friends across the Atlantic.37
The Monroe News-Star recognized that the European fight was being 
waged for the existence of the United States, also, but was selfishly
36Ibid., June 24, 1940.
37Shreveport Journal, June 11, 15, 1940.
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jubilant that this country was not yet involved in the struggle:
If our boys were over there fighting this war, 
we would send them everything they need which 
we have or could get. Then why should we not 
do all in our power to help the boys over there, 
who are fighting our fight over there, and thank
God that the war is not over here and that those
boys are not our boys?3®
The Louisiana/France connection was also poignantly revealed in 
the sentiments felt by the Marianite Sisters of Holy Cross College in
New Orleans. Their Mother House in LeMans, France was now in Nazi-
occupied territory. The Our Lady of Holy Cross Chronicles reported:
Our hearts are torn with anguish at the thought 
of the anxiety and suffering of our dear Reverend 
Mother and her Sisters. Many times a day our 
prayers rise heavenward, begging God to protect 
them in this hour of dire need and peril. May
our dear Mother of Sorrows be their solace in
this great affliction.39
The Allied military setbacks of 1940 were a severe shock to the 
American people. In Louisiana these events, especially the fall of 
France, led to increasingly widespread acceptance of the possibility 
that American troops might eventually be needed overseas, and that at 
the least Britain needed more supplies than it could buy with cash in
order to continue the struggle against Nazi Germany. By November,
1940, several major Louisiana newspapers began advocating loans or
38 —News-Star, June 5, 1940.
39Our Lady of Holy Cross Chronicle, quoted in Betty L. Morrison, "A 
History of Our Lady of Holy Cross College, New Orleans, Louisiana" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1976), p. 50.
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outright gifts to keep Britain supplied and American boys at home.̂
One Louisiana public official, United States Senator Allen J.
Ellender, however, warned at the end of 1940 that continued drift of
public opinion toward providing loans to England, President Roosevelt's
so-called "Lend-Lease" proposals, might well lead to war. "Should we
determine to change existing laws so as to further aid England, we
might as well make up our minds to go the whole way and do some 
41fighting." Ellender*s comments, however, failed to stop the con­
tinued drift of public opinion toward acceptance of possible United 
States involvement.
By "the beginning of 1941, many Louisianians believed that perhaps 
the United States was no longer in control of its own destiny. The 
editor of the Lafayette Daily Advertiser recognized that the question 
of peace or war was not wholly for the United States to decide and re­
marked that keeping the country out of the war was an excellent idea 
"if we can only find the way to do it . . . [but] events may take the 
decision out of the hands of Americans." Or, as the Morning Advocate 
said even more directly: "Should the United States ever enter this
war . . .  it will be because the logic of events shall have gradually
40Times-Picayune, March 15, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 27, 1940; 
Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 27, November 27, December 26, 1940.
41Morning Advocate, December 25, 1940. Ellender's position closely 
reflected that of his Senate colleague, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, 
an isolationist. See Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, p. 282. Ellen­
der also wrote to a constituent that "You may be sure that I am whole­
heartedly in favor of the United States maintaining its neutrality in 
the present European conflict and I am absolutely opposed to sending 
our soldiers to fight the battles of other countries." Allen J. Ellen­
der to J. C. Curry, April 26, 1940, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. 
Ellender Archives, Allen J. Ellender Library, Nicholls State Univer­
sity, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
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drawn us into the position ... in which the likely results of not
fighting is [sic] less tolerable than all the horror of war itself."
The Baton Rouge Kiwanis Club also passed a resolution on May 1, 1941,
which recognized "that no nation or people anywhere on the globe can
hope to remain neutral except on terms and conditions specified by
[the Axis] and to end in becoming their tool and vassal" and "that the
vital interests and perhaps the very survival of our American democracy
42are at stake in this World War."
President Roosevelt decided in July, 1941, that the safety of 
the United States and the North Atlantic shipping lanes to England 
required that he dispatch American soldiers to protect Iceland from 
threatened German subjugation after the fall of Denmark. This move 
met with widespread approval in Louisiana. The Shreveport Times 
wrote:
There can be no question in Hitler’s mind now 
that this nation really means business.
Either we [keep the Atlantic shipping lanes open] 
or everything that has been done and everything 
that has been said of what we are willing to do 
to defeat Hitler must be classed as empty phrase­
ology and idle gesture.^
While the Morning World also supported the president’s action, 
it also soberly reflected on its possible outcome:
42Lafayette Daily Advertiser, January 2,- -1941; Morning Advocate, Janu­
ary 16, 1941; Congressional Record, 77 Congress 1 Session Volume 87 
Part 11 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 
1941), p. A2139I
/
Shreveport Times, July 8, 1941; Drummond, The Passing of American 
Neutrality, pp. 245-246; Cole, Roosevelt & the Isolationists, pp. 431- 
433.
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. . . the war is entering upon an intensified 
stage, and the United States is drawing ever 
nearer to hostilities as the nation’s defense 
effort is providing more and more of the sinews 
of war.44
North Louisiana press attitude toward the American move into Ice­
land was best summarized in a thoughtful editorial in the Shreveport 
Journal:
That President Roosevelt acted upon his own 
initiative and then informed Congress, is . . . 
worthy or note —  and of commendation . . . 
here is one instance, at last, where a Demo­
cratic government has taken decisive action 
before it was ’eternally too late’ . . . the 
friendly move into Iceland • . . means that 
Hitler can not under any possible set of cir­
cumstances use it as a base from which to 
launch an attack against this country or 
against ships in service between the United 
States and Great Britain. It was a very wise 
and timely action.45
In south Louisiana, the New Orleans States commented of the
United States move into Iceland that "It is encouraging to see one of
the great democracies moving boldly with foresight." The Morning
Advocate added that "The occupation of Iceland by American air and
land forces is the only logical step under the circumstances . . .
What would it avail us to make goods for Britain if the Nazis had
46control of the strategic post in the North Atlantic?"
Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has maintained that
44Morning World, July 11, 1941.
45Shreveport Journal, July 10, 1941.
^States, July 8, 1941; Morning Advocate, July 9, 1941.
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Roosevelt’s movement of United States troops into Iceland by executive
agreement constituted a major assumption of power by the president at
47the expense of Congress. This consideration mattered little to many
Louisianians. The States commented that "It is well that he acted
without first submitting the enterprise to Congress for debate that
would have run on interminably and likely resulted in the imposition
48of silly restrictions or conditions." Other newspapers confidently
commented that if Roosevelt arrogated some powers not normally held
by the presidency, the wartime situation demanded and legitimized such
action. Furthermore, other wartime presidents, notably Abraham Lincoln
and Woodrow Wilson, had exercised unprecedented wartime powers, but
with the coming of peace, the executive branch had relinquished those
49powers. Roosevelt, they thought, would do the same.
The event that unquestionably led to almost unanimous support in 
Louisiana for direct American military intervention in the horror of 
World War II was the Japanese attack on the American naval base at 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. The immediate American re­
action was to shatter nearly all isolationist opposition to the war 
and to weld together temporarily a strong base of domestic support for
47Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, Hough­
ton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 110-112.
48States, July 8, 1941.
49Shreveport Times, June 8, November 8, 1941; Morning World, June 17, 
1941.
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American intervention.^ Again, Louisiana public opinion closely re­
flected American public opinion. The Shreveport Times echoed the 
popular idea that "By her vicious assault, the Far Eastern imperialists 
have eradicated . . . all the inner dissensions which have hampered 
American rearmament in recent months . . . the nation [now] takes up 
arms against an enemy who made the fatal error of initiating aggressive 
action." The Shreveport Journal called for "Prosecution of the war to 
definite and overwhelming victory.
After the Pearl Harbor attack, the Monroe Morning World came 
fully about face from its earlier non-interventionist position. On 
December 11, 1941, the Morning World remarked that "the urgent task 
is to smite the Japs so hard that they will never be able to take the 
offensive in the war." The Monroe News-Star echoed the same sentiment:
"We shall not sheathe [our sword] until the world power of Japan is
52broken, finally and forever."
The New Orleans newspapers also abandoned completely their pre­
vious non-interventionist sentiment. The Item on December 8, 1941, 
called for "the prosecution of the war against our aggressor enemies 
. . . with all our strength and resources." The States commented more
J
^Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, pp. 290-291; T. Harry Williams, 
"World War II: The American Involvement," in The Selected Essays of
T. Harry Williams, pp. 143-147; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
American Foreign Policy, pp. 311-313; Bums, Roosevelt The Soldier 
of Freedom, pp. 166-171; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 437- 
438; Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, pp. 502-505.
"̂ Shreveport Times, December 8, 1941; Shreveport Journal, December 8,
1941.
52Morning World, December 11, 1941; News-Star, December 15, 1941.
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53bluntly that "Japan must be blasted off the face of the earth."
In summary, Louisiana public opinion about World War II from Sep­
tember, 1939, until December, 1941, generally followed American public 
opinion closely. The outbreak of war in September, 1939, competed 
with the breaking story of the Louisiana Scandals and the gubernatorial 
election for Louisiana’s attention and indeed, many opinion-makers in 
Louisiana compared the Longite machine and the dictatorial Nazi govern­
ment in Germany. As Louisiana considered the military situation, 
however, a general revulsion at the possibility of American involvement 
in another "European" war gradually gave way to the realization that 
the United States was necessarily going to be involved in the war on 
the side of the Allies. The fall of France in June, 1940, greatly 
accelerated that realization, but it was only after the Pearl Harbor 
attack that the United States and Louisiana had at last to accept the 
fact that the United States had become, though perhaps unavoidably, a 
major belligerent.
53Item, December 8, 1941; States, December 8, 1941.
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CHAPTER V I I I
THE EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II UPON EDUCATION IN LOUISIANA
World War II caused unprecedented problems within the Louisiana 
education system, and led to the assumption of new responsibilities 
and the placement of greater emphasis on certain portions of the tra­
ditional curriculum. As the conflict began, and as the United States 
responded with expanded national defense programs which included 
training thousands of soldiers in Louisiana army camps, local school 
systems designed to accomodate the local population found themselves 
suddenly overrun by children of soldiers who had moved their families 
south. The central Louisiana area including Camps Beauregard, Living­
ston, and Claiborne suffered especially from such overcrowding. State 
Superintendent of Education John E. Coxe announced on January 7, 1941, 
that the Rapides Parish School System had experienced an increase of 
approximately 600 students over the previous year’s enrollment. More­
over, the system expected about 500 additional students by February 15. 
Small Pollock High School in neighboring Grant Parish had a one-hundred 
student increase over the previous year, and expected an additional 
one hundred students within a few weeks. Nevertheless, Coxe promised 
that Louisiana would provide educational facilities for all children 
of army men stationed in the state. Massive federal aid programs 
which might have facilitated the absorption of the new students did 
not then exist. The major federal aid program for Louisiana schools 
in 1939 was the Works Progress Administration program, co-sponsored by 
the State Department of Education, to provide nutritious lunches to
348
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underprivileged children.*
Following the initial increase, however, Louisiana schools experi-
2enced declining enrollments. Table 1 illustrates the steady reduc­
tion in numbers of both white and black students which began in the
TABLE 1
Students Enrolled in Louisiana Schools, By Race
1938-39 through 1945-46
Year White Black Total
1938-39 298,028 173,300 471,328
1938-40 298,455 174,649 473,104
1940-41 297,486 174,886 472,372
1941-42 288,324 173,511 461,835
1942-43 277,338 171,743 449,081
1943-44 266,061 163,208 429,269
1944-45 263,291 163,553 426,844
1945-46 264,770 165,229 429,999
SOURCE: Louisiana State Department of Education ninetieth Annual Re­
port for the Session 1938-39. Louisiana State Department of Education 
Annual Report, 1939-40, Louisiana State Department of Education Ninety- 
fourth Annual Report For the Session 1942-43, Louisiana State Depart­
ment of Education Ninety-fifth Annual Report For the Session 1943,
1944, Louisiana State Department of Education Ninety-Sixth Annual Re­
port For the Session 1944-45, Louisiana State Department of Education 
Ninety-Seventh Annual Report For the Session 1945-46.
Alexandria Daily Town Talk, January 7, 1941 (hereinafter cited as 
Town Talk); Jerry W. Valentin, "The WPA and Louisiana Education," 
Louisiana History, Fall, 1968, pp. 391-395.
2The composition of the student body also underwent a change. By the 
1943-44 school year, only in West Feliciana Parish did boys outnumber 
girls enrolled in school. Louisiana Department of Education Bulletin 
No. 543 Ninety-fifth Annual Report for School Year 1943, 1944, pp. 
186-187; Louisiana Department of Education Bulletin No. 548 Official 
Proceedings of the State Board of Education January 8, 1945; James 
Adair Mackey, "A History of the Louisiana State University Laboratory 
School, 1915-1965" (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 
1971), pp. 90, 92. The Department of Education Bulletins will herein­
after be cited as Bulletin with the appropriate number and/or subtitle.
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1941-42 school year and continued through the 1945-46 school year, 
with white enrollment continuing to decline until 1946 and black en­
rollment increasing only slightly from 1944 to 1946.
Regardless of the number of students enrolled in Louisiana schools 
during any wartime year, the state experienced problems providing the 
education Coxe had promised in 1941. The massive army training exer­
cises known as the "Louisiana Maneuvers" conducted during 1941 and 
again in 1942 caused a delay in opening the school year in the maneuver 
area because of the "considerable danger" the State Department of Edu­
cation found for school children riding buses on roads crowded with 
military vehicles. Delays in opening schools in these parishes 
created an accounting problem. The school boards preferred beginning 
teacher pay periods on the first day of classes, thus retaining control 
of payroll funds for an additional time period, while the teachers
themselves and the Louisiana Teachers' Association requested that pay
3periods begin on the day school would have normally begun.
Wartime gasoline rationing also caused problems within the edu­
cation transportation system. The State Department of Education in 
1943 directed all parish superintendents to prepare maps for the 
routes of each school bus so that an adequate supply of war-rationed
3Willoughby Aaron Sullivan, Jr., "The Development of the Louisiana 
Teachers' Association," (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Univer­
sity, 1968), p. 310; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, August 14, 1941.
The State Board of Education approved the delay in opening schools in 
the maneuver area in 1941, and ordered local school systems to pay 
their employees on the same schedule they would use if they followed 
their normal calendars. Bulletin No. 460 Official Proceedings August 
22, 1941.
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gasoline could be obtained.
The school system also suffered from personnel shortages during 
the war years. Teachers and other school employees left their posts 
to enter the armed forces or to accept higher-paying jobs in defense 
or war-related industries. As a result of this exodus, the State 
Department of Education issued more than 1,000 temporary teaching 
certificates during the twelve months between March, 1941, and March,
1942. The Louisiana Teachers’ Association worried that the tempor­
arily-certified teachers would be unqualified, that scholastic achieve­
ment in the state would drop, and that "the schools will be subjected 
to harsh and unjust criticism ..."■?
Despite these dislocations and annoyances, Louisiana schools were 
still obliged to assume additional functions in the war-time society. 
Teachers, already under stress because of larger classes than normal, 
were expected to provide time for implementing the rationing program 
by enrolling people on ration lists, and distributing ration books or 
commodities. Teachers also had to encourage students to buy war stamps
B̂ulletin No. 518 Ninety-fourth Annual Report for the Session 1942- 
43, p. 20.
'’Town Talk, August 31, 1943; Sullivan, "The Development of the Louisi­
ana Teachers* Association," p. 299; E. B. Robert, '!rhe College of Edu­
cation of Louisiana State University in the Present Emergency, March 
4, 1942" in The Life and Work of E. B. (Ted) Robert (Baton Rouge, The 
Bureau of Educational Materials and Research, College of Education, 
Louisiana State University, 1972), p. 214; "Minutes of the Executive 
Council, May 24, 1941," Louisiana Schools, September, 1941, p. 32; 
"Editorial Comment," Louisiana Schools, January, 1942, p. 17; "Shortage 
of Teachers With Special Reference to Louisiana," Louisiana Schools, 
December, 1942, p. 9. The Class T "Temporary" Certificates were valid 
for only one year, and were issued "to applicants of high qualifica­
tions on recommendation of the superintendent."
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or bonds to aid the war effort.^
The Louisiana education system, along with other state systems, 
had to inculcate both a strong awareness of the national defense needs 
of the United States and a vigorous patriotism in students. The New 
Orleans Times-Picayune remarked in August, 1941, that "National de­
fense will be an underlying theme of classes from kindergarten through 
college." The Times-Picayune predicted that awareness of national 
defense needs would result in increased interest in military training, 
and in the introduction of more home nursing, nutrition, physical fit­
ness, and skilled trades in the schools.^
A movement toward requiring Louisiana schools to teach the dangers 
of the world emergency and to place increased emphasis on patriotism 
began during the summer of 1940 when representatives from the American 
Legion of Louisiana and the United Veterans Defense Council appeared 
before the State Board of Education. The American Legion requested 
that the Board "include as a part of the Educational system of this 
state, and to be included in its curricula, a course on flag etiquette." 
In addition, the United Veterans Defense Council petitioned the Board
to direct that one hour each week be set aside to educate "Americans
*. . . in the public schools of the State . . . that a national crisis 
now exists." The Board approved the petitions, and directed an
6Town Talk, January 22, February 4, 1942; Sullivan, "The Development 
of the Louisiana Teachers' Association," p. 311; Bessie Lawrence 
interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, September 10, 1983; Thomas P. 
Southerland, "Rules and Regulations Enacted By Rapides Parish School 
Board Since 1893 and Their Implications" (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisi­
ana State University, 1960), pp. 55-56.
N̂ew Orleans Times-Picayune, August 26, 1941.
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8enthusiastic State Department of Education to implement the program,
Superintendent Coxe having already reflected much the same sentiment:
the world crisis, he said, "should make us sensitive to the virtue of
democracy and appreciative of our government, as well as deeply aware
of our responsibility to provide training and practice in citizenship
9for the boys and girls in our schools."
The Department prepared a circular explaining the objectives of 
this "intelligent patriotism" program, explaining that
What we need most is a generation trained with 
a devotion to [the] principles which will serve 
as a guarantee to our freedom against the 
enemies of democracy who refuse to value the 
lives of the people who constitute the state 
—  a devotion so strong that we will be willing 
to fight for them, and if necessary, die for 
them.
The circular included a number of specific goals. Depending on grade 
level, students would learn to understand and appreciate the meaning 
of the flag; to sing the national anthem and other patriotic songs; 
understand "what our national heroes stood for from the time our govern­
ment was founded"; understand "wherein our government is superior to 
a state ruled by a dictator"; learn how to condemn dishonesty, corrup­
tion, graft, and inefficiency in government; how to discover and use
OBulletin No. 438 Official Proceedings August 16, 1940. pp. 25-26, 
28-29.
qBulletin No. 435 Suggested State Program, 1940-41, p. 18. In 1943, 
the State Board of Education made the teaching of patriotism a perman­
ent part of the Louisiana education system by adding one year of high 
school civics to the requirements for graduation. Bulletin No. 499 
Official Proceedings January 11, 1943, p. 7.
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facts against "insidious propaganda"; how to read patriotic stories 
and biographies; hold a mock Constitutional Convention and learn that 
they could not do so under a dictator; and study the Magna Carta, the 
Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights.^
The State Board of Education also passed a resolution in June, 
1941, reiterating its approval of the teaching of patriotism, saluting 
the flag, and the.Pledge of Allegiance, and commending the local school 
authorities for their help in carrying out these goals.
The combined themes of defense and patriotism were greatly empha­
sized in school activities throughout Louisiana. Teachers at Ruston 
High School, for example, developed and taught a unit on national 
defense during the fall semester of 1941. Students learned about the 
Army and Navy, defense bases, diplomatic policy, the role of industry,
and other aspects of the subject (including one that could have been
12most interesting —  "Defense and the Public Pocketbook").
Forty years after the war, Bessie Lawrence, a third grade teacher 
at Buckeye High School in rural Rapides Parish during the 1940s re­
membered the patriotic flavor of school life during the early 1940s.
The school day began with the Pledge of Allegiance and salute to the 
flag. School assemblies often were held around the flagpole in front 
of the school. The students sang patriotic songs, a faculty member,
^Bulletin No. 453 Minutes of the Meeting of the State Board of 
Education May 5 and 6, 1941, pp. 26-27.
"̂Bulletin No. 459 Official Proceedings June 27, 1941, p. 29.
12Judith Crymes, "National Defense —  A Project," Louisiana Schools, 
January, 1941, pp. 19, 32.
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or occasionally a soldier, spoke on a patriotic theme, stressing the
virtue of democracy symbolized by the United States flag. "We taught
them that’s what men were fighting for. As long as it flew, we would
be free, but if someone else took us, we would not be free."
Dean E. B. Robert of the Louisiana State University College of
Education told high school graduating classes in 1941, "Every public
school-house in this republic should be a holy temple of democracy,
every public-school teacher a high priest daily administering at its
altar . . . Preparation through education for its duties and obliga-
14tions is the ordained means for its preservation."
In New Orleans, teachers at the Henry W. Allen Elementary School 
used the sudden popularity of things military and patriotic to en­
courage their students to read more energetically. They devised a 
system of military ranks in which students received promotions for 
reading certain books. Reading any ten approved books made a student 
a "second lieutenant" in the army or an "ensign" in the navy; two 
historical novels read promoted one to the rank of "second lieutenant" 
or "lieutenant j.g." The ranks went all the way to the top —  Tales 
From Shakespeare, King Arthur and His Knights of the Round Table, and 
Rip Van Winkle carried one upward to "lieutenant commander" or "major," 
while twenty-four poems by Sidney Lanier, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow,
13Bessie Lawrence interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, September 10, 
1983.
14E. B. Robert, "Education As A Safeguard to Democracy," in The Life 
and Work of E. B. (Ted) Robert, p. 202. Louisiana educators obviously 
took Robert’s admonition to heart.
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James Russell Lowell, and Edgar A. Guest brought the rank of "commander" 
or "lieutenant colonel." A student could complete the program by 
reading three "oustanding" plays and become an "admiral" or "general- 
Requirement of patriotic observances in the public schools caused 
some disagreement regarding the constitutional relationship between 
church and state. The controversy arose when A. J. Smith, principal 
of Evergreen High School in Avoyelles parish, required members of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses attending his school to pledge allegiance to the 
flag during classroom exercises. The Jehovah’s Witnesses objected 
because such a pledge conflicted with their religious beliefs, and 
Reverend Victor Blackwell of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Richard 
Cadwallader, a representative of the Louisiana League for the Preser­
vation of Constitutional Rights, protested Smith's requirement to the 
State Board of Education. Louisiana Attorney General Eugene Stanley 
advised the Board that because they had passed a resolution requiring 
the observance, he could find no reason why they could not enforce it. 
Board members themselves were split on the issue. Most stated their 
belief that all students should salute the flag, while other suggested 
a compromise by which the Board should specifically exempt Jehovah's 
Witnesses from the requirement. The Board decided to defer action on 
the question indefinitely and declined to issue a ruling on the ques­
tion during the war years, presumably leaving parish superintendent or
^New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, November 23, 1941.
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school principals to wrestle with the problem themselves.^
In addition to inculcating patriotism in school children, the 
State Department of Education also developed plans for the schools to 
educate adults about the national emergency. The Department formulated 
this plan in response to a nationwide call by President Franklin 
Roosevelt and United States Commissioner of Education John W. Stude- 
baker for development of public education and discussion forums 
focused on the national emergency. The Louisiana plan called for 
community meetings to be held in school buildings. Programs included 
the singing of patriotic songs, group recitations of the Pledge of 
Allegiance, and discussion of pertinent topics. Suggested topics in­
cluded "The Local Community's Part in the Present Emergency," "Public 
Health and the War," "The Farm Family's Part in the Present Emergency," 
"Inter-American Friendship," and "The Bill of Rights.
World War II also initiated a debate concerning the utility of 
education during wartime. Governor Jones called on Louisiana educa­
tors to make education more practical:
We ought to scrap or radically revise our educa­
tional system and start all over again . . .  We 
need to teach our children agriculture, how to 
farm, and mechanics . . . You can’t face the 
problems of life by studying Shakespeare.*®
^Bulletin No. 453 Minutes, May 5 and 6, 1941, pp. 31-33; Town Talk, 
January 8, 1941; Morning Advocate, April 9, May 7, 1941.
^Bulletin No. 478 Proposed Plan of Citizenship and Civilian Morale 
Education for Louisiana, pp. 1-2, 4-7.
18Morning Advocate, August 12, 1941.
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"The plain fact is that our boys and girls are not learning in suffi­
cient numbers how to earn a living in their own baliwicks," the 
Governor reiterated. "Somehow, I can’t escape from the notion that
it is more important for a young man in the coastal parishes to know
19how to build a boat than to know Latin." While the Governor may have
overstated his case in order to be emphatic, he clearly and sincerely
desired that Louisiana train its students for jobs in the traditional
farming, fishing, and trapping occupations, as well as positions in
20the newer oil recovery and chemical industries.
Not everyone in Louisiana agreed that public education in America 
should abandon its responsibilities for teaching the history and 
legacies of Western civilization and developing well-rounded intellects 
just to impart timely technical knowledge. John Edward Hardy, writing 
in Louisiana Schools remarked:
. . . the purpose of education is not to be de­
fined with a cancellation clause effective in 
the event of war. If the purpose of educational 
activity is well considered and seriously defined 
at its inception and is consistently understood 
during the building of the tradition of an edu­
cational system, it is not subject to capricious 
change with a view only to the exegencies of the 
moment. *
All that the new war-time studies can provide is 
a knowledge of technique. The necessary develop­
ment of the intellect must be accomplished by 
other means . . .  If [we give the students] only 
these techniques and deprive a whole generation 
of that knowledge . . . which alone can make 
them just and not blind users of the power instru-
19Times-Picayune, October 21, 1941.
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ments, we are defeated though we conquer those 
nations which have appeared as the immediate 
incarnation of the forces of evil .'21
While Governor Jones called for an ambitious program of vocation­
al education to provide students with practical knowledge they could 
apply on the farm or in one of Louisiana's emerging industries, the 
increased vocational emphasis during the war years themselves focused 
on training more efficient workers for jobs serving the needs of 
America's defense effort. Therefore, both public schools and trade 
schools in Louisiana adjusted their curricula to incorporate programs 
requested by the federal government. These programs were of two 
categories: those designed to improve industrial performance, and
others designed to increase agricultural production.
The schools provided additional industrial training under three 
plans. Plan I (Trade and Industrial) included pre-employment re­
fresher courses for people drawn from Louisiana State Employment 
Office and Works Progress Administration rolls. These courses in­
cluded thirty to forty hours of class time each week. In addition, 
the schools provided refresher courses for people already employed, 
which included ten to twelve hours of class time each week. Plan I 
provided refresher courses in welding (both electric and oxy-acetylene), 
machine shop, electricity, sheet metal, automobile mechanics, and 
radio repair. The Plan I curriculum did not interfere with regular 
courses because it was presented at odd hours when school facilities 
were not in use. By the end of the 1939-40 school year, 4,938 people
21John Edward Hardy, "War-Time Proposals for High School Curricula 
Changes," Louisiana Municipal Review, March-April, 1943, pp. 27, 42,
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22were enrolled in courses offered under.Plan I.
Plan II (Vocational Education for Defense Workers for Rural and 
Non—Rural Youth) provided courses specifically for persons just 
entering the industrial work force. Potential enrollees had to be 
between seventeen and twenty—five years of age. This program drew 
students from the Civilian Conservation Corps and NYA rolls as well 
as from the general population. Plan II was subdivided into "Pro­
grams." Progam A, titled "General Pre-Employment Courses," provided 
training in the operation, care, and repair of tractors, trucks, and 
automobiles (both gasoline and Diesel engines); metal work, including 
simple welds, tempering, drilling and shaping; woodworking; and ele­
mentary electricity, including care and repair of electrical equipment. 
Program B, titled "Specific Pre-Employment Preparatory Courses,” pro­
vided more intensive training in motor mechanics, welding, machine 
shop, lathe operation, drill press operation, shaper operation, elec­
trical work, sheet metal work, and radio repair. By the end of the
1939-40 school year, approximately 10,000 Louisianians were enrolled
in the 400 courses offered in Program A, and 1,200 were enrolled in
23the 70 courses in Program B.
Plan III, entitled "Youth Engaged on NYA Work Projects," offered 
courses in three areas: agriculture, trade and industry, and home
22Bulletin No. 448 Ninety-first Annual Report for the Session 1939- 
40, p. 32; Bulletin No. 473 Manual For Vocational Training for De­
fense Workers For Administrators and Teachers of Vocational Training 
For Out-Of-School Rural and Non-Rural Youth—  Louisiana Program Num­
ber 4, p. 11; Bulletin No. 445 Official Proceedings January 3, 1941, 
pp. 17-19; Bulletin No. 448 Ninety-first Annual Report, pp. 33-34, 41.
23Bulletin No. 448 Ninety-first Annual Report, pp. 34-35, 41.
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economics. These courses provided intensive training supplementary 
to work experience provided hy the NYA, and supposedly eased the ad­
justment from NYA jobs to permanent employment- In addition, Plan III 
included programs designed "to enlarge the civic or vocational intel­
ligence of young people employed on NYA work projects." Approximately
4,000 of the 5,000 NYA workers in Louisiana at the end of the 1939-40
24school year were enrolled in some phase of Plan III.
The home economics courses taught in Plan III included instruction 
in health and nutrition, home care of the ill, first aid, clothing, 
housing, consumer buying, and personal living. Students enrolled in 
the Trade and Industry section of the plan also received training in 
federal, state, or local government offices in bookkeeping, filing, 
typewriting, manual and machine record keeping, and preparing statisti­
cal data.^
While the programs summarized above dealt primarily with individu­
als outside the mainstream of Louisiana secondary education, the war 
also altered the state’s high school curriculum. These modifications 
occurred primarily in two areas: implementation of the "High School
Victory Corps" program, and improvement in the Vocational Agriculture 
program to improve agricultural education.
The High School Victory Corps caused an extensive expansion in 
educational programs. It required both new emphasis on traditional 
subjects and introduction of subjects not normally taught in high
^Ibid., pp. 36, 42.
25Bulletin No. 454~ Louisiana For Defense, pp. 37—41.
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schools. The High School Victory Corps was originally intended for 
high schools desiring an ROTC, but not previously having the facilities 
to implement such a program. The United States Army provided a train­
ing curriculum approved by the State. Department of Education; ROTC 
departments in colleges and universities throughout the state provided 
training sessions for instructors, and also became "sponsoring 
agencies." This assistance from the military helped high schools im­
plement the program and maintain acceptable quality. The object of 
the High School Victory Corps was to familiarize boys with army life
and training, and thus shorten the basic training period required for 
27recruits.
Courses studied in the High School Victory Corps included (during 
the first year of study) military courtesy and customs of the armed 
services, infantry drill regulations, military sanitation and first 
aid, military history and policy, military organization, and rifle 
marksmanship. The second year of study included map reading, tech­
niques of rifle fire, tactical training of the individual soldier 
(as scout, observer, sentinel, listener, sniper, or messenger), auto­
matic rifle and machine gun fire, combat training, and infantry 
28drill. In addition, the High School Victory Corps curriculum in­
cluded studies of the opposing philosophies of the Axis and the Allied 
powers, patriotic attitudes, progress of the war, recognition of 
propaganda, global geography, and the wartime economy. Community
27Bulletin No. 520 Military Training and Leadership in High Schools 
of Louisiana (High School Victory Corps Program), pp. 1-2.
2 8 , o cIbid., pp. 3-5.
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services included school participation in civilian defense, scrap
drives, war stamp and bond drives, and conservation of community 
29resources.
In addition to training future soldiers, Louisiana schools also 
helped to train future army clerks by providing training in army pro­
cedure and forms. The State Department of Education suggested that 
this course be ranked as a second semester senior course worth one-
half credit toward graduation, but warned that it could not be sub-
30stituted for regular business courses.
The State Board of Education, at the request of the War Depart­
ment, also recommended, but did not require, that high school prin­
cipals include one or more general pre-induction courses in the funda­
mentals of electricity, radio, machines and tools, shop work, and 
automobile mechanics. The War Department had found that inductees
from throughout the United States needed additional training in these
31areas in order to shorten their post-induction training period.
Not all Louisianians initially favored this headlong rush to
turn the state’s educational system into prep schools for boot camp.
A coalition of Parent-Teachers' Associations defeated a bill requiring
compulsory military training for high school and college students
32introduced in the 1940 legislative session. This defeat occurred
29Bulletin No. 496 Wartime Education'Curriculum Changes (Implementing 
the High School Victory Corps), pp. 14, 37, 40-57.
30Bulletin No. 511 Pre-induction Training in Army Clerical Procedures, 
pp. 1-4.
^ Bulletin No. 502 Official Proceedings April 5, 1943, p. 48.
32New Orleans Item, June 5, 1940.
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just as Louisiana experienced the shock resulting from the fall of 
France. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, cast military 
training in a different light and led to a more receptive attitude 
toward the teaching of military subjects in Louisiana schools. Even 
then, however, the High School Victory Corps remained a voluntary 
program.
Louisiana also adjusted its Vocational Agricultural Education 
program to meet the needs of the wartime emergency by providing in­
struction in producing specific crops deemed vitally essential by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. The new Vocational Education program 
trained high school youths, out-of-school rural youths, and adult 
farmers. The schools provided evening classes for the out-of-school
youth and adults, while high school students participated in Vocational
33Agriculture training during the regular school day.
The Vocational Agriculture program shared with the general in­
dustrial programs an emphasis on care and repair of farm machinery, 
welding, metalworking, woodworking, and elementary electricity. In 
addition, training in Vocational Agriculture included instruction on
how to increase production of milk, poultry, eggs, pork, beef, mutton,
•» 34lamb, wool, soybeans, peanuts, and vegetables. Agriculture teachers
33John H. Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agriculture Education in 
Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1959), p. 
202; S. M. Jackson, "Adjusting the Program of Vocational Agriculture to 
Meet the Needs of the War Effort," Louisiana Schools, December, 1942, 
pp. 12-13; Jackson, "The Part Rural War Production Training Will Play 
in the 1943 Food for Victory Program,” Louisiana Schools, March, 1943, 
p. 19.
34Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education in Louisi­
ana," p. 202; Bulletin No. 490 Louisiana State Plan for Vocational 
Education to Carry Out the Provisions of Public Law No. 647, 77th Con­
gress, Chapter 475, 2nd Session, Authorizing a Vocational Program of
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also participated in scrap drives; taught how to preserve and can
food; helped to develop cooperative school-community facilities for
food preservation; and —  because of the increased mechanization of
agriculture caused by the agricultural labor shortage —  stressed farm
35machinery care and repair in their farm shop facilities.
In addition to training rural workers, the State Department of
Education also created Emergency Farm Workers' Schools to solve the 
agricultural labor shortage. These schools prepared persons 14 years 
of age or older for farm work. The students were drawn from those 
who either had no farm experience, or who needed additional training.
The program accepted both in-school and out-of-school students of
, . 36both sexes.
The principal school organization for students of agriculture,
the Future Farmers of America, also suffered from declining enrollment
in the overall school system. Many vocational agriculture teachers
entered the armed services, and some departments closed for lack of
qualified replacements. (Membership in the LSU chapter of FFA dropped
from 125 in 1939-40 to none from 1942 until the end of the war in 
371945.) The other school-related organization for agricultural
Instruction Essential to the War Production Training Program to be Given 
for Out-of-School Rural and Non-rural Persons Subdivision (3), p. 32
35Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education in Louisi­
ana," p. 203; Bulletin No. 518 Ninety-fourth Annual Report for the Ses­
sion 1942-43; p. 77; Morning Advocate, August 2, 1943.
36Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education in Louisi­
ana," pp. 238, 246.
37Frederick W. Williamson, Origin and Development of Agricultural Exten­
sion in Louisiana 1860-1948 How It Opened the Road for Progress in Bet­
ter Farming and Rural Living (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University 
and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Division of Agricultural
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students, the 4-H Club, continued operations during the war years,
even though it experienced the same problems as the FFA: declining
student population and shortage of sponsoring agents. Louisiana 4-H
students, nevertheless, participated in numerous war-related scrap
38collection and bond sale drives.
Modernization of the state educational system began during the 
war years because of reform movements within the state and not only 
as a response to national defense requirements. The major internal 
change which occurred was the addition of a required twelfth year 
for high school graduation. The additional year of school had been a 
goal of the Louisiana Teachers' Association for several years. Rep­
resentative William J. Dodd, who was also state LTA president, had 
criticized Superintendent Coxe and Governor Jones for not lobbying
the requirement through the 1940 legislature, and the measure was 
39enacted in 1944.
A problem arose, however, when the state had to decide whether 
the extra grade required reclassification of other grades. In other 
words, would the addition of grade twelve mean a difference in the 
number of grades classified as grammar school grades or junior high 
school grades? Should the ninth grade be included in junior high 
school, or high school? Dr. Clark Barrow, East Baton Rouge Superinten-
Extension, 1951), pp. 230-231.
38Agricultural Extension Annual Narrative Report (1944), p. 1.
39Charles E. Weimer, "John Easterly Coxe, Louisiana Educator" (Ed.D. 
dissertation, Louisiana State Dniverstiy, 1974), p. 21; Anthony Eugene 
Pacella, "A History of the Louisiana School Boards Association” (Ed.D. 
dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1977), p. 41; Bulletin No.
530 Official Proceedings April 10, 1944, p. 25.
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dent of Education, ordered a halt to all school construction in the 
parish until the State Board of Education resolved the matter. The 
Board's ruling, he said, would determine how school buildings were to 
be constructed and which facilities should be included, depending on
whether the institution was to be a junior high school or a high
,  -* AOschool.
The State Department of Education experienced reorganization on
two levels simultaneously during the war years —  by Governor Jones,
and by newly-elected Education Superintendent John Coxe, who took
office in 1940. While the governor’s reorganization was only temporary
because the courts ruled it unconstitutional, Coxe's revision survived
longer. Former Superintendent T. H. Harris had preferred a system of
general area supervisors. (Coxe, himself, had served as Head State
Supervisor of High Schools until Harris dismissed him early in 1939.)
Elected to replace his former boss, Coxe instituted a system of subject
area supervisors. He also organized the State Department of Education
into three major divisions: Administration and Finance, headed by
John M. Foote; Instruction and Supervision, headed by R. R. Ewerz; and
41Higher Education, headed by Joe Farrar.
A profound change in Louisiana's traditional methods of instruc-
40Bulletin No. 533 Official Proceedings June 26, 1944; Morning Advo­
cate, November 3, 1944.
^Weimer, "John Easterly Coxe," pp. 9-21; Charles Edward Sutton, 
"Activities of the Louisiana State Department of Education on the 
Elementary School Level, 1940 to 1964" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana 
State University, 1969), p. 61. Coxe, in turn, was defeated for re- 
election in 1948 by one of his former employees, Shelby M. Jackson, 
whom he had fired as Supervisor of Vocational Agriculture in 1945.
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tion occurred during the war years as a result of the increased 
availability of visual media, primarily films. The armed services 
first discovered that films were useful aids in training and educating 
large numbers of people. While visual aids had been a peripheral part 
of Louisiana education for some time, the war years brought them into 
far more classrooms. Indeed, by 1945 the State Department of Educa­
tion had six film depositories throughout the state from which schools 
could obtain films. Money to purchase the films was scarce, but 
agencies of the federal government, especially the Agriculture Depart­
ment and the War Department, donated approximately one hundred films 
to Louisiana schools prior to 1945, primarily on war-related subjects. 
The State Department of Education reported in 1943 that it owned 330 
prints of 205 film titles. The Agricultural Extension Service, another 
source of films, reported in 1944 that the most requested film in its 
library was "Soldiers of the Soil." The new importance of educational 
media also caused a change in the curriculum of teacher training pro­
grams. The LSU College of Education added a new short course, Educa­
tion 152, taught during the simmers of 1941 and 1943, which covered
42the functions and use of audio-visual aids.
Louisiana's colleges and universities were affected by many of 
the same problems within the public school system during the war years. 
War-related jobs or the armed services took many students, especially 
males, away from their studies —  so many, in fact, that Southern 
University President J. S. Clark wrote in June, 1943, that "our campus
Pauline M. Rankin, "The Development of Educational Media in Louisi­
ana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1977), pp. 62,
65, 72.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
369
has almost developed the appearance of a female school. Less than 50
43boys are here in college now." Enrollment at Louisiana State Uni­
versity dropped from 5,682 to 4,233 between June and December, 1942. 
Southeastern Louisiana College (now Southeastern Louisiana University) 
at Hammond enrolled 612 students in September, 1940, its largest en­
rollment up to that time. By the beginning of the 1944 school year, 
however, only 331 students were on campus. Enrollment at Xavier 
University fell from 1,012 in 1939-40 to 510 in 1944-45. Other
Louisiana institutions of higher learning, both public and private,
44shared the experience of declining enrollments.
Louisiana's colleges, of course, needed students to justify their 
existence; they therefore sought to replace regular students lost to 
the war effort with army recruits who needed specialized training.
The State Board of Education in April, 1943, authorized colleges under 
its control to negotiate training contracts with the United States 
Army and Navy. As a result of this authorization, state colleges 
commenced a spirited competition among themselves to secure training
43Charles Vincent, A Centennial History of Southern University and 
A & M College, 1880-1980 (Baton Rouge, Southern University, 1981), p. 
148; An Historical Sketch of Louisiana State Colleges (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State Department of Education, n.d.), p. 40; Oscar Hoff- 
meyer, Jr., Louisiana College 75 Years (Pineville, Louisiana, Louisi­
ana College, 1981), p. 70.
44Morning Advocate, January 10, August 26, 1943; LeRoy Ancelet, "A 
History of Southeastern Louisiana College" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Louisiana State University, 1971), pp. 75, 92; Douglas Coughlin 
Marshall, "A History of Higher Education of Negroes in the State of 
Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1956), p. 
143; Southeastern Louisiana University Fifty Years Foundation for the 
Future (Hammond, Louisiana, 50th Anniversary Committee Southeastern 
Louisiana University, 1975), pp. 6-8.
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programs for their campuses. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute (now 
Louisiana Polytechnic University), Southwestern Louisiana Institute 
(now the University of Southwestern Louisiana), and Louisiana State 
Normal College (now Northwestern State University), all launched Army 
or Navy training programs. In addition, Southeastern Louisiana College 
acquired a Civilian Aeronautics Authority training program, South­
western and Southern Universities offered agricultural refresher
courses, and two of Louisiana's private colleges, Centenary College
46and Louisiana College, acquired small Army Air Force programs.
Female colleges contributed to the war effort in other ways. The 
Sisters of the Academy of Holy Angels (later Our Lady of Holy Cross 
College) in New Orleans, for example, conducted air raid drills, sold 
Defense Stamps, and participated in Red Cross activities. Academy 
students constructed 326 garments of various kinds for Red Cross
45Bulletin No. 502 Official Proceedings April 5, 1943, p. 62; Bulletin 
No. 519 Official Proceedings October 5, 1943, pp. 6-11; Bulletin No.
526 Official Proceedings January 11, 1944, pp. 12-14; Bulletin No.
518 Ninety-fourth Annual Report for the Session 1942-43, p. 23; An 
Historical Sketch of Louisiana State Colleges, p. 40; Joel L. Fletcher 
to Allen J. Ellender, March 3, 1943; Gus Trahan to Ellender, March 3, 
1943, Allender J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, Allen 
J. Ellender Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana; 
James Domengeaux to Overton Brooks, March 2, 1943, Joel L. Fletcher 
to Brooks, March 4, 1943, Overton Brooks Papers, Department of Archives 
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Brooks Collection); Florent Hardy,
Jr., A Brief History of the University of Southwestern Louisiana 1900 
to 1960 (Baton Rouge, Claitor’s Publishing Division, 1973), pp. 55, 102.
46Vincent, A Centennial History of Southern University, pp. 148-149; 
Ancelet, ”A History of Southeastern Louisiana College,” p. 73; Gerard 
Banks to Overton Brooks, February 26, 1943, Brooks Collection; Hoff- 
meyer, Louisiana College, p. 74; Walter M. Lowrey, 150 Centenary Col­
lege of Louisiana Sesquicentennial 1825—1975 (Shreveport, Louisiana, 
Centenary College Alumni Association, 1975), p. 21.
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47distribution to soldiers.
Louisiana college students adjusted to the grim realities of war 
in various ways. Some became apathetic, others adjusted well to the 
new spirit of patriotism, while still others saw in the threat to their 
country a reason to do well in their studies. Many enrolled in mathe­
matics and science courses, enrolled in extracurricular first aid
48courses, or became air raid wardens. Major General Campbell B.
Hodges, President of LSU, told students in February, 1942, that "Every 
man student at the University, down to and including every freshman 
man, will see service before this war is over ..." Hodges therefore
49instituted compulsory physical education for every male undergraduate.
While several other schools instituted compulsory physical educa­
tion and emphasized intramural sports to improve the physical condition 
of male students, the State Board of Education voted on January 11,
1943, to discontinue all intercollegiate athletic contests involving 
the colleges under its control.̂ ® The Morning Advocate applauded the
^Betty L. Morrison, "A History of Our Lady of Holy Cross College, New 
Orleans, Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 
1976), p. 52.
/ QAndrew W. Hunt, "The College Student and War Morale," Louisiana 
Schools, November, 1942, pp. 3, 38.
49Morning Advocate, February 24, 1942. Hodges, a former commandant of 
cadets at West Point and military aide to President Herbert Hoover, be­
came LSU president on July 1, 1941, when he replaced Law School Dean 
Paul M. Hebert, who had been acting president since James Monroe Smith 
abruptly resigned and fled the country in June, 1939, in his futile 
attempt to escape punishment for his embezzlement of LSU funds.
^ Bulletin No. 498 Official Proceedings December 16, 1942, pp. 4-5; 
Bulletin No. 499 Official Proceedings January 11, 1943, pp. 11-12.
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Board's action, noting that "to continued these sports and maintain 
their schedules in the face of transportation shortage, and rapidly 
dwindling enrollments of eligible students is obviously impossible.
The Board's ban on intercollegiate athletics lasted only nine 
months, however. In October, 1943, the Board authorized resumption of 
the contests because it had found that the Navy training program it 
had authorized in March (and which several colleges had now obtained) 
required that enrollees have the opportunity to participate in college 
athletics. The guidelines for the reinstituted program, however, re­
quired that the number of events be held to "a reasonable minimum," 
that students could not be absent from campus more than forty-eight 
hours for an athletic event, and that "no means of transportation re­
quiring the use of rubber or gasoline shall be used for out-of-town 
trips by athletic teams, contestants, or spectators connected with any 
college unless OPA [the Office of Price Administration] approves in 
advance.
Morning Advocate, January 14, 1943; Hardy, A Brief History of the 
University of Southwestern Louisiana, p. 93, reports that Southwestern 
lost 7 of its leading football players, 6 of its 9-man basketball 
team, and all the sprinters on its track team by 1943. Lowrey, 150 
Centenary College of Louisiana, p. 23 reports that the advent of World 
War II and soaring costs ended Centenary's intercollegiate football 
programs.
52Bulletin No. 519 Official Proceedings October 5, 1943. p. 66; Bulle­
tin No. 526 Official Proceedings January 11, 1944, pp. 19-20; Morning 
Advocate, October 6, 1943. Peter Finney, The Fighting Tigers Seventy- 
five Years of LSU Football (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University 
Press, 1968), p. 154, maintains that "Beyond doubt, the backbone of 
American football in 1943 was the U. S. Navy, with its famed preflight 
and physical training courses . even though LSU managed to field
an all-civilian team. He also relates (p. 156) that some members of 
Coach Bernie Moore’s 1943 LSU team physically reached the Orange Bowl 
in Miami that year only because Tiger fans had saved their gasoline 
rationing coupons for the trip.
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Conditions on Louisiana college campuses did not improve until
after the war, when returning veterans created an abundance of students.
Several of the colleges would establish special Guidance Centers to
help veterans select the proper studies and to assist them in obtaining
53federal education benefits.
While Louisiana’s entire education system encountered various
problems and challenges during the war years, facilities for black
students remained separate from —  and decidedly unequal too —  those
for white students. In 1940-41 there were only forty-five public and
ten private high schools for blacks accredited by the state. In
addition, twenty-three public and one private high schools were
"approved" by the state. Incredibly, fourteen parishes provided only
elementary schools for their black students. The State Department of
Education’s report for 1941 noted that "the number of Negro educables
54in several of these parishes does not justify a high school." The 
report made no mention of the undeveloped potential in those fourteen 
parishes. Thirty-nine parishes employed black supervisors for their 
separate black schools, but the black administrators were subordinates
53Vincent, A Centennial History of Southern University, p. 149; Ancelet, 
"A History of Southeastern Louisiana College," p. 79; Frank James 
Price, Troy H. Middleton A Biography (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State 
University Press, 1974), pp. 298-302. The ”G. I. Bill" (the Service­
man's Readjustment Act of 1944) also provided a maximum of 52 weeks 
unemployment pay, priorities for materials needed by the Veterans’ Ad­
ministration, and additional hospital facilities for returning veter­
ans as well as the educational assistance which increased college en­
rollments . Jack Stokes Ballard, The Shock of Peace Military and Eco­
nomic Demobilization After World War II (Washington, D.C., University 
Press of America, 1983), pp. 48-49.
^ B̂ulletin No. 458 Ninety-second Annual Report of the Session 1940-41, 
p. 109.
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of both the white supervisors and superintendents. Black education in 
Louisiana continued to focus almost entirely on vocational training: 
agriculture, home economics, and industrial arts. Some schools, how­
ever, provided academic courses for the few students who needed them 
as a foundation for professional training.^
The State Department of Education had recognized by 1940 that
By no principles of economics or ethics can a 
state progress or reach the highest stage of 
development with a large proportion of the popu­
lation unskilled, shiftless, ignorant, and 
diseased. Neglect of the Negro and indifference 
to his home life, his health, his education, 
and his training for useful and gainful employ­
ment are detrimental to public w e l f a r e . 56
Despite this recognition, the Louisiana Educational Survey Commission 
found in 1942 that the state had done little to improve black public 
education. The Commission —  most often called the Washburne Commis­
sion after its head, Dr. Carleton Washburne —  repeated almost exactly 
the same sentiment as the Department of Education had expressed two 
years earlier:
The value of the Negro as a plantation worker, 
as a tenant farmer, as a farm owner, as a do­
mestic servant, as a laborer, as a mechanic, 
as a professional man or woman rendering ser­
vice to his own race, can all be greatly in­
creased by the right kind of e d u c a t i o n . ^ 7
53Ibid., pp. 109-119.
^ B̂ulletin No. 432 Ninetieth Annual Report for the Session 1938-39, 
p. 14.
"^Carleton Washburne, Louisiana Looks At Its Schools A Summary Report 
of the Louisiana Educational Survey (Baton Rouge, Louisiana Educational 
Survey Commission, 1942), p. 105.
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The Commission, however, realized that improvement of black edu­
cation in Louisiana would be difficult. Most white Louisianians were 
not aware of the poor conditions in black schools, while many others 
shared the traditional southern prejudice against educating blacks. 
Several parishes even subsidized white education by expropriating the 
money provided by the state for black teachers and schools. Black 
education could ill afford the loss. Louisiana in 1942 spent $66 per 
year for the education of each white child but only $15.50 per year
C Ofor each black child.
The Commission also found that black schools could do little to
liberate their students from a substandard home environment. Two- or
three-room frame cabins often housed large black families with barely
adequate shelter. Parents themselves were often no.more than poorly
educated sharecroppers who could provide no newspapers or books for
59supplemental learning. Schools were equally deficient. About two- 
thirds were one-room buildings with several grades demanding the 
teacher's attention at the same time. The school building was usually 
on the same level as the surrounding homes —  a wood frame structure 
heated by a wood stove, providing primitive toilet facilities at best, 
and surrounded by inadequate playground space. In addition, black 
schools were typically staffed by teachers who were ill-trained and 
paid less than th’eir white counterparts. Instruction and available 
textbooks (often cast-offs from white schools) were also geared to
58Ibid., pp. 114-116.
.
Ibid., pp. 107-109; Bulletin No. 518 Ninety—fourth Annual Report 
Session 1942, 1943, pp. 50-56.
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white norms and values, and thus failed to arouse, or even to awaken, 
the black children’s desire to learn.^
Despite wartime problems, Louisiana enabled more blacks to re­
ceive at least the rudimentary education available in the state's 
black schools. By 1946, the state provided 128 public high schools 
(eighty-three state-approved and forty-five non-approved)
The findings of the State Department of Education and of the 
Louisiana Educational Survey Commission only reflected part of a 
regional pattern. Blacks in the South had been traditionally relegated 
to subservient roles in a society which was content to provide only 
substandard facilities for blacks (when it provided any facilities 
at all). World War II, however, changed relations between the races, 
both nationally and in the South. Richard M. Dalfiume notes that the 
war marked the turning point at which blacks decided no longer to 
accept unequal treatment without protest. ."The dominant attitude in
World War II came to be that the Negro must fight for democracy on two
62fronts —  at home as well as abroad."
Louisiana blacks, including black educators, joined in this fight. 
Eight black citizens of East Baton Rouge Parish asked the School Board 
in May, 1943, to begin adjusting salaries "so that white and black 
teachers with equal qualifications and equal experience would receive
^Washburne, Louisiana Looks At Its Schools, pp. 109-114.
^Marshall, "A History of Higher Education of Negroes in the State of 
Louisiana,” p. 60-
62Richard M. Dalfiume, "The ’Forgotten Years’ of the Negro Revolution," 
The Journal of American History, June 1968, pp. 90, 95.
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equal salaries." J. K. Haynes, President of the Louisiana Colored 
Teachers’ Association, asked Governor Jones in June, 1943, to use his 
influence to persuade the State Board of Education to equalize teachers' 
salaries in order to prevent more teachers from leaving their profes­
sion for jobs in defense industries. Daniel E. Byrd, State President 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, also 
requested that Jones work for equalized salaries and pointed out that 
despite the contention of the white Louisiana Teachers’ Association —  
that equalized salaries would mean lower salaries for whites because 
the state did not have sufficient funds to increase black salaries to 
match those of whites —  no such event had occurred in Maryland, Vir­
ginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Alabama, Oklahoma, Florida, 
Tennessee, Kentucky, or Texas, all former slave states which had al­
ready equalized salaries. And while Jones agreed in principal ("We 
cannot consistently hold the Negro to excessively low educational and 
economic standards without suffering some of the ill effects of the 
low standards"), a revised statewide salary schedule prepared by Super­
intendent Coxe based a teacher's salary on experience, education, and
63merit, but maintained unequal salaries for blacks and whites.
Black educators filed several lawsuits during the war years to 
establish equal pay scales for white and black teachers. The first of 
these equalization suits was McKelpin v. New Orleans School Board,
T _n _
Petition, May 15, 1943; Daniel E. Byrd to Sam Jones, June 14, 1943;
J. K. Haynes to Jones, June 15, 1943; "Meeting of Committee on Equali­
zation of Teachers’ Salaries," June 7, 1943; H. W. Wright to Jones,
May 11, 1943; William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam 
Houston Jones, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial 
Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
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filed in June, 1941. In this case, McKelpin, a permanent teacher in 
New Orleans, claimed that he and other black teachers and principals 
in the system received uniformly lower wages than white employees 
possessing equal qualifications. The school board lost a motion to 
dismiss the case from the federal district court in 1942, and consented 
to eliminate salary differences based on race.^ Other cases followed.
In November, 1944, for example, a federal district court in Baton 
Rouge heard a suit brought by Wiley Butler McMillon and two other 
Iberville Parish teachers. The plaintiffs had originally filed in 
December, 1943, charging that their Parish School Board had violated 
their rights to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution by maintaining separate 
pay scales for black and white teachers. Upon receipt of the original 
suit, the School Board instituted a new salary schedule based on edu­
cation, experience, merit, and responsibility. Thurgood Marshall of 
New York, Special Counsel to the NAACP representing the plaintiffs, 
argued that the School Board minutes showed the use of color classifi­
cation in granting raises, and that the word "race" had not been elimi­
nated in salary schedules until late 1944. Salary lists Marshall 
introduced revealed that white teachers in Iberville Parish received 
an average salary of $1,749 for a nine-month school year ($194.33 per 
month), while black teachers average $637 for seven or eight months 
($91 per month for a seven month year). The plaintiffs requested that
64Leedell Wallace Neyland, "The Negro in Louisiana Since 1900: An
Economic and Social Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 
1958), p. 95.
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the School Board adopt a salary schedule based solely on education 
and experience, and equalize black and white teachers’ salaries for 
the 1946-47 school year.^
Black educators failed for the moment, however, to persuade either 
the courts or the educational establishment to equalize salaries. By 
1944, black teachers’ average salaries had increased by more than 
fifty per cent over the 1940 levels, but that increase occurred mainly 
because Orleans Parish, which employed 12 per cent of the state’s 
black teachers, had equalized salaries as a result of the McKelpin 
case. Black teachers waited until 1948 for equalized salaries to be 
provided statewide by Governor Earl Long as part of his ambitious
legislative program introduced at the beginning of his first full
- , 66 gubernatorial term.
Nor were blacks immediately successful in improving the quality 
of black graduate education. The first black student was admitted to 
LSU’s Law School in 1950, and only then as a partial result of the 
United States Supreme Courts’ ruling in Sweatt v. Painter, in which 
the court found that a "separate" black law school in Texas was "un­
equal" to the state’s law school for whites.^
^ Morning Advocate, November 28, 1944; Bulletin No. 548 Official Pro­
ceedings January 8, 1845, pp- 66-68.
. . . .
Bulletin No. 543 Ninety-fifth Annual Report for the Session 1943, 
1944, p. 47; Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana State Politics, 
1920-1952 (Baltimore, Maryland, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 210.
^Bulletin No. 530 Official Proceedings April 10, 1944; Marshall, "A 
History of Higher Education of Negroes in the State of Louisiana," p. 
185; Charles P. Roland, The Impossible Era The South!Since World War 
IT (Lexington, Kentucky, The University Press of Kentucky, rev. ed., 
1976), pp..33̂ 34; NumanV. Bartley, The Rise of Massive'Resistance Race 
ana Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
State University Press, 1969), pp.. 6—7.
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In summary, Louisiana’s public schools had grown and taken on 
additional responsibilities during the war. Superintendent Coxe re­
ported to the State Board of Education in 1942:
In this supreme effort, our educational forces 
have duties as clearly defined as those of our 
soldiers ... there must be drastic action by 
the teachers of America . . . May our schools 
. . . indoctrinate our children with love of 
freedom and will to sacrifice; with passionate 
fervor for our living, growing democracy; with 
courage, confidence, and conviction in a com­
plete victory and a better w o r l d . ^8
Louisiana’s schools successfully met that challenge with sweeping 
changes in instructional method and in the curriculum. The greatest 
wartime failure of Louisiana's educational establishment was its in­
ability to improve black educational facilities and standards, even 
though leaders of both races realized that black education was sub­
standard to white education in all respects. Generations of inequality, 
however, had bred acceptance of substandard black education in Louisi­
ana, the South, and the nation at large. The first stirrings of 
determined' black protest occurred during World War II, but achievement 
of educational equality over the objections of conservative white 
southerners who adopted the strategy of "massive resistance" lay far 
in the future.^ World War II permanently altered public education 
in Louisiana, but it had nowhere near the effect on dismantling racially 
segregated public schools as did the United States Supreme Court's
gg
Bulletin No. 480 Wartime Education in Louisiana Schools, p. 3.
^The meaning and.failure of massive-resistance are summarized in 
Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, pp. 340-345.
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decision in the case of Brown Et. Al« v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas, Et. Al. (1954). Those events, however, are well beyond the 
scope of this study.
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CHAPTER IX
LOUISIANA AGRICULTURE DURING WORLD WAR II
Louisiana agriculture during 1939-40 retained many of the aspects 
which had characterized it since Reconstruction when it adjusted it­
self to the loss of slave labor by adopting the tenantry system and 
depended on animal power to produce its staple crops. Louisiana's 
farm population in 1939-40 typically lived on a farm consisting of 
less than fifty acres. Of the 150,007 farms in Louisiana in 1940,
12,508 consisted of less than ten acres, 62,989 consisted of ten to 
twenty-nine acres, and 33,487 consisted of thirty to forty-nine acres. 
Even though a majority of rural Louisianians lived on these small-to- 
medium size farms, the number of large farms (858 containing 1,000 
or more acres, for example) skewed the average farm acreage to just 
over sixty-six acres in 1940.*
Many Louisiana farmers in 1939-40 were still tenants. The Census 
Bureau attributes one "operator" to each farm, so it found 150,007 
farm operators in Louisiana in 1940. Of this total, 52,936 were 
listed as full owners, 7,376 as part owners, 528 as managers, and 
89,167 as tenants (not quite sixty per cent of the total). Within 
the ranks of tenancy, the share tenant (31,460) and the sharecropper 
(39,631) far outnumbered the 11,201 cash tenants, the 1,469 share- 
cash tenants, and the 5,406 tenants who farmed under other arrange-
United States Census of Agriculture: 1950 Counties and State Eco­
nomic Areas Louisiana Volume 1 Part 24 (Washington, D.C., United 
States Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 3.
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. 2 ments.
The farmers of Louisiana in 1939-40 typically grew at least some 
cotton- Of Louisiana’s 150,007 farms in 1940, 114,291 reported cotton 
acreage. Cotton produced more farm income in 1940 than any other 
crop: $33,540,333 in cotton lint and an additional $6,333,126 in
cotton seed. (The crop closest to cotton in total income produced
3was "all cereals" —  $28,122,337.) Each farmer, however, typically 
produced only a few bales of cotton. While 9,210 farmers reported 
growing one bale of cotton or less in 1940, 14,011 reported one and 
one-half to two bales, 14,779 reported two and one-half to three 
bales, 14,984 (the largest number in any category) reported three and 
one-half to four bales. From that point the numbers decline: 13,706
farmers reported four and one-half to five bales, for example, and
11,509 reported five and one-half to six bales. The Census Bureau 
found only twenty-four farmers in Louisiana producing over 400 bales 
of cotton in 1940. Eight farmers reported 400 to 500 bales produced,
4and sixteen reported over 500 bales.
Louisiana farmers still depended on animal power to produce their 
crops. The 1940 Census found only 6,937 tractors throughout the state.
—2Ibid., p. 4.
3Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940 Agriculture Volume II
Third Series State Reports Part 2 Statistics for Counties, Value of 
Farm Products, Farms Classified by Major Source of Income, Farms 
Classified by Value of Products (Washington, D.C., United States 
Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 672.
4Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940 Agriculture Special
Cotton Report (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing 
Office, 1943), p. 101.
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Mules and mule colts, on the other hand, constituted the second most 
valuable category of livestock on Louisiana farms. The value of all 
cattle and calves totaled $26,591,163, while the value of all-mules 
and mule colts totaled $18,981,112. Moreover, the value of all horses 
and colts (many of which were draft animals) totaled an additional 
$8,918,969. The livestock next in value to the draft animals were 
hogs and pigs, totaling $3,497,974.̂
Louisiana farmers utilized these traditional resources but also 
found that they had to abandon or modify many of them during World War 
II as they wrestled with "the uncomplimentary requirements of high 
farm production caused by war needs, and farm labor shortages caused 
by the military draft . . . "̂  Despite the difficulties posed by the 
latter, Louisiana farmers, with the help of the agricultural estab­
lishment, struggled to fulfill the former.
American agriculture in 1939 had survived almost two decades of 
severe depression. Farm prices, temporarily high because of abnormal 
demand and scarcity during World War I, collapsed during the early 
1920s, long before the Great Depression began to afflict the rest of 
the American economy in late 1929 and early 1930. Gross agricultural 
income in the United States fell from $17,700,000 in 1919 to 
$10,500,000 in 1921. Louisiana agriculture shared in the national 
"bust." Per capita farm income in Louisiana fell from $322 in 1919
^United States Census of Agriculture: 1950 Volume 1, Part 24, p. 6;
Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940 Agriculture Volume II
Part 2, p. 672.
Ĵ. Philip Dismukes, The Center:' A History of the Development of 
Lafayette, Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, City of Lafayette, 1972), 
p. 53.
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to $129 in 1921, and fluctuated throughout the rest of the 1920s, but 
always remained less than $250. Then, the Great Depression added its 
burden to Louisiana farmers. Per capita farm income in the state 
sank to $80 in the bleak year of 1932. By 1933, however, the effects 
of early New Deal agricultural programs had initiated a weak recovery. 
Farm income reached a Depression high of $207 in 1937 before declining 
again to $153 in 1940. That income rose dramatically during the next 
four years: to $230 in 1941; $360 in 1942; $476 in 1943; $497 in 1944;
and $528 in 1945. (A post-war boom lasted until 1948, when per capita 
income reached $752.)̂
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal wrestled with the problem 
of Southern rural poverty throughout the 1930s, but none of the 
several programs designed to alleviate it succeeded in eliminating
gwidespread deprivation on southern farms. Even though George Brown 
Tindall found that "The [New. Deal] farm program . . . clearly helped 
the South more than any other region in benefits, prices, and income," 
he also found that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the 
succeeding Soil Conservation Service both failed to limit production 
and thus increase prices. The 1937 cotton crop, for example, produced 
18,946,000 bales, and the surplus on August 1, 1939 exceeded 13,000,000
Ârthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933 
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p. 105; J. P. Montgomery, 
Agricultural Statistics for Louisiana 1909-1957 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Agricultural 
Experiment Station, December, 1958), p. 9.
QPaul E- Mertz, New Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1978), pp. 1-6, 253-262.
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9bales, a surplus which depressed the market until 1941.
Demand for agricultural produce during the years of World War II, 
however, accomplished what the New Deal had not done —  war needs sub­
stantially raised farm income by creating larger markets for expanded 
production. Louisiana farm income increased every war year except 
1944, growing from $113.90 annual cash income per farm in 1940 to 
$133.60 in 1941; $192.40 in 1942; $260.50 in 1943; dipping to $248.50 
in 1944; and rebounding to $271.40 in 1945.*̂  The reasons for this 
growth in farm income are simple: the world needed more food and
fiber than the producing countries could supply, and Louisiana farmers 
shared in the rise in agricultural prices, caused by the favorable 
operation of the law of supply and demand.
All was not high production and high prices for Louisiana farmers, 
however. Bad weather and insects, the bane of the farmer's existence 
from the earliest times that mankind shifted from a food-gathering to 
a food-producing creature, plagued Louisiana agriculture. Bad weather 
was the principal reason why the total value of Louisiana's crops de­
clined some $24,000,000 from 1939 to 1940. Drought and boll weevil 
infestation devastated the cotton crop in north Louisiana and east 
Texas during 1941. The cotton yield in the area dropped to less than 
25 per cent of normal. Mrs. N. E. Teagle of St. Maurice wrote to
—9George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South 1913-1945 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 403, 406.
^Stephen D. Reiling and Fred H. Wiegmann, Louisiana Agriculture, Eco­
nomic Trends and Current Status, 1940-1977 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Center for 
Agricultural Sciences and Rural Development, June 1979), p. 22.
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Senator Allen Ellender that the 1942 crop year was no better: ". . .
it has been one of the turbelst (sic) years I have ever expearenced
(sic) and I am 64 years old." Fortunately, New Deal relief agencies
still in operation prevented the destitution that normally would have
followed such a catastrophe.^ In addition, late spring weather,
combined with lack of labor for seedbed preparation and fears of
difficulty in finding labor for harvest in 1944, led to the smallest
number of acres (930,000) planted in cotton in Louisiana since 1915.
The 1944 crop year turned out badly. A hot, dry summer followed a
late, wet spring, and both total acreage harvested and average yield
per acre declined in most areas. Fortunately for the farmers, however,
12prices increased slightly over 1943.
Farmers expect bad weather and occasional poor harvests as a nor­
mal course of their business. The war years, however, brought an 
additional problem that was not successfully solved. The tremendous 
demand of the American military machine and war-related industry 
which provided relatively high wages and a steady income in contrast 
to farming caused a shortage of farm workers. Louisiana farmers at­
tempted to solve the labor problem in two ways: they increased
Shreveport Times, December 22, 1941; New Orleans States, November 21, 
1941; R. S. Wilds to Allen J. Ellender, October 9, 1941; G. J. Posey 
to Ellender, October 10, 1941; Max Cockerham to Ellender, October 10, 
1941; Lon H. Law to Ellender, November 7, 1941; Grover B. Hill to 
Ellender, January 17, 1942; Mrs. N. E. Teagle to Ellender, December 
17, 1942, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, Allen 
J. Ellender Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana 
(hereinafter cited as Ellender Collection).
12Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, July 13, December 22, 1944; New Orleans 
Item, April 2, 1945.
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mechanization of farming procedure, and recruited ex—farm or non-
13traditional farm labor.
Mechanization of Louisiana agriculture had proceeded slowly.
There were only 1,691 tractors on Louisiana sugar cane farms in 1930.
By 1940, that number had increased to 3,327 (an increase of 1,636); 
by .1945, however, it had increased to 6,499 (an increase of 3,172 in 
just five years). The human labor shortage caused sugar farmers to 
switch to mechanical labor wherever possible. The number of cane 
harvesters increased from 79 in 1942 to 124 in 1943; 192 in 1944; 329 
in 1945; and 422 in 1946. In addition, county agents in the sugar 
parishes reported 266 flame cultivators (used to replace hand hoeing 
of sugar crops) in used in 1945, and 313 in 1946.^
Mechanization of other crop production in Louisiana lagged behind 
that of sugar. The first mechanical cotton picker did not appear in 
the state until the 1945 harvest season when it was used on a planta­
tion near Cheneyville. It performed well, even though rain caused a 
lengthy delay between defoliation and harvest, so that the machine 
gathered an inordinate amount of trash along with the cotton. Even 
though this cotton picker worked, true mechanization of the American 
cotton crop did not occur until after the war. Cotton production 
during 1940-1945 still relied as much on hand labor —  especially
13Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense 
Migration House of Representatives 77 Congress 2 Session Part 28 
Washington Hearings February 12 and 13, 1942 (Washington, D.C., United 
States Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 10857- This Committee, 
for example, found that all of south Louisiana and the Mississippi and 
Red River valleys in the state sorely needed seasonal farm labor.
*̂ E. Carl Jones, "Mechanization on Large Sugar Cane Farms in Louisiana" 
(M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1947), pp. 17, 65, 79-80.
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"chopping" (thinning) and picking —  as had antebellum cotton 
planters.^
Mechanization of rice harvest lagged even further behind. The 
problem with rice was that successful mechanical harvesting required 
a moisture content in the grain well in excess of that needed for 
successful storage. While the use of tractors in planting and culti­
vation before World War II signaled the beginning of mechanization of 
rice production, mechanical harvesting devices could not be utilized
until the development of modern grain drying facilities during the
16post-World War II years.
While machines helped to fill some of the demand for farm labor, 
Louisiana agriculture still relied primarily on hand labor and animal 
power. Even though the number of horses and mules on Louisiana farms 
decreased from 317,282 in 1940 to 293,226 in 1945 while the total 
number of tractors increased during those same years, only 8.8 per 
cent of Louisiana farms in 1945 were equipped with a tractor.In 
addition, tractors often only supplemented, and did not completely 
replace, draft animals or hand labor on many farms where they appeared 
during the war.
Therefore, farmers and the agricultural establishment sought to 
recruit farm workers from non-traditional sources of rural labor.
^Morning Advocate, September 21, 1945.
^David 0. Whitten, "American Rice Cultivation, 1680-1980: A Tercente­
nary Critique," Southern Studies, Spring, 1982, p. 22.
17W. D. Curtis, Statistical Data and Trends in the Agriculture of 
Louisiana Volume 1 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana Agricultural Extension Ser­
vice, February, 1947), p. 13.
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These sources included people who had never worked on farms before, hut
had agreed to do so. Many of them received training in agricultural
tasks at Emergency Farm Workers' Schools provided by the Louisiana De-
18partment of Education. High school students throughout the state 
also enrolled in the "Victory Farm Volunteers" to help harvest agri­
cultural produce. In exchange for their work, the students received 
small payments —  two cents per pound for picking snap beans and be­
tween $1.50 and $3.00 per day (depending on individual ability) for 
digging Irish potatoes, for example. School principals occasionally 
rearranged course schedules to allow time for students to work in the
fields, and almost 1,400 students in Terrebonne Parish alone helped
19harvest the 1945 crop.
Louisiana farmers also hoped to recruit farm labor among former 
agricultural laborers who had migrated to towns seeking work (or at 
least income) during the Great Depression. If the former laborers 
proved reluctant to return to the farm, then farmers hoped to force 
them back by removing the income which permitted them to remain in 
town. The Caddo Parish Police Jury on December 11, 1941, unanimously 
passed a resolution calling upon the Works Progress Administration, the 
Shreveport City Council, and the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce to 
help return "idle labor now on relief rolls" back to farms. Juror J.
P. Fullilove attacked the "idleness of the city" and begged fellow 
jurors: "For God's sake, let's get these fellows back on the
Tc---------------John H. Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education
in Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1959),
p. 202.
19Morning Advocate, June 3, 1945.
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The next year, J. M. Crutcher, state WPA administrator removed
2,600 farm workers from the WPA rolls, and in addition, removed 7,600
persons from the "awaiting assignment" list and announced that they
would not be considered for WPA payments while farm work was available.
"The WPA will not be a party to such a labor shortage," Crutcher said,
"but will do everything in its power to see that men of farming ex-
21perience go back to the farms if the work is there for them."
Louisiana farmers, however, were not desperate enough to accept 
unanimously the offer of Harry Itaya, an American citizen of Japanese 
descent who wrote to the editor of the Shreveport Times in 1943 from 
the relocation camp in Arkansas to which he had been transported after 
the beginning of the war. Itaya suggested that Japanese-Americans 
should be released from the internment camps to which the United States 
government had assigned them and be relocated on farms and plantations 
where they could grow staple and vegetable crops for both military and 
civilian use. Some Louisianians approved Itaya's proposal, calling it 
a "wise observance of our great American creed of life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness," and "a concrete way to show that democracy 
is still alive in our country." Other Louisianians approved it be­
cause "a few persons of the type of these Japanese-blood American 
citizens can do more work than a large number of negroes (sic) when 
it comes to farming and usually can do it better." Still other
20Shreveport Times, December 12, 1941.
21New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 28, 1942.
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Louisianians adamantly disapproved the suggestion, contending that
the "present low standard of living" in Caddo Parish, "would he
dragged lower still." One person referred to his son in the military
and wondered: "What he would think if I stood by without opposing it
and let this parish be filled with cheap Jap (sic) labor while he is
risking his life fighting to free this nation of Jap (sic) rule and 
22domination." Louisiana's opinion, of course, remained a moot point. 
The United States internment policy prevented any serious consider­
ation of Itaya's suggestion.
While the prejudice against Orientals and the searing memories 
of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor prevented utilization of 
native Japanese-American labor, Louisiana farmers felt no hesitation 
about using German or Italian prisoner of war labor.
Axis prisoners of war came to the United States as a result of 
American entry into the war following the Pearl:Harbor attack. As 
American troops participated in the North African campaign against 
German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's Afrika Corps, captured German 
soldiers began arriving in the United States. The prisoners posed a 
problem to American authorities: where could they be safely interned
for the duration of the war? Decision-makers in Washington eventually 
decided that the POW internment camps had to be as isolated and as
29“Shreveport Times, August 1, 1943; Milton S. Eisenhower, The President 
Is Calling (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974), 
pp. 95-127. Eisenhower, national director of the relocation, chron­
icles the United States government’s imprisonment of Japanese-Ameri- 
cans. The widespread perception of the need to imprison them is also 
revealed in the quote from Westbrook Peger (p. 102), who wrote that 
"The Japanese in California should be under guard to the last man and 
woman right now and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger is 
over."
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heavily guarded as possible. In order to discourage escape or sabo­
tage attempts, emergency wartime regulations decreed that the camps 
could not be located within about 170 miles of a coastline, within a 
150-mile-wide "zone sanitaire" along the Mexican and Canadian borders, 
or near shipyards, munition plants, or vital industries. Despite 
these rulings, approximately two-thirds of the POW base camps (con­
taining approximately three-fourths of the prisoners) were located in
23the southern and southwestern regions of the country.
Officials located the camps in these areas for more than security 
reasons. Maxwell McKnight, Chief of the Administrative Section of the 
POW Division, Camp Operations Branch of the Provost Marshal General's 
Office during the war, noted that the mild southern climate also 
appealed to army planners: "Oil was a problem back in those days
... If you could have the prisons down South where the winters were 
milder, you had less of a problem with heat." Problems with the extra 
screening and sanitation to shield POWs from southern mosquitoes par­
tially offset the advantages of the warm climate, but did not stop
24construction of the camps.
Louisiana received a large share of the southern POW camps. The
23Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (New York, Stein 
and Day, 1979), pp. 27-28. The United States government eventually 
yielded to pressure from the Louisiana Sugar Cane League and Louisiana 
Congressmen and allowed the POWs to work in parishes bordering the 
Gulf of Mexico.
24Judith M. Gansberg, Stalag: USA (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Com­
pany, 1977), p. 24. Gansberg also noted that the mosquitoes could be 
used to the army’s advantage to discipline the POWs, as in an incident 
at Camp Wynne, Arkansas, where camp authorities ordered some POWs who 
refused an increased work load to stand out-of-doors naked for several 
hours exposed to mosquitoes.
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state had more camps than any other southern state except Texas and
Arkansas. Texas had thirty-three such camps, while Arkansas tied
Louisiana for second place among southern states, each with seventeen 
25camps.
The United States treated its prisoners of war under the guide­
lines set forth at the Geneva Convention of 1929. These guidelines 
stipulated that prisoners of war other than officers could be re­
quired to work, but that the work could not be directly related to
war operations, and could not jeopardize the health or the safety of 
26the prisoners. These restrictions, however, did not preclude agri­
cultural labor and prisoners of war in the United States helped to 
alleviate the agricultural labor shortage. In the South, the prisoners
picked cotton, cut sugar cane, harvested tobacco and peanuts, cut
27pulpwood, and worked in fertilizer plants.
Louisiana first became involved with imprisoning enemies of the 
United States in late 1941, when the government sent Japanese, German, 
and Italian enemy aliens to the Quarantine Station at Algiers. Then
95Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, p. 31. The other south­
ern states and their number of camps are: Mississippi and Georgia —
13 each; Alabama —  11; Florida —  8; North and South Carolina —  7 
each; Virginia —  5, and Tennessee —  4.
26Lt. Col. Lamar F. Peyton, "Treatment and Utilization of Prisoners of 
War By the United States During World War II" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana 
State University, 1973), p. 17.
27Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, pp. 35, 90; Gansberg, 
Stalag: USA, p. 34; Matthew J. Schott and Rosalind Foley, Bayou
Stalags German Prisoners of War in Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, 
n.p., 1981), pp. 5-6. Krammer notes that a Huntsville, Texas, farmer 
remarked that POWs did not know "a stalk of cotton from a goddamn 
cockleburr."
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in 1942, the United States Army Provost Marshal General ordered the
preparation of Camps Livingston, Polk, and Ruston to house enemy
28aliens and prisoners of war.
Camp Livingston received its first enemy.aliens, all Japanese men, 
in early June, 1942. Newspaper reporters allowed into the camp in 
July reported that the camp authorities treated the prisoners well.
The United States had reason to treat the Japanese well, even though 
popular sentiment might have demanded otherwise. The Japanese govern­
ment had failed to ratify the Geneva Convention, and was thus not 
bound to abide by its guidelines, even though the Japanese had gen­
erally agreed to adhere to them. The difference between the Japanese 
government "ratifying" and "agreeing to" an international accord al­
lowed the United States some leeway in its treatment of Japanese 
29prisoners. United States authorities hoped that news of humane 
treatment Japanese prisoners received in this country would filter
30back into Japan and temper treatment of Americans held captive there. 
This consideration became increasingly important after the fall of 
Corregidor and Bataan in May, 1942, left thousands of American pris­
oners in Japanese hands.
German prisoners reached Louisiana on July 9, 1943, when captured 
members of Rommel's Afrika Corps arrived at Camp Livingston, just north 
of Alexandria in central Louisiana. Camp Livingston, along with near-
28Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, p. 2.
29Peyton, "Treatment and Utilization of Prisoners of War," p. 19.
30Alexandria Daily Town Talk, July 14, 1942 (hereinafter cited as 
Town Talk).
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by Camps Claiborne and Beauregard and Camp Polk near Leesville, were 
primarily constructed as training camps for American inductees, but 
were also pressed into service to house POWs. Prisoners boused at 
these camps lived a life quite similar to that of an American soldier 
in a military prison: reveille at 5:55 A.M.; roll call at 6:15;
breakfast at. 6:30; lunch break, 11:30-1:00; and end of the work day
31at 5:00. 1
Louisiana POW camps eventually housed prisoners from virtually 
every Axis country, but most authorities permitted little interaction 
among the various nationalities. Camp Claiborne officials located 
the German compound southwest of the main entrance of the camp, and 
the Italian compound far to the west. The United States Army also 
attempted to separate hardened Nazi POWs from those who had been 
drafted into the ranks of the Axis armies. Subsequently, Camp Ruston
became an anti-Nazi camp with a population primarily composed of non-
32Germans.
The Louisiana POW camps housed thousands of able-bodied young men. 
The Geneva Convention governing their treatment did not prevent their 
employment in occupations not directly related to the war effort. 
Louisiana farmers needed farm hands to replace labor lost to the war 
effort. Therefore, quite logically, the farmers and their spokesmen 
began asking for POW labor to cultivate and harvest Louisiana crops.
Their inquiries began even as the German prisoners arrived in the
^ Ibid., August 2, 1943.
32Ibid., December 8, 1979; Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, p. 3.
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state. Charles A. Farwell, educational director of the American Sugar 
Cane League, announced on July 3, 1943, that his association had ex­
plored the possibility of using the Germans to harvest the fall sugar 
cane crop. Senator Allen Ellender announced on July 8 that Louisiana 
would receive farm help from German and Italian POWs, but their use 
in the sugar crop would be limited because of Southern Defense Command
prohibition against establishing a prison camp within 150 miles of a
33coastline (a restriction which officials later lifted). By the 
height of the 1943 harvest season in October, more than 950 German 
prisoners worked.on farms surrounding Camp Livingston and the sub-camp 
established at Franklin specifically to provide laborers for the sugar 
harvest. The Army also permitted an expansion of camps and sub-camps 
at various locations throughout the state to house workers near areas 
with farm labor shortages. Camp Claiborne received German prisoners 
from Camp Polk on November 4, Port Allen housed POWs at a compound 
established at the Parish Fair Grounds, Lafourche Parish received 
several temporary camps to house workers beginning with the 1943 har­
vest. Sub-camps at Rayne, Eunice, Jennings, Sulphur, and Welsh housed
34POWs used in the rice harvest. The decentralization of the POW popu-
ftlation continued into 1944 because of the continued shortage of farm 
labor. Senator John Overton, for example, successfully requested a
33Morning Advocate, July 4, October 6, 1943; Shreveport Times, July
9, 1943.
34States, September 29, 1943; Town Talk, October 19, November 5, 1943; 
Morning Advocate, December 16, 1943, November 3, 1983; Joseph T.
Butler, "Prisoner of War Labor in the Sugar Cane Fields of Lafourche 
Parish, Louisiana: 1943-1944," Louisiana History, Summer, 1973, p. 287.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
398
sub-camp at Bastrop to house POWs which area farmers wanted to help
35harvest the cotton crop.
Farmers in an area with a shortage of farm labor worked closely 
with State Supervisor of Emergency Farm Labor Carl E. Kemmerly to 
establish the sub-camps. Farmers contributed to the construction of 
the prison compounds, then Kemmerly contacted Army inspectors to 
certify that the facilities met Geneva Convention housing specifica­
tions. Employers had to provide suitable buildings for kitchens and 
mess halls; sanitary facilities had to include one shower per twenty 
men and one faucet per fifteen men (counting both prisoners and 
guards); and each compound had to be equipped with water and electri­
city. If the facility passed Army inspection, Army guards escorted 
prisoners to the site and maintained surveillance of the area. The 
expense of contributing to the construction of the compounds, plus the 
daily wage of $1.20 to $1.50 per day (usually seventy cents paid to 
the government for operating expenses of the compounds and eighty cents 
paid to the prisoner) for a minimum contingent of ten workers meant
36that only substantial farmers or businessmen could afford POW labor.
Louisiana farmers needed help from any source to harvest the 1943 
crop. Not only had the armed services taken their workers, but war 
industries actively recruited farm workers at higher wages than they
35Joseph N. Lockwood, "The German Concentration Camp, Bastrop, Louisi­
ana," North Louisiana Historical Association Journal, Spring, 1980, p. 
34.
36Peyton, "Treatment and Utilization of Prisoners of War," p. 78; But­
ler, "Prisoner of War Labor in the Sugar Cane Fields of Lafourche 
Parish, Louisiana," p. 178; Louisiana Farm Bureau News, May, 1980, pp. 
1, 4; Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, p. 5.
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received on the farms. This activity began in 1942, when the boom in 
defense industries caused industrial labor shortages. P. Theo 
Landaiche, a St. Gabriel rice farmer, complained to Senator Ellender 
in January, 1942, that several individuals who owned trucks facili­
tated the farm labor flight to industry by using the vehicles to 
transport farm workers to defense industries in Baton Rouge (for a 
fee, of course). Moreover, Landaiche complained, "These jobs are 
strickly (sic) a union proposition . . . The pay on these jobs are 
(sic) from $4.00 to $6.00 per day for these common farm Negroes ..." 
Congressman Overton Brooks complained to Paul McNutt, Chairman of the 
War Manpower Commission, that the WMC placed advertisements in Louisi­
ana newspapers offering jobs in both in-state and out-of-state in­
dustries, and thus contributed to the drain of Louisiana's agricul­
tural labor. McNutt replied that the WMC and the United States Em­
ployment Service carried on their search for available workers nation­
wide, and no agency of the federal government had designated northwest
37Louisiana a critical labor area.
The industrial raids on the agricultural labor pool continued 
into 1943. Mark H. Brown, a Lake Providence lumber mill operator, com­
plained in May, 1943, that government contractors sent trucks to 
transport labor to their construction sites for "grading, sodding, and 
beautifying" frills, while producers of forest products and farmers 
lacked sufficient help. Furthermore, H. B. Naquin, a small-scale
37P. Theo Landaiche to Allen J. Ellender, January 2, 1942; Louis 
Krielow to Ellender, February 24, 1943, Ellender Collection; Overton 
Brooks to Paul McNutt, May 2, 1944; McNutt to Brooks, May 12, 1944; 
Brooks to McNutt, June 23, 1944, Congressional Record 78 Congress 2 
Session Appendix Volume 90 Part 10, pp. A3345-A3346.
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manufacturer of a mechanical sugar cane harvester, reported to Presi­
dent Roosevelt that the giant Higgins Industries, producing ships and 
other war implements, depleted the available labor supply within "40 
or 50 miles" in all directions by providing buses to transport workers
from rural areas into New Orleans, and that "our sugar planters cannot
38compete with the prices that they are paying per day." Instructions 
issued by the WMA and the USES subsequently provided that individuals 
currently or most recently employed in agriculture could not be re­
ferred to non-agricultural employment without prior consultation be­
tween the USES and a designated representative of the War Food Admini­
stration (usually a County Agent of the State Agricultural Extension 
39Service). This provision proved to be ineffectual. Relocation of 
agricultural labor continued to be a problem throughout the war.
Geography, climate, traditional southern racial attitudes, and 
legalized segregation in the South thwarted one effort to ease the 
labor shortage by utilizing workers from the West Indies. The govern­
ments of the United States and Jamaica agreed in 1943 that Jamaican 
workers could come to the.United States. The major concentration point 
for the West Indian laborers was Camp Pontchartrain, adjacent to New 
Orleans. The extra labor was therefore tantalizingly close to Louisi­
ana farmers. The Jamaican government, however, had agreed to export 
workers to the mainland only with two stipulations: they had to re­
OOMark H. Brown to Allen J. Ellender, May 10, 1943; H. B. Naquin to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 15, 1943; Ellender Collection.
39Paul V. McNutt to Allen J. Ellender, September 15, 1943, Ellender 
Collection.
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turn to Jamaica after the 1943 harvest season so they would not be ex­
posed to a harsh North American winter, and they could not be used in 
the South. Some south Louisiana farmers asked Senators Ellender and 
Overton to prevail upon the federal government to seek changes in the 
original bilateral agreement. The War Food Administration subsequently 
asked the Jamaican government to extend the period of employment of 
its nationals in the United States, and allow their use in the Louisi­
ana and Florida sugar cane fields, where the harvest season extended 
far beyond that of other crops. Despite pleas from Louisianians, 
however, both the Jamaican and Bahamian governments agreed to allow 
their nationals to remain in the United States over the winter of 1943-
44, but stipulated that they could be employed only in Florida, where
40the winters more closely matched the mild, tropical winter.
Failure to secure imported workers left only the POWs as a large 
pool of untapped labor. Their subsequent work in the fields of Louisi­
ana brought them into close contact with many more Louisianians than 
would have associated with them otherwise. The attitude of many 
Louisianians was more favorable toward the primary enemies, the Ger­
mans, than toward Italians, Southern Europeans, or Asians. Black 
Louisianians, closely associated with the POWs in agricultural work, 
were of two minds about the prisoners: some blacks resented the com­
petition for their work and the special treatment some prisoners
40Charles A. Farwell to W. C. Kemper, July 31, 1943; Paul V. McNutt to 
Allen J. Ellender, August 17, 1943, September 14, 1943; Walter Godchaux 
to Farwell, August 2, 1943; Godchaux to Ellender, August 2, 1943, 
September 2, 1943; Wilson R. Buie to Ellender, August 28, 1943; God­
chaux to Frank Wurzlow, August 23, 1943, August 30, 1943; Marvin Jones 
to Ellender, October 30, 1943; Ellender Collection.
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received; other blacks found satisfaction in seeing whites sharing 
menial field work. Despite official attempts to discourage fraterni­
zation, hundreds of personal relationships developed between prisoners
41and both black and white Louisianians.
Louisiana’s use of POW labor reached its peak during the 1945 
crop year after Germany's surrender, but before the prisoners were 
repatriated. Many farmers and others who utilized POW labor in the 
forest industry feared continued agricultural labor shortages through­
out the South after the war and wanted the government to keep the 
POWs for an extended period, but by 1946 POW labor disappeared from 
Louisiana.^
Despite the problems posed by bad■weather and the agricultural 
labor shortage, Louisiana farmers continued to produce their three 
historic major staple crops: sugar cane, cotton, and rice. Each
subdivision of agriculture responded to the challenge of the war in 
its own way.
Louisiana sugar farmers during the war were confined mainly to 
the triangle with apexes in West Baton Rouge, Iberia, and Lafourche 
Parishes, covering an average of 266,200 acres during those years.
41Matthew J. Schott, "World War II Prisoners and Internees in Louisi­
ana: A Lesson in Racial and Ethnic Stereotyping," paper delivered to
the Louisiana Historical Association Annual Convention, March 25, 1983.
4°Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, .p. 4; R. D. Crowell to Overton 
Brooks, January 28, 1944; E. A. Frost to Brooks, January 28, 1944; Q.
T. Hardtner to Brooks, February 9, 1944, Congressional Record 78 Con­
gress 2 Session Appendix Volume 90 Part 8 (Washington, D.C., United 
States Government Printing Office, 1944), p. A825; Henry D. Larcade to 
Colonel Clifford S. Urwiller, February 19, 1945, Congressional Record 
79 Congress 1 Session Appendix Volume 91 Part'10 (Washington, D.C., 
United States Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. A726-A727; Joseph
C. Goulden, The Best Years 1945-1950 (New York, Antheneum, 1976), p. 
130.
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43Production from 1940 to 1944 averaged 4,800,000 tons. The Sugar 
Act of 1937 regulated that production during the war. Congress 
planned the Sugar Act to apply to crops only until 1940, but the 
beginning of World War II caused Congress to extend the Act until 
1944.44
The Sugar Act of 1937 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture 
(Henry A. Wallace, until his election to the vice presidency in 1940, 
Claude Wickard thereafter) to estimate the annual consumption require­
ments of the United States in December of each year, or at other times 
if he deemed it necessary, and then allocate portions of the total to 
farmers in the sugar-producing areas of the country. The Secretary of
Agriculture thus had broad powers to manipulate the price of sugar
45through his power to determine consumption requirements. In addi­
tion, an international agreement reached in 1937 between sugar 
importing and sugar exporting countries allowed the exporting coun­
tries to produce sugar at high levels, thus in effect helping to hold 
down sugar prices. This international agreement nominally lasted un­
til 1942, but the war caused new problems in the international sugar
46market before that date.
43Reiling and Wiegmann, Louisiana Agriculture Economic Trends and Cur­
rent Status, p. 33.
44Rudolph Carrol Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture" (Ph.
D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1973), p. 242; Thomas Becnel,
Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment Louisiana 1887-1976 (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1980), pp. 34-35. .
45Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," p. 243; Becnel, 
Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, p. 35.
46Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950 A 
Study of Their Origin and Development (New York, The Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1953), p. 399.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
404
Following the beginning of the war, American sugar merchants, 
many of whom remembered the short supplies experienced during World 
War I, bought large quantities of sugar, even though Roosevelt and 
Wallace assured them that the United States surplus of 800,000 tons 
of sugar would prevent shortages in the new world situation. Never­
theless, the buying spree caused Roosevelt to suspend all quota re­
strictions on September 11, 1939. He reinstated the quotas on Decem­
ber 26, 1939, but by then Louisiana sugar farmers had planted a 1940 
crop far in excess of any reasonable quotas. The Department of Agri­
culture ruled, therefore, that the farmers could harvest up to 110 
per cent of their proportionate share of the 1940 crop without deduc­
tion from their payments. Nature, however, had the last word on the 
1940 sugar cane crop. Adverse weather conditions destroyed much of it. 
In addition, Japanese expansion the Pacific threatened United States 
imports from Hawaii and the Philippines. Therefore, the USDA, Secre­
tary of State Cordell Hull, and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes 
agreed in April, 1941, that all acreage restrictions should be lifted 
from sugar production. The marketing quotas remained, however, and 
were not lifted until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
After that attack, the government encouraged full production and dis­
tribution of sugar.^
Aid to the sugar industry as originally assigned to the Defense 
Supplies Corporation, which on October 14, 1942, announced that it 
would reimburse United States refiners of Louisiana raw sugar for
47Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," pp. 255-261.
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certain transportation costs they incurred in shipping the raw sugar
to refineries designated by the War Production Board instead of the
refinery nearest the raw sugar mill. The government hoped to keep
the raw sugar supply distributed to all available refineries so that
some would not be inundated with raw sugar while others lay idle. The
Commodity Credit Corporation assumed responsibility for this program
on December 16, 1942, and the CCC continued the reimbursement payments
48for the 1943-1946 crop years.
The CCC also supplied assistance payments for harvest of the 1943
sugar cane crop. On October 22, 1943, it offered a payment of 33 cents
per ton of Louisiana standard sugar cane to be paid through the proces-
49sors to the growers. The early freeze during the 1943 harvest 
season threatened to reduce the amount of sugar produced, so the CCC 
extended the payment program to include salvage operations for the 
freeze-damaged cane.^
Despite these attempts to bolster domestic sugar production, the 
United States and its allies supplied less than their need. Therefore, 
United States consumers seldom received all the sugar they could use.
48Earl B. Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls 1941-1947 Volume I 
(New York, The Statistical Press, Inc., n.d.), p. 65; Sugar and Its 
Wartime Controls Volume II, pp. 592-607. This program was designed 
to keep all refineries operating at full capacity. The alternative, 
the USDA thought, would be to allow refineries near the raw sugar 
mills to be choked with surplus sugar, while refineries further away 
operated at partial capacity or stood idle.
49Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, pp. 85-86; Volume 
II, pp. 608-612.
^Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, p. 86; Volume II, 
pp. 613-614.
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Per capita consumption in the United States fluctuated during the war.
The 1942 per capita consumption of 86.2 pounds fell to 80.3 pounds in
1943, rose to 89.1 pounds in 1944, and sank to 73.6 pounds in 1945.
Furthermore, beginning in 1942, consumers received ration books which
allowed them to purchase only a limited amount of sugar (originally
slightly more than one-half pound per week, eventually falling to less
than one-third pound per week), and then only within a carefully
specified time.'’*'
Cotton crops covered more acres in Louisiana during the war years
than any other single staple crop —  an average of 995,000 acres during 
521940-1944. Cotton production was also more widely spread over the
state. A survey in 1945 found cotton on 61.3 per cent of Louisiana
farms, sugar cane grown for sugar on 6.51 per cent and rice on 4.94
per cent. All areas of the state except Jefferson, Plaquemines, St.
Bernard, and Orleans Parishes produced at least some cotton during the 
53war.
Cotton, of course, was the historic crop of the South, and 
southern farmers could grow cotton well —  so well, in fact, that they 
had repeatedly flooded the market during the 1930s, thus depressing
*̂Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, p. 87; Volume IV, 
pp. 1321, 1351.
52Louisiana farmers grew com on an average of 1,300,000 acres during 
the war, but corn was not a staple crop grown primarily for sale. In­
stead, the farmers generally used the com either as food for them­
selves or their workstock.
53Reiling and Wiegtnann, Louisiana Agricultural Economic Trends and 
Current Status, p. 30; Curtis, Statistical Data and Trends, p. 9.
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prices. Cotton, because of the use of cotton lint in armament pro­
duction, became an important commodity during the war. Therefore, 
the Louisiana Agricultural Extension Service concentrated on improving 
the quality of the cotton produced. The United States Department of 
Agriculture, however, recognized that the huge stockpiles of surplus 
cotton precluded the need for production stimulation programs. The 
United States in March, 1941, had a carry-over of almost 12,000,000 
bales, and the carry-over never fell much below 10,500,000 bales at 
any time during the war.^
Therefore, Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard introduced a 
1941 Supplementary Cotton Program in an attempt to reduce the supply 
in two ways: the USDA paid cotton farmers to reduce their cotton
acreage with stamps which could only be used to purchase cotton 
clothing at local stores participating in the program; and it paid 
farmers to grow vegetables on land taken out of cotton production.^ 
The second part of this program met with little success. The
54Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," p. 289; Tindall, 
The Emergence of the New South, p. 704; Frederick W. Williamson,
Origin and Growth of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana 1860-1948 
How It Opened the Road for Progress in Better Farming and Rural Living 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechani­
cal College, Division of Agricultural Extension, 1951), p. 222. Dr. 
Henry G. Knight, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry and 
Engineering and Regional Research Laboratories, told the House Appro­
priations Committee on March 2, 1942, that the Southern Research 
Laboratory in New Orleans had developed a way for cotton lint to be 
used in the production of smokeless gunpowder. Knight admitted that 
the resulting shells were more explosive than shells with regular 
linters and therefore required more careful handling, but the use of 
cotton virtually guaranteed an unlimited supply. States, March 2, 
1942.
^Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," p. 289.
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payment to the farmers was a token $1.50 for a one—fourth acre plot 
which had to he protected from livestock and which had to grow at 
least six kinds of vegetables. A farm family could also receive a 
$3.00 payment for producing and storing 300 quarts of frozen or canned 
foodstuffs."*̂  Many farmers, accustomed to producing staple cash 
crops, however, disliked vegetable gardening and failed to understand 
the importance of family food production in diversified farm manage­
ment.^ Despite the admonitions from Georgia Farm Bureau President 
R. L. Wingate that "We cannot eat surplus cotton," many cotton farmers
throughout the South, including Louisiana, preferred to continue pro-
58ducing the crop they understood best.
Rice, Louisiana’s third staple crop, was confined mostly to the 
southwestern corner of the state during the war years. Between 1940 
and 1944, Louisiana rice farmers planted an average 558,400 acres.
Rice was a crop of restricted acreage because it required the imper­
vious subsoils found in southwest Louisiana which are used to hold the 
irrigation water that discourages weed growth during the growing 
season. Southwest Louisiana produced 83 per cent of Louisiana’s total
C gIbid., p. 290; A. B. Curet, "Food Wins Wars, Too —  So Point Coupee 
Parish Goes All Out For Victory," Louisiana Municipal Review, September- 
October, 1942, pp. 154-155.
"*̂ Williamson, Origin and Growth of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana, 
pp. 218-219; J. L. Lee, "Louisiana Farming in the National Emergency," 
Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1942, pp. 44-48.
58Tindall, Emergence of the New South, pp. 704-705. It should also be • 
noted that it was not unprofitable to grow cotton during the war. The 
price of cotton on the New Orleans market reached 20.77 cents per pound 
including government soil conservation payments in January, 1942. This 
price exceeded cotton prices back to 1929. Times-Picayune, January 23, 
1942.
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rice harvest during the war years, but Louisiana’s share of the
national rice market fell from 40.6 per cent in 1939 to 28.6 per cent 
59in 1944. As in most other commodity areas, the United States govern­
ment encouraged unlimited rice production and guaranteed prices. Loss 
of normal Asiatic supplies to Japanese expansion sharpened the American 
realization that it needed more domestic supplies, and raised total 
plantings to the practical limit of 1,500,000 acres over the country. 
Louisiana farmers harvested 88,690,000 bushels of rice worth 
$147,819,000 between 1941 and 1944.60
Louisiana farmers also increased production of other crops during 
the war. They had grown soybeans for years, but primarily for hay, 
forage, and soil improvement. The federal government, however, called 
for more soybeans for vegetable oil production, and Louisiana’s farmers 
responded. Soybeans remained a minor crop during the war, however, 
covering an average 31,800 acres between 1941 and 1944.̂ ^
In addition to vegetable crops, Louisiana farmers also increased 
production of meat and meat products. Swine, beef, poultry, egg, and 
milk production all increased during the war. The entire pig crop of 
1942 —  1,106,000 —  was 7 per cent above that of 1941. The New
59Reiling and Wiegmann, Louisiana Agriculture Economic Trends and 
Current Status, pp. 34-35; Whitten, "American Rice Cultivation," p. 21.
Ĥaramack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," pp. 296-298.
^Reiling and Wiegmann, Louisiana Agriculture Economic Trends:and 
Current Status, pp. 34-35; Williamson, Origip and Growth of Agricul­
tural Extension in Louisiana,' p. 229. The real "boom" in Louisiana 
soybeans occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. The average yield be­
tween 1940 and 1944 was 388,000 bushels. In comparison, average yield 
between 1972 and 1976 was 46,500,000 bushels, reaching a high of
63,000,000 bushels in 1976.
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Orleans market received 79,202,000 pounds of milk in 1940, compared 
to 105,452,000 pounds in 1941, and 112,651,000 in 1942. Louisiana 
farmers produced about 10,000,000 chickens in 1942, and improved egg 
production 17 per cent over the previous year. During the spring and 
summer of 1942, Louisiana farms supplied over 100 railroad cars of 
eggs —  over 1,000,000 dozen —  to the egg dehydration plant at Ruston 
in north Louisiana.^
Louisiana sweet potatoes provided another source of income to 
Louisiana farmers. The B. F. Trappey family of Jeanerette had moved 
their agricultural canning operation to Lafayette shortly after 1930, 
and there developed a process for canning formerly discarded sweet 
potatoes that were not of the highest quality by packing them in a 
heavy sugar syrup which preserved both the shape and sweetness of the 
potato. By the beginning of World War II, the Trappeys had introduced 
their "candied yam" to much of the middle South. The Allied armed 
forces included the potatoes in their field ration kits and thus 
created an unprecedented demand. The Trappeys expanded their cannery 
and produced about 12,000,000 pounds of canned sweet potatoes for the 
military before the end of the war. In addition, five plants in Lou­
isiana —  Warriner Starch at St. Francisville; American Foods at 
Opelousas, Trappey, and Little and Company at Lafayette, and Frank 
Tea and Spice at New Iberia, produced dehydrated sweet potatoes. These 
plants in 1943 used nearly 1,000,000 bushels of raw potatoes, for which 
they paid $2,500,000. The Quartermaster Corps bought their entire
£2 _Williamson, Origin and Growth of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana,
pp. 225-227; Shreveport Times, July 7, 1942.
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63production.
Louisiana’s forests also contributed to the war effort- As the 
United States shifted its national defense preparedness program into 
high gear, the government became the country's largest lumber consumer. 
In September, 1941, alone, the federal government ordered 2,000,000,000 
board feet of lumber for the construction of cantonments.^ Southern 
pine timber producers supplied much of the government’s need. Louisi­
ana then had about 16,193,000 acres of forest land (about 55 per cent 
in public ownership and 88.1 per cent in private ownership. About
one-half of this acreage was in hardwood timber, and the other one-
v  - i *  -  -  65half xn pxne.
The federal government did not impose stringent controls on the 
forest industry, but industry trade groups instead organized produc­
tion of this valuable source of war material. The Southern Pine 
Association, headquartered in New Orleans, for example, pledged its 
full support to the war effort; the government accepted lumber of
poorer grade than it had permitted before, and the timber industry 
66boomed. By the end of 1945, Louisiana had produced 82,000,000 board
Morning Advocate, May 27, 1944; Dismukes, The Center, pp. 52-53. In 
addition to sweet potatoes, the army also bought Louisiana-grown Irish 
potatoes. In 1943 the army needed 5 railroad cars (1,500 sacks) each 
day for its camps in Louisiana. Town Talk, April 29, 1943.
64James E. Fickle, The New South and the 'New Competition’ Trade As­
sociation Development in the Southern Pine Industry (Urbana, Illinois, 
Forest History Society by the University of Illinois Press, 1980), p. 
350.
^A. D. Folweiler, Forest Land Ownership in Louisiana and Its Influence 
on Timber Production, Louisiana Bulletin No. 377 (Baton Rouge, Louisi­
ana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, December,
1943), p. 9.
66Fickle, The New South and the 'New Competition*, pp. 350-351; William
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feet of timber in excess of its need, and 475 timber operators in the 
state had paid $50,000,000 to some 40,000 people working in the timber 
business, even though Louisiana timber producers struggled with 
shortages of labor, equipment, and transportation, as did timbermen 
in other sections of the United States.^ North Louisiana Soil Con­
servation District forestors noted at the end of the war that the 
heavier—than-normal cutting caused by war demand had improved the 
north Louisiana timber stands by removing many weak "weed” trees of
68questionable value and thus leaving room for healthy trees to grow.
World War II caused many changes on Louisiana farms. While the 
amount of land devoted to farming remained virtually the same —  
9,996,108 acres in 1939 (34.6 per cent of Louisiana's total area), and 
10,039,657 acres in 1944 (34.7 per cent of the total area), the number 
of farmers declined from 150,007 in 1940 to 129,295 in 1945. In 
addition, the characteristics of the farm population changed notice­
ably. More farmers became full or part owners of the land they 
worked during the war. In 1940, 52,946 farmers owned their farms out­
right. By 1945, that number had increased to 58,761. This trend to­
ward farm ownership cut across both races. The number of white full 
owners increased from 43,410 to 48,357, while the number of black full 
owners increased from 9,526 to 10,404. Overall, the percentage of
G. Robbins, Lumberjacks and Legislators Political Economy of the 
Lumber Industry 1890-1941 (College Station, Texas A & M University 
Press, 1982), pp. 236-238.
^ Morning Advocate, December 7, 1945; Robbins, Lumberjacks and Legis­
lators, p. 238.
68Shreveport Times, August 26, 1945.
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Louisiana farms operated by owners increased from 40.2 in 1940 to 50.4 
in 1944.69
While the number of farm owners increased, the number of farm 
tenants declined during the war years as agricultural workers found 
jobs in war-related industry or entered the armed services. The 
number of all classes of tenants fell from 89,167 in 1940 to 63,541 
in 1945. The decline occurred in tenants of both races, but more 
whites than blacks left tenantry during the war years. The number of 
white tenants fell from 40,787 in 1940 to 25,263 in 1945 (a decline 
of 14,524), while the number of black tenants fell from 48,380 to 
37,278 (a decline of 11,102). This trend held true even for the 
poorest of Louisiana agricultural workers —  the sharecroppers. The 
number of ’croppers fell from 38,631 in 1940 to 25,221 in 1945. In 
this category the decline was greater for blacks than for whites. The 
higher number of black sharecroppers at the beginning of the war, 
however, still left more black than white sharecroppers at the end of 
the war. The number of white sharecroppers declined from 12,082 to 
6,110 (a decline of 5,972), while the number of black sharecroppers 
declined from 27,549 to 19,111 (a decline of 8,438).^
The scarcity of farm labor during the war years is also revealed 
in the startling decline in the number of hired hands. Louisiana 
farmers reported 56,712 hired hands on their farms in 1940. By 1945,
^9Curtis, Statistical Data and Trends in the Agriculture of Louisiana, 
pp. 5, 7.
70,.., _Ibid., p. 5.
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however, that number had fallen to 18,954,7  ̂a decline of 37,759.
(No wonder Louisiana farmers agreed to risk using German POWs on 
their farms I)
Louisiana farmers also grew older during the war years. Their 
average age in 1940 was 44.2 years, while in 1945, their average age 
had increased to 46.7 years. It is no surprise that the number of 
farmers in the "Under 35" age group declined most sharply —  from 
42,104 in 1940 (29 per cent of the total number of farmers) to 25,707 
in 1945 (20 per cent of the total). The young farmers, of course, 
were most susceptible to the draft. Also, many of them had less of 
a stake in farm life, and therefore felt less reluctance to leave the 
farm for industrial jobs. All other age categories of farmers rose 
in their percentage of the total number of farmers during the war 
years. . The "35-54" age group fell in actual numbers from 64,710 in 
1940 to 64,359 in 1945, but their percentage of the total number of 
farmers rose from 45 per cent to 50 per cent. The ”55-64" age group 
similarly fell in. real numbers —  from 22,877 to 22,837, but in­
creased slightly in percentage from 16 per,cent to 18 per cent. The 
"65 and Above" age group, however, increased in both real numbers and 
percentage —  13,948 (10 per cent) in 1940 to 15,106 (12 per cent) in 
1945.72
Louisiana agriculture also experienced a slight trend toward 
larger farms during the war years. The "Under 30 Acres" farm
7*Ibid., p. 14.
72Ibid., p. 6.
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classification showed a decline from 50.3 per cent of all Louisiana 
farms in 1939 to 46.1 per cent in 1944, while all other classifica­
tions (30-49 acres; 50—99 acres; 100-179 acres; 180-259 acres; 260- 
499 acres; 500 or more acres) showed increases. These increases, how­
ever, were slight. The "50-99 acre" classification, for example, 
showed the largest percentage increase, and it was only 1.3 per cent.
The "180-259 acres" and "500 or more acres" classifications, in con-
73trast, showed the least increase (.4 per cent).
The relative prosperity of the war years also brought more 
amenities to farm life. The number of trucks on Louisiana farms in­
creased from 17,005 to 20,974 from 1940 to 1945 (a 23.3 per cent in­
crease), while the number of automobiles increased from 34,891 to 
7440,651. In addition, 17,481 farms in 1945 (13.7 per cent of the 
total) reported running water in the main dwelling; 31,558 farms re­
ceived electricity (24.4 per cent of the total); 63,025 were equipped 
with radios (48.7 per cent of the total); and 6,434 had a telephone 
on the premises (5 per cent of the total).7̂
In summary, Louisiana agriculture faced many difficult challenges 
during the years of World War II which it met with varying degrees of 
success. Perennial problems with bad weather and insects, of course, 
are beyond the total control of farmers at any time. The labor 
problem likewise remained beyond the ability of Louisiana farmers to
73 :Ibid., p. 8.
74Ibid., p. 13.
75Ibid., p. 14.
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solve completely, although several human and mechanical substitutes 
were used effectively.
Despite these difficulties, however, the unprecedented worldwide 
demand for agricultural products created by the war brought,Louisiana 
agriculture out of the economic doldrums caused by the loss of a cap­
tive market following World War I and the Great Depression. The war 
demand, however, while it stimulated Louisiana's agricultural economy, 
failed to reorient that economy toward new crops. Louisiana farmers 
both before and after the war concentrated on growing their three 
traditional staple crops: cotton, sugar cane, and rice. Fortunately
for them, the war created demand for these specific commodities —  
cotton for both fiber (including military uniforms and accessories) 
and ammunition, sugar cane and rice because German naval attacks 
threatened to disrupt dependable sources of supply, and because 
Japanese expansion in the Pacific and Asia destroyed traditional 
sources of both sugar and rice. Louisiana farmers, therefore, could 
sell their favorite crops in a most faborable sellers' market and 
enjoy the attendant prosperity —  while that market lasted.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER X
LOUISIANA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR II
During World War II, the South received some $4,442,000,000 in 
federal funds for war plants, 17.6 per cent of the national total. 
Louisiana received more of these funds than any other Southern state 
except Texas —  about $1,773,713,000.  ̂ The South had trained many re­
cruits during World War I, and federal officials in World War II, in­
cluding President Franklin Roosevelt, remembering that contribution, 
sent thousands of new recruits for training in the South again. In 
addition, Southern urban areas contained relatively large pools of 
workers needed in wartime industry. Therefore, the South, and especi­
ally Southern cities became important centers in the headlong rush to
2enable the United States to participate in the war.
Increased federal spending for war projects helped to bring 
Louisiana and the South out of the economic doldrums of the Great De­
pression, but many people felt a great reluctance to let go of New 
Deal agencies which had ensured their subsistence and had attempted to 
bolster their morale by emphasizing work rather than charity during 
the dark days of the 1930s. The Works Progress Administration, the 
Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration, and 
other agencies had brought hope when there appeared to be no hope
Ĝeorge Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 699-700; 
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, January 30, 1945.
2David R. Goldfield, Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers Southern City and 
Region 1607-1980 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 
pp. 182-183.
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during the decade of despair, and such programs remained popular even 
after wartime prosperity made them less necessary. As late as 1939, 
the WPA remained a major employer in Central Louisiana, sponsoring a 
nursery school in Alexandria, community centers in Grant, Nitchitoches, 
Rapides, and Winn Parishes, archeological expeditions studying Indian 
village and burial sites in LaSalle and Avoyelles Parishes, the His­
torical Records Survey in ten parishes, and a unit of the Veterans* 
Graves Registration Program, venereal disease control projects in 
Rapides, Natchitoches, LaSalle, and Concordia Parishes, and a Vital 
Statistics Project in LaSalle and Rapides Parishes. The Rapides 
Parish Police Jury in 1940 turned over one entire floor of the old 
parish courthouse, which the parish government had just vacated to 
move to a new building, to the WPA district office and its sixty-nine 
employees. In addition, Alexandria provided all utilities to the WPA
3office without charge.
Even though the WPA continued approving projects for Louisiana —  
street construction and repair for Baton Rouge in March, 1941, and 
statewide recreational facilities for soldiers in September, 1941 —  
Louisiana’s labor force increasingly moved off WPA rolls and onto 
payrolls. The state led all others in the percentage increase in the 
private sector employment rate from September through October, 1940. 
Louisiana’s increase was 141.8 per cent. New Orleans WPA rolls
—3Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 23, 27, 1940 (hereinafter cited 
as Town Talk); William W. Breme, "Along the 'American Way”1 The New 
Deal's Work Relief Programs for the Unemployed," The Journal of Ameri­
can History, December, 1975, pp. 636-652; Fifteenth Biennial Report, 
Department of Conservation, State of Louisiana, 1940-1941, p. 59.
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reached their peak in April, 1939, when the agency carried 17,698 
names on its payrolls. By March, 1942, however, only 6,489 names 
remained, and about 250 men per week left those rolls as they found 
work.^
By December, 1942, when President Roosevelt ordered liquidation 
of the WPA, the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate thought that the time had 
indeed come to issue a eulogy for that beneficial federal agency:
For its purpose, when it was created, the WPA 
was one of the soundest experiments of the 
emergency relief era. It served the double 
purpose of giving the taxpayers some return 
for their money, and of helping to preserve 
the self-respect of those receiving relief.
But those days of emergency unemployment are 
gone —  if not forever, at least until the 
war has been won.^
The National Youth Administration also shifted the last phase of 
its work in Louisiana to the war effort. The NYA announced in July, 
1940, that it planned to spend $1,271,038 in Louisiana during 1941, 
and that it would place increased emphasis on projects designed to 
provide work experience and basic training in mechanical pursuits to 
provide additional preparation for jobs in industries expected to ex­
pand because of increased production for national defense —  including 
plumbing, electricity, automobile mechanics, welding, painting, car­
pentry, blacksmithing, woodworking, cabinet making, truck driving,
~ 4Shreveport Times, December 4, 1940; Morning Advocate, March 19, 1941; 
New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 28, September 18, 1942.
^Morning Advocate, December 18, 1942.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
420
dispatching, telephone work, hospital work, and army messenger work.^
In addition, the Civilian Conservation Corps during the early 1940s 
oriented the training of the youths in its program to the war effort. 
Some CCC workers, for example, engaged exclusively in work on military 
reservations.̂
The 1940 Louisiana legislature also enacted a law to ensure 
federal-state cooperation in upgrading rural housing. The statute 
created regional housing authorities, to which a farmer could donate 
one acre of land. The housing authority then built a small but sub­
stantial home on the property and rented it to the farmer for $4.25 
per month. In addition, the farmer could purchase the house anytime 
within the next sixty years.^
The beginning of World War II in Europe brought an immediate boom 
to the American economy as businessmen on all levels rushed to stock 
up on materials and products which they feared might become scarce 
because of war demand. The immediate boom collapsed after concurrent
public consumption and export booms failed to develop, but the American
geconomy rebounded, albeit more slowly, in 1940. Louisiana's economy
^Times—Picayune, July 2, 1940; Town Talk, January 9, 1941; New Orleans 
States, July 2, 1941.
Ĥubert Humphreys, "In a Sense Experimental: The Civilian Conserva­
tion Corps in Louisiana," Louisiana History, Fall, 1964, pp. 347, 349- 
350, 367.
QE. M. Morgan, "Federal Rural Housing in Louisiana," Louisiana Police 
Jury Review, April, 1941, pp. 72-73.
qEliot Janeway, The Struggle For Survival A Chronicle of Economic 
Mobilization in World War II (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University 
Press, 1951), pp. 146-148.
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improved along with that of the United States during 1940. Standard 
Oil Company in Baton Rouge began an expansion program including syn­
thetic rubber production; Higgins Shipyards in New Orleans recorded 
banner profits in 1940; the federal government spent approximately 
$13,000,000 for construction of training camps around Alexandria; the 
Louisiana Employment Service placed approximately 57,000 people in 
jobs (16,000 in work on the army camps alone); new passenger car sales 
in the state increased from 27,882 in 1939 to 33,064 in 1940; and 
crude petroleum production increased from 90,000,000 barrels in 1939 
to almost 102,000,000 barrels in 1940.*̂  Retail sales in Baton Rouge 
during the 1940 Christmas season increased twenty-five per cent over 
1939 Christmas sales, and topped the 1929 record sales. Baton Rouge, 
in fact, ranked seventh among United States cities in increased retail 
buying power in 1940, according to the Federal Reserve System report 
for the year. In addition, the National Industrial Conference Board 
found that earnings per person during 1940 had increased in only three 
southern states; Virginia (to $408), Louisiana (to $390), and South 
Carolina (to $296). All three states stood above the 1929 level of 
income per person, but their citizens were only relatively better off. 
Even the highest southern state (Virginia) remained well below the 
United States average income per person ($546), and received less than 
half the earnings per person of the highest state in the Union (Connec­
ticut, with $818 per person).*1
1(1 Town Talk, December 27, 1940.
11Moming Advocate, December 28, 1940; March 8, 10, April 1, 1941.
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The construction industry in Louisiana had begun to recover from 
the Depression even before the advent of the war. The Federal Housing 
Administration reported that during the first week of March, 1939, it 
had accepted more mortgage loans for construction or improvement of 
private dwellings than during any comparable time period in its ex­
perience in Louisiana. Following the federal government's decision 
to construct training camps in Louisiana, however, the building in­
dustry recovered even more, especially in Central Louisiana with its 
concentration of war camps and influx of population. The city of 
Alexandria issued sixty-five building permits for construction worth 
$75,517 in April, 1940, alone. Building permits for the entire year 
reached a value of $1,276,957 (the 1939 total value had been 
$774,460.57). The value of building permits issued throughout the 
state grew 32.4 per cent in 1938; 32.8 per cent in 1939; declined
14.0 per cent in 1940; increased 84.3 per cent in 1941 (height of the
12war-camp construction boom) and declined again in 1942 and 1943.
Industrial growth during the war occurred throughout Louisiana. 
While New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Shreveport were the major indus­
trial centers, small manufacturers located their plants in smaller 
towns. Most of the state's industrial development, however, occurred 
in the three major cities.
Baton Rouge, in 1940 boasted a population of 34,719. By 1945, 
its population numbered 110,000, an increase of 75,281 in just five
~12"Louisiana FHA Loans Lead the Nation," Louisiana Police Jury Review, 
April, 1939, p. 57; Town Talk, May 7, 1940, January 1, 1941; Louisiana 
Business Review, March, 1939, p. 15; January, 1940, p. 16; January, 
1941, p. 16; January, 1941, p. 18.
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years. Much of that growth resulted from the city's industrial devel- 
13opment. Baton Rouge became a major oil refining center following es­
tablishment of the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana refinery in 1909
14to process oil from the mid-portion of the continent. During the 
1940s, the city became a vital cog in the nation's war machine because 
of Standard Oil and other major industries located there. The Standard 
Oil complex, alone, included the first catalytic cracking plant ever 
built, which contributed heavily to the badly-needed production of 
100-octane aviation fuel and also produced by-products useful in 
making synthetic rubber. In addition, the complex included an alky- 
lation plant which made high octane blending agents for aviation fuel, 
plants synthesizing both ethyl and isopropyl alcohol from petroleum, 
and plants which produced synthetic rubber —  Buna-S used primarily 
to make tires, and special use Buna-N and Butyl rubber. By June, 1945, 
the Standard refinery had produced its one billionth gallon of high- 
octane aviation fuel, and the government estimated that it had fueled 
one plane of every fifteen used in the war effort.^
In addition to Standard Oil, Baton Rouge was also the site of a 
bauxite reduction plant, financed by the Defense Plant Corporation of 
the federal government and operated by the Aluminum Company of America
"l3Morning Advocate, November 25, 1945.
^Mark T. Carleton, River Capital An Illustrated History of Baton 
Rouge (Woodland Hills, California, Windsor Publications, 1981), pp. 
153-157; John L. Loos, Oil On Stream! A History of Interstate Oil 
Pipe Line Company, 1909-1959 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University 
Press, 1959), pp. 3-7.
^Morning Advocate, June.l, 1945; W. B. Cotton, Jr., "Baton Rouge Re­
finery Converts Petroleum Into War Materials," Louisiana Municipal Re­
view, July-August, 1943, pp. 105-106.
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to reduce bauxite ore to aluminum used in aircraft and other construc­
tion. By April, 1944, the Baton Rouge facility produced enough alumi­
num for 2,000 fighter planes per month and employed approximately 800 
16persons.
Baton Rouge became■, finally, a large concentration depot for 
United States Army supplies in Louisiana. This project more than 
doubled railroad trackage capacity in the old Illinois Central Rail­
road yards. The Horning Advocate noted, however, that income from 
this source would obviously end with the war.*7
Increased deposits in Baton Rouge banks revealed the city's 
growing prosperity. Deposits set new record levels during 1940. At 
the end of that year, Fidelity Bank and Trust Company reported de­
posits of $5,550,537.83 compared to $5,078,262.56 at the end of 1939. 
In addition, City National Bank reported $11,009,595.14 on deposit 
at the end of 1940, compared to $10,860,227.90 in 1939, and Louisiana 
National Bank reported $11,876,391.81 oh deposit compared to 
$11,250,811.90 the previous year. Growth in bank deposits continued
throughout the war. The three banks during 1942, for example, re-
18ceived an additional $15,378,778 in deposits.
Baton Rouge was not the only city in Louisiana which experienced 
the flush of wartime prosperity. In northwest Louisiana that pros­
perity centered in Shreveport. The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce
*̂ Morning Advocate, March 24, 1942; April 16, June 2, 1944.
17Ibid., May 30, 1942.
*̂ Ibid., January 2, 1941; April 1, 1943.
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sought with determination to bring defense industries, contracts or 
army bases (with their attendant payrolls) to northwest Louisiana.
The Chamber sent a committee to Washington to attend a meeting during 
which President Roosevelt unveiled his "favored areas" for war in­
dustries. The committee reported that Shreveport was included in a 
"favored area," and the Chamber began contacting aircraft manufacturers 
in an attempt to obtain a factory near the city. The Chamber Board of 
Directors directed its industry recruiters to offer manufacturers free 
sites supplied by the city for their factories provided that the
19industry offered sufficient revenue to justify such a contribution.
Even though the Chamber failed to lure an airplane manufacturer 
to Shreveport and failed in its prolonged effort to convince the 
federal government to build an Army cantonment near the city, it pro­
vided information on raw material priorities, labor relations, allo­
cations, contract services, and other business problems which stemmed 
from the war emergency and actively sought small war contracts for 
small businesses.^
Several Shreveport businesses contributed to the war effort. The 
J. B. Beaird Company, for example, employed approximately 800 people 
in 1943, and produced shell casings, tanks for the production of syn­
thetic rubber and storage of high octane gasoline, landing barge an­
chors, and armored tank parts. The Brewster Company plant in Shreve-
ydShreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, June 13, 1940. Microfilm 
copy, Microform Division, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge.
20Ibid., March 13, 15, May 8, November 6, December 11, 1941.
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port produced 250-pound aerial bomb bodies. This plant received raw
steel tubing which it cut, shapred, finished, and then shipped to
21shell loading plants.
Northwest Louisiana also could load the shell casings it produced. 
This step in bomb production, however, was completed not in Shreveport, 
but at the shell-loading plant located in Minden, approximately twenty 
miles east of Shreveport in Webster Parish. The Shreveport Chamber 
of Commerce began lobbying the Army Ordnance Department in 1940 for a 
munitions plant for the Shreveport area. The. War Department informed 
them in February, 1941, that the requirements for munitions plants 
were relatively rigid: sites of at least 6,000 acres, without any
pipelines or oil or mineral leases, served by two railroads and by 
highways, and preferably within twenty-five miles of a town of 100,000 
population. Northwest Louisiana could supply these requirements.
(The 1940 Census found just over 110,000 people in metropolitan 
Shreveport) and on April 1, 1941 the War Department notified local 
officials that it planned to locate the ordnance plant at Minden, 
provided it could obtain sufficient land. The proposed site was then 
held by 105 private landowners, but by September the War Department 
had acquired sufficient acreage to begin clearing the site of agricul­
tural crops, and auctions in November and December disposed of some
H Shreveport Times, June 25, July 18, 1943; Viola Carruth, Caddo 1000 
A History of the Shreveport Area From the Time of the Caddo Indians 
to the 1970s (Shreveport, Louisiana, Shreveport Magazine, 1971), p.
173; Allen J. Ellender and John H. Overton to Pat Beaird, August 26, 
1941, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, Allen J. 
Ellender Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana 
(hereinafter cited as Ellender Collection).
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22600 dwellings and farm buildings.
Costs of constructing the Minden Shell-Loading Plant ran higher
than original estimates, because contractors found that the site was
too flat to drain properly without an extensive network of ditches and
canals. In addition, they found the water table too high and the soil
too unstable for construction without larger and heavier foundations
23than originally thought necessary, thus adding to the total cost.
Nevetheless, by 1943 the massive plant encompassed 16,025 acres, 
and included 430 buildings, one hundred miles of road, forty-eight 
miles of railroad, sixty miles of fence, eleven deep water wells, 
fifteen miles of sewer line, fifteen miles of gas line, and forty-one 
miles of water mains. War Department officials demanded that muni­
tions plants be diffuse for two reasons: to provide protection against
sabotage bombings and against accidental explosions. If one building
24exploded, the rest of the plant could continue production.
War prosperity came to southwest Louisiana at Lake Charles, which
became an important petro-chemical center. Lake Charles’ industrial
growth began even before the war. The city and Calcasieu parish in
1921 began constructing a ship channel to connect Lake Charles with
*the Gulf of Mexico. By 1926, the ship channel and a newly-completed 
port facility provided a new outlet to the Gulf. By 1931, tonnage at
22Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, August 8, 1940, February 13, 
1941, July 10, 1941; Shreveport Times, August 11, 1943; Allen J. 
Ellender to various radio stations in Shreveport, June 5, 1941; Frank 
Wurzlow to various radio stations in Shreveport, July 11, 1941,
Ellender Collection.
23Shreveport Times, August 11, 1943.
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the port exceeded 1,000,000 tons per year. (Senator Allen Ellender 
intensely lobbied to convince the War Shipping Administration to use 
the port of Lake Charles for more rice shipments during the war, es-
25pecially those to Cuba and Puerto Rico, but met with little success.)
Industrial development in Lake Charles began in 1933 when the 
Mathieson Alkali Works invested $7,500,000 in a new plant, followed 
by Swift Packing Company with a $2,500,000 plant. Calcasieu Parish 
also produced some 12,000,000 barrels of oil annually by 1939 and 
about 25,000,000 more barrels moved through the port. The availability 
of petroleum led Continental Oil Company in 1939 to construct a vast 
$5,000,000 complex including an oil refinery, a tank farm, and a
26pipeline to transport crude oil from large oil fields in the vicinity.
The war, however, brought an intensified development of the Lake 
Charles petro-chemical industry. Mathieson enlarged the alkali plant 
in 1941. Cities Service Company built a high octane gasoline refinery 
that by 1945 produced 25,000 barrels per day. Firestone Rubber Com­
pany produced synthetic rubber at a plant financed by the Defense Plant 
Corporation, which also financed a butadiene plant, an ammonia plant,
25Kathleen Collins, "Lake Charles Claims Rarest Port in the World," 
Louisiana Heritage, Volume II, Number III, pp. 13-14; E. S. Land to 
Allen J. Ellender, May 29, 1943, July 2, 1943; T. A. Smith to Alva 
P. Frith, July 8, 1943; Frith to Ellender, July 27, 1943; Ellender to 
Frith, August 5, 1943, Ellender Collection. Ellender eventually had 
to report that the WSA would not promise to ship the entire 1943 
Louisiana rice crop through the port of Lake Charles, as its boosters 
wanted.
26Collins, "Lake Charles Claims Rarest Port in the World," pp. 14-15; 
"Facts About Calcasieu Parish," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 
1939, p. 35; John W. Harrop, Jr., "Lake Charles —  A Decade of Prog­
ress," Louisiana Municipal Review, September-October, 1941, pp. 140- 
141.
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27and a magnesium plant in Lake Charles.
While much of Louisiana's economic development centered in cities, 
other areas of the state also shared in the wartime prosperity. 
Louisiana's oil and gas industry had experienced dramatic growth 
during the latter half of the 1930s. The value of Louisiana petroleum 
products doubled between 1935 and 1938, reaching slightly above 
$130,000,000 in the latter year, according to official figures. Lou­
isiana oil operators, spurred on by the national defense effort, drilled 
some 202 holes in 1941, and discovered twenty-nine new fields. These 
new discoveries brought the state's known reserves officially to
925,972,000 barrels (third in the nation). Again according to official 
figures, Louisiana's production of crude oil rose from 214,888,995 
barrels in 1940-41 to 275,709,168 barrels in 1944-45. Lack of labor 
and steel for oil field production caused the number of wells drilled 
in Louisiana during 1942 to drop to 137. By 1943, however, Louisiana's
approximately 7,300 wells spread over forty-six parishes produced eight
28per cent of the entire United States output.
27Collins, "Lake Charles Claims Rarest Port in the World," p. 15; 
Morning Advocate, June 15, 1941; Lake Charles American Press, December 
2, 1941; Shreveport Times, May 27, 1944; New Orleans Item, August 23, 
1945. The Defense Plant Corporation was a division of the Reconstruc­
tion Finance Corporation created to finance the construction of de­
fense production facilities and to stockpile strategic materials. 
Janeway, The Struggle For Survival, p. 167.
28States, December 29, 1941; William G. Rankin, "The Conservation of 
Louisiana's Natural Resrouces," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 
1939, pp. 54-55; Petroleum Investigation (Crude Oil Prices and Exten­
sion of Cole Pipe Line Act) Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Com­
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce House of Representatives 78 
Congress 1 Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government Print­
ing Office, 1944), pp. 137-138, 156; Sixteenth Biennial Report, Depart­
ment of Conservation, State of Louisiana, 1942-1943, p. 214; Seven­
teenth Biennial Report, Department of Conservation, State of Louisiana,
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Oil and gas contributed more severance tax revenue to the state 
than any other natural resource. State Collector of Revenue Roland 
P. Cocreham reported that during the 1944 fiscal year, Louisiana col­
lected a total of $16,015,733 in severance taxes from all sources.
(Oil tax contributed $13,344,804 of the total, while gas contributed 
$1,661,998.) Sulphur, produced principally in the marshy Mississippi 
Delta of Plaquemines Parish and used in producing steel for armored 
plate, gasoline, and synthetic rubber, contributed $715,463 in sev­
erance taxes. (Timber was the only other natural resource to produce
more than $100,000 in revenue —  $257,771 —  all other resources to-
29gether produced only $135,092.)
While many parts of Louisiana shared in the wartime industrial 
development, New Orleans remained the state’s most industrialized 
area, producing a myriad of goods ranging from Liberty Ships to tents. 
Louisiana Shipyards, Delta Shipbuilding Company, and Higgins Indus­
tries all built ships in New Orleans. Delta Shipbuilding, for example, 
launched its first Liberty Ship in May, 1942, after working on it 242 
days. Improvements in construction techniques cut the time necessary 
for Delta to build a Liberty Ship to slightly over sixty-seven days
1944-1945, p. 15. L. M. Moffit, secretary-treasurer of the Triangle 
Drilling Company of Shreveport, testified to this subcommittee that 
many independent operators dared not start drilling a well without 
having all the necessary casing already on the site. Otherwise, he 
might drill to a productive sand and then find a delay in bringing 
the well into production.
29Morning Advocate, September 26, 1945; E- D. Wingfield, "Louisiana 
Sulphur Aids Defense," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1941, pp. 
51-52. Louisiana’s total severance tax jumped from $9,160,500 in 
1939-40 to $16,751,199.47 in 1946-47.
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by January, 1943, when the yard launched its thirty-first ship (the
"Leonidas Polk") . ̂
In addition, Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation of Downey,
California also operated an aircraft production plant in New Orleans,
building, among others, the Consolidated Model 31, a "flying boat"
ordered by the Navy, powered by two 1,000 horsepower Wright engines
31and capable of cruising at 160 miles per hour at high altitudes.
New Orleans also had a number of smaller manufacturing plants 
that produced an astonishing array of war materiel. Rheem Manufac­
turing Company produced 105-millimeter shell casings; the Neptune 
Boat and Davit Company built lifeboats; Edwin H. Blum manufactured
161,000 pairs of trousers in 1944; the Federal Fiber Mills produced 
manila and sisal rope (the only such plant in the South, which, by 
1944, had produced enough rope to encircle the globe); the Snider 
Poster Process Company produced decals which speeded production of 
airplanes by eliminating handlettering of instrument panels; the 
National Blow Pipe and Manufacturing Company produced metal ammunition 
shipping containers; the Crescent Bed Company built berths for Liberty 
Ships; the International Lubricant Corporation produced specialized
greases ordered by the armed forces to keep their equipment running
32when exposed to sea water or extremes in temperatures. Other plants 
30Morning Advocate, April 8, 1941; Item, July 18, 1941; Times-Picayune, 
March 28, 1942, January 8, 1943.
^ States, July 11, 1943, October 5, 1944; Item, July 11, 1943.
32Morning Advocate, August 12, 1941, December 31, 1944; States, Janu­
ary 19, 1945; Allen J. Ellender and John H. Overton to Robert S. Maes­
tri, September 13, 1941, Ellender Collection.
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produced other goods, but listing them would only belabor the point —  
New Orleans became a prominent war-materiel production center.
New Orleans’ most dominant war industry, however, was the manu­
facturing empire of Andrew Jackson Higgins. Higgins' business career 
began in his hometown of Columbus, Nebraska at age nine when he began 
a lawn care service. He migrated south, first to Mobile, Alabama in 
1906, and on to New Orleans in 1910, where he entered the lumber busi­
ness. His limber business crashed in the post-war slump in 1922, but 
Higgins recouped his fortunes as a boatbuilder. During 1930 and 1931, 
his boats set New Orleans to St. Louis speed records on the Missis­
sippi River (seventy-two hours, four minutes). In his work designing 
racing boats, Higgins evolved a design which allowed his boats to 
jump logs and small spits of land without injuring vital components. 
From that discovery, he developed the Higgins Eureka, a thirty-six- 
foot motorboat that could rush onto a beach without damage. Oil 
companies quickly realized the usefulness of Higgins' design, and 
used his boats in their oil exploration forays into the marshes of 
Louisiana, the Amazon Basin, the Persian Gulf, and the Far East. By 
1935, Higgins was selling $87,000 worth of boats per year. His asso­
ciation with the armed forces began in 1936, when the Army ordered 
two river steamer inspection boats. The Onited States Navy ordered 
its first landing boats from him in 1938, and Higgins produced Eurekas 
for the United States, Britain, Finland, and Holland. By 1941 he was 
selling landing boats, ramp-type welded steel tank lighters, and patrol
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torpedo (PT) boats worth $1,000,000 per month.^
Higgins, like the more famous Henry J. Kaiser, used radical new
production methods to build ships quickly. In September, 1940, his
company employed 400 production workers. By 1941, Higgins employed
1,800 workers and spent $700,000 monthly for Louisiana labor and
products. By 1944, the number of Higgins employees had grown to some
20,000, blacks as well as whites, turning out twenty-five landing
craft and PT boats daily in seven different manufacturing units in New
Orleans. The company eventually sold more than 14,000 combat boats of
all types to the Allies. In September, 1943, the United States Navy
reported that 12,964 of its 14,072 vessels were either designed or
34built by Andrew Jackson Higgins.
Higgins, however, shared in the misfortune common among American 
manufacturers during the war years. He planned to operate a vast new 
shipyard built by the federal government in which he proposed aban­
doning convential shipways containing only one keel at a time and sub­
stituting larger ways accomodating several keels at once. A keel would
"Higgins Is the Name," Time, May 4, 1942, pp. 76, 78; Jack B.
McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential Politics,” Louisiana His­
tory, Summer, 1974, pp. 274-275; A. A. poeling, Home Front USA (New 
York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), p. 52; Hearing Before a Spe­
cial Committee Investigating the National Defense Program United States 
Senate 78 Congress 1 Session Part 17 (Washington, B.C., United States 
Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 6999; Morning Advocate, March 
25, 1941; Times-Picayune, August 24, 1941; Shreveport Times, October 
24, 1943; Andrew J. Higgins to Allen J. Ellender, December 2, 1940, 
Ellender Collection.
34McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential Politics," p. 275; 
Morning Advocate, March 25, 1941; Item, May 22, 1944; Morton Sosna, 
"More Important Than The Civil War? The Social Impact of World War II 
on the South," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southern 
Historical Association, November 5, 1982, p. 11, typescript copy, 
author's collection.
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be placed on rollers at the head of the way and eased toward the
water’s edge. Workers would construct the ship as the keel slid
gradually toward the water. The United States Maritime Commission in
1942, however, canceled its order for 200 Liberty Ships which Higgins
planned to construct at this yard because of the shortage of steel
35necessary to construct both the ways and the ships.
Higgins criticized the "dollar-a-year" men who ordered cancella­
tion of his Liberty Ship contract for the Michaud plant, but despite 
a rare agreement between Governor Jones and New Orleans Mayor Robert 
Maestri, both of whom peppered Washington with appeals to restore the 
Liberty Ship contract, the Maritime Commission chose to cancel the 
order permanently. Higgins then cast about for another war product 
to build at his huge Michaud plant and settled upon airplanes. He 
first hoped to build the Curtiss C-76 Caravan all wood-troop transport, 
but the Army canceled its plans for wooden airplanes. A complex series 
of negotiations with federal defense officials brought Higgins Air­
craft, Incorporated, a contract in 1942 for 1,200 Curtiss C-46 Com­
mandos, an all-metal transport designed to carry paratroopers, light 
' artillery, or freight. The plant had turned out only one of these
35"Crepe Hung in Louisiana," Time, July 27, 1942, pp. 13, 74; Congres­
sional Record 77 Congress 2 Session Volume 88 Part 5 (Washington, D.
C., United States Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 6635-6640; 
Congressional Record 77 Congress 2 Session Volume 88 Part 10 Appendix 
(Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 
A2983; Sam Jones to Allen J. Ellender, May 16, 1941, Ellender Collec­
tion; Sosna, "More Important Than the Civil War?", p. 11. Some of 
Higgins' innovations included constructing his landing boats on the 
second floor of his plant and then lowering them on a 35-ton elevator 
to railroad flatcars which then transported them to Bayou Sara for 
testing, and weaving them strips of birch and mahogany into a wooden 
tubing which replaced virtually all scarce metal tubing in boat con­
struction. Morning Advocate, October 5, 1942.
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airplanes when the Army canceled the C-46 contract in August, 1944.
Higgins then expanded production in the Michaud plant of a newly-
designed rescue boat sturdy enough to be dropped by parachute from
high altitudes to airplane crash or shipwreck survivors. The Michaud
plant also produced parts for the Atomic bomb designed by the Man- 
36hattan Project.
Higgins' difficulty in obtaining and keeping war production con­
tracts demonstrated the vagaries of fortune experienced by business­
men who turned.most of their industrial production to war contracts 
and thus depended upon the continuing need of the federal government 
for specialized products which changes in the military situation 
might make obsolete overnight. Even beyond that difficulty lay the 
problem of obtaining sufficient workers to produce the goods, and the 
question of labor union representation for those workers.
The increased industrialization of Louisiana created labor union 
conflicts within the state. Louisiana labor troubles symbolized the 
larger labor problem which existed in the United States during the 
war. The labor union movement was then still split into the rival 
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organiza­
tions. Each group capitalized on the favorable union attitude of the
federal government and the shortage of manpower, and each increased
37membership in the South. Unions made these gains despite a growing
Morning Advocate, August 4, October 31, 1942; Town Talk, August 12, 
17, 1944; Congressional Record 78 Congress 2 Session Appendix Volume 
90 Part 10 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office,
1944), pp. A3541-A3545; Sosna, "More Important Than the Civil War?", 
p. 12; Hoeling, Home Front USA, p. 53.
37F. Ray Marshall, Labor In the South (Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 225-227.
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antiunion sentiment which increasingly equated unionism with dangerous 
radicalism. Many Louisianians shared this sentiment, even though 
Louisiana remained more friendly to unionism than other southern states. 
By the summer of 1943, for example, the AFL reported its organization 
of the Aluminum Company of America, DuPont Chemical, Copolymer, and 
Bell Telephone workers in Baton Rouge. In New Orleans, union con­
tracts protected metal trades workers in marine repair shops, the 
Delta Shipyards, and Higgins Industries, as well as about 500 office 
workers and an unspecified number of teamsters, who were members of 
new locals of their unions. In addition, the Louisiana legislature 
refused to pass anti-labor legislation (primarily "right to work" laws 
and other measures limited strikes or regulating union internal af­
fairs), while other southern states including Texas, Arkansas, Florida,
Alabama, and Mississippi enacted such laws as part of a conservative
38anti-union reaction during 1943.
The United States labor union movement sought to preserve during 
the wartime emergency the improvements it had obtained for workers 
since the New Deal came to power in 1933. The Roosevelt Administration 
wanted peace within the factories to ensure production of war materials 
to meet the emergencies of the 1940s. In exchange for unions in 
general agreeing not to stage strikes detrimental to war production 
(even though some walk-outs occurred), the unions obtained support of 
"maintenance of membership" —  a union could recruit enough new members 
to keep its membership at pre-war levels —  and protection of wages
38Ibid., pp. 225-226, 241-242.
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from the effects of inflation —  the "Little Steel" formula by which
wages were pegged to the cost of living increase between January 1,
391942 and May 1, 1942. Nevertheless, major strikes occurred in the 
coal, steel, and railroad industries and caused severe criticism of 
"greedy" unions endangering the lives of American soldiers by not pro­
ducing the maximum number of armaments the factories could turn out.
Many Americans also resented the relatively heavy initiation fees
40they had to pay to join unions working on defense-related jobs.
Union, therefore, lived an uneasy coexistence with individuals, news­
papers, and officials ready to criticize their every perceived misstep 
and curtail their hard-won rights, if possible, at least for the 
duration of the war.
Despite a resolution passed on May 11, 1942 by the Louisiana 
State Federation of Labor urging all affiliated unions to adhere to a 
strict no-strike policy for the duration of the national emergency,
4some conservative Louisianians remained heavily critical of unionism. 
Unions in Louisiana suffered from the disrepute cast upon unionism in 
general by strikes elsewhere, and because of strikes which affected 
Louisiana directly.
39Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph The American 
People 1939-1945 (New York, Coward, McCann, and Geohagen, 1973), pp. 
264-265.
40Richard R. Lingeman, Don’t You Know There’s a War ON? The American 
Home Front 1941-1945 (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Son, 1970), pp. 136- 
137; Roy Hoopes, Americans Remember the Home Front An Oral Narrative 
(New York, Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1977), p. 103.
41Congressional Record 77 Congress 1 Session Appendix Volume 87 Part 
12 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 
p. A3090.
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Governor Jones noted the rising anti-union sentiment in the nation 
and state as early as April, 1941, and told the state American Feder­
ation of Labor convention in Baton Rouge that "I want you to keep your 
right to strike; I want you to share fully in all the profits of 
defense industries —  but unless you keep first and primarily the 
confidence of the American people you stand in grave danger of losing
all the things labor has won for itself in a bloody, uphill struggle
42over half a century.”
Unions in Louisiana had much public sentiment to overcome. The 
Morning Advocate in March, 1941, derided "greedy professional labor 
leaders” who were "winning some battles in America for Mr. Hitler" by 
"sabotaging the national defense program." Later in the month, the 
newspaper railed against reports that construction jobs on the new 
airport being built north of the city were reserved for union members, 
and that only about one-half of the construction jobs at Camp Polk
near Leesville were filled by Louisiana men because of union member-
, . . 43ship requirements.
The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution on Decem­
ber 11, 1941, which decried "unnecessary strikes delaying war prepar­
ation work" and called upon President Roosevelt, Congress, "and other 
such persons as may be in position of authority" to pass legislation 
outlawing strikes in industry essential to warfare during the
42Sam Jones Address, April 7, 1941, James B. Aswell, Jr., and Family 
Papers, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Li­
brary, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge-
43Morning Advocate, March 23, 27, 1941.
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44emergency period.
A Times-Picayune editorial of March 18, 1942, attacking labor 
unions elicited comments both favorable and unfavorable. Mrs. W. F. 
Russo reminded Times-Picayune readers that her two sons in the armed 
forces "are on duty 24 hours a day and $21 a month is the miserable 
Sian they get," while labor unions clamored for increased wages at 
home. Another reader wrote that the proposed "time-and-a-half" pay 
for overtime work would only be "the incentive for deliberate slow­
downs which prevent the government from getting a fair output per 
worker at the established normal union wage scale," and observed that 
too strict observance of "business as usual" in the face of threats 
from Adolf Hitler "ruined France." Carl Mitchell of Bogalusa, a 
self-styled "working man," condemned "selfish, greedy groups of so- 
called labor leaders who are destroying the influence of labor by 
taking advantage of war to promote a labor dictatorship." Labor also 
found its defenders in this episode. Mrs. Bertha T. North of Algiers 
wrote that "your lying, filthy editorial . . . should be condemned by 
every decent working man and woman in the city of New Orleans ..." 
and Henry Gegenheimer remarked that the newspaper attempted "through 
distortion of the facts, to assign to the laboring man the dubious role
of profiteers, which said role seems to be the motive of the interests
45you seem to be serving."
Official union spokesmen in Louisiana also fought back. E. H.
44Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, December 11, 1941.
45Times-Picayune, March 18, 20, 26, 1942.
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(Lige) Williams, state AFL president, in April, 1942, described recent 
attacks on organized labor as "well thought out." They reminded him, 
he said, "of the well-known Hitler plan to divide and conquer." Also, 
Steve Quarles, president of the Central Trades and Labor Council of 
New Orleans, reminded Louisianians that union members had sons in the 
armed forces "just as are the sons of the manufacturers' association 
and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States . . . and labor today 
is not asking for more than it has been asking in the past 60 years, 
so we are not profiteering in this crisis." In addition, labor union 
leaders in Winnfield reported to Representative A. Leonard Allen that 
they had denounced press attempts to stampede Louisiana officials into 
precipitate antiunion action: "There is no more loyal and patriotic
group in America than organized labor."^
Despite the encouraging words from labor leaders, Louisiana experi­
enced several strikes during the war years. A small group of workers 
walked off their construction jobs at Camp Polk in April, 1941, be­
cause they thought that negotiations between union and government 
representatives were too slow. Their wildcat strike idled 400 other
47workers until international union officials ordered them back to work. 
Workers established a picket line (even though Industrial, Pipefitters, 
Welders, and Helpers Union [AFL] business agent R. 0. Middleton in­
sisted that "no strike was called") against Stone and Webster Construc­
tion Company, which was constructing the expansion of the Ethyl Gasoline
46States, April 6, 1942; Town Talk, April 3, 1942.
47Morning Advocate, April 5, 1941.
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plant at Baton Rouge. The unions demanded a "closed shop" and that
workers who refused to join the unions be discharged. The dispute
ended some two weeks later when Paul A. Rasmussun, president of the
Baton Rouge Building Trades Council, announced that the Ethyl plant
would reopen as a "union shop" with Union members given preference in 
48employment. Members of Local 260 United Construction Workers Organ­
izing Committee (CIO) struck the Johns-Manville Products Corporation 
plant in Marrero, in August, 1941, and idled about 400 workers in a 
dispute concerning overtime pay. Louisiana Shipyards and Delta Ship­
building Company both faced strikes in 1941 called to enforce demands
for a closed shop. And garbage men and incinerator workers in New
49Orleans struck for higher wages during 1943-
As the war neared an end in 1945, Louisiana experienced even more 
strikes. Employees at the Cities Service refinery, at Lake Charles 
struck in April, 1945, to protest recent rent increases in the pri­
vately-owned Maplewood housing project for war workers. The strike 
was crucial because the Firestone Tire and Rubber plant next door de­
pended on the Cities Service refinery for a steady supply of butadine 
to use in its production of synthetic rubber. Subsequently, Governor 
Davis asked President Truman to take over and operate the refinery. 
Truman, in turn, ordered Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to seize the 
plant because interruption of its production would "unduly impede or 
delay" the war effort. The workers, however, agreed to return to their
48Ibid., Jun 4, 1941; States, June 20, 1941.
49Times-Picayune, August 19, Septmeber 27, 30, 1941; States, September 
15, 1943.
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jobs the next day, but continued working for rent reductions in Maple­
wood and requested the Federal Housing Authority to take over the 
privately-owned property.^
Louisiana was also directly affected by a strike against Grey­
hound Bus Lines which spread across five southeastern states in July, 
1945 in support of five employees discharged on June 14, because they 
had refused to drive their assigned buses on May 1, when the union 
called a one-day walk-out to protest the War Labor Board ruling in a 
retroactive pay case. The Bus Drivers Union (AFL) claimed that the 
five drivers were arbitrarily fired, and called the July strike. The 
Eighth Regional War Labor Board in Dallas ordered the striking em­
ployees back to work On July 31, but about 950 employees of the Teche 
Greyhound Bus Lines serving Louisiana refused. The strike ended soon 
after that, however, when the WLB adamantly refused to consider the 
strikers' grievances until they returned to work.***
Louisiana’s two bitterest strikes occurred early and late in the 
war. The first of these was the 1941 strike called by the Interna­
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL) against Gulf States 
Utilities. The IBEW maintained that GSU refused to bargain collec­
tively with it, and instead negotiated with the Gulf States Electric 
Employees' Association, a company union. GSU, however, maintained 
that the National Labor Relations Board on May 10 had ruled that "we 
find that the unit contended for by the brotherhood is inappropriate
Morning Advocate, April 13-14, 18-20, 1945; Town Talk, April 19-20, 
1945.
^Morning Advocate, July 30-31, 1945; Item, August 1, 3, 1945.
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for purposes of collective bargaining and shall, therefore, grant the
motions of the Company and the Association to dismiss the petition for
investigation and certification of representatives filed by the
Brotherhood," and that the IBEW now illegally tried to force its recog-
52nition as the collective bargaining agent despite the NLRB ruling.
The Morning Advocate recognized that "The right to strike and the
right to picket peacefully are well-established principles of law" but
also commented that when massed picketers prevented other employees
from working or threatened their personal safety, then "law enforce-
53ment officers should come on the scene." The public mood against 
the strikers became even more sour after a blackout left large sections 
of Baton Rouge and the surrounding area in darkness during the night 
of July 12-13. GSU officials maintained that the blackout resulted 
from the work of saboteurs who had drained the oil from a transformer 
at Oak Grove in Ascension Parish causing it to explode. The officials 
also announced that the saboteurs could be prosecuted under federal 
anti-sabotage acts which made the disruption of the flow of electri­
city to the national defense effort illegal. In addition to the power 
supplied to local defense industries, the lines at Oak Grove fed 
electricity into the Tennessee Valley Authority system, which, in turn, 
supplied power for the manufacture of aluminum. GSU offered $500 re­
ward for information leading to arrest of the saboteurs and strongly 
implied that IBEW members had drained the oil from the Oak Grove
53Ibid., July 13, 1941.
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transformer.5^
The utility presented its side of the dispute in a series of ad­
vertisements published in Baton Rouge newspapers portraying the 
strikers as slackers who neglected the national defense: "The experi­
enced men who are on strike are needed on the job so that Gulf States 
service to homes, stores, factories, and to industries so vital to our 
local and national welfare again will have behind it a full personnel 
adequate to take care of emergencies and growth.”55
Howard Colvin, southern regional director of the Labor Department 
Conciliation Service, announced on July 20 that he had failed to 
settle the dispute between the IBEW and GSU, and the Defense Mediation 
Board assumed jurisdiction over the case while extra patrols of deputy 
sheriffs, city police, and state police guarded company property. The 
NLRB issued the last ruling in the dispute in February, 1942, when it 
held that GSU had not interfered with the right of its employees to 
organize and had not dominated the formation of the Gulf States Elec­
tric Service Employees’ Association, which it held to be a labor union 
within the provision of the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB 
also recommended dismissal of charges brought against GSU by the 
IBEW.56
The bitterest strike Louisiana experienced during the war years 
occurred at Higgins Industries as the war drew to a close during 1945.
55Ibid., July 18, 20, 1941.
56Ibid., July 20, 22, 23, 1941, February 4, 1942.
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In 1943, Andrew Higgins had portrayed a cozy relationship between labor 
and management at his New Orleans plants when he testified in Washing­
ton before the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National 
Defense Program (the Truman Committee). Higgins reported that his was 
an organized shop with his workers represented by the American Feder­
ation of Labor. Senator Truman inserted into the record a letter from 
Holt Ross of the AFL in which he maintained that "Labor has an abiding 
confidence in Mr. Higgins and the teamwork between him and his em­
ployees is remarkable." Higgins added that when grievances arose, he 
called his business managers and the union leaders together "in a 
soundproof room" and settled the problem. Labor union bands helped 
him to boost the workers' morale when larger rush orders for boats ar­
rived by providing patriotic music for pep rallies he held to convince 
his employees to work harder and complete such assignments. ("When 
the tears are running down their eyes (sic), then I have the silver- 
tongued labor leader tell them what's expected of them. I ask them 
how they are going to do it, and we get along fine.") Unions helped 
keep absenteeism low at the Higgins plants by detailing members to 
find out why a person missed work.^
By late 1944, however, any good feelings built up between manage­
ment and labor at the Higgins yards disappeared in acrimonious charges 
and countercharges further complicated by a CIO attempt to supplant 
the AFL as representative of a majority of Higgins workers. Higgins 
and the AFL had negotiated their closed shop agreement during August,
"^Investigation of the National Defense Program Fart 17, pp. 6999- 
7005; Sosna, "More Important Than the Civil War?", p. 10.
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1940, and the agreement was scheduled to remain in force until Septem­
ber 13, 1945. The company, however, terminated the agreement on 
January 1, 1945, charging the AFL with a "substantial breach of con­
tract.” The dispute arose over a fundamental difference in labor 
philosophy: Higgins preferred to negotiate only one contract with
all workers; the AFL sought to negotiate separate agreements for each 
trade. The dispute broke into the open over the so-called "Hot Ship" 
episode. The problem arose as the winter of 1944-45 approached.
Great Lakes shipbuilders had about one hundred ships under construc­
tion and the delays threatened by the approaching winter weather caused 
the Navy to request that they be completed in ice-free areas. Higgins 
agreed to finish a portion of them and received one. His unions, how­
ever, declared this work to be ship repair or conversion, and asked 
for double wage rates for overtime work. The United States Maritime 
Commission refused to let Higgins pay the higher wage scale and the 
unions thereafter ordered their members not to work on the "Hot Ship." 
Between thirty and fifty anticipated ships were not sent to Higgins 
for completion, and on November 30, 1944, Higgins notified the unions 
that their contracted would be canceled January 1, 1945. The CIO 
muddied the situation even more when it filed for an election to 
determine which labor organization legitimately represented Higgins’ 
workers.
Trouble developed soon after the beginning of 1945. Higgins first
COItem, November 1-2, 1945; Stuart S. Heilman to Allen J. Ellender,
June 8, 1945; Stuart S- Heilman, Background of Present Dispute Be­
tween Higgins Industries Incorporated and the American Federation of 
Labor (n.p., n.d.), p. 3. Ellender Collection.
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sought to close his facilities, but announced that he would keep his
plants in operation soon after the National Labor Relations Board
ordered a collective bargaining election to determine whether his
59workers wanted to be represented by the AFL or the CIO.
Labor trouble simmered at the Higgins plants throughout 1945.
In June, some 7,000 members of the Building Trades and Metal Trades 
unions walked off their jobs, thus idling about 5,000 additional 
workers, because Higgins had hired ex-servicemen to work at the plants 
without requiring them to join unions. Morris Gottesman, treasurer of 
Higgins Industries, subsequently announced that his office was pre­
paring a list of the names of striking workers eligible for the draft 
which he would forward to General Raymond H. Fleming, Selective Service 
Director in Louisiana. A union spokesman replied that union members 
would "rather fight the Japs than be browbeaten by Higgins.
The War Labor Board directed the strikers to return to work, but 
the employees on June 5 refused to do so. The next day, John P. Frye, 
international president of the Metal Trades Workers, directed the New 
Orleans local to resume work at Higgins’ plants pending appeal of the 
War Labor Board approval of Higgins' cancellation of the original con­
tract. As long as the appeal was not settled, he maintained, the con­
tract remained in effect. Local union officials added their approval 
of Frye's plea and recommended a fifteen-day return to work during 
which they hoped to iron out their differences with Higgins. The
59Morning Advocate, January 6, 1945.
^States, June 4-5, 1945; Heilman, Background of Present Dispute, p. 3.
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strikers, however, voted to remain off their jobs, and did not return 
to work until July 13, after union leaders informed them that Army and 
Navy officials had reported to them that the strike was depriving both 
branches of the armed service of badly-needed war equipment. The 
strikers formally announced that they were returning to work because 
of the armed service need for boats, not as a favor to Andrew Higgins.^ 
Higgins, however, realized that cutbacks in war contracts caused 
by the winding down of the conflict gave him new leverage in the situ­
ation. He announced during the first week of June that some 1,500 of 
the strikers would not be needed at his City Park plant alone, even if 
they voted to return to work. Treasurer Gottesman announced on August 
16 that the company planned a $25,000,000 reconversion from production 
of landing craft to producion of boats for civilian use, but cancella­
tion of Higgins Industries' remaining $20,000,000 in war contracts
meant that about two-thirds of its workers would be laid off, many of 
62them permanently.
His diminishing need for workers allowed Higgins to act more in­
dependently than he had in the past. In October, he walked out of a 
Washington meeting with members of the NLRB and the union, declaring 
that he could no longer work with the unions. A work stoppage occurred 
at his plants again on October 29. Union members claimed that Higgins 
had locked them out and declared an open shop. Higgins, meanwhile, 
said that he knew nothing of such action; that while he had not
^ States, June 6-7, 9, 12, 1945; Morning Advocate, June 6, 13, 1945.
62Morning Advocate, August 16-17, 1945; Times-Picayune, August 17, 1945.
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received official notification of a strike, union members were not on 
their jobs; and that the CIO unions (which then claimed to represent 
a majority of Higgins workers, even though the election had not yet 
been held) had called the walk-out because he had broken off contract 
negotiations with them. This action proved the last straw for Higgins, 
and he announced that he planned to close his three remaining New 
Orleans shipbuilding plants (at City Park, Industrial Canal, and 
Bayou St. John —  the Michaud plant was government-owned) —  sell them 
to the highest bidder, and subcontract his remaining obligations to 
other firms. He would devote his energy then, he said, "to [a] crusade 
to see that men who want work can get it without paying tribute to 
anybody.
Jack Rawls, vice president of the New Orleans Metal Trades Coun­
cil, called the closures a "red herring" and AFL spokesman William L. 
Donnels, joint chairman of the Metal Trades and the Building Trades 
Council, said that Higgins had "the mind and spirit of an old-time
plantation overseer," but Higgins remained adamant that he would not
64negotiate with the unions under prevailing conditions.
Higgins hinted, however, that he did not completely discount con­
tinuing boat production in New Orleans under a different arrangement. 
Subsequently, he announced that he planned to liquidate all his 
holdings (Higgins Industries, Incorporated [the boat division], Higgins 
Aircraft, and Higgins Plastics) out of court, and carry on his
"63States, October 29, 1945; Item, November 1-2, 5, 1945; Morning Advo­
cate, November 2-3, 1945.
64Item, November 2, 1945; Morning Advocate, November 5, 1945.
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operations with a new firm, Higgins, Incorporated, which would, in 
effect, take over and consolidate all his old holdings. Union leaders 
claimed that his action was only an attempt to break the strike by 
means of questionable legality, but police protected prospective em­
ployees who lined up for the jobs Higgins offered.^ He was no more 
successful with the new company than he had been with the old, and 
continued labor disputes eventually forced the closure of Higgins’ 
boat-building empire.
While other areas of the state attracted industrial develop­
ment along with its attendent problems, the central Louisiana area's 
economic development during the war rested on the training of United 
States Army troops. This training program included both a series of 
massive maneuvers which brought thousands of soldiers into the area 
and the construction of more permanent army posts in which inductees 
received their regular basic training.
Central Louisiana’s association with training camps had begun 
during World War I. Late in 1917, workers completed Camp Beauregard 
just north of Alexandria as one of sixteen centers built to train 
National Guard units from Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Missis­
sippi. During the post-war demobiliation, however, the Army sold 
most of Beauregard’s 5,200 acres, but retained a small area to provide 
facilities for training Louisiana National Guard troops. Between the 
World Wars, Louisiana National Guard units used Beauregard as a summer 
training ground and target range. The camp also became a Citizens*
£ CMorning Advocate, November 6, December 1, 1945, January 8, February 
2, 1946; Item, November 10, 29, 29, 1945.
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Military Training Camp. The CMTC nation-wide program began soon after 
World War I in response to the realization that American youth had 
been poorly prepared for military training when called upon in 1917. 
The CMTC program provided high school boys with thirty days experience 
in military organization, management, discipline, instruction, ath­
letics, recreation, and social contacts during their summer vacation 
from school.^
Adolph Hitler's stunning conquests of his European neighbors 
brought a quickening of life at Camp Beauregard. The Army resumed 
work on a military air field just north of Beauregard in 1939, and 
during 1940 Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embrick of the United States 
Army Fourth Corps Area headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, selected 
the central Louisiana area as the site of Army training maneuvers.
The 1940 Louisiana Maneuvers began in May and eventually involved more 
than 70,000 troops spread over Rapides, Natchitoches, Sabine, and Ver­
non Parishes. Foot soldiers cursed Louisiana's mud and heat, but the 
maneuver area pleased Army officials so well that they returned in the 
autumn of 1940, and in 1941, 1942, and 1943.^
The maneuvers brought Central Louisiana to the nation's attention, 
and brought thousands of Americans from'other regions into Central 
Louisiana. Alexandria Mayor V. V. Lamkin reserved a block of parking
TZTown Talk, July 29, 1957; Jerry Purvis Sanson, "Cenla During World 
War II," Alexandria Daily Town Talk Centennial Edition, April 8, 1983, 
p. 18; The Peep Sight Camp Beauregard Louisiana 1931 (n.p., 1931), pp. 
20-23.
67Sanson, "Cenla During World War II," p. 18; "Extensive War Games in 
Louisiana," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1940, pp. 67-68;
Town Talk, March 25, April 8, 1940.
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spaces near the Visitor’s Bureau at Hotel Bentley in the downtown area
for exclusive use of the Army during the spring, 1940, maneuvers, and
announced that because of the heavy traffic the city’s traffic lights
would continue to function until 12:00 midnight instead of going off
68at 10:00 P.M. as they had in the past.
The soldiers and the civilian population showed a keen interest 
in each other. Hundreds of local residents drove to Camp Beauregard 
to see the weekly progress of the tent city which rose at an astonish­
ingly rapid rate. The Town Talk remarked that "The men in the ranks 
have taken to Alexandria as though it were their home —  and have 
received a royal welcome.” Never were they more welcome, of course, 
than the occasions when they stormed into the city on week-end leave 
with money to spend. A warm week-end in early May, 1940, brought such 
an influx. The Town Talk reported that "Every roadside establishment 
in the local area was crowded with troopers . . . and while they were
here there was a steady tinkle of cash drawers in every establishment
69where refreshments and sandwiches could be obtained."
The 1940 Maneuvers pumped large amounts of money into the Central 
Louisiana economy. The troops involved in the fall maneuvers, for 
example, received some $700,000 in pay and allowances, and needed 
approximately $130,000 in goods for subsistence. (The total cost of 
these maneuvers was $1,826,200 or some $87,000 per day.)^ Not all
To
Town Talk, April 19, May 3, 9, 1940.
69Ibid., May 6, 11, 1940.
^Times-Picayune, August 17., 1940; Town Talk, August 21, 1940. The 
crush of business experienced by small firms is revealed by the sales 
of the Olympia Cafe in Alexandria on August 23, 1940: 1,448 sand­
wiches, 362 pies, and 362 dishes of potato salad. Town Talk, August
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of the money found its way into the Central Louisiana economy, of 
course, but the amount that did whetted Central Louisiana's appetite 
for more.
It had not long to wait. The 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers easily 
eclipsed the magnitude of the 1940 exercises. Army officials sought 
to make the maneuvers as close to real battlefield experience as 
possible. They formulated a background scenario in which the "nations" 
of Kotmk (Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, and Kentucky, with its 
capital at Houston), and Almat (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Tennessee, with its capital at Birmingham) squared off 
for battle as tensions between the two, increasingly tense since the 
end of a war between them in 1919, broke down over failure to secure 
Kotmk navigation rights on the Mississippi River.
Preliminary maneuvers began in late May as the two "countries" 
began deploying their troops to strategic locations as the navigation 
conference between their Inland Waterways Commissions supposedly 
dragged on at Memphis. Troops arriving early were acclimated to 
battle noises by recordings of dive bombers, machine guns, cannon, and 
the wail of gas-warning sirens broadcast over loudspeakers placed 
throughout the Beauregard practice range. The first skirmish of the 
maneuvers occurred on June 17, but full "hostilities" broke out in 
August. As the starting date of the maneuvers neared, Central Louisiana
24, 1940.
^ Morning Advocate, August 3, 5-6, 1941. One has to wonder why Army 
planners obviously spent so much time constructing this elaborate 
plan, which included jeering slogans "Almat" troops could hurl at 
"Kotmk" troops about Kotmk Premier Kodunkis: "Kodunkis is the Bunkis"!
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was inundated with people. During the latter part of July, between 
300 and 400 Army vehicles passed through Alexandria each day. Soldiers 
arrived at the nearby camps by the thousands —  about 5,000 on July 30; 
10,000 on July 31; and 5,000 on August 1.^
The Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, the largest peace-time maneuvers 
in American history up to that time, were a landmark in the development 
of the United States Army’s strategy and planning for war because they 
proved the usefulness of tanks in modern warfare. The Spring, 1940, 
maneuvers had demonstrated the capability of armored columns to over­
run a defending army as General Joseph Stilwell commanded a "blitz­
krieg” invasion of Louisiana just as Hitler's forces had used similar 
tactics to slice through the Low Countries and France. The 1941 
maneuvers further revealed the weakness of conventional defense against 
armored might as General George S. Patton proved that tanks could 
operate effectively even in the marshes of Louisiana. In addition, 
the Army learned about reconnaissance and troop supply problems en­
countered in battlefield situations during the fall of 1941, and thus
had several months to seek solutions to these problems before the
73United States entered the war.
72Morning Advocate, May 5, 9, 30, June 6, 10, 17, 1941; Town Talk,
July 30-August 1, 1941.
73Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, United 
States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces, Volume I, The Or­
ganization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, D.C., Historical Divi­
sion, Department of the Army, 1947), pp. 44-45; Barbara W. Tuchman, 
Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York,
The MacMillan Company, 1971), pp. 208-209; Ladislas Farago, Patton 
Ordeal and Triumph (New York, Ivan Obolensky, 1963), pp. 161-165;
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York, Double­
day & Company, Incorporated, 1948), pp. 10-13; J. Lawton Collins, 
Lightning Joe: An Autobiography (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Univer­
sity Press, 1979), pp. 111-115.
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Just as the 1941 maneuvers were important to the development of 
an effective United States fighting machine, they were also important 
to the Louisiana economy. The Array payroll for the last part of 
August, for example, was the largest made up in Shreveport up to that 
time —  approximately $900,000 issued through the Commercial National 
Bank. Alexandria merchants stocked their shelves in anticipation of 
extra-heavy business, and they were not disappointed. Most of them 
remained open on Labor Day, and troops on holiday crowded stores in 
the maneuver area, sometimes buying out a store's entire stock, es­
pecially tobacco, candy, and refreshments. Theaters and restaurants 
both experienced continuous lines for seats, and some smaller store 
owners reported selling as much in a day as they normally sold in a
year. One study of the maneuvers estimates that they were worth about
74$25,000,000 to the state.
The Army descended upon Central Louisiana again in 1942 and 1943 
for more maneuvers but these exercises were much less extensive than 
the massive 1941 maneuvers. Additional maneuvers planned for April,
1944 did not occur because the Army needed the units scheduled for 
participation in the maneuvers to bolster the forces then being readied 
for the cross-Channel invasion of Europe.7̂
74Viola Carruth, Caddo 1000, p. 173; Town Talk, August 29-September 1, 
1941; G. Patrick Murray, "The Louisiana Maneuvers: Practice for War,"
Louisiana History, Spring, 1972, p. 123.
7̂ Morning Advocate, August 2, 1942, February 2, 1943; Town Talk, August 
3, 1942, February 1, 1943; Shreveport Times, August 31, 1943; Robert R. 
Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, United States Army in World 
War II, The Army Ground Forces, Volume II, The Procurement and Training 
of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, D.C., Historical Division, Depart­
ment of the Army, 1948), pp. 384, 470.
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While the maneuvers contributed to the Louisiana economy through 
payrolls and purchase of supplies, they also contributed to problems 
that hampered transportation of people and goods in the maneuver area 
throughout the war. The Army recognized that its training exercises 
would damage roads and bridges not designed for heavy use and reques­
ted that the Louisiana Highway Commission station a representative in 
Alexandria to cooperate with them in road maintenance and repair. The 
average vehicular traffic in the maneuver area during 1941 rose to 
95,023 vehicles per day (from 40,762 daily in 1940), an increase of 
133 per cent over the previous year. Louisiana requested $1,407,150 
from the Public Works Administration in August, 1941, for improvement 
of highway markings for nightime driving during the maneuvers, and in
December, 1941, presented the United States Public Roads Administration
76a bill for $2,014,689.30 to repair road damage in the maneuver area.
The state found, however, that it faced a great deal of difficulty 
with bureaucratic red tape, and labor and material shortages. There­
fore, road damage within the maneuver area remained a problem. Many 
people had difficulty reaching their jobs at Camp Polk; adequate sup­
plies failed to reach rural stores; school buses and mail carriers
often failed to make their rounds; doctors sometimes failed to reach
their patients; and farmers found it difficult to bring their produce 
to market. The Public Roads Administration started repair work on 
February 1, 1944, and comandeered some engineer troops to assist in
7 T̂own Talk, May 6, 1940, December 31, 1941; Morning Advocate, May 30,
August 9, 1941; Shreveport Times, January 1, 1942.
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grading and hauling, but only had $400,000 for its maintenance pro- 
77gram.
The maneuvers held in Louisiana brought thousands of troops, the 
attention of the nation, and the excitement of "war" to Louisiana, but 
the training camps constructed in the state contributed more steadily 
to the local economy. The complex of camps around Alexandria, called 
"the center of national defense activity in the state," began as the 
1940 maneuvers ended, when Representative A. Leonard Allen and Governor 
Jones announced that the Army planned to take over Camp Beauregard from 
the Louisiana National Guard. Jones and Louisiana National Guard Com­
mander Raymond H. Fleming had traveled to Washington in May, 1940 to 
propose to Army officials that they use Beauregard as a training facil­
ity for National Guard troops as soon as Congress passed the bill (then 
pending) calling Guard units into one year of active service. Congress
passed the Guard bill on August 27, 1940, and work began almost immedi-
78ately on Camp Beauregard.
In September, the Army announced plans to construct two additional 
training camps in Central Louisiana, one near Tioga, just north of 
Alexandria (eventually named Camp Livingston), and one near Forest 
Hill, some eighteen miles south of Alexandria (eventually named Camp
^J. H. Anderson to Allen J. Ellender, December 31, 1943; J. G. Chris­
tiansen to Ellender, February 29, 1944, General Richard Donovan to 
Ellender, March 9, 1944, Lois Whittaker to Ellender, May 29, 1944, 
Thomas McDonald to Ellender, September 28, 1944, Ellender Collection; 
Shreveport Times, January 1, 1942.
78Town Talk, August 21-22, 28, 1940; Isaac D. Chapman, "Louisiana’s 
Natural Resources and National Defense," Louisiana Conservation Review, 
Autumn, 1940, p. 35.
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Claiborne). The need for still more training facilities led to plans
announced in October to construct a large training camp for an armored
contingent of about 10,000 troops near Leesville in Vernon Parish
(eventually named Camp Polk) which became the largest armored force
training camp in the United States. By April, 1941, over 32,000
79troops were training in the camps around Alexandria.
These camps, plus the Alexandria (now England) Air Base, Barksdale 
Field near Shreveport, other air bases at Baton Rouge and New Orleans, 
and the Coast Guard base in New Orleans, provided both construction 
jobs and income from maintenance and service requirements. By October, 
1940, some 8,000 workmen were employed constructing Camps Beauregard 
and Livingston. The number employed grew to a peak of 36,857 in 
January, 1941, before tapering off. In April, 1941, however, con­
struction employees at these two camps plus Camps Claiborne and Polk 
numbered 80,000. It is impossible to determine exactly how many of 
these workers were residents of the area, but the United States House 
of Representatives found in 1941 that seventy-five per cent were non­
residents of Rapides Parish, even though Rapides Assessor Trent L.
James had set up an employment headquarters at his office in the court­
house to secure work for unemployed citizens of Central Louisiana.
The nonresident group included residents of other parishes and non­
residents of Louisiana brought in by construction companies or unions. 
The Louisiana State Employment Service, for example, had directed many
~7§Morning Advocate, October 20-21, 1940; Item, November 18, 1940; Town 
Talk, December 7, 18, 1940, January 3, 11, 21, 1941, July 29, 1957;
New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August 22, 1943; Shreve­
port Times, August 31, 1943.
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sugar workers into jobs at the camps. The workers were available for
immediate placement at the end of the short 1940 harvest season, and
needed the money because of the poor crop. Army camp constuction,
however, paid as much as $1 per hour for an eight hour day, six days
per week, and many farm workers continued to hold these jobs rather
80than return to the uncertain income from farm labor.
General Fleming commented in August, 1940, that placement of 
the training camps in Louisiana would mean "the expenditure of mil­
lions of dollars more in Louisiana for the subsistence of men."
General Fleming proved to be correct. The Army estimated in November, 
1940, that the costs of operating Camps Livingston and Claiborne 
would reach some $500,000 per day, and that they planned to use local 
suppliers for perishable and immediately expendable supplies ($12,000 
per day for gasoline and $600 per day for stovewood, for example) 
whenever possible. Louisiana farmers also often found a ready market 
for their produce at the Army camps, even though they sometimes com­
plained of Army purchasing procedures that seemed unnecessarily strin— 
81gent or complex.
80Morning Advocate, September 21-22, October 20, 1940; Town Talk, Sep­
tember 18, 1940, July 29, 1957; Chapman, "Louisiana’s Natural Resources 
and National Defense," p. 36; National Defense Migration Hearings Be­
fore the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
House of Representatives, 77 Congress 1 Session, Part 11 (Washington, 
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 4663-4665; 
"Defense Program Casts Louisiana in Leading Role," Louisiana Police 
Jury Review, April, 1941, p. 79; Mrs. L. J. Barrios to Allen J. Ellen- 
der, February 1, 1943; Julius Maillian, John Gamer, Sam Domico, Jr.,
Bob Conran, and Roy C. Bridges to Ellender, February 26, 1943; Paul 
McNutt to Ellender, March 19, 1943, May 3, 1943; L. M. Green to Ellen­
der, March 23, 1943; Major General E. Reybold to Ellender, May 18, 1943, 
Ellender Collection.
81Town Talk, August 22, 1940; New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, Novem-
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In summary, the war had a significant impact on the Louisiana 
economy. Most elementally, the war brought more people into the 
state. In addition, those people made more money and paid more taxes. 
The 1940 Census found 2,363,880 people in Louisiana, while 1950 found 
2,683,516, an increase of 13.5 per cent. Louisiana's population 
growth occurred primarily in the urban industrial areas or the train­
ing camp areas. Greater New Orleans, for example, grew by 64,463 (to 
559,000) individuals between 1940 and November, 1945; greater Shreve­
port grew by 17,775 (to 130,000) inhabitants during the same years, 
while Baton Rouge grew by 75,281 (to 110,000); Alexandria and Pineville 
by 28,756 (to 60,119); Lafayette by 5,790 (to 25,000).82
This sharp increase in population strained the ability of many 
areas to provide housing and basic services. Fresh ground-water use 
increased ten per cent from 1940 to 1943 (to about 50,000,000 gallons 
per day), for example. Rental property in Alexandria became virtually
ber 24, 1940; Raymond Fleming to Roy Dibuono, October 28, 1940; Harry 
D. Wilson to Quartermaster Marketing Center, Chattanooga, Tennessee,
May 13, 1941; Wilson to Allen J. Ellender, March 27, 1942, William 
Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special 
Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane Univer­
sity, New Orleans, Louisiana.
82States, July 5, 1944; Morning Advocate, November 25, 1945; J. C.
Maher, "Water Supplies and Louisiana's War Effort," Louisiana Municipal 
Review, January-February, 1943, p. 8; T. A. Pittman to Warren M. Simon, 
January 2, 1943; Pittman to Jack Stewart, March 8, 1945, John B. Four- 
net Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton 
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge; Sixteenth Census of 
Inhabitants (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 
1942), p. 435; A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the 
United States, Census of Population: 1950 Volume I Number of Inhabi­
tants (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office,
1952), p. 18.
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unobtainable. By October, 1941, 693 Army personnel paid $31,497 in 
combined monthly rent in Alexandria; 8,437.25 in Pineville; $1,132.50 
in Bunkie; and $2,059.50 at Glenmora (near Camp Claiborne). War 
workers moved into the Fournet War Housing Project in New Orleans even 
before New Orleans Public Service, Incorporated, could connect the 
electricity and gas. Alexandria’s number of gas meters increased from 
4,125 in 1941 to 6,142 in 1943. During the same period, the number of 
electricity meters increased from 6,900 to 8,672 and the number of 
water meters from 5,500 to 6,237. Renters in many areas around army 
camps in central and north Louisiana complained of unjust rent in­
creases. A survey of rental rates in the Shreveport area in December, 
1941, for example, found that rents had decreased slightly during 1939 
and 1940, but had increased after September, 1941, as new workers and
armed forces personnel began arriving in greater numbers and thus
83created unprecedented demand.
This increased population resulted in more income and more taxes. 
The United States Department of Commerce reported in 1942 that incomes 
of people in Louisiana-had broken their record 1929 levels in 1941.. 
Combined income of Louisianians had been $863,000,000 in 1929, had 
fallen to 86,600,000 in 1940, and shot up to 1,028,000,000 in 1941. 
Louisiana received $7,655,654.30 from income taxes in 1941; 
$8,541,137.84 in 1942; $9,039,769.82 in 1943; $11,213,417.96 in 1944;
Q O Town Talk, November 28, December 31, 1940, October . 1, 1941., July 11,
22, 1942, October 9, 1943, May 30, 1944; Shreveport Times, November 21, 
1940; Shreveport Journal, December 10, 1941; Hermann Colvin, "Alexan­
dria Goes to War," Louisiana Municipal Review,.January-February, 1941, 
pp. 4-5; Goldfield, Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers, pp. 183-184.
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and $11,464,000 in 1945- Total state revenue rose from $96,830,000 
in 1939 to $145,000,000 in 1945- In addition, bank deposits in Louisi-
A/
ana topped $1,000,000,000 for the first time in October, 1943.
Many Louisianians shared with other Americans a surplus of money 
and a scarcity of consumer goods. Therefore, bank deposits increased 
steadily throughout the war. Bank deposits increased by 7.7 per cent 
in 1940; 10.8 per cent in 1941; 33.5 per cent in 1942; 15.8 per cent
in 1943; 21.4 per cent in 1944; and 21.9 per cent in 1945. Reappear­
ance. of consumer goods on the market in 1946 brought bank deposits
down by 7.5 per cent from 1945. The steady increase in bank deposits,
however, did not mean that Louisiana business suffered. Department 
store sales, for example, grew 12.6 per cent in 1940; 14.8 per cent in 
1941; 14.6 per cent in 1942; 24.9 per cent in 1943; 15.6 per cent in 
1944; and 11 paer cent in 1945. (They spurted to 25.3 per cent growth 
in 1946.)85
84Shreveport.Times, July 20, 1942; Times-Picayune, October 16, 1943; 
Louisiana Revenue Bulletin, July 25, 1943, pp. 8-9; January 25, 1944, 
pp. 6-8; July 15, 1944, pp. 6-7; July, 1945, pp..14-15; Financial 
Statistics of States: 1939 Louisiana Volume I Number 20 (Washington,
D.C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1941), p. 1; State 
Government Finances in 1945: Louisiana Volume I (Washington, D.C.,
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1946), p. 1. The rela­
tive prosperity of urban areas is demonstrated in the tax returns. In
1943, for example, St. Helena Parish (the lowest) had only 25 inhabi­
tants who paid income tax (a total of $544.69), while Orleans Parish 
(the highest) had 34,290 inhabitants who paid a total of $1,775,508.63 
income tax. The second-highest parish, Caddo, had 7,356 people who 
paid $485,168.03. Furthermore, Cameron, Red River, St. Helena, and 
West Carroll had no firms which paid corporate income tax, while Or­
leans had 705 and Caddo had 180. Louisiana Revenue Bulletin, March 25,
1944.
g5 • - • •
Louisiana Business Review, January, 1941, p. 16; January, 1942, p.
18; January, 1943, p. 18; January, 1944, p. 19; January, 1945, p. 19; 
January, 1946, p. 19; January, 1947, p. 19. The 1946 spurt may have 
also resulted from the introduction of Charga-Plate, a credit card 
acceptable at 12 area stores introduced in New Orleans late in 1945.
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Much of Louisiana's wartime prosperity, of course, stemmed directly 
from federal government expenditures. The state received $1,733,713,000 
worth of war contracts issued between June 1, 1940 and October 1, 1944 
(compared to some $205,000,000,000 issued throughout the United States). 
Some Louisianians, Governor Jones among them, hoped that the industri­
alization brought on by the war would result in a more balanced econ­
omy with less dependence on agriculture. The Louisiana Department of 
Commerce and Industry created a fifty-member Economic Development 
Committee to help attract businesses to Louisiana in the post-war 
period to provide jobs. Louisiana remained a rural state during the 
war, however. In 1945, for example, 192,836 people worked on farms, 
while in 1947, only 132,464 people worked in manufacturing in Louisi-
A composite index of overall Louisiana business activity using 
the activity of the average month of the period 1937-1939 as 100, re­
veals that the overall index stood at 105.2 in 1940; 130.3 in 1941; 
179.3 in 1942; 205.0 in 1943, and 210.4 in 1944.87 The years of World
States, October 5, 1945.
86Morning Advocate, March 10, 1941, January.30, May 6, 1945; Overton 
Brooks, "Louisiana's Part in the War," Louisiana Police Jury Review, 
April, 1942, p. 12; United States Census of Agriculture: 1950 Counties
and State Economic Areas Louisiana Volume I Part 24 (Washington, D.C., 
United States Government.Printing Office, 1952), p. 4; Census of Manu­
facturers: 1947 Volume III Statistics by States (Washington, D.C.,
United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 251. Louisiana 
shared this trend toward urbanization with the rest of the South, but 
the United States Census did not find that the region had become urban 
until 1960, Goldfield, Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers, pp. 142-143.
gy ......... .
Louisiana Business Review, January, 1942, p. 3; January, 1943, p. 3; 
January, 1944, p. 3; January, 1945, p. 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
War II thus marked Louisiana's return from the economic doldrums of the
Great Depression —  a fundamental shift in which employment offices
quit attempting to find a job for every applicant and instead franti-
88cally sought a worker for every job. And while the war did not 
completely industrialize Louisiana, it did set Louisiana's economy 
on the road to industrialization —  a trend it shared with the rest 
of the South. Its further industrialization during the late 1940s and 
thereafter, however, is beyond the scope of this study.
88Manpower Review, May, 1943, p. 16.
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CHAPTER X I
LIFE IN WARTIME LOUISIANA
Military concerns and requirements intruded into Louisiana's 
society and culture during World War II. The conflict moved people 
to unfamiliar locales, rearranged relationships within families, cur­
tailed freedoms generally enjoyed by American citizens, removed many 
consumer goods from store shelves, altered traditional holiday themes, 
demanded money and scrap, and helped set in motion civil rights move­
ments which gathered momentum in the ensuing decades. World War II, 
in short, affected almost every aspect of life in Louisiana.
It was impossible to escape the war. Soon after the conflict be­
gan, the American Radio Relay League prohibited amateur shortwave radio 
operators from contacting anyone in the warring countries. Moreover, 
they were not to voice an opinion or lament the existence of the war 
when talking to citizens of neutral countries.̂ -
While such prohibitions affected few Louisianians, many more wit­
nessed the Nazi invasion of Europe at movie theaters. Louisianians 
during the terrible spring of 1940 could choose among movie-houses 
offering "My Favorite Wife," starring Irene Dunn; "Gone With the Wind" 
("shown here in its entirety, exactly as presented at Atlanta and 
Broadway premiers"), starring Clark Gable and Vivien Leigh; "Typhoon"
(a "Tornado of Tropic Love! See tidal wave! See forest fire! See 
typhoon! RED LIPS . . . WHITE ARMS . . . BLACK PEARLS") starring 
Dorothy Lamour and Robert Preston; among others. The newsreels,
*New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, October 1, 1939.
465
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
466
however, brought the war into Louisiana's visual consciousness: "GER­
MAN BLITZKRIEG in Holland and Belgium"; "War Bulletin! Europe Aflame! 
Paramount newsreel flown from war zone gives first graphic evidence 
of chaos of 1940!"̂
While some Louisianians saw only the destruction the war caused 
in Europe, other glimpsed a deeper meaning in the chaos. The Seventh- 
Day Adventist Church in Baton Rouge offered "The Way Out of the pres­
ent World Muddle" in 1940. The war was not the end of the world. In­
stead, "This is the Earth's Hour of Destiny . . . the solution of its 
age-long problems —  War, Disease, Poverty, Crime, Insecurity —  is at 
hand. The evidence is so clear that you will rejoice in the bright
3prospects of the future."
The war also spawned a change in clothing styles throughout the 
United States. Vests, cuffs, ruffles, and patch pockets disappeared 
to conserve cloth. The summer of 1940 also brought on a boom in red,
4white, and blue costume jewelry —  American flags, eagles, and stars.
Deeper changes also occurred in Louisiana society. Many debu­
tantes in New Orleans in 1941 abandoned the usual round of parties for 
civilian defense activities, learning about air raid procedures, ambu­
lance driving, and other skills useful in wartime society. New Orleans, 
_
New Orleans States, January 25, 1940; New Orleans Times-Picayune,
May 16, 22-23, 1940. The producers of "If I Had My Way" starring Bing 
Crosby, however, used a different tack: "Forget the Blitzkrieg! Come
Laugh and Sing and Enjoy the Year's Hit Show!"
3Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, October 27, 1940.
4Times-Picayune, March 14, 1940; States, August 6, 1940; Alexandria 
Daily Town Talk, April 15, 1942 (hereinafter cited as Town Talk); 
Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph The American 
People 1939-1945 (New York, Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, Inc., 1973), 
pp. 134-135.
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the state’s premier "party town," found its social ranks thinned. 
Weddings and other less spectacular observances substituted for the 
glittering social events of other seasons. New Orleans held a Wash­
ington’s Birthday dinner in February, 1942, for example, which attrac­
ted 449 people including Mrs. Claire Chenault. James A. Noe announced 
that proceeds from the dinner would be split evenly between a contri­
bution to the Democratic National Committee to help erase its debt 
and a donation to the fund he had created to buy a bomber for General 
Chenault, a native Louisianian then in charge of American volunteers 
readying China’s air defenses against Japanese attack.^
Providing entertainment for soldiers stationed in the state 
partially replaced normal means of recreation. Between 500 and 1,000 
Shreveport girls agreed to become "military maids" and attend dances 
for soldiers on one or two Saturday nights per month. The Young Men's 
Business Club in New Orleans scheduled picnics, athletic contests, and 
seafood dinners for visiting soldiers. Baton Rouge provided block 
dances, private homes opened to soldiers for a meal, and the Elks Club 
and YMCA provided showers at a nominal five cents for soldiers travel­
ing through the city. The Masons located a Masonic Service Center at 
Alexandria to provide stationery, stamps, magazines, newspapers, books, 
games, and puzzles, available to all soldiers. DeRidder received the 
first United Service Organization (USO) Center completed in the United 
States, in December, 1941. The one and one-half story white frame 
building provided an auditorium, showers, locker rooms, library, game
^States, December 18, 1941; Times-Picayune, January 30, February 24, 
1942.
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room, and kitchen for soldiers at nearby Camp Polk. Recreation facili­
ties remained segregated, however, as did most of the rest of the 
society. Newspapers throughout the war reported activity schedules 
for the USO centers and separate schedules for the "Colored" USO cen­
ters, as they were known.®
Louisianians shared with other Americans an interest in reading 
during the war. The Louisiana State Library loaned 1,300,000 books in 
1941, and filled 78,000 additional requests for information. Technical 
books —  "how to" books of skills development, nutrition, the current 
world situation —  vied with books of inspiration, escape, and adven­
ture for readers’ attention. The most popular books at the East Baton 
Rouge Parish Library in March, 1945, were: Nonfiction —  Wendell Will-
kie’s One World; Robert Scott’s God Is My Co-Pilot; Sumner Welles’ A 
Time For Decision; Walter Lippman’s TJ. S. War Aims; Ernie Pyle’s Brave 
Men and Here Is Your War; and Gordon S. Seagrave's Burma Surgeon.
Fiction —  Frances Parkinson Keyes’ Crescent Carnival; Lloyd C. Doug­
las’ The Robe; Somerset Maugham’s The Razor’s Edge; and Betty Smith’s 
A Tree Grow in Brooklyn.̂
The war caused an increase in marriages as men "popped the ques­
tion" either to avoid the draft (which usually proved futile) or to
M̂orning Advocate, May 28, July 7, 12, August 3, 9, 1941; New Orleans 
Item, July 5-6, 1941; Town Talk, July 22, 26, December 1, 3, 1941; Lake 
Charles American Press, December 1, 1941; Shreveport Chamber of Commerce 
Minutes, April 10, 1941, microfilm copy, Microform Division, Troy H.
Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
^States, June 3, 1942; Morning Advocate, June 10, 1942, March 4, 1945;
Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph, p. 238.
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marry just before leaving for an overseas assignment. The number of 
marriages drifted upward during 1940. In Orleans Parish, for example, 
marriages during the first quarter of the year ran behind those for 
1939, then approximately equalled the 1939 level by mid-1940. Then 
Congress passed the Selective Service Act in August. In October, 581 
couples married in New Orleans, up from 283 in October, 1939, and 
second only to June, 1920, when soldiers returning from World War I 
helped escalate the number of marriages to 628. Marriages in Rapides 
Parish more than trebled between 1939 and 1941, and especially in­
creased after the army troops arrived in the area during the last 
quarter of 1940. In all of 1940, only 889 couples married in Rapides 
Parish. In 1941, however, 2,212 couples bought marriage licenses at 
the parish courthouse. The number of marriages continued climbing in 
1942 (to 3,766), then tapered off in 1943 (3,736) and 1944 (2,693). 
Rapides Clerk of Court Julius P. Arial estimated that about one-third 
of the 1941 and 1942 licenses had been issued to out-of-town couples, 
and that about one-half of all licenses issued between 1940 and 1945 
had been issued to couples at least one member of which was a native
gof central Louisiana.
The crime rate in Louisiana fluctuated during the war. Alexandria, 
with its concentration of army troops, in 1942 added twenty officers 
to its police force, which was augmented by one hundred military 
police. The city court collected fines totaling $16,845 in 1940 and
gSunday Item-Tribune, July 26, 1940; States, August 27, 1940; Item, 
November 1, 1940; Town Talk, December 2, 1941, January 2, July 1, 17, 
1942, August 22, 1945.
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$36,452 in 1941- The police made 4,746 arrests in 1940 and 5,963 in
1941. Over the state, the crimes of arson, burglary, confidence games, 
narcotics, and sexual offenses generally increased, while murder, man­
slaughter, assault, embezzlement, forgery, kidnapping, counterfeiting,
9and felonious assault generally decreased.
Officials of the federal Narcotics Bureau in New Orleans reported 
that supplies of illegal drugs in the city had dropped during the war, 
while prices had skyrocketed. As peacetime sources of these drugs —  
Japan, Japanese-mandate Pacific islands, and the Balkans —  became 
inaccessible, drug users had to pay exorbitant prices for inferior 
Mexican drugs. Marijuana cigarettes, formerly available on the streets 
of New Orleans for the price of two for twenty-five cents, by 1945 
sold for $1.50 each. A pack of marijuana cigarettes, which cost three 
dollars before the war, rose to fifteen dollars when available. The 
New Orleans community conducted an extensive anti-marijuana campaign 
during the spring of 1942. At that time, police officials suspected 
the existence of two marijuana cigarette factories and about one hun­
dred street peddlers in the city. The street peddlers worked crowded 
street corners, barrooms, night clubs, and poolrooms. Customers ap­
proached a peddler and asked either "Where’s the boy?" or "What’s that 
you’re holding?" as a code to indicate that they wanted marijuana. 
Police officials also reported that black users of marijuana outnum­
bered white users by about three to one, and that most users were men, 
primarily between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Heroin, once
__
Town Talk, January 7, September 13, 1941, February 5, 28, 1942; 
Times-Picayune, August 30, September 18, 23-26, 1941.
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twenty-five to thirty per cent pure in the New Orleans trade and priced 
at twenty dollars per ounce, by 1945 was one per cent pure and cost 
$150 per ounce. The supply situation became so acute that some addicts 
forged prescriptions, broke into drugstores, or raided doctor’s medi­
cal, bags to obtain drugs, while others gave up and conquered their 
dependency.^
Gambling, especially in New Orleans and its suburbs, continued 
throughout the war, despite periodic ineffectual police raids. The 
Smoke House Bar, the Blue Eagle Lottery Company, the Louisiana Daily 
Keeno Combination, were only a few of the gambling establishments 
raided by New Orleans police. Such raids typically drove gambling 
enderground a few days until officials again looked the other way.^
The presence of illegal activity in the state offended the sensi­
bilities of several groups. The New Orleans Ministerial Union launched 
a massive crusade against gambling in 1944. In that same year, the 
East Baton Rouge Police Jury recognized "open and widespread gambling 
in the parish," and called on all law enforcement agencies having 
jurisdiction to enforce anti-gambling laws. Other groups deplored il­
legal activity, and attempted to use the war to reform American and 
Louisiana morals. The East Louisiana Baptist Association complained 
in October, 1941, that beer was available to soldiers even in camps 
located in "dry" parishes and wards, and that during the recent maneu­
vers "Government trucks were used and men in uniform doing the
^States, January 24, 1945; Item, March 19-26, 1942.
^Morning Advocate, September 5, 1944; Times-Picayune., September 18.,
* 23-26, 1941.
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delivering, and that protest by citizens was met with rough retort." 
The Association protested "the action of the Army officials in deliv­
ering our soldiers over to the tender mercies of the brewers, whose 
sole purpose is to exploit them for their pitiful army wages ..."
The First Baptist Church of Ashland, Louisiana in 1942 protested the 
use of scarce sugar in the production of intoxicating liquors. The 
Women's Missionary Union of Zion Hill Baptist Church in Winnfield 
urged the prohibition of the sale of liquor and suppression of vice 
within specified zones around army camps, and industrial or other stra­
tegic areas. The Louisiana Moral and Civic Foundation ("representing 
and supported by 350,000 Protestant citizens of Louisiana") petitioned 
President Roosevelt to close "all night clubs and gambling halls in 
these United States . . . until one year after peace is declared . . ." 
The Foundation held that such places were non-essential to the war 
effort, caused absenteeism, used supplies of gasoline and rubber, 
absorbed money in profit that people could otherwise use to buy War
Bonds, and contributed to juvenile delinquency and the overall crime
*  12 rate.
Perhaps the most stringent suggestion for the suppression of 
supposed immoral activity came from the*Winn Parish Baptist Associa­
tion on November 16, 1942. The Association called on Congress for a 
law closing all establishments in the United States engaged in the
^Morning Advocate, September 5, November 22, 1944, January 2, 1945; 
Congressional Record 77 Congress 1 Session Appendix Volume 87 Part 14 
(Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 
pp. A5285-A5283; Congressional Record 77 Congress 2 Session Volume 88 
Part 2 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 
1942), p. 1805; Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph, pp. 239- 
240.
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the manufacture, sale, or storage of alcoholic beverages; a law to 
place all "diseased" prostitutes in "concentration camps" and treat 
them as saboteurs and to conscript healthy prostitutes into war in­
dustry; a law to conscript all men with venereal disease in the United 
States, along with all criminals, and place them in a "foreign legion"; 
and a declaration of a period of prayer every night except Sunday at 
9:00 P.M. throughout the country. United States Representative A.
Leonard Allen dutifully introduced this petition, and it disappeared
13into the Military Affairs Committee.
The war affected almost every aspect of life in Louisiana. Cities 
reduced garbage pick-ups, many stores stopped delivering packages, 
dairies reduced deliveries, and launderies no longer used bags to cover 
clothes after they were cleaned. State Highway Directory W. Prescott 
Foster and Superintendent of State Police Steve Alford warned Louisi­
ana drivers, pedestrians, and boat operators in 1942 not to loiter 
around the state's bridges. The state posted armed guards to protect 
these vital links in the transportation system and "any motor vehicle 
driver, owner or operator of a boat, or pedestrian not observing the 
warning may be seriously injured or killed." Transportation systems 
struggled to maintain schedules in the crush of increased numbers of 
riders and the scarcity of replacement parts for buses. Traditional 
vacation trips virtually disappeared during the war because of gasoline 
and tire rationing and overcrowded public transportation. New Orleans
__
Congressional Record 77 Congress 2 Session Volume 88 Part 7 (Washing­
ton, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 8896, 
9186.
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beer drinkers found their beer bottled in quart bottles by the New
Orleans Brewers' Association in order to save scarce metal bottle caps
("Let us serve you beer in quarts and split the serving with a friend,"
the Association urged). Sliced bread disappeared from store shelves
in 1943 when the Office of Price Administration allowed bakers to stop
slicing bread in order to offset an increase in wheat prices without
raising bread prices. Unsliced bread caused many hardships among
younger housewives unfamiliar with the task of slicing bread, and
furthermore, many older housewives had donated their bread knives to
scrap metal drives, confident that they had no more use for them. Un-
*sliced bread lasted from January to March, 1943, when Food Administra­
tor Claude R. Wickard announced that he would again allow bakeries to
sell sliced bread because "the savings are not as much as we had ex-
* a ..I* pected.
Insurance agents warned their clients in 1942 that normal home­
owner's automobile, and property insurance would not cover damages re­
sulting from military attack, and offered "as a patriotic war gesture" 
a new War Risk and Bombardment Policy. The policy had some quirky 
clauses. It covered, for example, loss of personal or real property 
resulting from enemy attack or from United States military defense, 
but did not cover loss caused by America's allies resisting an attack 
in one's neighborhood.*^
_
Town Talk, March 23, 1942; States, April 2, June 11, 29, 1942; Item, 
June 8, 17, 1942; Morning Advocate, July 25, 1942, January 3, 28,
March 9, 1943, February 27, 1944.
*̂ Item, June 9, 1942.
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Despite a widespread feeling throughout the United States and 
Louisiana that Americans were not sufficiently patriotic early in the 
war, Louisianians joined enthusiastically in various patriotic gestures. 
The Town Talk suggested in May, 1942, "Let's Have Some Hoop-La:"
One thing missing in this war is the good old 
hoop-la that gets under the toughest hide, brings 
one's heart up into his throat, and turns humdrum 
mechanics and prosaic clerks into dashing heroes.
We need the firecracker enthusiasm of 1917 and 1918.
We need flag waving, troops marching, one-minute 
speakers. We need war songs that will spring to 
our lips as spontaneously as "[It's A Long Way to]
Tipperary" and "Over There" did a quarter of a 
century ago.
Let’s have some songs, some slogans, some cheer­
leaders, some flag-waving, some name-calling, 
some enthusiasm, something to let the ten mil­
lions who are going to be in uniform know that 
we're with them, not away behind.16
Town Talk editorial writers need not have worried. Louisianians 
responded to the patriotic tenor of wartime life, even though their 
initial enthusiasm for scrap and bond drives waned during the later 
war years. Paul Maloney, Federal Revenue Collector in New Orleans, 
even noticed in 1941 and 1942 a change of attitude on the part of 
people paying their income taxes. About 200 Louisianians in 1941 made 
voluntary tax contributions ranging from $1.50 to $1,000. The same 
feeling persisted into 1942. One individual return in that year in­
cluded an extra $20 and a note: "I felt I owed something more than
$3 to a government that's doing so much for me, and also upholding 
freedom in the world." One man came to Maloney's office and handed a
16Town Talk, May 6, 1942.
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deputy collector $5, remarking "I expect a Jap for every dollar. I 
guess they* re worth a dollar each dead ..." Crowds waiting to pay 
taxes, silent and sullen in previous years, now talked openly of Hitler 
and the Japanese and expressed a militaristic outlook: "I want my
money used to kill a regiment," for example.^
Many Louisianians left on the home front felt that they could 
contribute most directly to the war effort by their unstinting support 
for scrap collection and war bond and stamp sales rallies. These 
activities brought the war home to many people, and gave them a purpose 
and a place in the war effort. They may have been unable because of 
age, health, or sex to fight against Germany and Japan on the battle­
field, but they could help supply scrap to be recycled into war 
materiel, or provide the money necessary to buy new supplies.
The collection drives began in Louisiana early in 1941, primarily 
to aid Britain and France. The local "Bundles for Britain" chapter in 
Baton Rouge collected money and merchandise, and made hospital gowns 
for shipment overseas. Shreveport patriotic societies began collec­
ting old automobile license plates as a source of scrap metal for ship­
ment to England; By March 1, 1941 (some two months after they began), 
Louisiana had collected about eighteen tons of old license plates. 
Students at John McDonogh High School in New Orleans organized a 
British War Relief Club in March, 1941, which collected old clothes, 
wool, silk, and cotton for quilts and air-raid covers, and raised money 
for British Relief. (After Pearl Harbor, this organization became the
^Morning Advocate, March 19, 1941; Times-Picayune, February 29, 1942; 
Item, March 12, 1942.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
477
War Relief Club and widened its scope to "all countries helping to pre- 
18serve democracy.")
Scrap drives for domestic use began before American involvement 
in the war, with the aluminum scrap drive during the summer of 1941.
The Item predicted accurately that the aluminum drive "will be small 
training for larger things later." Louisiana threw itself into this 
first of the nationwide scrap drives. Mayor Robert Maestri’s ATuminum 
Committee met with principals of forty-five black schools in New Or­
leans to ensure participation by black schoolchildren (some 25,000 volun­
teered) . The New Orleans posts of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and 
United Spanish War Veterans staged a parade to begin the aluminum 
drive in the business sections of the city. Xavier University held a 
bazaar and charged one piece of aluminum per person as admission. 
Members of Rapides Parish 4-H clubs collected scrap. (4-H club agent
B. W. Baker challenged them to "Let's see what we can find for the 
cause of democracy and the defeat of the powers that are trying to 
destroy democracy.") Boy Scouts in Metairie, Pineville, Baton Rouge, 
and other areas served as collection agents. Edmund D. Davis, execu­
tive director of Louisiana's National Defense Council, reported in 
September that Louisiana had contributed 132,090 pounds of aluminum 
to the drive. New Orleans led the list with 53,000 pounds, followed
by Shreveport with 20,306 pounds, which in turn was followed closely
by Baton Rouge with 16,540 pounds, Alexandria with 16,407 pounds, and
Morning Advocate, January 7, March 1, June 10, 1941; Town Talk, Janu­
ary 13, 1941; "The War Relief Club of the John McDonogh High School,"
Louisiana Schools, December, 1942, pp. 14-15.
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19Lafayette with 16,102 pounds.
Utilization of material previously thought worthless, however, be­
gan in earnest after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent 
United States entry into the war. Governor Jones appointed Oakdale 
businessman Parrish Fuller to head the state’s "Salvage for Victory" 
campaign in February, 1942, and Louisiana was soon rummaging through 
attics, barnyards, and back lots for waste paper, rags, metal, and 
articles made of natural rubber to recycle for use in the war effort. 
Housewives began saving waste cooking fats in the summer of 1942, af­
ter the government asked for them because they could be used to pro­
duce glycerin for explosives.^
Louisiana organized itself for participation in the massive 
nationwide scrap drive held during the autumn of 1942. Fuller's office 
cooperated with parish school systems to enlist schoolchildren.
Teachers and school administrators explained carefully to the children 
the items they were to collect, and assigned each child a specific 
section of the community to canvass, held poster and slogan contests 
in each school to focus attention on the campaign, and integrated the 
scrap drive into English classes by directing each student to write 
three letters in which they expressed iii their own words the purposes 
of the drive and its uses in the war. Students then hand-delivered 
the letters to their parents, and to the people living on either side 
of them. Local schools offered War Stamp prizes to the student who
TgItem, July 3, 1941; Sunday Item-Tribune, July 13, 1941; States, July 
19, 1941; Town Talk, July 21, September 21, 1941; Morning Advocate,
July 22, 25, 1941.
20Morning Advocate, February 27, 1942; Town Talk, July 17, 1942.
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collected the most scrap each week, and many schools also granted "mili­
tary rank" to students based on the amount of salvageable material col­
lected: any scrap earned the rank of "private;" ten pounds brought the
rank "private first class;" twenty pounds equaled "corporal;" thirty 
pounds equaled "sergeant;" forty pounds equaled "top sergeant;" fifty 
pounds equaled "2nd lieutenant;" and seventy-five pounds equaled "1st 
lieutenant.
In addition, Louisiana's newspapers sponsored an intensive house- 
to-house search for scrap metal throughout the state on October 5, 
underwrote the expenses of the campaign, and provided cash prizes for 
the most scrap collected in certain geographical areas. The scrap 
metal drive turned up an odd assortment of objects. Shreveport mayor 
Sam Caldwell donated the city's old firebell to the newspaper scrap 
metal drive. 0. P. Oglivie, publisher of the Coushatta Citizen, do­
nated a complete press retired from service in 1935 and standing use­
less since then. The 1942 scrap metal drive also uncovered old steam­
boat paddlewheels, World War I helmets and bomb casings, Civil War 
cannonballs, cooking pots and swords, abandoned cars and appliances, 
all of which went to provide metal to the war effort. In addition,
Baton Rougeans contributed brass, nickel, silver, and copper for war
industries to a "Victory Key Kan" drive conducted independently of the
22newspaper scrap metal drive during the autumn of 1942.
21Parrish Fuller, "Outline of Overall Plan For Enlisting School Child­
ren In The Collection Of Scrap Iron, Rags, Rubber, Etc.," Louisiana 
Schools, September, 1942, pp. 10-11, 30; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, 
October 23, 1942, H. S. Weigel Family Papers, Division of Archives and 
Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Weigel Collection).
22Shreveport Times, September 19, October 5-6, 1942; Morning Advocate,
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The Shreveport Times commented of the concerted effort to collect 
scrap that "This isn't just another drive. It's a do-or-die drive 
and it's the boys in uniform —  our sons and our neighbor's son who 
die if we don't do." This concept of the importance of the drive 
caused an extreme episode in Baton Rouge suggestive of surveillance 
methods used in totalitarian countries. The Morning Advocate on October 
6 published a "Kibitzer's Koupon" to be clipped out by anyone knowing 
of uncollected scrap and mailed to the local scrap drive chairman:
I'm no snooper, but I think that somebody ought 
to know about the scrap I have seen at the 
following location: ______________________
I hope somebody will call at this location and 
get this cleaned up before the scrap drive is 
over.
Yours for Victory 
(No Signature Required)
Louisianians responded so well to the scrap drive that, ironically,
23collectors ran out of space to store it until it could be used.
Collection drives continued throughout the war. Alexandria’s 
abandoned street car rails fell victim to the war in 1943, and the D- 
Day invasion of France spurred an increase of blood donations to the 
Red Cross for use by the armed services at the collection center in 
New Orleans. By 1944, however, most scrap drives lagged behind projec­
ted goals. The States noted in July that from June 27 until July 18,
October 4, 1942.
23Shreveport Times, October 6, 1942; Morning Advocate, October 6, 11,
1942.
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New Orleans had collected only about two ounces of waste paper per
person. The Morning Advocate reported in August that previously unused
tin cans could now be "detinned" at a new plant in Birmingham, Alabama,
and urged people to salvage them. By the end of the month, however,
Baton Rougeans had collected only enough tin cans to fill about one-
24third of one boxcar.
Excess patriotic zeal remaining after the scrap drives could be 
directed into war stamp and bond sales. The federal government sold 
war stamps and bonds in seven issues heralded with much fanfare to help 
meet the enormous economic burden of the war. The first series of 
stamps and bonds appeared in 1941, and were dubbed "defense" stamps 
and bonds. Louisiana entered into the spirit of stamp and bond sales 
just as it did the scrap drives. Members of the Alexandria Chamber 
of Commerce agreed to sell stamps in their stores to make them more 
available to the public. In addition, delivery boys for the Times- 
Picayune , States, Morning Advocate, and State Times delivered stamps 
to their customers. Students at Tulane University held a "Blackout 
Ball" in the school gymnasium and used the proceeds to buy defense 
stamps and bonds. (A "Blackout Ball" featured a one minute "lights 
out" every fifteen minutes.) During the months May to December, 1941, 
Louisianians purchased over $11,000,000 in savings bonds and 
$5,418,000 in stamps. (In comparison, Mississippi purchased $7,090,000
24Town Talk, June 8, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 24, August 9, 31, 
1944; States, July 26, 1944.
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25in bonds and $3,259,000 in stamps during the same period.)
Louisianians continued buying war stamps and bonds during 1942, 
even before the first of the big war bond drives, in September. The 
Town Talk congratulated its readers for their continued orders for 
stamps and for asking for stamps in lieu of change when they made a
purchase. The Morgan and Lindsey store in Amite created a "Defense
Window" in June, 1942, displaying pictures of local residents in the 
armed services in an effort to boost bond sales. The Shreveport Re­
tail Merchants' Association sold $601,615.85 in War Bonds in July.
26The total bond sales in Caddo Parish that month reached $1,489,000.
Each War Bond drive in Louisiana followed the same general pattern: 
numerous newspaper advertisements extolling the patriotic and economic 
virtues of War Stamps and Bonds; business, civic, and fraternal organi­
zation members manning booths or otherwise assisting in bond sales;
visits by celebrities who entertained at rallies boosting war bond 
sales. The later bond drives often also included appearances by mem­
bers of the armed forces demonstrating equipment purchased with bond 
sales, and programs in both black and white schools to encourage 
schoolchildren to purchase war stamps.
The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce urged its members to buy as 
many bonds as they could afford and give their time and energy to bond
25Town Talk, September 10, 1941; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, 
November 23, 1941; States, November 26, 1941; Morning Advocate, Janu­
ary 18, February 21, 1942; Times-Picayune, December 12, 1941, February 
8, 1942.
26Town Talk, April 14, 1942; Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, 
August 13, 1942; Merle Weigel to H. S. Wiegel, June 28, 1942, Weigel 
Collection.
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drives. The Louisiana Councils of the Knights of Columbus added war 
bond sales to their varied war activities. Hollywood luminaries who 
came to Louisiana to sell bonds included Laraine Day and Andy Devine, 
who appeared at the Baton Rouge dinner which cost a $1,000 war bond 
to attend (The dinner raised $340,000); Fred Astaire, James Cagney, 
Lucille Ball, Judy Garland, Mickey Rooney, Betty Hutton, Greer Garson, 
and Harpo Marx, who attracted over 100,000 people to a "Cavalcade of 
Hollywood Stars" rally in New Orleans —  each member of the audience 
had to present a receipt for a Third War Loan Drive Bond to gain ad­
mittance; and Robert Young, who appeared at a mock invasion rally in 
27Baton Rouge.
As the seemingly interminable war bond rallies continued, the 
federal government attempted to whip up patriotic fervor by enlisting 
soldiers to sell bonds. Some 600 soldiers "invaded" Canal Street in 
Infantry Day ceremonies to boost Fifth War Loan Bond sales (and inci­
dentally to celebrate the anniversary of George Washington assuming 
command of the Continental Army during the Revolution). Richard W. 
Leche, Jr. described to his father a rally he had attended at New 
Orleans City Park Stadium in 1942: displays included jeeps, motor­
cycles, six-ton trucks, light trucks, and howitzers. Live demonstra­
tions included flame throwers and tank destroyers. (A live demonstra­
tion of phosphorus grenades in New Orleans in 1945 resulted in 250
27Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes., April 8, 1943; Roger Baudier 
and Millard F. Everett, Anchor and Fleur-De-Lis Knights of Columbus in 
Louisiana 1902-1962 (New Orleans, Louisiana State Council, Knights of 
Columbus, 1965), pp. 351, 354; Morning Advocate, September.17, 26, 1942, 
June 13, 15, 1945; States, November 16, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 
21, 1943.
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spectators receiving bums when one grenade landed too close to them.) 
Baton Rouge witnessed an "invasion" of the Louisiana State University 
football stadium during the Fifth War Loan Drive. "The roar of cannon 
and the crackle of machine gun fire, punctuated by soaring, varicolored 
flares, gave the crowd a small sample of what infantrymen are enduring 
in their section of hell in France." The Seventh War Loan Drive 
brought a mock air attack on Harding Field north of the city. Alex­
andria witnessed an "invasion" by Higgins boats and Camp Livingston
28soldiers during the same drive.
Louisiana exceeded its quota in each of the War Loan Drives, be­
ginning with the First Drive, in which it bought $11,778,000 in bonds 
compared to the quota of $8,250,000. The later bond sales slowed, es­
pecially the "E" small denomination bond for the individual investor. 
Editorial writers pushed the "E" bonds in the Fifth War Loan Drive by 
appeals to patriotism. The Morning Advocate reminded its readers to
Just remember that each time you buy a bond you 
are furnishing a fighting man with the equipment 
he needs to win . . . each time you buy a bond 
you destroy one more Nazi or one more Jap . ..
The States similarly reminded its readers that while firecrackers were
*
outlawed for Fourth of July celebrations,
Bombs for Berlin and Tokyo, and grenades and 
shells to shoot against the Nazis and Nippies 
are not. Your bond will buy a bomb that will
28 • .Item, June 15, 1944; Morning Advocate-, June 16, 1944, May 31, June
18, 1945; Town Talk, June 13, 1945; Richard W. Leche, Jr. to Richard
W. Leche, Sr., November 30, 1942, Richard W. Leche Papers, Division of
Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge.
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destroy a German pillbox or a plane factory, 
depending on the size of your investment ...29
State War Finance Committee Chairman Leon Tujacque announced in
August, 1945, that Louisiana had exceeded its quota in each of the war
30loan drives by the following amounts:








Louisianians also found that they could contribute to the war 
effort and fill time left empty by the disappearance of traditional 
leisure activities by working in Civilian Defense. Louisiana, with 
its miles of unpopulated coastline, war production facilities, and 
concentration of training camps, was considered a prime target for 
enemy infiltration. The warning network for such attack established 
by the United States Office of Civilian Defense depended on citizen 
volunteers "of known probity" scanning the skies for approaching enemy 
airplanes twenty-four hours a day throughout the United States. The
29Town Talk, October 13, 1942; Item, June 13, 17, July 12, 1944; 
Morning Advocate, June 8, July 9, August 9, 1944, July 18, 1945, Janu­
ary 11, 1946; States, July 3, 7, August 1, 1944. Warden D. D. Bazer 
reported in September, 1943, that Angola prisoners had exceeded their 
quota in bond purchases (quota —  $8,271; sales —  $13,375) in the 
Third War Loan Drive, largely because of the dedicated efforts of the 
prison’s inmate bond sales director - James Monroe Smith. Times- 
Picayune, September 19, 1943.
30Item, August 20, 1945.
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object of this system, of course, was to alert the Air Force of enemy 
attack at the earliest possible moment so it could intercept the in­
vaders before they inflicted heavy damage on important installations. 
The effectiveness of this system rested on a close distribution of 
watchers so enemy aircraft could not slip through the network undetec­
ted. When that distribution was not possible because of the scarcity 
of population in coastal parishes in Louisiana, the Office of Civilian
Defense depended on intracoastal bargemen, fishermen, trappers, and
31oystermen who knew the marshy coastal areas well. In other areas
of the state —  New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, for example —
32volunteers enrolled in the more common air warning system.
The National Defense Council of Louisiana chaired by Colonel L. 
Kemper Williams, spearheaded Civilian Defense in the state after its 
organizational meeting on July 23, 1940. In addition, Civilian De­
fense received support from fraternal and civic organizations and from 
the state government. The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce, for example, 
created a National Defense Committee to help develop a community-wide 
organized effort to prevent sabotage and "fifth column" activity. The
31Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy and Lieutenant Hodding Carter, Civilian De­
fense of the United States (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, Incorpor­
ated, 1942), pp. 22-27; Sam H. Jones, "Civilian Defense in Louisiana," 
Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1942, pp. 20-21; Joseph W. Reid, 
Jr., "The Geography of Louisiana's Civilian Defense Organization I," 
Louisiana Municipal Review, March-April, 1942, pp. 44-45; Louisiana 
Department of Education Bulletin No. 480 Wartime Education in Louisiana 
Schools, p. 12; Frederick J. Stielow, "Isolation and Development on a 
Louisiana Gulfcoast Island: Grand Isle, 1781-1962" (Ph.D. disserta­
tion, Indiana University, 1977), p. 214.
^̂ Morning Advocate, August 1, 1941; Item, December 8, 12, 1941; Shreve­
port Times, December 10, 1941, February 5, March 12, 1942; Town Talk, 
February 6, 1942.
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Hammond Veterans of Foreign Wars urged all former members of the World 
War I American Expeditionary Force to volunteer for civilian defense 
work at an open VFW meeting. In addition, the Louisiana State Police 
conducted a two-week workshop in blackout enforcement, anti-sabotage, 
and other police duties related to national defense for peace officers 
during 1940.^
By 1942, over 100,000 Louisianians had either received training 
or were receiving training in some phase of national defense work.
Air raid warden was the most popular job, with 17,982 individuals 
enrolled, while aircraft spotter was in second place with 13,700.
Other Civilian Defense jobs attracted fewer volunteers. In general, 
however, Louisiana’s urban areas and their surrounding parishes organ­
ized more thoroughly for Civilian Defense than did the more rural 
34areas. By 1942, for example, Caddo Parish boasted both a Shreveport 
Defense Council and a Caddo Parish Defense Council. Other parishes 
had one parish defense council, typically located in the largest town 
in the parish, usually open only part-time. In some rural parishes, 
especially in North Louisiana away from the coast, unless they con­
tained a defense-related activity, Civilian Defense remained largely 
non-existent, even though many of these parishes cooperated fully in
33States, July 23, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, January 17, 1941; Shreve­
port Chamber of Commerce Minutes, July 11, 1940; Baudier and Everett, 
Anchor and Fleur-De-Lis, pp. 351-354; Roman Heleniak, Soldiers of the 
Law; Louisiana's State Police (Topeka, Kansas, Josten’s Publications, 
1980), p. 53.
Sam H. Jones, "Civilian Defense in Louisiana —  A Review of 1942," 
Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1943, pp. 17-21.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
488
35bond and scrap drives.
Louisiana, of course, did not experience an enemy invasion during 
the war. The closest combat to Louisiana’s shores consisted of a 
series of offshore torpedo and depth charge incidents. For instance, 
at least three torpedoes struck and sank a United States cargo ship 
just as it entered the mouth of the Mississippi River south of New
Orleans at 3:05 P.M., May 12, 1942, bringing warfare to the lower
Mississippi for the first time since 1862. The ship lost 27 crew 
members killed and 14 seriously burned. In addition, a mysterious 
explosion (suspected to have resulted from a torpedo) had damaged a 
jetty earlier that same day. Two more ships sank on May 13 at an un­
specified location in the Gulf of Mexico, and the survivors were
36brought to New Orleans and Key West, Florida for treatment. Even
though the threat to American ships lessened after the 1942 rash of
attacks, the sinkings brought the war dangerously close to home in 
Louisiana.
Louisiana also experienced no major espionage episodes during the 
war, but attacks on ships in the nearby Gulf and the frightening 
rapidity with which Adolph Hitler's forces brought the horror of war 
to the civilian population of Europe left many Louisianians convinced
35Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, April 9, 1942; Joseph W. 
Reid, Jr., "Civilian Defense," Louisiana Municipal Review, May-June, 
1943, pp. 68-69, 81; Leonard B. Watt, Jr., "Lincoln Parish Prepares 
for 'Total War,'" Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1942, pp. 14- 
15.
36Shreveport Journal, May 15, 1942; States, May 16, 18, 1942; Item, 
June 6, 1942; Stielow, "Isolation and Development on a Louisiana Gulf- 
coast Island," pp. 214-215; Thomas L. Karnes, Tropical Enterprise The 
Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin America (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1978), pp. 217-218.
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of the need for adequate preparation within the United States and sus­
picious of any activity perceived to be friendly toward the Axis 
powers- Discovery of Nazi flags flying from flagpoles at Martin Behr- 
man High School and a playground in Algiers on May 24, 1940, led local 
citizens to form the "American Vigilance Committee of Algiers" to in­
vestigate all un-American activity in the area. Baton Rouge was 
rocked in July, 1940, by the discovery of four men digging under a 
wire fence at the DuPont Ethyl plant. The men escaped, leaving behind 
four sticks of dynamite and a mystery. East Baton Rouge Sheriff 
Newman deBritten dispatched deputies and bloodhounds to the scene, but 
the men (spies? saboteurs? someone with a grudge against the company?) 
had disappeared into the night. This episode, occurring so close to 
a vital war plant —  only one other plant in the country, DuPont’s 
facility at Wilmington, Delaware produced the tetraethyl high-octane
leaded fuel produced at the Baton Rouge plant —  led State Police
37officials to redouble their security measures.
On at least two occasions, however, common occurences caused a 
flurry of undeserved excitement because of wartime anxiety. An un­
announced flight of four airplanes excited Baton Rouge on the night of 
September 9-10, 1940. People jammed telephone lines reporting the 
flight as the airplanes faded away into the night. After the excite­
ment passed, sheriff’s deputies learned that the airplanes were on 
night training maneuvers from Barksdale Air Force Base. In another 
instance, Alexandrians awakened on the morning of March 21, 1942, and
37States, May 24, July 6, 1940; Item, July 6-8, 1940; Morning Advocate, 
July 6-9, 1940; Heleniak, Soldiers of the Law, p. 52.
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found a fine, yellow dust covering the outdoors. Speculation that the
powder might be a poison or residue of a poison gas sprayed by enemy
airplanes during the night caused a flurry of concern until chemists
from Camp Beauregard and Louisiana College confirmed in separate tests
that the mysterious yellow powder was, in fact, normal spring pollen
38blown from trees in an especially powerful March wind.
The perception that Louisiana was vulnerable to an enemy attack 
contributed to the development of Civilian Defense in the state. Al- 
cee Legendre, coordinator of Civilian Defense in the New Orleans area, 
stated on December 9, 1941 that his office was already laying the 
groundwork for practice blackouts in the area. City attorneys in New 
Orleans discovered, however, that the city had no ordinances covering 
violations of blackout orders, so the city council had to pass a 
special blackout ordinance providing ninety days in jail and a $100 
fine for anyone failing to comply with blackout orders. New Orleanians 
rushed to hardware stores to purchase flashlights and candles, thus 
quadrupling normal demand for these items, and also created a "run" 
on guns and ammunition in local gun stores. New Orleans newspapers 
on December 15 published a full-page instruction sheet prepared by the 
United States Office of Civilian Defensfe informing people what action 
to take during an air raid: 1. Keep Cool[!] 2. Stay Home 3. Put
Out Lights 4. Lie Down 5. Stay Away From Windows (the instructions 
also included directions for handling any unexploded incendiary bombs 
that happened to fall near you: "Spray a fine mist of water [over it].
OQMorning Advocate, September 10, 1940; Town Talk, March 21, 1942.
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Streams or buckets of water will make it explode.") The Orleans
Parish School Board cancelled all night activities in the public
39schools to remove any possible interference with the blackouts.
As the initial outburst of enthusiasm for Civilian Defense waned 
during 1942, some Louisianians maintained that many of their fellow 
citizens had not yet fully realized the importance of Civilian De­
fense in a war of such magnitude as World War II. The Shreveport 
Times commented early in 1942 that a "vital defense plant destroyed in 
a token air raid is just as completely destroyed as by any other type 
of attack ..." while the Town Talk remarked "It is time to pinch 
ourselves, wake up, and decided we better [sic] dig a few trenches, 
build some bomb shelters, and do something —  anything —  to remind 
us that we are living in a dangerous age." The height of this atti­
tude in Louisiana appeared in a Louisiana Municipal Review editorial 
entitled "America Needs to be Bombed," which maintained that Americans 
were too worried about high taxes, profits, and rationing of consumer 
goods, and not worried enough about winning the war. Governor Jones 
expressed much the same sentiment in a Shreveport speech: "We are
still judging this war as being the same kind of war we had in 1917-
1918. That war was a mere fist fight in a side street compared to
40this world-wide conflict."
New Orleans held its first test blackout on the night of March
39Times-Picayune, December 10, 15, 1941; Item, December 12, 18, 1941; 
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, December 14, 1941.
^Shreveport Times, February 7, 1942; Town Talk, February 9-10, 19, 
March 3, 1942; "America Needs to be Bombed," Louisiana Municipal Re­
view, July-August, 1942, pp. 99, 121.
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6-7, 1942. Legendre proclaimed the test "99% effective," but repor­
ters in an airplane circling the city reported that some automobile 
headlights remained on, lights stayed on along the wharves, as did 
streetlights along the waterfront, that aircraft warning beacons atop 
the WWL radio transmitting tower, and the Mississippi River bridge 
navigation warning lights remained on, all of which clearly outlined 
highly vulnerable locations in the city. Baton Rouge followed with 
its first practice blackout on the night.of March 31-April 1, and met 
with similar results, but this time officials ordered lights atop the 
state capitol, the Mississippi River bridge, and the WJBO radio tower ' 
to remain on. (Soon after, however, Manager of Executive Buildings 
Frank Grevemberg ordered the spotlight illuminating Huey Long's 
grave extinguished for the duration of the war.) The first statewide
practice blackout did not occur until the night of February 5-6, 1943,
41almost fourteen months after the beginning of the war.
World War II intruded on daily life in Louisiana in other ways 
as well. Consumers faced shortages and rationing of many commodities 
to which they had become ̂ accustomed. The first shortage developed 
after the federal government announced its seizure of all raw silk 
supplies in the nation for the national defense program as Japanese 
expansion threatened normal supply areas in Asia. American women 
clogged department stores as they rushed to stock up on silk stockings, 
despite official assurances that a new duPont chemical plant would as­
sure an adequate supply of substitute nylon hose. Hosiery, however,
TTItem, March 7, 1942; Morning Advocate, April 1, May 31, 1942; Times- 
Picayune , May 17,-1942; Town Talk, February 6, 1942.
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42continued to be a scarce item during the war.
Automobile owners faced the twin trials of tire and gasoline 
rationing. Tire rationing began in January, 1942, in order to con­
serve supplies of natural, and later synthetic, rubber for use of the 
armed forces. Gasoline rationing followed in the spring of 1942 in 
order to conserve gasoline itself, and also to suppress needless use 
of tires by eliminating all but essential driving. Tire rationing 
provisions were stringent. Parish ration boards could not issue 
certificates authorizing an individual to buy a tire until inspection 
showed the old tire to be no longer safe at the speeds the individual 
would normally be expected to drive even if retreaded and recapped. 
Furthermore, a certificate did not guarantee a tire. Each parish re­
ceived a monthly allotment of tires and people holding valid certifi­
cates often encountered great difficulty locating an available tire. 
Rapides Parish, for example, received an allotment of 42 passenger car 
tires and 143 truck and bus tires in January, 1942. Orleans Parish, 
with about 100,000 cars and trucks registered, received an allotment 
of 1,282 tires for the same month. Scarcity of tires led to theft. 
Citizens of Shreveport formed the Automobile Vigilante Society in 
March, 1942, to combat the increasing occurance of tire theft. New
Orleanians reported 823 tires stolen between December, 1941, and
43August, 1942 (159 in July alone).
42Morning Advocate, August 5, 1941.
43Town Talk, January 2, 1942; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, Janu­
ary 4, 1942; Item, March 3, 1942; States, August 10, 1942; L. E. Fra- 
zar and J. E. Brumfield to All Members of War Price and Rationing 
Boards State of Louisiana, June 22, 1943, Sam Jones to W. Scott Heywood, 
December 28, 1943, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Records, Troy H. 
Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter
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Gasoline and tire rationing caused various problems throughout 
the state. Workers sometimes faced great difficulty obtaining suffi­
cient gasoline to drive to defense or other vital jobs and had to 
plan their trips carefully. Ration boards received instructions to
urge compliance with the thirty-five mile-per-hour speed limit to
44conserve fuel and tires.
Gasoline rationing in a state which produced as much oil as 
Louisiana seemed pointless to many people, including Governor Jones. 
Jones maintained that gasoline rationing would wreck the state’s 
petroleum-based economy. The otherwise rebellious 1942 legislature 
agreed with the Governor, and sent President Roosevelt a resolution 
decrying the expected slump in oil and other business in the state. 
The Morning Advocate, however, adopted a positive attitude toward 
gasoline rationing. The United States needed to conserve its rubber 
supply, and moreover, "maybe the states will find some way to get 
along without depending on the motorist for such a large chunk of
cited as Jennings-Heywood Collection); Martha Byrd, "The Home Front —  
World War II," American History Illustrated, July, 1979, p. 10.
44W. Scott Heywood to Ray C. Martin, July 1, 1943, Heywood to Major 
B. A. Hardey, October 12, 1943, Heywood to To Whom It May Concern, 
December 30, 1943, F. J. Gimble, Charles A. Clark, and W. Scott Hey­
wood to All Motorists, May, 1944, Jennings-Heywood Collection; Merle 
Weigel to H. S. Weigel, October 3, 1942, November 15, 1942, Weigel 
Collection. The severe limitations placed on Louisiana motorists is 
revealed in the state’s shipments of motor gasoline during November, 
1943, when it shipped 44,796 barrels. Only 9,437 barrels of this total 
were shipped for local demand. Minutes of Natural Gas and Natural 
Gasoline Committee District 3 Records, Cline Room, Magale Library, 
Centenary College, Shreveport, Louisiana.
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,,45revenue.
Louisianians also experienced either stringent rationing programs 
or shortages of food supplies. They lined up at local schools to 
register for sugar rationing books which entitled the individual to 
purchase a limited amount of sugar within a specific time period.
Sugar coupon number one, for example, was valid only from May 5 until 
May 16, 1942, number two from May 17 until May 30. Sugar rationing 
continued to be a common reminder of wartime sacrifice. As late as 
May, 1945, for example, Baton Rougeans sought to stock up as much as 
possible on sugar after hearing a rumor that sugar allotments were to 
be reduced.^
Rationing and shortages caused various changes in Louisiana. 
Coffee, a mainstay of many Louisianians, became scarce. Merle Weigel 
reported to her husband her surprise that refreshments at a recent 
club meeting in January, 1943, included coffee "even second cups —  
and plenty of sugar." In February, she reported that the shortage of 
coffee had boosted afternoon tea consumption in its place, but "I 
guess I’m just Southern enough that nothing can ever really take the 
place of coffee ..." In May, she reported that visitors often 
brought along their own coffee, butter, and sugar so they would not 
deplete their host's supply of rationed items. Ice cream virtually 
disappeared from-store shelves. Mrs. Weigel wrote to her husband that
45Morning Advocate, May 25, 28, June 2, November 27, December 4, 1942.
46Ibid., February 19, April 27, 1942, May 6, 1945; States, May 4,
1942; Town Talk, May 6, 1945.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
496
rationing "makes us very careful with our food —  we can’t waste it,
and we can't make fancy desserts, pastries, etc. —  hut those are
47really unnecessary ..."
Intermittent food shortages also plagued Louisianians during the 
war. Restaurants instituted "Meatless Tuesdays" in 1942, substituting 
fowl, animal organ meat, or egg dishes for traditional meat dishes. 
Abbatoirs throughout the state closed in 1943 until the Office of 
Price Administration could establish slaughtering quotas. Louisiana 
existed on "short rations" and.tight supplies for much of the war. 
Restaurants reduced portion sizes early in 1943, and some began 
serving meat dishes only every other day. Shreveporters formed the 
Shreveport Clean Plate Club to reduce food waste. Officials at Charity 
Hospital in New Orleans announced in 1945 that a shortage in the hos­
pital’s rationing point allotment caused undesirable modifications in 
patient diets. OPA officials could offer little help during these 
shortages. New Orleans district director Gilbert J. Fortier reassured 
people in July, 1945, that "There is still enough for all of us to 
eat,” but also reminded them that "Not until after the war is over and
the liberated peoples are self-sustaining will we be able to buy and
48eat as extravagantly as we did before Pdarl Harbor."
Other, more minor, shortages developed during the war. Chewing 
gum became a war casualty in 1942, because of shortages of both sugar
Merle Weigel to H. S. Wiegel, January 14, February 1, 7, April 8,
May 3, 28, 1943, Wiegel Collection.
^Morning Advocate, November 18, 1942, February 26, 1943, July 14, 17, 
1945; Town Talk, February 4, 12, March 25, 1943, July 11, 1945; 
Shreveport Times, July 12, 1943; States, July 12, 1945.
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and chicle, a product of South America temporarily displaced by war 
materials in intercontinental shipping and a major ingredient of gum. 
Louisianians suffered through a shortage of seafood because fishing 
boats lacked crews, fuel, and spare parts. Black pepper became scarce 
because suppliers and the OPA could not agree on an adequate price for 
it. Ice became scarce in New Orleans during the simmer of 1944 be­
cause of a labor shortage at the ice—house until the War Manpower Com­
mission directed the United.States Employment Service to scour the city 
for able-bodied workers. Metal license plates disappeared from Louisi­
ana in 1943, replaced by a new fiber plate to conserve steel.
(Louisiana also then switched from requiring both front and rear
49plates to rear plates only.)
As often happens in situations in which people are deprived of 
products to which they have become accustomed, some Louisianians sought 
ways to circumvent rationing requirements. Thieves broke into the 
safe in the rationing board office in the Old State Capitol in Baton 
Rouge in April, 1944, and stole rationing coupons for gasoline, shoes, 
food, and sugar. Those not bold enough to break into rationing board 
offices, but who still desired additional goods could patronize the 
black market. Illegal markets existed for sugar, hosiery, and meat. 
Revenue Collector J. 0. Fernandez reported in 1945 that eight indi­
viduals had admitted participating in black market vending in New 
Orleans and paid $71,968.39 tax on an estimated $1,500,000 unreported 
profit for the past year. Some New Orleans consumers who banded
49Item, June 8, 1942, February 23, July 1, 4, 1944; Morning Advocate, 
February 3, 1943; Shreveport Times, October 1, 1943; States, December 
1, 1943.
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together to oppose both black market activity and some grocers* prac­
tice of charging more for items than the OPA allowed found that their 
grocers refused to sell them groceries.̂ ®
It is impossible to determine exactly how much black marketing 
occurred in Louisiana during World War II. The very nature of the 
enterprise makes it impossible to determine its dimensions. It is 
safe to say, however, that a black market existed because some 
Louisianians were eager to supply scarce items and reap a profit and 
others were just as eager to obtain a lion’s share of rationed items, 
even at an expensive price and the constant risk of detection.
World War II also impinged upon traditional holiday celebrations 
in Louisiana, in general imbuing each with a new patriotic flavor not 
normally associated with them. Traditional American holidays, of 
course, provided even more reason for patriotic themes. This new 
tendency to make holidays into quasi-patriotic celebrations is es­
pecially obvious in wartime Christmases.
America*s last peacetime Christmas gave people the opportunity 
to reflect on their good fortune at living in a country still at peace. 
Many of them also sought to symbolize this appreciation (and inciden­
tally celebrate the first flush Christmas some of them had enjoyed 
since 1928) by making Christmas, 1940, into a joy-filled, light-filled 
holiday. New Orleans Public Service, Incorporated (a utility which 
also wanted to sell increased amounts of electricity) accurately re­
flected this feeling in an advertisement published early in December:
^Morning Advocate, April 1, 3, June 18, 1944, March 11, April 22,
1945; Times-Picayune, June 18-19, 1944, April 22, 1945.
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Abroad there is fear and blackout. In America 
there is liberty and light.
Thus, Christmas lighting now becomes the symbol 
of the freedom that shines in the heart of every 
American. That is your warrant for making the 
lighting of your tree and your home this year a 
ceremony to drive home this truth, that liberty 
and light go together.51
Other, more economically disinterested, sources reflected the 
same opinion. The Hammond Vindicator asked its readers to light what­
ever lights they controlled on a Christmas Eve Night of Light "to 
show the light of liberty still in the United States." The Alexandria 
Garden Club offered $100 in prizes for the best decorated lawn, porch, 
and tree. Times-Picayune editorial writers looked over Canal Street
and rhapsodized that "one inevitably thinks of the blackouts in Europe
52and realizes that what is seen here is almost too good to be true."
Sam Jones, however, raised the ghost at the banquet: "The only
note of sadness in this Christmas," he said, "is the war in Europe."
Indeed, the war news of December 25, 1940 portended darker days ahead.
Some 300,000 Nazi soldiers invaded Rumania from Hungary as Adolph
Hitler secured a Balkans base for his proposed spring offensive against 
53Russia. The West, of course, saw only the expansion of Naziism, 
without knowing of Hitler’s secret plan that lay behind it.
The next Christmas, the "Pearl Harbor Christmas," was dominated
States, December 11, 1940.
52Town Talk, December 7, 1940; States, December 11, 1940; Times- 
Picayune , December 24, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, December 20, 1940.
53Morning Advocate, December 23, 26, 1940; William L. Shirer, The Rise 
and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 
811, 822-823.
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by the Japanese attack in Hawaii and the awesome task that now faced 
the United States as a full belligerent in the conflict. The Lake 
Charles American Press editorialized on the overriding bittersweetness 
of the day: "It is the opportunity to share Christmas one more time
with those who are dear to.us . . ." The States used the occasion to 
assure its readers that the Christ whose birthday they celebrated was 
undoubtedly on their side in the conflict:
Christ was no isolationist. He believed in the 
brotherhood of man ... He wouldn’t have be­
lieved in the rule of the Hitlers and Mussolinis 
and their yellow and grinning Allies. He would 
have believed in the kind of rulers that [sic] 
are asking their people to never give up the 
fight until freedom is won . . .54
Despite the dark foreboding which clung to this Christmas, many 
people attempted to keep the ritual as normal as possible. Catholic 
and Episcopal churches held their regular midnight services, chari­
table organizations distributed gift baskets to the poor, and carolers 
serenaded their friends. But everything was not the same. As the 
Item commented,
The soldiers aren't tin soldiers, the rumble of 
tanks and the roar of guns form a backdrop for 
’Peace on Earth, good will to men,' the swelling 
notes of ’Oh, Say Can You See’ mingle with 
tinkling 'Jingle Bells' . . . there is no peace 
on earth.55
54American Press, December 11, 1941; States, December 25, 1941.
~*~*Item, December 24, 1941; States, December 25, 1941; Times-Picayune, 
December 26, 1941.
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Later Christmases continued the military theme. In 1942, for 
example, the theme of the Town Talk's Doll and Toy Fund, by which it 
solicited donations to purchase toys for poor children, was "Give 
Scrap to Kill a Jap and Bring Joy to a Girl or Boy." Donors were to 
donate scrap metal to be sold to scrap dealers for the war effort and 
the proceeds used to purchase dolls and toys.^ An individual could 
thus be patriotic and philanthropic at the same time. As the tide of 
war turned in favor of the Allies, Christmas celebrations retained 
their militaristic overtones, but also took on a more positive cast 
than the early wartime celebrations. The Christmas holiday did not 
return to normal, however, until the 1945 holiday season witnessed the 
most joyous Christmas mood since Pearl Harbor.^
The New Year's holiday similarly gave Louisianians a pause to re­
flect upon the conditions of the world and their unique place in it.
New Year's Day, 1941, dawned on gloomy predictions about life in 
Louisiana for the next year. A. L. Wedgeworth, President of the Shreve­
port Chamber of Commerce, expected "A cessation of living for indi­
vidual gain and the lighter things of life." Walter E. Jacobs, presi­
dent of Shreveport's First National Bank remarked that "... our 
Democracy cannot be maintained as we have known it by wishing. It is 
going to be necessary to work harder and to make sacrifices that our 
generation has never known." Despite predictions of hardship and 
sacrifice, however, other Louisianians reflected a happier mood.
^Town Talk, November 11, 1942.
^Morning Advocate, December 22, 1944, December 24, 1945.
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Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell called for "living to the fullest extent 
of the present age . • . and embrac[ing] progressive ideas and oppor­
tunities." The Town Talk remembered the years of economic want ex­
perienced during the Great Depression, and hoped that "1941 will be a 
happy and prosperous era to the people of Louisiana . . .  and that the
hardships and vicissitudes experienced in the past will not arise to
58plague and harass the people."
The year 1941 Ibrought some measure of economic recovery to the 
United States, but, of course, it also brought war in early December. 
Therefore, New Year’s celebrations welcoming 1942 were relatively sub­
dued and quieter than usual, even though many people realized that it 
might be their last holiday together for several years. Also, offi­
cials prohibited use of industrial whistles to welcome the New Year
because they were also used as air raid warnings and therefore could
. 5 9  cause a panic.
Rain began to fall in Louisiana at dark on New Year’s Eve, 1944, 
so the state quietly ushered in the year that proved to be the last of 
the war (New Year’s Eve was also a Sunday). New Year's Day, 1946, 
however, saw a revived holiday celebration as Louisiana followed 
its first peacetime Christmas with a return to traditional New Year's 
Day activities.
Shreveport Times, December 29, 1940; Town Talk, January 1, 1941.
59States, December 30, 1941; Item, December 30, 1941; Times-Picayune, 
December 31, 1941; Shreveport Journal, January 1, 1942.
^Morning Advocate, January 1, 1945, January 1, 1946.
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The holiday most publicly . connected to Louisiana, Mardi Gras, 
was a war casualty. The last wartime Mardi Gras occurred in 1941, 
one of the largest, giddiest celebrations up to that time, with thirty- 
five balls and twelve large parades:
Outflanking the ramparts jealously guarded by high 
society, the common people, seeking relief from 
thoughts of bombs, blitzkriegs, and blockades in 
the fantastic world of Mardi Gras, make carnival 
its greatest success in nearly a century of mad­
ness.
Only five days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, governing com­
mittees of New Orleans carnival organizations announced that "because 
it would be inconsistent with the present status of the nation," there 
would be no Mardi Gras parades or balls in 1942, thus cancelling the 
celebration for the first time since 1919. The School of Design, spon­
sor of the Rex Parade, asked its members for full 1942 dues to cover 
expenses already incurred in design and construction of 1942 floats, 
then assessed reduced "stand-by" dues for the rest of the war. The 
Harlequin Rrewe held the only ball of the 1942 season, a dance in
honor of 1,500 visiting servicemen. The theme of the ball was mili-
62tary —  The Occupation of Iceland.
Mardi Gras day, February 17, 1942, found not the usual crowds of 
revelers in the streets of New Orleans, but instead found the normal
^Ibid., February 16, 1941; Times-Picayune, February 19-26, 1941.
62States, December 12, 1941; Item, December 12, 1941; Times-Picayune, 
December 13, 28, 1941; Charles L. Dufour and Leonard V. Huber, If Ever 
I Cease To Love One Hundred Years of Rex 1872-1971 (New Orleans, The 
School of Design, 1970), pp. 191, 111. Mardi Gras celebrations had 
been cancelled twice before —  during the Civil War and during World 
War I.
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business-day crowd. New Orleanians celebrated by purchasing War Bonds 
—  between $150,000 and $200,000 on Mardi Gras day alone. New Orleans 
continued to use Mardi Gras to boost bond sales for the remainder of 
the war. The 1943 sale brought in $1,000,000 during Mardi Gras week. 
The 1945 season featured twenty costumed individuals selling bonds 
outdoors on Canal Street, and retail merchants throughout the city 
participated in the sales drive either by purchasing bonds or setting 
aside a small space in their establishments for bond sales. As the 
war ended, however, officials of the Mardi Gras krewes decided in the
latter part of August, 1945, to hold the 1946 carnival season as
i 63 usual.
Other holidays acquired a military tinge. The New Orleans St. 
Patrick’s Day parade was cancelled and replaced by church services 
and bond sales rallies. Observers commented also on the seriousness 
of April 1, 1943: ". . . perhaps [the April Fool] was too busy at his
defense job, preparing to give the world's greatest hotfoot to those 
dignitaries Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo ..." Easter, the traditional 
holiday of hope among Christians, became an even greater symbol of 
hope. The Morning Advocate commented in 1941 that Easter symbolized 
"something immortal and immutable in the soul of man that cannot be 
crushed by oppression and hatred," and noted that "This bright Easter 
is a challenge to the spirit of man . . .  to out-live and overcome 
despair. Few years have needed Easter's promise and hope more." While 
the traditional trappings of Easter disappeared (the chocolate Easter
Times-Picayune, February 18, 1942; Morning Advocate, March 14, 1943, 
August 19, 1945; States, February 13, 1945.
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bunny and candy eggs were casualties of sugar rationing, and a tempo­
rary downturn in egg production caused a shortage of eggs in 1943) 
the spirit of Easter remained strong throughout the war. The Morning 
Advocate commented on the last wartime Easter that:
Today we can give thanks not alone for the sacri­
fices of Him who died for mankind but as well for 
the sacrifices of the many thousands who have 
died that freedom and the principles of Christ 
might not be driven back into the catacombs.^
The changes in holidays, hemlines, diets, and restrictions of 
unlimited movement caused by the war proved temporary. The years of 
World War II also brought the beginning of more permanent change in 
Louisiana’s social life. These changes are most graphically illus­
trated by the experiences of two groups: blacks and women, both of
which edged closer toward equal treatment during the war.
American blacks at the beginning of World War II still experienced 
the inequality which had historically dominated race relations in the 
United States. Many students of the civil rights movement see the 
years of World War II as the turning point at which many blacks de­
cided not to accept continued unequal treatment without protest. Many 
blacks still harbored bitter memories of World War I, when they had 
followed W. E. B. DuBois' admonition to subdue racial grievances only 
to be subjected to lynchings, race riots, and continued discrimination 
during the 1920s and 1930s. "The dominant attitude during World War 
II came to be that the Negro must fight for democracy on two fronts —
64States, March 2, 16, 1942; Item, March 17, 1942; Morning Advocate, 
April 13, 1941, April 4, 7, 1943, April 1, 1945.
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at home as well as abroad."^
Black Americans had to overcome the effects of generations of un­
equal treatment in politics, education, and employment. Their secon­
dary role in American life was revealed in a study completed during 
1940. During World War II, the black population of the United States 
numbered about 12,000,000 and about 2,200,000 were between the ages of 
sixteen and twenty-four. Of these, at least 500,000 were unemployed. 
Moreover, the average black youth with a job worked forty-nine hours 
per week for $8.71, while the average white person in the same age 
group worked forty-four hours per week for $15.17. In addition, 9.5 
per cent of the black youth obtained semi-skilled jobs, compared to 
twenty per cent of white youths, and only two per cent received skilled 
jobs, compared to eight per cent of white youth. It did blacks little 
good to hope for redress from the political system, for they had vir­
tually no political voice. Ten states used poll taxes, head taxes, 
educational tests, or outright intimidation to deprive blacks of the
right to vote, while fifteen states segregated public conveyances and
66places, and eighteen states provided segregated school facilities.
World War II, however, provided a bit of hope for improvement 
among black Americans. The labor shortage, for example, provided 
opportunities for black workers to enter new fields of work and
^Richard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," 
The Journal of American History, June, 1968, pp. 90-96.
^Al-Tony Gilmore, "The Black Southerner's Response to the Southern 
System of Race Relations," in The Age of Segregation: Race Relations
in the South, 1890-1945, ed. by Robert Haus (Jackson, University Press 
of Mississippi, 1978), pp. 67-76; "Age: 19 Color: Negro Occupation:
None," Look, December 3, 1940, pp. 20-22.
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establish a recognized position before the post-war slump, which many 
economists predicted, forced workers back out of jobs. Economic 
development also set southerners on the course of acquiring more edu­
cation and increased sophistication, which helped to undermine tra­
ditional systems of race relations based on economic relationships in 
an agricultural society. The war —  "the fight for democracy" —  
provided blacks the opportunity to prick the conscience of white 
America by stressing the anomolous position created for the United 
States: fighting for liberty in foreign countries and yet maintaining
an unequal status quo at home. As one black soldier commented: "If
I’ve got to die for democracy, I might as well die for some of it right 
here and now."^
Black Americans also responded to the same stirrings of patriotism 
as did other Americans, but contributions to the war effort could also 
be used in future drives for equality. As Dr. Felton G. Clark, Negro
Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," p. 96; 
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma The Negro Problem and Modern Democ­
racy Volume I (New York, Harper and Row, reprint ed., 1962), p. 409; 
George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 716; Robert Higgs, 
"Race and Economy in the South, 1890-1950," in The Age of Segregation, 
p. 90; Byrd, "The Home Front —  World War II," p. 17. Many blacks 
found their first industrial employment in shipyards which pioneered 
their use in many occupations. They remained in a segregated society, 
however. In New Orleans, for example, the Longshoremen maintained two 
units: Local 1418 with about 700 white members and Local 1419 with
about 2,100 black members. Southern whites also noticed a decline in 
the number of available female domestic servants as black sons, hus­
bands, or brothers found steady jobs. Employment Security Review,
July, 1942, p. 10; Town Talk, August 29, 1942; Leedell Wallace Neyland, 
"The Negro in Louisiana Since 1900: An Economic and Social Study,"
(Ph. D. dissertation, New York University, 1958), p. 45; Merle Weigel 
to H. S. Weigel, July 19, 1943, Wiegel Collection.
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Coordinator of the United States Civilian Defense program in Louisiana, 
remarked:
No better argument for a better integration of 
the Negro into the opportunities of American 
life and democracy can be given than the record 
of serving his country in a crucial hour as the 
present one . . .68
Various segments of the black community made concentrated efforts
to focus attention on the war effort. The theme of the Annual Parish
Achievement Day for Rural Negro Schools in East Baton Rouge Parish in
1941 was "Home-school-community coordination for national defense.”
The Louisiana Colored Teachers’ Association conducted a drive to urge
all black schoolchildren to buy at least one Defense Stamp per week for
the duration of the war, and also urged its members to join the payroll
allotment plan for the regular purchase of War Bonds. A report in 1944
revealed that blacks in New Orleans had bought $585,000 worth of bonds
in the current bond drive, while blacks in Bogalousa had bought
$12,000, in St. John the Baptist Parish $5,000, and in Ouachita Parish
$2,500. The Baton Rouge Negro Chamber of Commerce in 1944 pledged its
69support of the Community War Chest Drive.
Black Louisianians received recognition from some sources of 
opinion within the white establishment. The Monroe News-Star, for 
example, in 1941, remarked that "It is wise and right that both in the 
military services and in defense industries, broadening opportunities
gg
Times-Picayune, December 23, 1941.
69Morning Advocate, April.2, 1941, December 5, 1942, October 13, 1944, 
June 12, 1945; Times-Picayune, March 20, 1942.
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should be opening up for Americans of colored blood.
Nevertheless, other Louisianians looked less benignly on the 
stirrings of change in the black community. The Town Talk suspected 
that "fifth columnists" were at work among the black population 
"spread[ing] . . . theories of Naziism." E. A. Stephens, in his 1942 
Senate campaign against Allen Ellender, raised the "black threat" 
issue, just as did other southern politicians engaged in a difficult 
campaign. Stephens pointed out that draft boards inducted more whites 
than blacks, thereby "depleting the white manhood in the South." The 
emerging situation, Stephens said, was intolerable: " . . .  we of the
South cannot pour out our young manhood and leave our streets and roads 
populated by negroes incited by northerners to seek social equality." 
Southern parents were willing to sacrifice their sons to protect the 
United States, he maintained, but "they must not pay for this patrio­
tism by the loss of their dignity and the social balance that we know 
to be right and just."̂ *
The specter of the "outside agitator" haunted thought about the 
problem of racial inequality during the war. Charlton H. Lyons told 
fellow members of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce that white men 
of the south should begin solving the problems associated with the 
"negro question" before outside agitators attempted to settle those 
problems without proper knowledge of the south’s social structure.
The same organization passed a resolution in April, 1943, asking
70 --------------------------------Monroe News-Star, July 7, 1941.
^ Town Talk, July 27, 1940, August 10, 1942.
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Louisiana Congressmen and state officials to stop Office of War Infor­
mation distribution of a booklet the OWX had published recounting 
("extolling” in the parlance of the Chamber) black contributions to 
the war. The Chamber held that "most of this literature is prepared 
by individuals not acquainted with the negro problem and not acquainted 
with the problems of the south, and who are imbued only with the 
theory of an impractical approach of the social worker." It further 
held that "distribution of such literature in the south tends to cre­
ate racial unrest and misgivings, promote a feeling among the negroes 
that the federal government desires social equality between the races." 
The Shreveport Times urged all Louisianians to close ranks to prevent 
racial unrest "regardless of any outside influences." In his retiring 
speech to Congress in 1944, James Domengeaux said that "[e]xcept when 
aroused by self-seeking demagogues" southern blacks "were always as­
sured of a security far surpassing in its real benevolence the bureau­
cratic schemes of modern days . . ." The culprits, he said, were
"self-seeking demagogues" who "lure [blacks] by false promises to hope
72for a status they know [they] can never attain."
The federal Fair Employment Practices Commission appeared to the 
white south to be the ultimate "outside agitator" of the race question. 
The Morning Advocate commented cattily that the FEPC sought to protect 
blacks and Mexicans, but ignored "tens of thousands of persons avail­
able for work" —  the Japanese-Americans. The Shreveport Chamber of 
Commerce maintained that FEPC actions "had created ill will between
72Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, April 8, 1943, July 8, 1943; 
Shreveport Times, June 25, 1943, April 5, 1944.
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races," and opposed any further existence for the Commission. Fifth
District Congressman Charles E. McKenzie called the FEPC a "fraud on
American constitutional rights” which had "tried to make it appear
73that the South is a hot bed of prejudice and bigotry."
The conservative reaction against the FEPC and stirrings of 
equality proved to be ineffectual attempts to turn the tide of pro­
gress. The South learned that the federal government had a new com­
mitment to equality, and that it had no hesitation to reinforce that 
commitment by granting or withholding federal funds. Shreveport, for 
example, lost $67,000 in federal funds for construction of a health 
center because the city administration refused to acquiesce to the 
requirement that twelve per cent of the unskilled workers on the job 
be black. Mayor Caldwell angrily criticized "bureaucrats in Washing­
ton" for attempting "to cram the negro down our throats." "We have 
lost the health center," Caldwell said,, "but thank God we have re­
tained our respect and white supremacy. We are not going to be bribed 
by federal funds to accept the negro as our political or social 
equal.
The tide of social and political equality, however, was too strong 
to be stemmed. Local southern officials might stymie federal action 
by refusing to accept federal money available only with the stipulation
73Morning Advocate, August 16, 1943, August 2, 1945; Shreveport Cham­
ber of Commerce Minutes, June 8, 1944. Louisianians were not alone 
in their condemnation of the FEPC. John Rankin of Mississippi, for 
example, called it "the beginning of a communistic dictatorship."
The FEPC expired in June, 1945. Tindall, The Emergence of the New 
South, p. 715.
74Morning Advocate, Septmeber 17, 1943.
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that blacks also be included in the benefits, but they found that 
United States Supreme Court writs ran throughout the South, even when 
they overturned traditional political and social practices. The 
Court, for example, ruled in the 1944 Smith v. Allwright case that 
the Texas system of all white Democratic party primaries, which ef­
fectively excluded blacks from voting, was unconstitutional. Politi­
cal leaders throughout the South were outraged, not least in Louisi­
ana. Senator John Overton pledged that "The South at all costs will 
maintain the rule of white supremacy." If white primaries were now 
ineffective, "The negro can be kept from the polls by educational 
qualification tests ..." The Shreveport Times editorialized that 
the decision bore two potential dangers: it brought the Supreme
Court into disrepute, and, more seriously, it set the stage "for new, 
unwanted, and needless conflict between the people of this nation on 
racial philosophies ..." State Senator Wellborn Jack of Caddo 
Parish introduced a new "white primary” bill in the 1944 session of 
the legislature, but the House Committee on Elections sidetracked it 
with an unfavorable report. Committee members and members of the 
Davis administration thought that present state laws were adequate to
prevent black voter registration without conflicting with the Court
-.-75ruling.
While the Court's ruling in Smith v. Allwright had the immediate 
effect of strengthening the hand of southern conservatives,^ who
^Shreveport Times, April 4-5, May 7, 17, June 7, 1944; Alpheus Thomas 
Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Burger (Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
State University Press, 1979), pp. 190-192.
^William G. Carleton, "The Southern Politician —  1900 and 1950," The 
Journal of Politics, May, 1951, p. 225; George Brown Tindall, The Dis-
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began a rear-guard struggle to preserve the virtual white monopoly of 
the ballot box, it also opened the opportunity for black voter regis­
tration. That registration proceeded slowly, however. Rapides 
Registrar of Voters P. T. Haworth reported in August, 1944, that 17 
blacks had registered to vote in the parish —  thirteen as Democrats 
and four as Republicans. Haworth remarked that no blacks had been 
registered to vote in Rapides Parish for twenty years, and that no 
one could remember a black registered as a Democrat in the parish, 
and also noted that he had disqualified about as many blacks as he 
had registered because they could not complete the voters' registration 
form "intelligently." Assistant Registrar of Voters in Tangipahoa 
Parish Merle S. Weigel reported to her soldier-husband in August,
1944, that no blacks had yet attempted to register: "Of course, we
don't intend to let any register, but don't want any trouble about it." 
The number of Louisiana blacks registered to vote rose from 886 (.1 
per cent of the total voters) in 1940, to 7,561 (one per cent of the 
total) in 1946, but it was not until October, 1964, that every parish 
in the state had some blacks registered to vote.^
World War II also witnessed the testing of other racial barriers 
in the South, especially by black soldiers used to the relatively
ruption of the Solid South (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1972), 
p. 35.
^Town Talk, August 8, 1944; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, August 11, 
1944, Weigel Collection; Riley E. Baker, "Negro Voter Registration in 
Louisiana 18769-1964," Louisiana Studies, Winter, 1965, pp. 338-339, 
345. Black determination to win the vote was revealed soon after the 
war when Edward Hall, a resident of St. John the Baptist Parish, sued 
parish registrar T. J. Nagel in November, 1945, claiming that Nagel's 
questioning of black registrants but not white registrants violated 
the 14th Amendment. States, November 24, 1945.
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freer societies of other areas of the United States.. Public transpor­
tation, especially buses, historically segregated in the South, became 
increasingly crowded as shortages of gasoline and tires for private 
automobiles caused increasing numbers of people to depend upon them 
for transportation. Whites crowded into the rear seats of many buses, 
the seats normally assigned to blacks, thus causing blacks to stand 
in the aisles, or to be left at the bus stop because the bus contained 
no more room. Nevertheless, southern society demanded maintenance of 
traditional roles. For example, two black soldiers from Camp Living­
ston attacked Alexandria bus driver L. J. Bell after he attempted to
force them to move from the "white only" section of his bus, where .
78they had found seats.
Friction between the two races occasionally erupted into violence. 
Louisiana's major racial disruption occurred during January, 1942, in 
Alexandria. The incident began on Friday, January 9, when soldiers 
crowded into the city following receipt of their paychecks. Black 
military police normally patrolled the black neighborhood centered on 
Lee Street where most black entertainment establishments were located. 
The "Lee Street Riot" began after a patrol of about sixty white mili­
tary police entered the neighborhood and arrested a black soldier be­
cause of "disorderly conduct." The ensuing free-for-all fight left 
businesses along several blocks of Lee Street with broken windows, and 
approximately twenty-eight black soldiers hurt, including three to five
ygTown Talk, November 14, 16, 1942; Tindall, Emergence of the New 
South, pp. 716-717; Merle Weigel to H. S- Weigel, March 11, 1943,
Weigel Collection.
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who were shot and seriously wounded. One eyewitness later reported
that "Bullets were whistling and bricks were flying. The Japs might
as well have been attacking as far as I was concerned. I ducked."
The official army investigation of the incident reported that a show
of force might well have been necessary following the initial arrest,
but that civilian law enforcement officials (some twenty Alexandria
police and ten state troopers), along with one of the military police-
79men, "indulged in indiscriminate and unnecessary shooting."
Other incidents between whites and blacks were less damaging than 
the Lee Street incident. A small group of black soldiers attacked 
two white military police officers and a white taxicab driver in New 
Orleans in 1942 to protest the arrest of two black soldiers for "dis­
orderly conduct.
Even though blacks enjoyed some measure of improvement in their 
social and economic condition, they remained trapped in a segregated 
society in Louisiana during the war years, just as they did in the 
rest of the south. Politically they remained virtually powerless.
The number of blacks registered to vote remained low and thus no 
Louisiana politician thought it necessary to accomodate their needs. 
Blacks entered the state's political arena only in the form of a 
threat, notably during the 1940 gubernatorial election during which 
the Longites called their opponents friends of the blacks who wanted
79Morning Advocate, January 11, 1942; Town Talk, January 12-13, 21, 24, 
1942; Myrdal, An American Dilemma Volume One, pp. 419, 421.
80Town Talk, November 17, 1942, May 3, 1943; Morning Advocate, Septem­
ber 27, 1944.
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to enable them to vote and have a voice in the governing of the state, 
and in the rumblings of dissatisfaction which emerged as the Roosevelt 
administration belatedly aligned the federal government with the as­
pirations of blacks for equal protection of the laws and equal eco­
nomic opportunity. Powerful public reaction against the threat to 
"the southern way of life" caused by this new federal determination, 
however, prevented the dissolution of the segregated society during 
the war years.
Blacks, nevertheless, had the opportunity to participate in many 
homefront activities —  entertaining soldiers, buying war bonds and 
stamps, collecting scrap, learning about civilian defense. This 
participation was carefully kept separate from white activities in the 
same vein, however, in deference to the fiction of the "separate but 
equal" society.
While blacks shared in the enhanced economic opportunity created 
by the demand for increased agricultural and industrial production 
needed to carry out American participation in the war, they did not 
break down all economic barriers which had limited their opportunities 
for economic advancement. Increased prosperity allowed many black 
tenants to become landowners, but many more were left in tenantry at 
the end of the conflict. Demand for industrial workers brought black 
agricultural workers into higher-paying factory jobs, but many re­
mained on the farms. Those blacks who obtained industrial employment 
remained workers and did not move swiftly up the employment scale.
Black education in Louisiana, one of the most visible symbols of 
the "separate but equal" society, experienced little improvement during 
the war years. The general survey of Louisiana education ordered by
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the reformers after their 1940 victory revealed the inadequacies of 
black schools, and some white public officials publicly recognized 
the state's problems with its system of black education. A shortage 
of funds and lack of widespread popular support limited the improve­
ments made in black education. The most impressive gain made by 
black educators during the war was the equalization of black and white 
teachers' salaries in Orleans parish. That limited victory still left 
sixty-three other parishes with antiquated unequal pay scales for 
black and white teachers with equal education and equal experience, 
but it provided a promise that the old days of inequality were num­
bered .
While the World War II experience did not bring an immediate 
realization of a desegregated society in Louisiana, it awakened the 
modern resurgence of the drive for black equality. The comprehensive 
achievement of that equality, however, lay well beyond the war years 
and the years of conservative reaction which followed.
Another traditionally inhibited minority group began edging closer 
to the mainstream of American life during World War II. Women, cus­
tomarily relegated to civic pursuits, housework, or "women's jobs" in 
the workplace, used the labor shortage caused by the war just as the 
blacks used it —  to stake a claim on non-traditional forms of employ­
ment. Women became stock board markers at the New Orleans office of 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Bean; they ran parking lots, drove 
taxicabs, welded and repaired aircraft, delivered newspapers, worked 
in machine shops, and managed stores, often replacing men who had gone
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to war. In addition, more than 400 Louisiana women applied to the
Women's Auxiliary Army Corps Officers School during the first week
82after the government began accepting applications in 1942.
The movement of women into non-traditional roles received a mixed 
reaction in Louisiana. The Times Picayune New Orleans States editori­
alized that:
It would be foolishly optimistic to suppose that 
we shall be able to win this war by employing 
only a part of human resources . . .  It is better 
to foresee [the] necessity for the full mobili­
zation of our energies and prepare for it, than 
to have it dawn on us a little later that we 
have neglected another opportunity to ready our­
selves .
The Town Talk added that:
Woman’s place now seems to be in the munitions 
factory . . .
By thousands and tens of thousands they pour into 
the factories and tackle war jobs formerly sacred 
to men . . . From their hands come casings for 
bombs and a thousand other things.
It looks like an industrial revolution. These 
women are not enslaved, but released. And they 
are regarded with new r e s p e c t .83
Nevertheless, women still faced traditional conservative atti­
tudes. The same Town Talk editorial cited above, for example, also
81Item, December 6, 1941, March 12, 1942; Times-Picayune, February 8, 
1942; States, March 28, July 27, 1942; Morning Advocate, February 28, 
1943; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, July 1, 1942, Weigel Collection.
82Item, May 27, June 6, 1942; Town Talk, July 23, 1942.
83Times-Picayune New Orleans States, February 22, 1942; Town Talk, 
May 25, 1942.
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commented on women's war work that "It is surprising how they take to 
it. Especially so when it is remembered how inept with machinery 
women were always supposed to be."
Legislators also objected to a bill introduced in 1942 which
would have eliminated the requirement that women had to register
separately for jury duty. The bill was designed to replenish the
supply of potential jurors, depleted by the large number of men away
at war, by automatically including women as well as men voters on
jury rolls when they registered to vote. The Louisiana Federation of
Business and Professional Women's Clubs favored'the bill, but it went
down in defeat. Many legislators obviously agreed with the anonymous
representative who maintained "we [have] already gone too far in
abandoning our southern rights," and another who maintained that women
jurors would sometimes be required to hear unsavory testimony, from
which southern womanhood had to be protected. The Morning Advocate,
however, commented on the defeat of the bill that "We'll have more of
this sadly comic business as long as the idea persists that women are,
after all, much inferior to men and don't deserve an opportunity to
84prove that the holders of these opinions are wrong."
Women entered the workplace for a variety of reasons. Michelina 
LaCerva, Rosemary Jones, and Ruth Arcenaux, the first women hired at 
the Rheems Manufacturing plant in New Orleans, said that "We hope to 
turn out our work fast, so that the ones we love can blast the Japs."
84Morning Advocate, June 26, 1941, June 14, 17, 1942. Mrs. W. D. 
Burke, Sr., and Mrs. Inez Creidman became the first women sworn in as 
prospective jurors on December 18, 1941, when they volunteered for 
jury duty. Item, December 19, 1941.
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A job, however, sometimes also in part assuaged the loneliness experi­
enced by many women when their loved one left for war. Merle Weigel 
wrote to her husband that "I’ve been working extra hard lately. I’m
so glad I have a job for it keeps me busy all day and when I get home
85at night I'm tired and can sleep."
Loneliness became a daily companion for many Louisiana women, just
as it did for Mrs. Ttfeigel, but her feelings can be chronicled in the
collection of letters she wrote to her husband and which are now
available at the Louisiana State University Archives. Mrs. Weigel
involved herself in numerous war-related activities which replaced her
usual activities. She resigned from her bridge club, she ’wrote her
husband, because "my heart is not in a bridge game when there are so
many more useful things I can be doing." She volunteered for Red
Cross bandage-making and knitting, worked at the Ration Board office,
as well as working first in an Amite drug store and then as Assistant
Registrar of Voters in Tangipahoa Parish and being a single parent to
86two early adolescent boys.
Her numerous activities, however, did not completely fill her 
days: "When I go to the Post Office in the morning and don't get a
OC
States, March 28, 1942; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, July 10, 1942, 
Weigel Collection.
86Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, October 19, 27, November 30, 1942;
Amite Progress, February 11, 1943, clipping, Weigel Collection. Other 
organizations throughout Louisiana went the way of the Amite bridge 
club, usually for the same reason. Louis Panzeri and Carole Lawrence, 
for example, found that the New Orleans Music Teachers' Association 
in 1943 decided to hold only one meeting per year for the duration of 
the war because members were too busy with other activities to attend 
regularly. Louis Panzeri and Carole Lawrence, New Orleans Music 
Teachers' Association 1905-1980 (New Orleans, New Orleans Music Tea­
chers' Association, 1981), p. 9.
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letter from you I'm blue all day — and when I get one I'm 'pepped Up'
all the rest of the day," she wrote in June, 1942. "Nothing seems
right in any way since you are gone. I get so terribly lonesome for
you —  even when everyone is swell to me" she wrote in September.
Holidays she found even more lonely: "I'd give so much to know where
you are today and what you are doing;" "I dread [Christmas] without
you with us;" "It just seems like everything I go to do brings back
memories of the many good times we've had together;" "You've been in
my mind continually;" "I've been praying for you all day to-day darling
87and wondering just where you are today ..." Despite her worry,
Mrs. Weigel was fortunate because her husband returned at the end of 
the war. For many women, the loneliness, the uncertainty, the adjust­
ments caused by the war were only the beginning of even more adjust­
ments necessary because their loved one did not return alive from the 
war.
Women retreated somewhat from their wartime gains during the late 
1940s and 1950s just as did the blacks. These two groups, however, did 
not forget their wartime foray into prosperity and equality. Their 
permanent acceptance into fulltime participation in the American cul­
ture and economy, however, occurred some twenty years after the con­
clusion of the war, and is therefore beyond the scope of this study.
87Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, June 28, July 2, 4, August 6, Septem­
ber 9, 15, December 15, 21, 24, 25, 1942, June 6, 1944.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER XII 
LOUISIANA AT WAR'S END
Shortly after the United States became involved in World War II, 
its leaders began to consider the economic and social readjustments 
that would be necessary to reconvert the country from a military power 
to a peacetime society once the conflict had ended. Many feared that 
another economic depression with high unemployment and low industrial 
production would occur when the need for war materials ceased. New 
Deal experience with large-scale planning programs to meet social and 
economic emergencies, however, provided hope that with careful prep­
arations, the country could escape such major social and economic dis­
location. *
In Louisiana, concern for the economic dislocations expected at 
the end of the war surfaced as early as 1941, and reflected a basic 
division among the state's interest groups into those who favored 
continued federal spending on peace-time programs to soften the impact 
of unemployment with public improvement programs similar to those of 
the New Deal, and those who feared that a continuation of federal 
spending to support the economy during the reconversion period would 
result in severe repercussions later. Governor Sam Jones, for example, 
announced his concern about post-war developments on June 10, 1941, 
when he warned Louisianians that even though many of them had found
Ĵack Stokes Ballard, The Shock, of Peace Military and Economic De­
mobilization After World War II (Washington, D.C., University Press 
of America, 1983), pp. 15-59; Joseph C. Goulden, The Best Years 1945- 
1950 (New York, Antheneum, 1976), p. 9.
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jobs in the new defense industries and thus enjoyed a sudden rush of 
prosperity after the lean years of the depression, the industrial 
production would, at best, be reduced after the war, and that indus­
trial workers should prepare themselves for the possibility of post­
war unemployment. Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell, meanwhile, announced 
in December of that year that he expected heavy federal spending in
2post-war programs to absorb many of the unemployed when the war ended.
Many Louisianians, however, remained unconvinced that continued 
federal spending- would be a proper way to soften the impact of even­
tual reconversion, thus sharing the view of the Truman administration’s 
senior reconversion planner, John W. Snyder, who thought that the end 
of the war would cause "an immediate and large dislocation of our 
economy," but that "we will not manufacture a single shell, nor a 
single piece of equipment above absolute minimum military needs, for 
the purpose of reducing the shock of terminating war work." The 
Shreveport Chamber of Commerce exemplified the conservative reaction 
against massive federal spending programs in January, 1942, when it 
warned against "an orgy of spending" by the federal government after 
the war and decided to analyze the local economic situation in order 
to formulate a plan of reconversion. The subsequent Post War Readjust­
ment Council Report maintained that "... the most basic of all [re­
conversion] efforts must be directed toward the developing of a better 
national understanding of the influences of government and their 
ultimate effect, unless property directed, upon the existence of
— 2
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, June 11, 1941; Shreveport Times, Decem­
ber 5, 1941.
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communities and upon the lives of individuals." The report, there­
fore, called upon the United States Chamber of Commerce to initiate 
a nationwide program to "maintain capitalism or American free enter­
prise," while local chapters stood watch over the inevitable spending 
of federal money, and proposed that any federal project should benefit 
the local area economically —  expediting traffic and commerce, for 
example. The Shreveport Chamber's post-war department conducted a 
post-war industrial survey, promoted industrial development, and main­
tained a file of names of servicemen available for work in the post-war 
period.^
The Louisiana Bankers’ Association also formulated post-war plans. 
The bankers sought to ease the return of veterans to the community 
(and increase bank profits) by establishing a Committee on G. I. Ser­
vices which kept abreast of all benefit program developments provided 
by. the G. I. Bill and other benefit programs available to veterans, 
including, of course, those programs which featured government-
guaranteed loans, and held a series of "G. I. Meetings" explaining
4these benefits to returning veterans.
In the public sector, the Louisiana Department of Public Works 
urged parish police juries to establish a planning board, make an
3Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, January 8, 1942, January 13, 
1944, no date (1942?), microfilm copy, Department of Microforms, Troy
H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge; Goulden, 
The Best Years, p. 92.
4Morning Advocate, June 13, 1945; Golden Jubilee A Publication Com­
memorating the Louisiana Bankers' Association Golden Anniversary, 
1900-1950 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana Bankers' Association, 1950), p. 72.
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inventory of parish resources and facilities, and develop a three­
pronged plan for efficient use of those resources and facilities in 
the post-war world. The plan was to include projects to be completed 
by the parish, including improvement of roads, bridges, and drainage 
systems; projects carried out by private corporations; and improvement 
projects for individual landowners:. East Baton Rouge Parish called 
upon its citizens to suggest post-war projects. The restrictions on 
the suggestions, however, were that the project had to facilitate the 
return of veterans to civilian life, create wealth-producing jobs 
which would increase the income of the community, and create cultural 
projects necessary to the growth of the community.̂
Governor Jones announced his plan for the post-war South in 
August, 1943. The Governor’s plan called for diversification of agri­
culture, utilization of natural resources and raw materials in devel­
oping an industrial South, development of commerce by improvement of 
waterways, highways, railroads, and air transport facilities, and 
abandonment of traditional one-party Democratic political allegiance 
which, he thought, had "done nothing but maneuver us into a corner 
and further impoverish our people."^
Louisiana’s master plan for post-war development, announced by 
Department of Public Works Director DeWitt L. Pyburn in September, 
1944, included many of Jones’ ideas, even though by then he had re­
linquished the governor's office to Jimmie Davis. The Louisiana plan,
M̂orning Advocate, July 12, 1944; Gertrude Bouque. "Planning and the 
Postwar World," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1944, p. 16.
M̂orning Advocate, August 20, 1943.
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clearly a product of officials who had accepted the importance of 
government spending during the economic reconversion period, provided 
for expenditure of approximately $500,000,000 on a vast construction 
program including armories, health centers and laboratories, hospitals, 
college buildings, farmers’ markets, airports, and wharf and dock 
facilities at the New Orleans port, in addition to improvement of 
state parks and the state's drainage system.̂
While some Louisianians formulated plans to prepare the state's 
economy for the cessation of hostilities and the expected downturn, 
other Louisianians turned their attention to the diplomatic necessi­
ties of the post-war world. The war years witnessed a continued ac­
ceptance of a major role in international relations for the United 
States which editorial writers for the state's major newspapers had 
developed between the beginning of war in September, 1939, and the 
Pearl Harbor attack in December, 1941.
The immediate international consideration, of course, was a 
victorious conclusion of the war. As the Alexandria Daily Town Talk 
remarked, "Winning comes first." Or as the Shreveport Times observed: 
"What we must do now is put our shoulder to the wheel of war and try 
to grind out victory so that we may have a chance to do something when
g
the time for peace comes."
The golden days of peace, however, could only be preserved by 
United States participation in a post-war international organization.
^Ibid., September 17, 1944.
gAlexandria Daily Town Talk, March 6, 1942 (hereinafter cited as 
Town Talk); Shreveport Times, July 23, 1942.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
527
The lesson of United States failure to undergird the League of Nations 
during the 1920s and 1930s haunted discussion of the post-World War II 
world. The Monroe Morning World editorialized in late December, 1941, 
that
Surely it would seem apparent to anyone today 
that there must be established a League of 
Nations which will be capable of enforcing 
world peace and of compelling international 
justice.
In 1919 after the first World War, our senate 
refused to let us join a League of Nations to 
preserve world peace.
Now we are compelled to join with other nations 
and help fight and finance another world war 
in order to save ourselves
World War II, while terribly expensive in money and lives, pro­
vided new hope among editorial writers for continued international 
cooperation in the post-war world. The Morning Advocate observed in 
January, 1942, that
. . . the allegiance which contributes so momen­
tarily to the effective waging of war may well 
point the way to alliance in the world in peace 
when the war is over.
... it took a war to bring [this alliance] 
into being. Let us safeguard its spirit of 
unity and determination, in the hope that some 
of its high courage and fine spirit may be 
salvaged to guide us in making peace.10
9Monroe Morning World, December 26, 1941. 
^Morning Advocate, January 11, 1942.
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The Town Talk in February, 1942, speculated on the future of the 
"United Nations" (then only the name for the powers allied against the 
Axis): "Ties can be strengthened as we fight together for our ideals
... close association in a big and righteous war should be in it­
self a power to hold the partners together on broad lines of common 
interest [in the post-war world].
As the war drew to a close and representatives of the Allied 
Powers met in San Francisco, California, to plan a permanent inter­
national peacekeeping organization for the post-war world, the 
Morning Advocate warned that
If the men at San Francisco fail, if the rest of 
us fail, then another Hitler certainly will rise, 
perhaps in a comparatively short time. And when 
the last explosion of that war dies down, it may 
easily be that over the entire world there will 
descend the silence of death that has descended 
over Berlin, while savage and degenerate sur­
vivors pitch their tents in the ruins of civili­
zation. 12
While the United States could plan for a peaceful post-war world, 
it first had to complete the massive war in which it was engaged. 
Louisiana, along with the rest of the country, recognized a major 
turning point in the conflict as Allied armies gathered in England 
for the cross-channel invasion of Europe during the early summer of 
1944. Several Louisiana mayors issued proclamations as early as the 
first week of May designating "D Day," whenever it came, as a day of
**Town Talk, February 16, 1942.
12Morning Advocate, May 4, 1945.
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devotion and called upon churches to remain open and citizens to 
attend prayer services. Jimmie Davis' first gubernatorial proclamation 
called upon Louisianians for prayer and for "spiritual protection,
safety, and success" of American fighting forces on the day of the_ . . 1 3European xnvasxon.
News of the Allied invasion of Europe reached Louisiana on radio 
news bulletins broadcast at 2:32 A.M. on June 6, 1944. It was a day 
of mixed emotions —  joy that the invasion at last had begun; concern 
for family members or friends who might be involved. J. E. McLaughlin, 
assistant pastor of St- Rita’s Catholic Church in New Orleans began 
a forty-hour prayer vigil at 4:00 that morning upon hearing the news. 
Navy cadets at Tulane heard the news at the regular 6:45 reveille and 
broke into cheers. Archbishop Joseph Francis Rummel, awakened early 
and told the news, issued a statement ("I have absolute faith in the 
bravery of our armed forces, and feel that they are determined to 
pursue their effort to a victorious conclusion, thus bringing the 
prospect of peace nearer"), then paced in his garden. Mayor Robert 
Maestri called upon "all citizens to interrupt the daily routine of 
their lives to join in universal prayers for God's blessing upon our 
armed forces." Many Alexandria residents stopped by open churches on 
their way to work for a few moments of prayer, and others continued to 
file in throughout the day. Governor Davis called a special joint 
session of the legislature for 12:00 noon. Legislators and guests 
jammed the House chamber as Davis and Chaplain Edwin Olsen of Harding 
Field delivered prayers for the success of the invasion and the 
_ _  .
Town Talk, May 4, 1945; New Orleans Item, May 15, 1944.
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protection of Louisiana citizens involved.^
The Normandy beaches bought with such terrible cost on June 6, 
1944, established a foothold from which Allied soldiers pressed on to 
liberate Nazi-dominated Europe. By the spring of 1945, many observers 
realized that Germany could riot sustain the war effort much longer 
and looked forward hopefully to a quick end to the war. The nation, 
however, had to pass through one more trial before it could savor a 
victory over the Nazis: President Franklin Roosevelt died at his
Warm Springs, Georgia, retreat . on April 12. While some Louisianians 
had opposed Roosevelt during his third and fourth campaigns, the 
president had nevertheless remained popular in the state. Lieutenant 
Governor J. Emile Verret articulated the feelings of many Louisianians 
in his remarks at a memorial service for Roosevelt held in New Iberia: 
"I personally had never seen or known the President, yet I personally 
feel that I have lost a friend. Well, I have other friends, nearer to 
me perhaps, but still I regret the loss of this particular one. From 
him, I have drawn strength." One unidentified New Orleans woman was in 
her yard on the afternoon of April 12 when her neighbor called to her 
to turn on her radio. The woman reported that she started toward her 
house to do so when she overheard a report that Roosevelt had died:
"I couldn't get up the steps. It was like a member of my family [had 
died]."15
14Item, June 6, 1944; New Orleans States, June 6, 1944; Town Talk,
June 6, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 7, 1944.
15J. Emile Verret, "Eulogy," April 14, 1945, J. Emile Verret Papers, 
Dupre Library, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette; Item 
April 13, 1945.
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New Orleans stores remained open as usual that night, but clerks 
reported that the crowds were lighter than normal and bought very 
little. People gathered around radios in department stores and hotel 
lobbies listening for details of the events in Warm Springs and the 
transfer of power in Washington. The Roosevelt Hotel closed both its 
lounge and restaurant for lack of business. A security guard at Pat 
O’Brien's club reported that the crowd was "quiet and gloomy." The 
city's Catholic churches tolled their bells for five minutes beginning 
at 8:00 P.M. Mayor Maestri ordered all flags on city buildings lowered 
to half-staff. Officials closed parish and parochial schools and all 
colleges and universities in the city. In Baton Rouge, Governor Davis 
ordered flags on state buildings lowered, and declared April 15 an 
official day of mourning for Roosevelt in Louisiana. All state of­
fices closed on that day, as did many stores, the Stock Exchange, the 
Cotton Exchange, and the Board of Trade in New Orleans- Many people 
throughout the state attended memorial services.^
Even while it mourned its fallen leader, Louisiana also welcomed 
the new president. The Morning Advocate reminded its readers that
The place of Franklin D. Roosevelt as the great 
humanitarian, the great liberator, the foremost 
citizen of our time, will be unique in history.
But there is always a place in the sun for 
others. The truly great are always needed and 
there is always a place for them.
^Item, April 13-15, 1945; Times-Picayune, April 14-16, 1945;
Morning Advocate, April 13, 1945; Shreveport Times, April 13, 1945.
^ Morning Advocate, April 15, 1945.
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As Allied armies pushed close to Berlin in the spring of 1945, 
rumors of peace swept Louisiana, along with the rest of the United 
States, beginning in March. The desperate longing to finish the war 
was revealed in the eagerness to confirm any hint of peace. Callers 
jammed the telephone switchboard of the Shreveport Times in late 
March, asking whether peace had finally come. The calls stemmed from 
an incident at a local radio station which had "plugged" its news de­
partment by announcing that its listeners should stay tuned for later
18newscasts and "the big news stories of the day." Peace rumors 
again swept through Louisiana in late April. Bars closed in Shreve­
port in accordance with agreements between owners and police attemp­
ting to curb excessive celebrating. Church bells pealed in Baton
Rouge announcing the victory, but official denials of a peace settle-
19metn quickly scotched the celebrations.
Ironically, Louisiana remained calm during the days preceding the 
actual German surrender. Peace rumors of May 5, 1945, brought no new 
round of celebrations because skeptics now demanded proof before be­
lieving the end of the European war had come. They had not long to 
wait, however. Germany surrendered at 2:41 A.M., Monday, May 7, 1945 
(7:41 P.M. Central War Time, May 6, in Louisiana). Louisiana began 
its celebration of "Victory in Europe Day" even before President Tru­
man officially announced the peace settlement at 8:00 A.M. (local 
time), May 8. Churches throughout the state again opened for prayer
T O Item, March 17, 1945; Shreveport Times, March 28, 1945.
19Morning Advocate, April 29, 1945; Shreveport Times, April 29, 1945.
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and meditation, businesses closed, shopkeepers nailed boards across 
vulnerable plate glass show windows, workers in the Whitney Bank • 
Building and the American Bank Building in New Orleans sent showers 
of torn newspaper, telephone books, and other paper items fluttering 
down as impromptu confetti. Old-timers, however, remembered the Armi­
stice Day rallies in the city following World War I as rowdier. The 
major reasons for the relatively sober celebration was that only one
phase of the war had ended. As one New Orleans policeman commented,
20"bullets are still flying in the Pacific."
During the months between the surrender of Germany and the sur­
render of Japan, Americans increasingly turned their thoughts to the 
consumer goods which would become available at the end of the war.
An informal survey conducted in New Orleans during August, 1945, asked 
what an individual would purchase for dinner in a grocery store fully 
stocked with pre-war supplies. Eight people replied "steak"; two re­
plied "meat of any type"; and one each replied "vegetables" and 
"chicken." A Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce survey of 2,585 persons 
asked, "What will be your first purchase after the war when there are 
plentry of things to buy?" The replies reveal the pent-up demand for 
consumer goods: the most popular reply was electric washing machine,
followed by automobile, hand electric iron, kitchen stove, electric 
refrigerator, radio, furniture, furnace, electric mixer, and electric 
food freezer.2^
20States, May 7-8, 1945; Morning Advocate, May 9-10, 1945; Town Talk, 
May 8, 1945.
21Item, August 1, 8, 1945; Goulden, The Best Years, pp. 93-94.
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Rumors of a peace settlement with Japan swept through Louisiana 
as early as August 10, but official confirmation that the Japanese 
had indeed surrendered reached the state minutes after it was an­
nounced at 6:00 P.M., August 15, 1945. The state erupted in a spon­
taneous victory celebration. New Orleans witnessed the largest cele­
bration since the 1941 Carnival. Confetti piled six inches deep on 
some downtown streets; stores and offices closed; church bells rang; 
boats in the harbor sounded their whistles; and shopkeepers again 
boarded up vulnerable windows. (New Orleans police made only 107 
arrests, however.) Crowds jammed Third Street in downtown Baton Rouge 
within fifteen minutes of the announcement, and filled the air with 
confetti and the noise of whistles, sirens, and bells. Governor Davis 
proclaimed a two-day state holiday. Shreveport celebrated with closed 
stores and offices, joyous celebration, and much noise. The Alexandria 
business district filled minutes after the announcement. The Town 
Talk reported comments randomly heard on the streets: "Thank God,
it’s done"; "How soon do you suppose my husband will come home"; "Oh,
Gee"; "I'm going to cry"; "Praise the Lord that it's over"; and most
22poignantly, "I wish my son could have lived to see this day."
The federal government announced the end of gasoline rationing 
only a few hours after the Japanese surrender and thus initiated 
another round of celebration on August 16. Many motorists shared the 
pleasure of one Baton Rougean who reported that "I immediately drove 
my car to a gas station and said 'fill it up,' something I haven't
22 :Item, August 10, 15, 1945; Morning Advocate, August 14-16, 1945;
Town Talk, August 14, 1945; Shreveport Times, August 15, 1945.
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been able to do for a long time. I hope I never need those gas
coupons again." One Baton Rouge gasoline station which had normally
sold 1,000 gallons of fuel per day during rationing, sold 6,000
gallons the day rationing ended. New Orleans motorists rushed to
filling stations, causing the president of the New Orleans Service
Station Association to comment that "Everybody said ’fill ’er [sic]
23up' just for the pleasure of saying it."
Even as the state celebrated the end of the war, however, many 
Louisianians were concerned about the new weapon which had precipitated 
the unconventional conclusion of World War II. The consequences of 
possible misuse of atomic technology concerned editorial writers 
throughout the state. The Town Talk commented on August 7, that
The responsibility of the possession of knowledge 
is a serious matter. Lest it become the monster 
by which man with his own hands and mind destroys 
himself, it behooves us to examine.carefully, 
even prayerfully, the uses to which this Franken­
stein is put, and the hands in which its secrets 
lie . . M
The next day, the Shreveport Times noted that the further mankind pro­
gressed, the more it acquired the ability to destroy "vast chunks of 
the world." On the same day, the Item reported that "one common re­
action to [the atomic bomb] seems to be that it is very unfortunate 
for humanity that so terrible a weapon had to be invented. For at 
least a dozen of our acquaintances have expressed in varying terms the
23Morning Advocate, August 15-16, 1945; Item, August 16, 1945;
Goulden, The Best Years, p. 91.
24Town Talk, August 7, 1945.
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feelings that atom-cracking will destroy us all, if not the world 
25along with us." The States speculated on the possibility of out­
lawing the new weapon as "the answer to fears that another war will 
end civilization": "It seems to us that attempts to outlaw the
atomic bomb are doomed to failure unless they can be approached 
through strong international controls of the very process involved in 
the manufacture of atomic power," while the Morning Advocate asked:
"how can any logical person argue that any effort, no matter how
26great, on behalf of lasting peace, is not entirely justified?"
The threat of nuclear proliferation appeared to some observers 
even in the virtual afterglow of the wartime detonations. This 
danger, some thought, might even enhance the possibility of construc­
ting a lasting peace. The Morning Advocate commented that
Against the atomic bomb, there is no defense. From 
it, there is no hiding. By this frightful inven­
tion, the strongest fortifications known to man can 
be crumpled like tinfoil, the deepest shelters can 
be blown open, and the very mountains toppled.
We are now trying to establish machinery to keep a 
lasting peace. We had better make it work. This 
may be our last chance to avoid the pocalyptic [sic] 
destruction with which the science of war so long 
has threatened us.
Peace will come. Will it come now, or after the 
final holocaust when atomic power has split the 
world asunder? Will it be the peace of a brave 
new world —  or the peace of the grave? Atomic 
power offers mankind the choice. Mankind must
choose.27
25Shreveport Times, August 8, 1945; Item, August 8, 1945.
26States. October 29, 1945; Morning Advocate, November 29, 1945.
27Morning Advocate, August 8, 1945.
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The end of the war, even though it brought unimagined fears and 
the brooding threat of atomic warfare, also brought the beginning of 
American reconversion to a peace-time society- Many Louisianians 
celebrated Labor Day, 1945, the first peace-time holiday since Thanks­
giving, 1941, with short automobile trips fueled by unrationed gasoline. 
The telephone company assured Baton Rougeans that new telephones were 
on the way to fill the backlog of 33,186 orders for residential or 
business telephones- Scarce china, silver, and crystal appeared on 
store shelves and met a brisk demand. One New Orleans jeweler re­
marked that "Victory Brides" created much new demand, but that "many 
of our old customers are replenishing their stocks or changing their 
china and silver patterns. They’ve' had to do without fine things for 
so long." Ex-servicemen crowded into the state’s colleges. Long- 
awaited floor samples of new Frigidaire electric refrigerators ap­
peared on October 31. Customers could only place an order, but stores 
promised "Deliveries As Soon As Frigidaires Are Available." Applica­
tions for new trucks numbered 400 for every vehicle brought into the 
state. The Baton Rouge USO held its closing ceremonies in January,
1946.28
The Louisiana economy entered the post-war reconversion when the 
war industries announced cancellation of war contracts soon after the 
Japanese surrender. Higgins Industries lost all its war contracts by 
August 16. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft announced that it would com­
plete the airplanes actually on the assembly line, but would begin no
28
Morning Advocate, September 2, 19, 27, 1945, January 10, 28, 1946; 
States, October 29, 31, 1945; Item, November 15, 1945.
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new construction. Rheem Manufacturing lost, two of its three war
contracts by August 16. The last ship left the Delta Shipbuilding
ways on October 11, thus bringing to a close the World War II era of
29shipbuilding in New Orleans.
The Item regretted the resulting loss of employment, but edi­
torialized that "efforts to prolong production at public expense, 
without need" would have proven even more costly: "Sudden increase
in employment at unprecedented wages was an abnormal condition 
brought on deliberately to meet the abnormal demands of an abnormal 
situation. Now it is time to return to normal living." Senator Allen 
J. Ellender called on workers to "forget this holiday spree" of high 
wartimes wages so that United States production costs could be lowered 
sufficiently to allow American products to compete in the international
i * 30market.
Many workers realized that the future might not be as exciting
(or as profitable) as the past. An Item survey of workers at the
Consolidated Vultee plant elicited the following comments: "Before
the war, I was a seamstress, but I'll never go back to it. I’d rather
starve"; "My husband's in the Pacific and I hope he'll be back soon.
So, I'll keep house for him. However, I'll sure miss those rivets.
Housekeeping will seem mighty dull now"; "I guess I’ll go back to
[accounting]. I know it won't pay as well, but I figured on that and 
31will be satisfied."
29Item, August 16, 1945; States, October 11, 1945.
30Item, August 20, 1945; Morning Advocate, August 30, 1945.
31Item, August 17, 1945.
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Louisiana in 1945 was not the same state it had been in 1939 when 
the war began. While precise measures of change are impossible to 
determine for 1945, the entire decade of the 1940s brought continued 
population growth to the state. Louisiana's population in 1950 
numbered 2,683,516, an increase of 319,636 (13.5 per cent) over the 
1940 total. Urban growth, moreover, outstripped rural growth. Total 
urban population increased by 383,350 (39.1 per cent) during the 
decade, while rural population lost 63,714 (-4.6 per cent) from the 
1940 total. Moreover, the 1950 Census found that Louisiana contained 
more population in urban areas (50.8 per cent) than in rural areas 
(49.2 per cent). Urban growth, however, left a recognizable state.
No new urban area emerged to displace New Orleans as the state's most 
populous city. Urban areas in 1940 continued to be urban areas in 
1950, but they had grown rapidly. The state's urban growth had been 
uneven. New Orleans grew more slowly than any other urban area (15.3 
per cent), while Shreveport increased by 19.6 per cent; Alexandria by 
29 per cent; Monroe by 36-3 per cent; Lafayette by 74.6 per cent; Lake
Charles by 94.6 per cent; and Baton Rouge by a staggering 261.8 per
32cent. The most impressive growth in Louisiana's urban areas during 
the 1940s were the gains made by Baton Rouge, which by 1950 threatened 
to displace Shreveport as the state’s "second city."
Louisiana, however, ranked fifth in the South in population 
growth during the decade. Florida, Virginia, Texas, and North Carolina
32A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the United States 
Census of Population: 1950 Volume I Number of Inhabitants (Washington,
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 18-5.
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grew more rapidly, while Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
33Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi grew more slowly.
Louisianians in 1950 were also relatively better educated than 
they had been ten years before. In 1940, the median grade completed 
for white residents was 8.2. By 1950, that number had increased 
slightly to 8.8. Blacks had reported 3.9 as the median grade com-
<3 /
pleted in 1940. By 1950, that number had increased to 4.6. The in­
crease for both races however, was slight.
The Census of Manufacturers, completed in 1947, illustrates the 
economic shift toward industrialization in the Louisiana economy.
The 1939 Census had found 1,779 manufacturing establishments in the 
state employing 70,453 workers and paying wages.of $55,083,540. The
1947 survey found 2,389 manufacturing establishments, employing
35132,464 workers at total wages of $309,871,000.
In summary, then, Louisiana had experienced much change since 
1939. Events of the six-year period which began in that year affected 
state and national political considerations, the economy, and virtually 
every aspect of life on the Louisiana homefront.
State politics had been affected most, however, not by America's 
involvement in the war, but by the venality of Longite politicians 
who in 1939 incurred the wrath of the voters by their greedy excesses.
33Ibid., p. 18-7.
3^Ibid., p. viii.
35A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the United States 
Census of Population: 1950 Volume II Characteristics of the Popula­
tion Part 18 Louisiana (Washington, D.C., United States Government 
Printing Office, 1952), pp. 18-32.
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Prom Huey Long’s death in 1935 until the exposure of the Louisiana 
Scandals in 1939, top officials in the Longite organization lived os­
tentatiously expensive lives largely financed by fraudulent or improper 
use of state resources. Their ambition to continue enjoying the "good 
life" ran into the political ambition of former Longite James A. Noe, 
who alerted federal officials to the misuse of state money.
The result of the federal investigation was that the Longite 
machine, exposed as greedy and unworthy, was banished temporarily from 
control of the executive branch of the state government which it had 
controlled since Huey Long’s election as governor in 1928. Their 
banishment left open the way for the anti-Long faction of the Demo­
cratic party to prove its ability to govern Louisiana honestly and 
effectively.
Anti-Long forces had been out of power for eleven years, however, 
and thus did not have recent experience in governing the kind of state 
that Long and his associates had created. The anti-Longs’ "last 
hurrah" before the Louisiana Scandals had been their impeachment of 
Long in 1929, which he thwarted. For eleven years, Long and his allies 
had constructed by parliamentary maneuver, legislative act, and execu­
tive fiat, a powerful organization capable of keeping virtually all 
its opponents out of office.
When that domination of the executive branch ended in 1939, the 
reformers who swept into office on the tide of voter disgust had to 
learn how to govern and not merely criticize the government in office. 
In addition, voter revulsion at the excess of the scandals did not 
sweep all Longites out of positions of influence. Therefore, when
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reform Governor Sam Jones sought to dismantle the highly-centralized 
state administration Huey Long and his associates had created, he 
found a strong Longite faction in the legislature which sought to 
derail his reforms at every turn. The 1940 legislature granted Jones 
many of his reforms because the memory of the scandals was too recent 
to ignore. During the 1942 session, however, Longites in the legis­
lature had regrouped and virtually brought the governor’s efforts to 
a standstill until he outmaneuvered them by withholding funds from the 
New Orleans Charity Hospital. The Longites subsequently agreed to 
certain key measures in a special legislative session.
Moreover, Longites mustered a series of "taxpayer suits" against 
Jones’ reform laws which nullified many of his reforms as the courts 
examined them closely. Jones, then, proved that Louisiana could be 
governed honestly, but the effectiveness of his reform administration 
was blunted by the powerful Longite bloc in the legislature and the 
unfavorable judicial decisions.
Jones' successor, James H. Davis, continued the reform thrust in 
Louisiana state politics, but his soothing personality, and his fre­
quent absences from the state took some of the edge off the factional 
strife during the last two years of the war.
Even the relative success of the anti-Long administrations, how­
ever, proved that both Long and anti-Long candidates stood a serious 
chance at election. The result was a system of effective bifactional 
politics within the Democratic party, which gave Louisiana a political 
system resembling somewhat the national two-party system with the 
relatively conservative reforms (a rather anomalous concept in itself)
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resembling the Republicans and the more liberal Longites resembling 
the Democrats.
This system of effective bifactionalism which began in 1939 
lasted until 1960, when the race issue began sweeping aside the old 
politics based on economic issues. While it lasted, however, it gave 
Louisiana three reform governors —  Jones, Davis, and Robert Kennon —  
and the same Longite governor three times —  Earl Long, who carried on 
many of his older brother's social welfare programs without the atten­
dant concentration of political power that Huey had achieved.
During the war years, Louisiana experienced development on two 
levels of national politics: the congressional level and the presi­
dential level. National politics on the congressional level often re­
flected the state's bifactional division with candidates seeking the 
endorsement of the Longite organization or the reform administration. 
Even though Longite congressmen in the 1940 election suffered along 
with their allies at the state level from the exposure of the Louisiana 
Scandals, they were not completely eliminated from office. Six of them 
were defeated, but Longites always retained two seats throughout the 
war —  Overton Brooks' Fourth District and A. Leonard Allen's Eighth 
District. Moreover, Louisiana's two Longite United States Senators, 
Allen J. Ellender and John Overton, successfully defeated reform chal­
lengers .
Congressional races in Louisiana during the war years generally 
turned on two issues: the corruption of the Longite organization (and
thus reflected the bifactional system), or the United States war ef­
fort. Reformers often concentrated on the former issue, while Longites
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often concentrated on the latter in an attempt to downplay the aura 
of fiscal malfeasance which clung to Longite politicians. Concentra­
tion on these two major issues varied from campaign to campaign and 
from district to district, depending on the success of the war effort 
or the personalities of the candidates involved. Even in campaigns 
which concentrated on the war issue, however, the corruption issue 
always loomed as a ready weapon with which a reformer could attack 
his Longite opponent.
Franklin Roosevelt overrode all other concerns in presidential 
politics throughout the United States during the war years, and the 
force of his personality displaced bifactionalism in Louisiana during 
presidential campaigns. No matter how far apart reformers and Long­
ites stood on various other issues, they found common ground in their 
general support of Roosevelt's presidential candidacies.
Nevertheless, Louisiana shared with the rest of the South some 
rumblings of discontent with the continued urban, liberal, and black 
drift of Roosevelt's Democratic party. The stirrings of racial 
equality which were a feature of the war years, and which Roosevelt's 
brand of New Deal democracy fostered, brought the first stirrings of 
unhappiness among many southern white Democrats. The war emergency 
helped to contain the Southern revolt against the party, even when 
Roosevelt chose the eccentric Henry A. Wallace as his running mate in 
1940, but by the first peace-time presidential election in 1948, Presi­
dent Harry Truman could no longer retain the unquestioning loyalty of 
the South, and Louisiana, along with three other southern states, 
bolted to Strom Thurmond and the States' Rights Democrats. Once it
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had broken with the Democrats, Louisiana found it easier to do so 
again when other parties offered presidential candidates closer to its 
conservative ideology in national affairs —  Republicans Dwight Eisen­
hower in 1956, Barry Goldwater in 1964, Richard Nixon in 1972, Ronald 
Reagan in 1980, and American Independent George Wallace in 1968.
Not only in politics, but almost all aspects of life in wartime 
Louisiana experienced change. Sentiments of non-involvement with the 
rest of the world gave way in the months between September, 1939, and 
December, 1941, to a realization that the necessity of the United 
States assuming a major role in defeating the Axis required a repudi­
ation of earlier non-intervention. Major sources of public opinion in 
the state, furthermore, adopted the concept that the United States re­
pudiation of its international role in the League of Nations during 
the 1920s and 1930s had helped lead the world into the explosive situ­
ation which burst into World War II. Therefore, many Louisianians 
repudiated any idea of another post-war retreat into non-interven­
tion and embraced the new international organization designed to keep 
the peace in the post-World War II international situation.
Louisiana’s educational system met the challenge of World War II 
on two levels, one practical the other idealistic. On the practical 
level, Louisiana educators sought to provide technical training re­
quired by new workers in both industrial and agricultural pursuits 
made necessary by the war effort. Schools also became major compon­
ents of wartime scrap collection and war stamp sales drives, as well 
as registration and distribution centers for the federal government’s 
rationing program.
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On the idealistic level, Louisiana education re-dedicated itself 
to the traditional role of inculcating a healthy patriotism in its 
students. Patriotic themes dominated consideration of history and 
civics courses, but teachers also used wartime necessity to urge 
their students to read more, or to do well in math and science.
Institutions of higher learning in the state suffered from de­
clining enrollments as male students became involved in the war ef­
fort, but partially offset the resulting loss of income by obtaining 
military training programs. Collegiate athletics suffered a temporary 
curtailment, and various curricula were modified to accomodate techno­
logical modernization brought on by the war.
The Louisiana educational system achieved many of its goals 
during the war years even though it suffered from a shortage of 
teachers caused by the military draft and by higher salaries in de­
fense industries. It also experienced change on the domestic level 
as Governor Jones and State Superintendent of Public Education John E. 
Coxe imposed their own reforms. Jones included the Department of 
Education in his general state reorganization plan in 1940, and thus 
the department suffered along with other state agencies in the admini­
strative chaos that resulted from the unconstitutionality of the Jones 
plan. While Jones sought to liberate Louisiana's education from the 
politicalization it had suffered under the Longites, Superintendent 
Coxe imposed internal reorganization to provide a more professional 
orderliness in the state educational administration. Throughout all 
these challenges, however, Louisiana’s Department of Education struggled 
to continue providing the education required by students in the new,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
547
threatening world situation.
The Louisiana economy, both agricultural and industrial, shared 
in the economic prosperity of the war years which obliterated the 
Great Depression of the 1930s by the simple law of supply and demand. 
Louisiana agriculture, for example, was called upon to help fill the 
insatiable appetite for food and fiber of the Allied war effort and 
shared in the attendant prosperity.
The war introduced no major new crops to Louisiana agriculture, 
but it did have the fundamental effect of accelerating mechanization 
because of the acute shortage of labor on Louisiana farms caused by 
United States military needs and the labor requirements of new indus­
trialization within the state. Louisiana farmers attempted to remedy 
the labor problem by utilizing the labor of Axis POWs incarcerated in 
the state and met with varying degrees of success depending on the 
crop and the abilities of individual prisoners, but also relied on in­
creased mechanization. The mechanization of Louisiana agriculture was 
uneven, however. Sugar cane production led the way in mechanization, 
while cotton and rice production lagged behind.
Nevertheless, the acceleration of mechanization caused by the war 
resulted in major changes in Louisiana's black population during the 
late 1940s and on into the 1950s and 1960s, when blacks in increasing 
numbers left agriculture and the shanties provided by landowners on 
the periphery of the fields and either left the South or moved to one 
of its urban areas.
World War II also caused an acceleration of the industrialization 
of Louisiana’s economy. Major manufacturing establishments in the
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state provided vital material and petrochemicals to the Allied war 
effort. Industrialization, however, continued along the paths it had 
already begun in the state. New Orleans, with its major shipbuilding, 
aircraft, and other manufacturing plants, remained the state’s major 
industrial area. Baton Rouge, Shreveport, Monroe, Alexandria, and 
Lake Charles continued to be industrial and urban centers as they 
had been earlier, while other areas of the state, even though they 
slightly increased their industrial production, lagged behind.
Louisianians also shared in the curtailment of American life ex­
perienced by the rest of the country during the war. Shortages and 
rationing removed some customer goods from store shelves and made 
others difficult to obtain. The population, used to deprivation during 
the 1930s, probably survived these shortages with more equanimity than 
they or their descendents would had they occurred during the Age of 
Abundance of the 1950s and 1960s, but those with money from war-time 
jobs found the shortages galling, for now they had money to spend after 
doing without during the lean years of the Depression, but had few 
consumer goods to spend it on. Shortages and rationing of scarce gaso­
line and tire supplies severely hindered traditional American freedom 
of movement. Traditional holiday celebrations assumed a military and 
patriotic tinge. Traditional recreation and personal concerns were re­
placed in many instances by involvement in civilian defense, scrap 
collection drives, and war bond and stamp sales, which provided the 
individual a sense of participation in the titanic struggle to rid the 
world of the Nazi menace in which the country was engaged.
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Two substantial minority groups in Louisiana, blacks and women, 
historically denied full access to participation in all aspects of the 
state's economy and society, utilized the opportunity presented by the 
war years to establish themselves as heirs of the full equality ac­
corded other Americans. Blacks purposefully, and women more by de­
fault, moved out of traditional low-paying jobs and into more lucra­
tive jobs formerly dominated by white males who were now away at war. 
The gains made by both, however, proved only the beginning of true 
equality. Many women retreated to traditional roles with the advent 
of peace, and blacks had to endure the white backlash of the 1950s and 
beyond, but the experiences of equality sown by the war in both cases 
lay ready as a foundation for the struggles to broaden and to achieve 
true equality during the 1960s and beyond-
In summary, Louisiana changed a great deal during World War II. 
Politics, economy, and many aspects of the state's society were recog­
nizably different in 1945 from the way they had been in 1939. World 
War II, however, only started many changes. . The forces it unleashed 
in the state came to fruition only in the succeeding decades. Louisi­
ana in 1945 had experienced change, but stood on the threshold of even 
more change set in motion by the state's experience in the massive 
United States war effort and by domestic forces which happened to sur­
face during the war years.
George Brown Tindall maintains in his massive study of the New 
South that the southern states emerged from World War II with social 
and economic conditions much different from those they had known in
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361939 and had even more radical changes in store. Louisiana's ex­
perience conforms to this interpretation, even though life in post­
war Louisiana resumed many of its pre-war aspects. After the thou­
sands of troops left, Louisiana’s army camps were either abandoned 
and torn down or their functions were reduced to fit the needs of 
peacetime. Nevertheless, Louisiana could not return completely to 
the pre-war world. Just as it is still possible to stumble upon a 
concrete foundation at the abandoned sites of Camps Livingston or 
Claiborne, it is also possible to perceive the permanent changes 
wrought in Louisiana and the memories deeply etched into its collec­
tive or individual conscience by the war.
36George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 731.
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